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Studies on National Movements

Volume 8

2021

Studies on National Movements

(Online) Journal of NISE (National Movements and Intermediary Structures in Europe)

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Studies on National Movements is published by Peristyle
Contact Address: Lange Leemstraat 26, 2018 Antwerp, Belgium

Online ISSN: 2295-1466

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Volume 8

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Introduction Volume 8

KAS SWERTS

NISE/University of Antwerp

In American football, the last two minutes of a game hold special relevance. As the game clock hits the final two-minute mark, the match is briefly stopped, commercials are being played, and players get a quick rest as they prepare themselves for the 'real' game (if the score is close, at least), as this is when 'crunch time' starts. Every decision by both teams is intensely debated, scrutinized and planned out, and can have lasting consequences for the outcome of the game. Crunch time – particularly in American football – can result in dramatic finishes or results determined by a single play or error, and certain players on the field can arise as key figures that were instrumental in their team's win or loss.

One could argue that European politics experienced a similar 'crunch time' in the aftermath of the First World War. As Europe's map was being redrawn following the Great War, politicians and activists from different regions and ends of the political spectrum engaged in intense debates on the (political) future of their respective region or nation.

The articles in this volume (partly from the 2021 NISE online conference) focus on this specific period, and via a wide array of cases illustrate how different political parties or actors became relevant, and how different solutions in different cases were being proposed. Moreover, in conjunction with the previous volume, volumes 7 & 8

provide an extensive overview of national movements across Europe in the aftermath of the Great War and can function as clear cases for further comparative or transnational research.

Furthermore, NISE can announce two promising projects in the nearby future. First of all, in cooperation with ASEN, Ghent University and the University of Antwerp, NISE organises the upcoming *Nationalism and Media* conference in Antwerp from 5-7 April 2022. Further details (and registration) can be found on https://nationalismand.media.

Secondly, NISE has started a new digital project which will be conducted in its DIANE-database. In cooperation with the Maurits Coppieters Foundation, NISE will expand the 'DILINAME' (Digital Library of National Movements in Europe) project and construct a database that will comprise political documents of different national movements across Europe, and an extensive historical overview of the different national movements. The aim is to provide researchers a simple and quick overview of relevant political documents from different cases across Europe in order to conduce comparative and transnational research of national movements. We will post regular updates on the project, so be sure to follow or subscribe to our different channels!

Scholars and the reframing of Europe: the complex relationship between language, race and nation during the Great War

FRANCESCA ZANTEDESCHI

SPIN (UvA) Research affiliate

Delegates attending the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 were given the arduous task of establishing the terms of the peace after WW1, including the criteria by which to determine the boundaries of new states emerging from the collapse of the old multinational empires. Given that U.S. President Woodrow Wilson had laid so much emphasis on the principle of 'self-determination', language was considered by many as the best element to establish nationality in ethnically mixed territories. A legacy of the nineteenth century, the apparently straightforward identification between language and nation was nevertheless complicated by pervasive ideas about race, as the taxonomies of language and race became increasingly entangled.

By presenting selected works by two scholars – Leon Dominian, a geographer, and Antoine Meillet, a linguist –, this paper analyses the main and most widespread arguments propounded in support of the identification between language and nation during the Great War. It also explains why this principle turned out to be exceedingly problematic at the time of the redrawing the political map of Europe, and how the ambiguous relationship between language and race persisted during the early years of twentieth century.

Keywords: World War 1, new states, making borders, language, race.

Introduction

When the delegates convened at the 1919 Peace Conference in Paris, they were given, among others, the task of solving what would be the guiding principle by which to define and draw up the boundaries of the new states, in particular those born from the ashes of the defunct Austro-Hungarian Empire. In an article on the languages spoken in that Empire by the various nationalities, published in the *Journal de la société statistique de Paris*, in 1915, the French physician and anthropologist, Arthur Chervin, had observed, with good reason, how language had come to serve political aims, especially with regard to the question of self-determination. In it, he aimed to analyse 'with the aid of indisputable scientific documents, without bias and without passion', the ethnic composition of Austria-Hungary. His objective was therefore to present the results of official administrative surveys on religion and, above all, the language spoken by its inhabitants. However, after immediately discarding religion, on the ground that it did not provide 'such conclusive information as the spoken language', he turned his attention to the 'spoken mother tongue'. This, according to him, represented an important proof that the nationalities were constituted by 'perfectly distinct linguistic units'. He argued that, 'whatever the primitive and remote origin of the races which populate the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the spoken language has now become the determining factor of the race which the various nationalities claim for themselves in their present habitat and the raison d'être of their political aspirations'.[1]

Chervin's statement identifying language as the main element by which a nation was to be defined conveys an assumption that certainly did not appear novel at that time; it was indeed a by-product of the evolving concept of nation, an ongoing process that began at the turn of the nineteenth century, according to which peoples were to be distinguished by cultural factors – above all linguistic ones. Even though the

association of language to nations was by no means simple (as there are languages without nations, just as there are nations with more than one 'national' language), language indeed became one of the principal factors used in the identification of nations. Further still, as language also conveyed a sense of ethnic (or racial) identification, given that language studies was directly correlated with the proliferation of race thinking throughout the century,[2] the taxonomies of language and 'race' became increasingly intertwined.[3] The full complexity of the tripartite nexus between language, race and nation came to the fore during the drafting of the Peace Treaties at the end the First World War on the question of 'reframing' Europe based on a 'natural and scientific solution'.[4] According to the 'nation-state principle', in effect, there was 'perfect congruence between political and ethno-cultural unity'.[5] Moreover, this principle spurred decision-making at the time of the peace treaties, which in turn led to the redrawing of the political map of Europe. Language, then, was therefore invoked as a 'natural' criterion by which to define and draw the boundaries of the new territories (nation states).

In this article, I would like to focus on precisely how this close nexus between language and nation was advocated by certain scholars during the Great War as the guiding principle for reframing Europe once the war had ended. Indeed scholars played a fundamental role in redefining the borders of central and eastern European states, since they were given the task, as the French linguist Antoine Meillet explained in the foreword of his book, *Langues dans l'Europe nouvelle* (1918), of not providing 'ready-made solutions' or 'lead[ing]', but 'enlighten[ing] those who have the responsibility to act'.[6] However, in order to grasp the complexity of the problem, it will be necessary to explain the awkward coexistence between 'language' and 'race' in greater detail. By the same token, throughout the century the 'myth of race' was intertwined with the 'myth of nation': in fact, both 'provided complex social, cultural, historical, and political narratives that sought to solidify inherent similarities and

differences amongst individuals and communities'.[7] The close interconnection between these three concepts, facilitated by the fluidity of 'race' theories, emerged to its full extent during the First World War, in particular during the peace negotiations. Accordingly, in the following pages, I will try to 'verify' Anna Morpurgo Davies' assertion whereby, 'if one disregards the personal opinions of some scholars, the development of professional linguistics in the nineteenth century [...] ends up with a clear division between language and race'.[8] The fact is that the debate on the relationship between language and race (and of those of the nation), far from being limited to professional linguists, was a common concern of all those who, in one way or another, were confronted by the task of defining the characteristics (and hence, also the boundaries) of a nation.

Finally, the analysis of the relationship between language, race, and nation will help to clarify the deepening entrenchment of nationalist ideologies in ethnic (or cultural) principles from the end of the nineteenth century onwards, not only because the idea of the nation changed meaning in the late nineteenth century 'under the influence of science, and specifically of evolution and race theories',[9] but also because, inevitably, nationalism was transforming European politics and scholarship.[10] Some recent works have indeed emphasized both the influence that human and social sciences (such as ethnology, history, physical anthropology, psychology, etc.) had on nationalism and vice versa, and the transnational dimension of the development of the national sciences, which spread in the context of international relations.[11] This international frame of reference provides the context in which (cultural, physical, psychological) national differences were 'scientifically' elaborated and explained, and (more or less deliberately) manipulated for political purposes. However, as Chris Manias has explained, contrary to what happened in the earlier period, which were characterised by consolidation of scientific networks and disciplines, the decades preceding the Great War testified to a growing 'splitting and

fragmentation'. The reasons for this were many, and related to both political factors (such as the exacerbation of inter- and intra-national rivalries, and the repercussions of 'New Imperialism' on 'public consciousness, domestic politics and the human sciences'), as well as more scientific factors, for instance, the 'challenging the idea of progress', and the growing importance of countries previously considered 'peripheral' to intellectual production in the international scholarly context. This led to increasingly scientific specialism and differentiation.[12]

It is in this context, then, that I would like to introduce and explore a few selected works by Leon Dominian and Antoine Meillet, as they are useful in understanding the issues at stake in the negotiations that culminated with the signature of the 1919 Peace Treaties. Leon Dominian was a naturalised American Armenian geographer, who made a detailed study of the political and linguistic situation in Europe and Near East, for the benefit of Americans; Antoine Meillet, on the contrary, was a French linguist who had participated in the meetings of the *Comité d'études*, held by the French government in 1917 to determine the country's peace objectives. Their works provide an opportunity to reflect on some of the major disputed questions as a result of the correlation between language and nation, such as the impossibility of using them as a reference framework for the redrawing of the map of Europe, and the need to dampen exacerbated nationalisms through the search for an 'international' (neutral) language.

Nation, language, race: a tricky relationship

The language/nation convergence developed significantly in the nineteenth century in the context of nationality movements and the birth of nation-states. Before the coming of national languages, however, the

linguistic landscape of Europe was rather jumbled: the vast majority of people were illiterate, and languages were for the most part learnt orally. Moreover, different written languages existed within the single political unit, which could be accounted for by the different functions assigned to them: administrative, literary, religious and so on. By the end of the eighteenth century, national languages were deemed capable of 'replacing a heterogeneity of linguistic modes responding to diversified uses' and 'representing the nation', which therefore responded to the increasing demands of the modern state.[13] In contexts where multilingualism was the norm, a single idiom was chosen as the official language of the state. The equivalence of state language and national language is therefore the result of a long evolutionary process of both linguistic and political-legal conceptions of the nation and the modern state. Accordingly, the status of 'national language' was also attributed to written language, as it became codified, officialised, controlled and disseminated by state institutions in all domains of public life.[14]

The equivalence of language and nation is not only the product of a particular conjuncture, brought about by the consolidation of states into national entities during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but it was also the product of progress in human and social sciences – in particular, the linguistic disciplines – that accompanied the creation of those states. At the end of the eighteenth century, the aesthetic and socio-historical discourse developed by German romanticism placed language, as an expression of the spirit of a people, at the heart of the legal and political definition of the nation.[15] In the absence of a unifying state – as was the case for the German-speaking territories –, language 'was thought to testify to native speakers' shared historical descent from a common cultural origin'.[16] Philology was then applied with the aim of understanding historical cultures based on the analysis and interpretation of their texts. From a historical-scientific point of view, philological practice laid down the foundations of an independent discipline of

philological-historical scholarship, as well as its correlated sub-disciplines, such as historical linguistics, cultural-philological interpretation and philosophical hermeneutics.[17] At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the transformation of philology from an auxiliary science to an autonomous scientific discipline seemed to confirm the idea that language was 'one of the most significant elements in understanding the development of a nation'.[18] Its success was also a result of the social function exercised by literature as a cultural activity that participated in the construction of collective identities. Having become the main tool of medieval historical study, philology was given the task of tracing the origins of the nation. By facilitating 'the creation of a "scientific" national history that projects both the national language and the national ideology into the distant past', the new philology thus provided a scientific tool capable of proving the 'antiquity' of nations.[19]

At the same time, the idea of the close nexus between language and race was gaining ground. As 'the basis of somatic features that are stable over time', in fact, race was thought 'to reflect – and codetermine – the specific fundamental characteristics of language and the cultural forms associated with it'.[20] It was facilitated by both the inherent ambiguity of the notion of race itself, and the issues implicit in linguistic studies, as was the case of the monogenesis/polygenesis debate. This debate centred on the origins of languages, that is, whether or not they had a common origin, and the extent to which their differentiation had taken place over time (monogenetic hypothesis) or, conversely, the multiple origins of languages analysed in relation to population and geography (polygenetic hypothesis).[21]

Another issue widely debated among linguists and others, and which was to have important repercussions in terms of 'race' theories, related to the question of whether European tongues descended from a single, ancestral Indo-European language. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the German writer and philosopher, Friedrich von Schlegel, devoted his

attention to a major study of Sanskrit, *Über die Sprache und Weisheit des Indier* (1808), in which he argued that not only this sacred Indian language was 'the most regulated, the most efficient, the most poetic' language and the least confused, but also that a number of other languages, including Greek, Latin, Persian and German, owed their origins to it. He was the first to use 'comparative grammar' in the 'historical-genealogical' sense, i.e. as a means of demonstrating the common descent of several languages from a single mother tongue.[22]

The passage transforming a linguistic category into a racial one was short. The idea spread that this linguistic kinship originated from a people from northern Europe or the Caucasus who migrated during proto-history to the Indian peninsula, Persia and Europe. In 1849, on the occasion of the prestigious Volney Prize, annually awarded to the best philosophical and comparative study of languages, the German comparative philologist, Friedrich Max Müller, 'first presented his ideas about the existence of a distinct Aryan language and civilization'.[23] Not long after, he published *Comparative Mythology: An Essay* (1856), in which he claimed that comparative philology could provide 'insight into a period "when Sanskrit was not Sanskrit, Greek not yet Greek, but when both, together with Latin, German and other Aryan dialects, existed yet as *one* undivided language"', and 'would allow "the archives of the most distant antiquity of the Aryan race" finally to be opened'.[24] The superiority of the Aryan race, defined as the 'race of Indo-European speakers', was also claimed at that time by the French diplomat, writer, and ethnologist Joseph Arthur, Comte de Gobineau. Despite not having invented the aesthetics of races,[25] Gobineau developed a theory of racial differences, whereby he identified the roles of the natural laws governing the social world, in his work, *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines* (4 vols., 1853-1855). Among his basic premises, he argued that the inequality of languages corresponded exactly to the inequality of races, and that the white race, especially the Aryan one of Germanic peoples, was superior to others. In that same

period, Ernest Renan published the essay *Histoire générale et système comparé des langues sémitiques* (1855), whose books I and V ('Questions of Origin' and 'Conclusions') were devoted to the construction of a genuine theory of 'Semitic peoples', and 'transposed a series of linguistic considerations into an ethno-cultural issue'.[26] In the case of German philologists, in the nineteenth century they interpreted language as evidence of ethnic descent and created influential myths of cultural origin around the perceived starting points of their own mother tongues.[27]

Such linguistic racial determinism was endorsed by the Belgian linguist Honoré-Joseph Chavée, who transformed the language/race partnership into a linguistic principle ('*telle race, telle langue, et telle langue, telle race*'), in his book *Les langues et les races* (1862), according to which he established a kind of hierarchy of languages.[28] Relying on the comparison of Indo-European and Semitic inflections and syntactic forms, Chavée argued that the two languages did not have a common origin and that, consequently, Indo-Europeans and Semites belonged to two different primitive races.[29]

Needless to say, the racial-linguistic affinity had also become commonplace outside linguistic circles.[30] For instance, Edward Augustus Freeman, the English historian mainly known for his *History of the Norman Conquest* (6 vols., Oxford, 1867-79), asserted in 1879 that the 'doctrine of race, in its popular form, is the direct offspring of the study of scientific philology'. This was not to say that 'scientific philologers' believed that language 'was a certain test of race', nor that men who speak the same tongue 'are necessarily men of the same blood'; rather, it was 'the natural instinct of mankind' to connect race and language:

> It does not assume that language is an infallible test of race; but it does assume that language and race have something to do with one

> another. It assumes, that though language is not an accurately scientific test of race, yet it is a rough and ready test which does for many practical purposes. To make something more of an exact definition, one might say, that though language is not a test of race, it is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a presumption of race; that though it is not a test of race, yet it is a test of something which, for many practical purposes, is the same as race.

Similarly, Freeman believed that even though nationality was not grounded in philological science, language was 'the best guide' to group races and nations, to 'mark them off one from the other'.[31]

Of course, not all authors agreed on the strict determinism between language, race and nation. Abel de Hovelacque contributed to the heated debate regarding the defining (political or cultural) characteristics of the French nation, which had taken place following the loss of Alsace-Lorraine because of the Franco-Prussian war (1870-71), and marked the beginning of the Third Republic. He wrote that the 'theory of races, languages and nationalities', was 'specious', for being at odds both with a number of scientific as well as political concepts it relied on, such as the right of free association, which was inherent in republican democracy.[32] He explained further that this theory had been 'officially affirmed and seemed to receive its first practical endorsement' during the unification of Italy. And yet, Hovelacque continued, 'this purported unity of the languages and races of Italy was mere fiction. The Italian people was *one* by necessity and by aspiration, it was not one [...] either in terms of its language or race'. In Europe, there are no places where race coincides with language. It is even rare for language to coincide with nationality, i.e. with 'voluntary political union'. And he therefore dismissed racial determinism: 'It is therefore just as inadmissible to pretend to base the idea of nationality on race as to pretend to base it on language'.[33] Abel Hovelacque, who was an anthropologist and linguist, in 1876 was

appointed professor (and from 1890 director) of the École d'anthropologie. In 1867 he founded, together with Chavée, the *Revue de linguistique et de philologie comparée* (1867-1916) (The Journal of Comparative Linguistics and Philology), which sought to integrate linguistics into the natural sciences, considering language as 'a living organism and argued for the rigorous application of evolutionary transformism in linguistics'.[34] In France, in that period, a generation of anthropologists-linguists (among others, Hovelacque, Girard de Rialle, and Julien Vinson) devoted themselves to analysing the question of the origins of language and its evolution. Following in the footsteps of the anthropologist Paul Broca, they admitted the distinction between *langage* (immutable and an integral part of man) and *langues* (which are transformed according to political events and social conditions). According to Hovelacque, the faculty of language was acquired by man, and the 'precursor of man' (a being in transition between man and animal) had acquired it through different places, thus giving rise to different human races. The plurality of languages thus contributed to the original plurality of races.

And yet, by the end of the century, many scholars still confounded the biological characteristics of a population with its linguistic or cultural heritage. The term 'race' became commonplace, as was transposed from linguistic to physical groups, and combined with ideas drawn from social Darwinism to produce theories of racial inequalities and superiorities.[35]

The complexity of the relationship between language, race and nation, as well as the different criteria with which to define the nation (voluntary political association or ethnic-cultural group?), and the contradictions they conveyed, would fully surface at the time of the 1919 Peace Treaties. Delegates at the Paris Conference attempted to identify the scientific and natural criteria with which to redraw the borders of the new states. That was the reason they called on experts (geographers, historians, linguists, economists, etc.) to redefine a geopolitical situation which, principally

due to the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman Empires, had become potentially explosive.

Leon Dominian: language as 'cohesive power of nationality'.

In September 1917, the American president Woodrow Wilson authorised Colonel Edward M. House, a diplomat and Wilson's personal adviser, 'to organize forces to gather and prepare for use at the Peace Conference the most complete information possible, from the best and latest sources, for consideration by the Peace Commissioners'.[36] This was known as 'The Inquiry', a group of experts directed by House himself, which had the task of collecting and analysing data on the geographical, ethnological, historical, economic, and political problems of those areas subject of the peace negotiations.[37] Two months later, Isaiah Bowman, geographer and director of the American Geographical Society (AGS) since 1915, placed the resources of the Society at the government's disposal, thus becoming the centre of 'The Inquiry'.[38] 'The Inquiry', which was 'entirely independent of any political hypothesis', was composed of about 150 specialists and scholars in all fields, from political and diplomatic history to international law, from economics to geography, from physiography and cartography to education and irrigation. The 'cartographic force' of the AGS was handed the task of drawing up maps which could 'visualize not only all manner of territorial boundaries, but distribution of peoples, number and local densities of population, religions, economic activities, distribution of material resources, trade routes, both historic and potential strategic points'.[39] All these reports, studies, and maps were to be used subsequently by the American negotiators at the Paris Peace Conference to support the final peace negotiations. Among them, Leon Dominian was called in February 1919

by the commission in Paris to deal with Turkish and the Near East related issues.

Of Armenian origin, but born in Istanbul, Leon Dominian (1880-1935) was not really trained in geography, since he studied geology and mining engineering in Belgium; he travelled in Asia Minor and Turkey, and lived for a time in Malta. He was fluent in many languages, Armenian, Turkish, Arabic, Italian, French, English, and Spanish. In 1903, he moved to the USA, becoming a naturalised citizen there ten years later; indeed, in 1912, he joined the AGS. In 1918, Dominian engaged in a consular career, which continued until his death. The following year, he was assigned to duty with the American Commission to Negotiate Peace at Paris.

As a member of the AGS, Dominian published a number of reviews and articles in the *Bulletin of the American geographical society*, namely on Balkan peninsula and Turkey, but also the linguistic areas of Europe. Dominian would further develop the arguments from his articles in the book *The frontiers of language and nationality in Europe* (1917), in which he reviewed all the disputed areas of speech in Europe, but also Asia Minor. As was pointed out by the American geographer, W.L.G. Joerg, who wrote a short memoir dedicated to him, the book 'supplied the desired detailed discussion of the problem of nationalities in Europe and the Near East and their geographical setting'.[40] In a letter sent to Isaiah Bowman on 19 February 1915, Dominian mentioned the idea of writing an article and drawing 'a set of maps showing linguistic boundaries' in Europe, explaining that the suggestion came from Madison Grant, a member of the AGS Council, under whose direction he would later carry out the work.[41] In his correspondence with the director of the AGS, Dominian went into detail about the nature of his intended work, also explaining which maps would be needed to complete it, including a map of Europe 'showing tendency of political boundaries to grow in accordance with linguistic frontiers'. He pointed out that the data he had collected revealed 'splendid conformity between physical features and

linguistic distribution' and that, even though it had no claim to originality, the work would be consisted of 'strictly impartial statement of facts, with very detailed mention of sources'.[42] Confronted with Bowman's misgivings about the work, which he considered not only 'exceedingly difficult' but also extremely complex, partly due to the absence of any dependence of linguistic boundaries on physical features, Dominian responded (citing Gruber's *Grundriss des Romanischen Philologie* and the *Atlas linguistique de France*) that 'while this is occasionally true, it is generally possible to trace genetic connection. Sometimes the sequence back is lost and it looks as if surface features had never intervened, but the deeper you delve into the subject the more you find the reverse to have happened'.[43]

Published in the *Bulletin of the American Geographical Society* (June edition, 1915), entitled 'Linguistic areas in Europe: their boundaries and political significance', Dominian's main argument was that national frontiers could best be distinguished by linguistic characteristics, and, as a general rule, boundary lines should follow the separation of languages. According to Dominian, 'linguistic lines of cleavage have twofold importance' when they are considered as 'political boundaries'. First of all, they are sanctioned by national aspirations, so that it is rarely possible to separate the idea of language from that of nationality. Except in very rare cases (e.g., Belgium and Switzerland), language is the 'cohesive power of nationality', and it has 'cementing qualities', since it is 'the medium through which shared success, achievement or struggle and sorrow are expressed'.[44] Second, linguistic lines of cleavage conform considerably to physical features: in fact, there is a strict correlation between language and its natural environment. Since linguistic areas 'have been largely determined by the character of the surface covered or delimited', determination of linguistic boundaries 'implies due recognition of selective influences attributable to surface features. But the influence of region upon expansion or confinement of language is far

from absolute. The part played by economic factors', in fact, 'have been of prime importance'.[45] Dominian then examined both some controversial linguistic boundaries – for example, the Franco-Flemish one, the Franco-German in Alsace-Lorraine, the Danish-German, the Italo-German, the Italo-Slavic, a.s.o. – and main linguistic areas of Europe, of which he outlined the political and economic history, to conclude that:

1. 'Zones of linguistic contact were inevitably destined by their very location to become meeting places for men speaking different languages. [...] The confusion of languages on their site is in almost every instance the result of human intercourse determined by economic advantages'. That means that 'language always followed in the wake of trade and Babel-like confusion prevailed along channels wherein men and their marketable commodities flowed'.[46]

2. 'The growing coincidence of linguistic and political boundaries must be regarded as a normal development', and 'modern reconstruction of nationalities is based on language', as the history of Europe during the nineteenth century shows (e.g., the unification of Germany and Italy as well as the disentanglement of Balkan nationalities). In this sense, 'the Congress of Vienna failed to provide Europe with political stability because popular claims were ignored during the deliberations'; this is why 'inhabitants of linguistic areas under alien rule' were now 'clamouring for the right to govern themselves'.[47]

Dominian further developed his main arguments in the book he would publish a couple of years later, including parts that he had previously been forced to omit from the article, and extended his study to the Turkish area because of its significance for European international affairs.

Quite interestingly, whereas Dominian had summarily dismissed the issue of 'race', considering its political significance as 'trifling' in both the

article and the book, on the contrary, Madison Grant, who wrote the introduction to the book, brought it to the fore. Grant was a member of the governing board of the AGS from 1913 to 1935,[48] besides being an American lawyer and wildlife conservationist, and later President of the New York Zoological Society; he was also a fervent eugenicist and advocate of scientific racism. In 1916, he published the best-selling book *The passing of the great race or the racial basis of European history*, in which he advocated the biological and cultural superiority of the 'Nordic race' (Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon groups) over all other people, and dealt with the fate of the 'Nordic type' in the United States of America.[49] In his introduction to Dominian's book, Grant explained the lack of 'race consciousness in Europe', arguing that 'although race taken in its modem scientific meaning – the actual physical character of man – originally implied a common origin; today, it has little or nothing to do with either nationality or language, since nearly all the great nations of Europe are composed, to varying degrees, of two and sometimes all three of the primary European races'. That is why language rather than race should be relied on as a basis for nationality, even though 'lines of linguistic cleavage frequently represent lines of race distinction as well'. In his opinion, the current war could probably have been avoided if, subsequent to the Franco-Prussian war, the borders between the two states in Alsace-Lorraine had been drawn up in conformity with the linguistic reality. Finally, national aspirations 'expressed and measured' by a common language' ought to serve as a monitor for future peace.[50]

Fig. 1. L. Dominian, 'Part of Europe showing languages having political significance', in: *The frontiers of language and nationality on Europe* (1917), 334.

Both the article and the book were widely criticised, and Dominian was accused not only of occasionally exhibiting anti-German sentiment, but also of knowing little about Germany and the history of the German language.[51] Moreover, the Romanian-born American sociologist, Max Sylvius Handman, reproached Dominian for using mainly second-hand literature and sources, except in the case of Turkey. This had not only led him to overlook 'the deeper underlying causes of nationalistic antagonisms', but also to present merely a one-sided stance. Hence, even though the book paid 'a great deal of attention to the subject of national characters and geographical influence, […] discussions of this subject will not be worth taking seriously until we have first developed a technique for the study of national characteristics and then found out something definite about them'.[52]

Following the convergence of linguistics and geography, which came about as a result of the upsurgence of ethnically and linguistically-based European nationalisms by the end of the nineteenth century, Philip Jagessar has commented that 'language was increasingly viewed as a mappable phenomenon that could provide a new, stable, variable for demarcating and organising space'.[53] Linguistic geography, which spread as a branch of dialectology from the end of the nineteenth century, dealt with the analysis of linguistic phenomena from the perspective of their geographical distribution, taking into account historical, social and geographical factors. The publication of the *Atlas Linguistique de France* (1902-1910) by the Swiss linguists Jules Gilliéron and Edmond Edmont, consecrated linguistic geography as an autonomous discipline.[54] Moreover, 'language areas were seen also as the geographical spaces inhabited by members of the concomitant "races" or nationalities, and this strengthened the tendency to give a political application to such ethnic-geographical groupings'.[55] Consequently, linguistic geography proved particularly suited to redrawing the borders of the states that had belonged to the fallen multilingual empires. This explains not only

Dominian's interest and work within the AGS, but also why linguists and experts on linguistic issues were gradually integrated into the French *Comité d'études*, which met in the 'Salle des cartes' of the Sorbonne *Institut de géographie* from 1917 to 1919, to clarify French military ambitions and prepare for peace. The Comité was set up by the Deputy, Charles Benoist, to deliberate in particular on what to do with the Dual Monarchy, and what place should be given to the principle of nationalities. In particular, since the conditions for peace had to be agreed upon by the other allies, it was necessary to identify possible areas of conflict within the Entente. In this sense, geographical, historical and philological knowledge made it possible to identify and clarify difficulties.[56] At the outset, the Comité was composed mainly of geographers and historians. In 1918, experts from other disciplines were added, namely linguists: Antoine Meillet, scholar of Iranian and Armenian studies, and Slavic languages; the Slavist, Paul Boyer, specialising in Russian; Émile Haumont, specialising in Slavistics; Hubert Pernot, specialising in Modern Greek Studies, and founder (1919) and Director of the *Institut néo-héllenique* at the Sorbonne; and Paul Verrier, specialising in Scandinavian languages and literature.

According to Isabelle Davion, the Comité was the 'laboratory of the new diplomacy', and reflected the need to provide support to diplomatic work by offering specific expertise on extremely technical issues.[57] However, the Comité was never really involved in decision-making processes. It was powerless, not least because of its independence from diplomatic and governmental spheres. Thus, its influence was limited to providing notes and statistics on highly specialised subjects, and consultations based on specialist status. Nonetheless, some of its members were later appointed as experts to the Peace Conference, as it was the case of the geographer Emmanuel de Martonne, a specialist in the construction and comparison of ethnographical maps,[58] who succeeded in obtaining the formation of 'Greater Romania'.[59]

Antoine Meillet: languages in 'new Europe'.

Born in Moulins, France, Antoine Meillet (1866-1936) was one of the leading linguists of his time, particularly in the field of historical-comparative philology of the Indo-European languages. In 1891, he was appointed director of comparative Indo-European studies at the *École pratique des Hautes-Études* in Paris and taught Armenian from 1902 until 1906, when he was appointed Professor of comparative philology of the Indo-European languages and of general linguistics at the Collège de France. In 1921 Meillet created the *Revue des études slaves*, together with Paul Boyer and André Mazon. That same year, and until 1937, he was also appointed as President of the *Institut d'études slaves*, established in 1919 by Ernest Denis, which 'served as a steering instrument for the French Institutes in the East, especially those in Prague and Warsaw'.[60]

Antoine Meillet divulgated some of his main ideas on language and nation through a number of articles published in the multilingual journal *Scientia, rivista internazionale di sintesi scientifica* (International journal of scientific synthesis),[61] as well as in his book, *Les langues dans l'Europe nouvelle* (1918; 2nd ed. 1928). These publications were all inspired by the tragic events afflicting Europe at that time. His intention was to present 'the linguistic situation of Europe as it stands', and not as the product of 'vanity and national claims' that had been exaggerated since the nineteenth century.[62] He blamed the 'German block' for triggering and carrying on the war against several nations: Serbia, Russia, France, Belgium and England. As he explained, the only allies of the Germans were two groups who had survived by oppressing other nationalities: the Magyars, who managed to make themselves the sole masters of a country in which they had been in a minority against the Serbo-Croats, the Romanians, the Ruthenians and the Slovaks; and the Turks who had dominated Arabs, Greeks, Armenians, Slavs, Christians from Syria, Jews by force.[63] Meillet drew on the contrasting examples of the Russian and

Austro-Hungarian empires to substantiate his arguments, both of which had populations belonging to mixed language groupings. He argued that, whereas non-Russian speaking population occupied mainly the borders of the Russian Empire, those who spoke Russian formed a compact and united people; the situation in Austria-Hungary was quite different. Of the two states constituting the Habsburg Empire, Austria had no language of its own, except Czech; on the contrary, Hungary had an official language, Magyar, which was the idiom of the largest and most influential group in the kingdom, but the mother tongue of less than half the population. The linguistic conditions of Russia and Austria-Hungary, he concluded, were in no way comparable: on the one hand, there was a huge number of people with the strongest possible unity speaking one of the great languages of European civilisation; on the other, groups had been brought together by chance, and rejected Magyar or German as their official language and language of civilisation, aspiring to disassociate themselves. Here, language was the vehicle through which peoples opposed one another.[64]

Meillet was also critical of Germany's expansionistic ambitions, which it achieved partly by endlessly multiplying the principle of nationality, and partly, by promoting its own linguistic expansion over the small national languages. This was the case of the small states bordering on the Baltic Sea, whose languages of civilisation could not compete, because of their very limited influence, with the spreading of German as a 'language of business and high culture'.[65]

In his book, Meillet defined the situation in Europe as 'paradoxical': while material civilisation, science and art were becoming increasingly unified, the languages that served this civilisation were extremely varied, 'and they were becoming more numerous every day', and each nation, no matter how small it was, wanted its own language. He therefore argued there was a link between language and nation, despite the fact that nation was not always expressed through language, 'nor is a particularity

of language sufficient to give a national consciousness'. Even though belonging to the nation was 'a matter of feeling and will' and the nation was not characterised by any kind of 'material' elements, Meillet continued, and 'the fact remains that language is the first, clearest and most effective character by which a nation is distinguished. Where differences of language disappear, national differences tend to disappear as well, and where national feeling is lacking, differences of language tend to disappear'.[66]

Meillet also devoted a chapter to the question of the relationship between language and 'race', the latter defined by physical traits. Moreover, he rebutted the thesis of the Austrian linguist and ethnologist, Friedrich Müller, who classified languages according to the physical character of those speaking them in his work *Grundriss der Sprachwissenschaft* (1876-1887). Meillet, on the contrary, believed that there was no such inevitability between a language and the 'race' of those who spoke it, and the limits of race and language were revealed by the fact that they could 'never coincide exactly'. 'No doubt, it is possible to observe a degree of concordance between languages and ethnic types [...]. But such concordance is due to the fact that the languages now used in the world appear to be almost all the result of the divergent evolution of a relatively small number of earlier languages, and that historical and geographical conditions have resulted in the distribution of languages and races which, despite not corresponding exactly, do have some common features'.[67]

Generally speaking, by illustrating the contemporary linguistic problems of his century, Meillet aimed to illustrate how languages could lose their unity and how common languages were created. An advocate of the fundamental unity of European culture, Meillet feared that the Entente's victory would lead to a multiplication of national languages, which would not only be pointless – being intrinsically weak, they were destined not to go beyond the borders of the nations for which they were created –,

but also detrimental to internationalisation of civilised life. In his opinion, for Europe to overcome its 'linguistic fragmentation' and the resilient crises that such situations engendered, a second language was needed for international relations. In light of the failure of existing languages, he pleaded for the adoption of an artificial language (such as Esperanto and Ido), which would provide international relations 'the simple practical instrument they lack'. Moreover, an artificial language, to be used only in international relations, had the advantage of never having, or at any rate not for a long time to come, 'qualities that enable it to compete with national languages outside the limited and relatively humble objects for which it will be made'.[68]

Conclusions

In 1928, the second edition of Meillet's book, which was improved and enriched thanks to a comprehensive statistical analysis by Lucien Tesnière, a specialist in Slavic languages, German and French, attempted to come to terms with the outcome of the 1919 Peace Treaties. While the Treaties had left the geo-political situation of Western Europe practically unchanged (except for Alsace-Lorraine, returned to France), they had totally overturned the reality of Eastern Europe. Meillet suggested that linguistic criteria had been fundamental in drawing the new frontiers: 'linguistics did not expect to be accorded such an honour'.[69]

No doubt, as the linguist Patrick Sériot has observed, the Treaty of Versailles typifies the belief that the 'distinction between languages' matches the 'distinction between nations'. However, even if the fundamental criterion according to which 'where there is language, there is a nation' appeared quite straightforward, it soon turned out to be inoperative. Sériot has therefore defined the 'boundary-makers using spontaneous linguistics' ('*la linguistique spontanée des traceurs de*

frontières') when thinking of the discontinuous and the homogeneous; on the contrary, field linguistics reveals a complex, heterogeneous and continuously evolving situation. However, as Sebastien Moret has argued, this approach to linguistics was embraced not only by non-linguists (as Dominian's has shown), but also by professional linguists.[70] The desire to achieve a 'scientific peace' had led the Entente governments to employ experts they considered capable of finding a solution for drawing up the boundaries of the new states, which could be both natural and scientific.[71] Yet, as the subsequent historiographical research on these expert committees has shown, their influence was eventually limited to furnishing notes and statistics on highly specialised subjects, and consultations based on specialist status.

In fact, the US peace plan advocated by Woodrow Wilson, which took the form of a peace brokered on the principles laid down in the Fourteen Points, came up against a labyrinth of interests making its implementation very difficult. The Peace Treaties failed to supplant national rivalries at the root of the war, and the conditions for further conflicts remained. The harsh political, economic and military conditions that were imposed on Germany soon proved unrealistic, while the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire fuelled national tensions in many of the new states. Commenting on the new European order, Isaiah Bowman noted indeed that 'where there were approximately *8,000 miles* of old boundary about the former states of central Europe, there are now *10,000 miles*, and of this total more than 3,000 miles represent newly located boundaries. Every additional mile of new boundary, each new location, has increased for a time the sources of possible trouble between unlike and, in the main, unfriendly peoples.'[72]



FIG. 1. Overlapping territorial claims in central Europe. Claims are represented not in their most extreme but in their more conservative forms; in general, therefore, the ethnic line is taken as the limit of the claims of Austria and Hungary; the eastern limit of Poland's claim as shown on the map is some distance west of her boundary in 1772 (see Figure 166), etc. The districts are numbered as follows:

1. Part of Austrian Tyrol
2. German-Slovene borderland
3. German Hungary
4. Istria and Dalmatia
5. Valona
6. Northern Epirus
7. Serbo-Albanian zone
8. Western Thrace
9. Eastern Thrace and the area claimed by Greece in Asia Minor
10. Southern Dobrudja
11. Western Bulgaria (See Fig. 153)
12. Southern Banat
13. Northern Banat
14. Southern Hungary
15. Western Transylvania
16. Eastern Ruthenia and Bessarabia
17. Southern Slovakia
18. Southern Bohemia
19. German Bohemia
20. Czech districts in German Silesia
21. Teschen, Orawa, and Spitz (named in order from west to east)
22. Ruthenia
23. Upper Silesia, Posen, Danzig, Marienwerder, and Allenstein
24. Polish-Russian border zone
25. Lithuanian-Polish-Russian border zone
26. Polish-Lithuanian border zone
27. Trans-Niemen territory
28. Saar basin
29. Malmédy, Eupen, and Moresnet
30. Southern Limburg
31. Luxemburg
32. Northern Sleswig

As for the relationship between 'language' and 'race', at the dawn of the new century the two notions began to undergo a certain differentiation, and their immediate juxtaposition were not unanimously accepted. Nevertheless, their relationship remained ambiguous (or at least was never clarified), and the use of racial (and ethnic) categories to define the nation emerged strongly in the first decade of the twentieth century. Not surprisingly, the words of Edward Augustus Freeman come immediately to mind: while juggling the ambiguity of those concepts, he was confident in saying that 'community of language is, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, a presumption of the community of blood, and it is proof of something which for practical purposes is the same as community of blood'.[73]

Endnotes

[1] A. Chervin, 'Les langues parlées en Autriche-Hongrie par les différentes nationalités d'après le dénombrement de la population de 1910' (Part I), in: *Journal de la société statistique de Paris*, 56 (1915), 105-137. Arthur Chervin (1850-1921) was a physician, director of the *Institut des bègues* (Institute of stutterers), from 1878. He was also president of the *Société d'Anthropologie* (1901) and *Société de Statistiques* (1904). In the article, as well in his books *L'Autriche et l'Hongrie de demain* (1915), and *De Prague à l'Adriatique; considerations geographiques, ethniques et économiques sur le territoire (corridor) faisant communiquer les Tchèques avec les Yougoslaves* (1919), Chervin advocated the creation of a kind of '*Marche slave*', in order to guarantee European peace. Accordingly, this common territory would connect northern Slavs with southern Slavs, where Czechs and Yugoslavs could live side by side. On the contrary, it would also allow Austrians and Hungarians to cease being neighbours, thus preventing the merging of Hungary with the 'groups of German provinces.

[2] B. Ashcroft, 'Language and Race', in: *Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture*, 7/3 (2001), 311-328.

[3] J. Leerssen, 'Language interest: Europe. Introductory survey essay', in: J. Leerssen (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Romantic Nationalism in Europe* (Amsterdam, 2018), https://ernie.uva.nl/viewer.p/21/56/object/122-159898

[4] S. Moret, 'Linguistique et nouvel ordre européen autour de la Grande Guerre', in: *Cahiers de l'ILSL,* 26 (2009), 132.

[5] P. Alter, *Nationalism* (London, 1989), 92.

[6] A. Meillet, *Les langues dans l'Europe nouvelle* (Paris, 1918), 7.

[7] M. Turda & M.S. Quine, *Historicizing Race* (London & New York, 2018), 51.

[8] Morpurgo Davies, 'Razza e razzismo', 56.

[9] G. Sluga, *The Nation, Psychology, and International Politics, 1870-1919* (Basingstoke, 2006).

[10] R. McMahon (ed.), *National Races. Transnational Power Struggles in the Sciences and Politics of Human Diversity, 1840-1945* (Lincoln, 2019), 35.

[11] To mention but a few: Sluga, *The Nation, Psychology, and International Politics, 1870-1919*; C. Manias, *Race, Science, and the Nation* (London & New York, 2013); C. Reynaud Paligot, *De l'identité nationale: science, race et politique en Europe et aux États-Unis, XIXe-XXe siècles* (Paris, 2015); R. McMahon, *The Races of Europe. Construction of National Identities in the Social Sciences, 1839-1939* (London, 2016); Id. *National Races.*

[12] Manias, *Race, Science, and Nation*, chap. 7.

[13] A.M. Thiesse, *La création des identités nationales* (Paris, 1999), chap. 2.

[14] D. Baggioni, *Langues et nations en Europe*, 12.

[15] A. Renaut, 'Logiques de la nation', in: G. Delannoi & P.A. Taguieff (eds.), *Théories du nationalisme* (Paris, 1991), 29-47.

[16] T. Benes, 'From Indo-Germans to Aryans', in: S. Eigen & M. Larrimore (eds), *The German Invention of Race* (Albany, 2006), 167-181.

[17] R.S. Leventhal, 'The Emergence of Philological Discourse in the German States, 1770-1810', in: *Isis*, 77/2 (1986), 243-60.

[18] A. Morpurgo Davies, *La linguistica dell'Ottocento* (Bologna, 1996), 98.

[19] P.J. Geary, *The Myth of Nations* (Princeton and Oxford 2003), 24-25 & 32.

[20] A. Burgio, *L'invenzione delle razze* (Roma, 1998), 99.

[21] As Morpurgo Davies explained, by the middle of the century, with the growth of linguistics and comparative-historical studies aimed at establishing linguistic kinship, the problem of language and race formed part of 'the cultural background against which the history of linguistic thought should be considered'. M. Davies, *La linguistica dell'Ottocento*, 227.

[22] S. Timpanaro, *Sulla linguistica dell'Ottocento* (Bologna, 2005), 44 ff.

[23] Turda & Quine, *Historicizing Race*, 74. Since Indo-Iranian-speaking peoples used to call themselves 'Ari', the term 'Aryan' was used to identify Indo-European peoples who had settled in India, Iran and Europe thousands of years earlier.

[24] J.R. Davis & A. Nicholls, 'Friedrich Max Müller: The Career and Intellectual Trajectory of a German Philologist in Victorian Britain', in: *Publications of the English Goethe Society*, 85/2-3 (2016), 87, DOI: 10.1080/09593683.2016.1224493.

[25] In George Mosse's words, Gobineau 'was not an original thinker, but a synthesiser who drew on anthropology, linguistics, and history, in order to construct a fully furnished intellectual edifice where race explained everything in the past, present, and future'; *Toward de Final Solution*, 49.

[26] D. Paone, 'The general history and comparative system of the Semitic languages, by Ernest Renan. 1863', http://heritage.bnf.fr/bibliothequesorient/en/history-semitic-languages-renan-art

[27] T. Benes, *In Babel's Shadow. Language, Philology, and the Nation in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Detroit, 2008).

[28] S. Auroux, *Histoire des idées linguistiques*. *Vol. 3: L'hégémonie du comparatisme* (Sprimont, 1989), 290-292; A. Morpurgo Davies, 'Razza e razzismo: continuità

ed equivoci nella linguistica dell'Ottocento', in: P. Cotticelli Kurras, G. Graffi (eds.), *Lingue, ethnos e popolazioni: evidenze linguistiche, biologiche e culturali* (Roma, 2009), 55.

[29] Although Chavée's influence was very limited outside the country, and linguistic classifications did not necessarily go hand in hand with 'racial' or ethnological ones, it is certain that at the time there was great confusion among linguists, fuelled, not least, by the ambiguity of the term 'race'. M. Davies, 'Razza e razzismo', 66 ff.

[30] M. Davies, *La linguistica dell'Ottocento*, 226.

[31] E.A. Freeman, 'Race and Language', in: *Historical Essays*, Third Series (London: 1879), 173-230. See also, C. Hutton, 'Race and Language: Ties of "Blood And Speech", Fictive Identity and Empire In The Writings Of Henry Maine And Edward Freeman', in: *Interventions*, 2/1 (2000), 53-72, DOI: 10.1080/136980100360797.

[32] A. Hovelacque, *Langues, races, nationalités* (Paris, 1875), 8.

[33] Hovelacque, *Langues, races, nationalités*, 9-22.

[34] P. Desmet, 'La Revue de linguistique et de philologie comparée (1867-1916)', in: *Orbis*, 37/01 (1994), 349.

[35] S.G. Alter, *Darwinism and the Linguistic Image* (Baltimore & London, 1999).

In particular, the French anthropologist Georges Vacher de Lapouge adapted Darwin's theory of evolution to a vision of society, and attempted to organise his vision of the racist world into a coherent system. He developed the thesis of the superiority of the Aryans in several works with a sociological background. After dealing with the question of the multiplicity of European 'races' and the mismatch between languages and 'races', Vacher de Lapouge conjectured that a native Aryan people had originated among the mists of the North Sea; an idea that later would serve the political ideology of the anti-democratic and racist extreme right; J.-P. Demoule, *Mais où sont passes les Indo-Européens? Le mythe d'origine de l'Occident* (Paris, 214), 145-147. See also, P.-A. Taguieff, 'Racisme aryaniste, socialisme et eugénisme chez Georges Vacher de Lapouge (1854-1936)', in: *Revue d'histoire de la Shoah*, 183 (2005), 69-134.

[36] 'Inquiry of the American Geographical Society for the Information of the Peace Commissioners', in: *Science*, 48/1250 (1918), 590-592.

[37] https://www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy/related-records/rg-256. See also L.E. Gelfand, *The Inquiry. American Preparations for Peace, 1917-1919* (New Haven & London, 1963).

[38] In December 1918, Bowman sailed for France as Chief Territorial Specialist, but he quickly assumed an administrative role as well, gaining the ear of President Woodrow Wilson and his chief adviser, Colonel Edward House. He thus played a major role in determining distribution of land areas and national borders, especially in the Balkans, as part of the Paris Peace Conference. G.C. Carter, 'Isaiah Bowman, 1878-1950', in: *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 40/3 (1950), 335-350.

[39] 'Inquiry', 592.

[40] W.L.G. Joerg, 'Memoir of Leon Dominian', in: *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 26/4 (1936), 197.

[41] 'Dominian, Leon, 1913-1935', in: 'Correspondence between Isaiah Bowman and Leon Dominian regarding matters of the American Geographical Society during the time Dominian was on staff, through his time at the U.S. Department of State and the American Consular Service', *American Geographical Society of New York Records*, 1723-2010, bulk 1854-2000, https://collections.lib.uwm.edu/digital/collection/agsny/id/28780

[42] https://collections.lib.uwm.edu/digital/collection/agsny/id/28781

[43] Leon Dominian's letter to Isaiah Bowman, 25 February 1915, https://collections.lib.uwm.edu/digital/collection/agsny/id/28785

[44] Dominian, 'Linguistic areas', 402-403.

[45] Dominian, 'Linguistic areas', 402.

[46] Dominian, 'Linguistic areas', 438.

[47] Dominian, 'Linguistic areas', 439.

[48] J.K. Wright, *Geography in the making. The American Geographical Society, 1851-1951* (1952), 147.

[49] C.C. Alexander, 'Prophet of American Racism: Madison Grant and the Nordic Myth', in: *Phylon*, 23/1 (1962), 73-90.

[50] M. Grant, 'Introduction', in: L. Dominian, *The frontiers of language and nationality in Europe* (New York, 1917), XV-XVIII. As explained by J. Leerssen, the 'applied geography' of such authors as Dominian and Grant, but also William Z. Ripley (author of *The races of Europe*, 1899), 'had given intellectual support to the agenda of various diaspora nationalisms in North America'; J. Leerssen, 'Ethnography and ethnicity: Introductory survey essay', in: J. Leerssen, *Encyclopedia of Romantic Nationalism in Europe* (Amsterdam, 2018), https://ernie.uva.nl/viewer.p/21/56/object/122-160535

[51] Before publication, both text and maps were 'censored by an expert committee'. Among the criticisms Dominian's article received, those by professor A.H. Palmer, reported here; https://collections.lib.uwm.edu/digital/collection/agsny/id/28804

[52] M.S. Handman, 'The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe by Leon Dominian', in: *Journal of Political Economy*, 27/5 (1919), 417-419.

[53] P. Jagessar, 'Geography and linguistics: Histories, entanglements and departures', in: *Geography compass*, 14/11 (2020), 3-4, https://doi.org/10.1111/gec3.12540

[54] However, the ALF contributed above all to 'spreading the idea that each language fact is unique, and that consequently dialects as closed, clearly circumscribed entities do not exist'; P. Sériot, 'La clôture impossible (l'espace en géographie linguistique: la querelle du continu et du discontinu)', in: G. Nicolas (ed.), *Géographie et langages(s). Interface, représentation, interdisciplinarité. Actes du Colloque IUKB-IRI (UNIL) de Sion, 1997* (Sion, 1999), 227-248.

[55] Leerssen, 'Language interest: Europe'.

[56] G.-H. Soutou (ed.), *Les experts français et les frontières d'après-guerre. Les procès-verbaux du comité d'études 1917-1919*, https://socgeo.com/wp-

content/uploads/2016/11/Les-experts-français-et-les-frontières-daprès-guerre-MEP.pdf

[57] I. Davion, 'Introduction', in: G.-H. Soutou (ed.), *Les experts français*, 19.

[58] G. Palsky, 'Emmanuel de Martonne and the Ethnographical Cartography of Central Europe' (1917-1920), in: *Imago Mundi*, 54 (2002), 111-119.

[59] See also T. Ter Minassian, 'Les géographes français et la délimitation des frontières balkaniques à la Conférence de la Paix de 1919, in: *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine*, 44/2 (1997), 252-286.

[60] J.-C. Chevalier, 'Les linguistes français et les pays d'Europe de l'Est de 1918 à 1931', in: *Cahiers de l'ILSL*, 8 (1996), 59.

[61] In 1915, *Scientia* inaugurated a specific section called 'Enquiry on the main present questions of an international character', which dealt specifically with war-related issues. Between 1915 and 1922, Meillet published in it a number of articles dealing specifically with the issue of language and nation, namely: 'Les langues et les nationalités' (vol. 18, 1915), 'La situation linguistique en Russie et en Autriche-Hongrie' (vol. 23, 1918), 'Les langues dans le bassin de la Mer Baltique' (vol. 24, 1918), 'L'unité linguistique slave' (vol. 27, 1920), 'L'Unité romane' (vol. 31, 1922).

[62] A. Meillet, *Les langues dans l'Europe nouvelle* (Paris, 1918), 7.

[63] A. Meillet, 'Les langues et les nationalités', in: *Scientia* 18 (1915), 192.

[64] A. Meillet, 'La situation linguistique en Russie et en Autriche-Hongrie', in: *Scientia* 23 (1918), 209-216.

Meillet made a distinction between '*parler*' (language), 'cultivated languages' (written languages with literature), and 'languages of civilisation' (whose strength is assessed according to the competence acknowledged in comparison; these are all Indo-European languages); P. Caussat, 'Langue et nation', in: *Histoire Épistémologie Langage*, 10/2 (1988), 195-204.

[65] A. Meillet, 'Les langues dans le bassin de la Mer Baltique', in: *Scientia* 24 (1918), 383-392.

Following the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (3 March 1918) between the Bolshevik government of Russia and the Central powers, Russia renounced all territorial claims to Finland (which it had already recognised as an independent and sovereign state), and to the future Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Belarus and Ukraine.

[66] Meillet, *Les langues dans l'Europe nouvelle*, 93-96.

[67] Meillet, *Les langues dans l'Europe nouvelle*, 86, 89.

[68] Meillet, *Les langues dans l'Europe nouvelle*, see Chapter XXV, 'Les essais de langues artificielles', 319-330. For more information see, S. Moret, 'Autour des *Langues dans l'Europe Nouvelle*. Une réception de Meillet par les adeptes des langues artificielles', in: *Histoire Épistémologie Langage*, 41/2 (2020), 157-176.

It is noteworthy that in the inter-war period, there were new developments in the pursuit of the universal language projects, which were quite different from the nineteenth-century efforts for several reasons. Firstly, there was increasing mention of an 'auxiliary language' (it was futile to try to eliminate the diversity of mother tongues; this 'universal language' only claimed to be a language of communication) and an 'International Auxiliary Language Association' was created (US). Secondly, in contrast to the projects of the end of the previous century, the enterprise was now the domain of linguists. Thirdly, the centre of gravity crossed the Atlantic, with the consequent marginalisation of European linguistics; D. Baggioni, 'Préhistoire de la glottopolitique dans la linguistique européenne, de J.G. Herder au Cercle linguistique de Prague', in: *Langages*, 21/83 (1986), 35-51.

[69] A. Meillet, *Les langues dans l'Europe nouvelle* (Paris, 1928, 2nd edition), IX.

[70] P. Sériot, 'La linguistique spontanée des traceurs des frontières', in: *Cahiers de l'ILSL*, 8 (1996), 277-304; Moret, 'Linguistique et nouvel ordre européen', 136.

[71] Moret, 'Linguistique et nouvel ordre européen'.

[72] I. Bowman, *The new world. Problems in political geography* (Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York, 1921), 3.

[73] Freeman, 'Race and Language', 224.

Farming The Nation: Agrarian Parties and the National Question in Interwar Europe

MIGUEL CABO[1]

University of Santiago de Compostela

Agrarian parties played a key role in many European countries during the interwar period, particularly in Scandinavia, Central and Eastern Europe. Though quite heterogenous in almost every respect, they had enough in common to jointly found the Prague-based Green International or International Agrarian Bureau (IAB) (1921-1938).

Although their ideological foundations lacked the depth and coherence of other political families such as liberalism or socialism, circumstances obliged agrarian parties to elaborate lengthy discourses on nationalism and nation-building. The writings of leaders and thinkers in the vein of Milan Hodža, Antonín Švehla or Alexandr Stamboliski, as well as the *Bulletin* of the IAB, provide enough material for a discussion of their views on these matters. These debates were not merely theoretical because agrarian parties were constantly confronted with the national question, either as minority-based parties within multi-ethnic countries (for example the HSS in Croatia), or as mainstream parties bent on redefining the national identity of their countries in accordance with their (rural) values (for example the Bulgarian Agrarian Union or the *Parti Agraire et Paysan Français*). Another source of contradiction was their vision of countryfolk as the purest expression of national identity, which often made them hard to distinguish from strictly nationalist parties, together with their support of regional federations aiming at a European confederation.

Keywords: nationalism, agrarian parties, ruralism, pacifism, agrarian reforms.

Agrarian Parties: A Brief Introduction

The historical importance of agrarian parties is often underestimated or even completely ignored in the grand narratives of twentieth-century European history. However, they were present in most European countries, with exceptions such as the United Kingdom and Portugal, though their characteristics and influence varied greatly. The first parties of this political family arose with the turn-of-the-century agricultural crisis, which also led to the appearance of agrarian cooperativism across Europe. Even before 1900, a number of parties were created such as the Danish *Venstre* (1888), the Bulgarian Agrarian Union (1889), the *Bayerischer Bauernbund* (Bavarian Peasant League, 1893), the *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe* (Polish People's Party, 1895) in Austrian Galicia or the *Česká strana agrarní* (Czech Agrarian Party, 1899) in Bohemia-Moravia. Others would follow in the years leading up to the Great War, but none would form a government prior to 1914, except in Denmark.

The interwar years were without doubt their golden age. Agrarian parties were present at one time or another in the governments of every Nordic country, the three Baltic States, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and the Helvetic Republic, to which could be added the occasional inclusion of regional agrarian parties in coalition governments in the Weimar Republic.[2] The proliferation of right-wing authoritarian regimes and then communist dictatorships in the Soviet sphere of influence marked the end of this golden age, albeit agrarian parties still exist with marginal political weight in several countries.

Agrarian parties were a heterogeneous family by any standard. From an electoral point of view, they ranged from those capable of forming single-party governments, as was the case in Bulgaria and Romania, to minuscule formations like those in Belgium and the Netherlands that had

to fight even to gain parliamentary representation. The majority seduced somewhere between 10-15% of the electorate, which allowed them to form coalition governments in places like Scandinavia and Czechoslovakia. With regards to their position on the ideological spectrum, the Bulgarian Agrarian Union fell on the extreme left, but most Western European parties leaned the other way, such as the *Partido Agrario Español* (1934-1936), whose raison d'être was to oppose the agricultural reforms of the Second Republic, or the *Parti Agraire et Paysan Français* (PAPF, 1927-1939) with its ambiguously structured criticisms of parliamentarism under the Third Republic. In general terms, support for agrarian parties was more precarious and their position on the ideological spectrum was more right-wing the further west one went, which has had an impact on their treatment at the hands of historians, since broad surveys of European History tend to be written by Anglophone authors.

Despite everything, these parties had enough traits in common to be recognised as a single political family. These traits include the defence of the agricultural sector, particularly smallholders; links to agrarian associations; an identification with parliamentarism; foreign policy marked by pacifism; anticommunism etc. Also relevant were the mutual links they forged with each other, such as the harbouring of Bulgarian and Polish agrarian refugees by the Czechoslovakian Agrarian Party in times of repression, or the circulation and translation of books and periodicals. Personal connections also played their part, as can be seen in the presence of agrarians from different countries as attendees at other parties' congresses, or the Bulgarian Alexandr Stamboliski's tour of several capitals after signing the Treaty of Neuilly in Paris, throughout which he was given what could almost be called a star's welcome.[3] The eventual culmination of these connections was the existence between 1921 and 1938 of a coordinating body, the International Agrarian Bureau (IAB), also known as the Green International, with its

headquarters in Prague, of which twenty-one parties from across the continent were members at one time or another.[4] As a prerequisite for admission into the IAB, a party had to conform to a sixteen-point programme, drafted in 1929, which included pacifism, parliamentarism, cooperativism etc. Taking all of this into consideration, it seems reasonable to analyse agrarian parties as a transnational phenomenon.

The historical role of agrarian parties reached its apogee just as the national question was brought into focus by the collapse of multi-ethnic empires after the First World War, the drawing of new borders via peace treaties that, in theory, respected distinct nationalities, and the official acknowledgment of the existence (and rights) of national minorities by the League of Nations. Therefore, it is pertinent to consider the positions taken by agrarian parties in the face of the national question, multiple iterations of which weighed heavily on interwar Europe. This article aims at offering a summary of the available state of knowledge through secondary literature and primary sources, as well as some hypotheses for further research on the subject.

Some Conditioning Factors

Unlike other political families, in the case of agrarianism there is no significant theoretical corpus that could serve as a framework for a developed system of ideas and guidelines to manage the endless complexity of human affairs. There is nothing that even comes close in scope or quality to Marx's works on socialist parties or John Locke and Adam Smith's writings on liberal ones, to name a few examples. The positions of agrarian parties regarding the national question must be inferred from their actions and from sources such as the *Bulletins* published by the Prague Green International and its successor, the International Peasant Union (founded in 1947 by exiles in the USA),

articles printed in party newspapers, and books and memoires penned by a number of agrarian leaders and theorists of note. Chief among the latter are the writings of the Bulgarians Alexandr Stamboliski and Giorgi M. Dimitrov, the Czech Antonín Švehla, and the Slovak Milan Hodža. The second of these authors had no qualms in pointing out in 1948 that

> '[...] agrarianism does not yet possess a systematic doctrine of fundamental principles or a coherent philosophical structure of values… is a practical rather than a theoretical ideology; its doctrine is being developed gradually on the basis of practical experience.'[5]

To this must be added a level of anti-intellectualism that did not help to attract theorists who might have been capable of articulating a true doctrine in all its complexity. Schoolmasters, local intellectuals, agricultural engineers, vets etc. were all to be found in the milieu of agrarian parties, often in positions of authority within the organisation. In other words, these were people who had undergone some form of training but whose knowledge had immediate practical applications. Seldom were they intellectuals in the sense of thinkers who moved in the realms of ideas and abstraction. One exception was the Romanian functionalist and political scientist David Mitrany (1888-1975), a Romanian Communist Party sympathiser and author of a refutation of Marxism from an agrarian perspective.[6] In any case, and as has already been mentioned, agrarian parties' production in the field of theory as well as their trajectories in a practical sense allow us to reconstruct their interactions with the national question. These were conditioned by a series of factors that are outlined below.

Firstly, the national question did not initially form a central part of the worldview of parties which, to use Lipset and Rokkan's terminology, the cleavage of city versus countryside had brought into being.[7] When the

conditions that gave rise to specific agrarian parties are examined, it is obvious that national problems were secondary or completely negligible at the moment of their founding. Some, like the Czech agrarian party, splintered off pre-existing liberal formations, while others like the Swedish and Bulgarian ones were autonomous creations, but as a general rule the representation of the interests of an agrarian sector that felt itself to be side-lined by established parties was the clear priority. This did not stop them from having to align themselves in response to national questions, whether that was because they acted in the context of multi-ethnic states (see the Croatians and Czechs in the Hapsburg Empire) or because said questions were closely linked to agrarian concerns. This is what occurred in the case of agrarian reforms through which parties aimed to extend family ownership over smallholdings. In places where land ownership was drawn along ethnic lines, a confluence of agrarian and national questions was inevitable, for example wherever a majority of large landowners were of a different group to that of the peasantry (Germans in the Baltic countries and Bohemia-Moravia, Hungarians in Transylvania, Poles in the mostly-Ruthenian areas of Austrian Galicia etc.)

Another factor to take into account is that relations between agrarian and nationalist parties were not always easy.[8] This may seem surprising given that both coincided in exalting the rural world and the peasantry, which for nationalists were the purest expression of a nation's identity and the most stalwart guardians of its traditions. The editorial of the first number of the *Bulletin* of the Green International claimed that agriculture was the basis of civilization and thus eternal, while any other institution or social reality could change. This resulted in the peasant being 'the main stone of the structure of human societies and the base of the idea of nation and State. Therefore, the man living upon his land is and must be the creative element within the State (...) Healthy and land-

toiling men are a reservoir of national energy, necessary for curing the exhausted mankind.'[9]

Or, as expressed immediately after the Second World War while trying to reconstruct the Green International in the U.S.

> 'The earth is the source of life and from it spring the main human opportunities. The entire existence of a nation organised in a state depends on its ties with the earth. The weaker these ties, the sooner comes moral and physical degeneration of individuals and groups (…) The moral regeneration of the world will be achieved by Peasant Movements, so closely connected with the earth. Their ripening into political maturity will put an end to the economic chaos and clear the stagnant atmosphere of the industrial centres. The mentality that was formed in everyday contact with the primeval laws of the earth will straighten the tortuous social thought of modern times.'[10]

Despite all this, nationalists did not tend to approve of parties which, apart from anything else, competed with them for the support of a social group that they considered to be their natural base from which to make the leap to become a mass party. In extreme cases, an agrarian party could be so successful in the electoral arena that it could end up unseating nationalist parties from their majority position, as happened in Croatia. Secondly, agrarians threatened to divide the *national community* that nationalist parties sought to represent by leaning on the support of only one sector of the population, albeit a highly numerous one. Lastly, agrarian parties' policies could enervate the national cause by focussing on practical issues like land ownership or fair prices for agricultural products instead of national rights. Furthermore, their proposals could pit different social groups against each other (large landowners against settlers, settlers against day labourers, farmers

against merchants…), while nationalists emphasised external causes in their analysis of social and economic problems.

Nowhere was this clearer than in Ireland, where nationalists were wary of cooperativism for the reasons stated and, by throwing in their lot with the Land League, simplified the local situation into a standoff between two apparently united fronts: Irish Catholic peasants versus English Protestant landowners. Of course, beneath all this broiled conflicts of a less diaphanous nature, like that of small landowners and leaseholders against day labourers, the problem of usury or the tensions between livestock and crop farmers. For nationalists, any solution to these 'secondary' problems (hardly secondary to those who experienced them) would have to be put off until the primary aim of independence could be achieved. Only after the creation of the Free State in 1922, when blame for disillusionment with the new order of things could no longer be placed at the feet of the British, did the Farmers' Party (1922-1932) appear, focussing on the interests of the more prosperous producers to the east of the country, and then *Clann na Talmhan* (1938-1965), which aimed to represent the poorer peasantry, especially in the western counties.[11]

The territorial implantation of these parties was another conditioning factor. Some of them had a regional character, like the Bavarian *Bayerischer Bauernbund*, Swiss agrarian parties from German-speaking cantons, the Walloon *Parti agraire belge* or the *Bund der Landwirte*, founded by the German ethnic minority in the First Czechoslovak Republic. However, they were more commonly state-wide parties with enormous variations in their level of support depending on the region, with the lion's share of their backing limited to certain strongholds, while they barely garnered any votes in other areas (which of course included urban areas). Thus, in the abovementioned case of Ireland, the first party to be created (the Farmers' Party) championed the cause of the wealthier peasants and failed to gain support from the poorer peasantry to the

south and west of the island. The pattern of support for *Clann na Talmhan* was the other way round, though on paper both it and the Farmers' Party operated across the whole country. To a large extent this reflected the diversity of agrarian structures and, looking towards Central and Eastern Europe, ethnic diversity as well. This was to condition parties' positions in debates over the structure of the state, with a general tendency to favour decentralising or federal formulas and a consistent opposition to centralism.

In relation to this last point, it is significant that agrarian parties were only rarely multi-ethnic constructions, or at least their ethnic makeup was not proportional to the demographic composition of their respective countries. In Central and Eastern Europe they were usually divided along ethnic lines, in the same manner that the cooperative movement was.[12] In multi-ethnic contexts, even though they were more open to dialogue than most other political groups, agrarian parties never managed to incorporate the rural populace equitably with no regards paid to linguistic or religious differences. There was a Croatian, a Serbian, and a Slovene agrarian party in interwar Yugoslavia, and though they reached occasional agreements, they never joined forces to become a unitary movement. In Czechoslovakia, the pre-existing Czech and Slovak agrarian parties fused in 1922 to form the RSZML (*Republikánská strana zemědělského a malorolnického lidu* – Republican Party of Farmers and Peasants), which went on to become the most voted party in the First Republic. Nonetheless, German minority farmers were represented by their own party (*Bund der Landwirte*, 1920), as were the Hungarian and Ruthenian minorities, each of which had a small agrarian party that acted in their name.

In the rhetoric of agrarian parties, two images that moulded their positions regarding this issue can be detected. The first is the frequent identification of the peasantry or the rural population in a broad sense with the 'people' as a whole, or at least with its most sound and

representative part. The Croatian HSS leader Vladko Maček (1879-1964) could thus exalt Ante Radič, founder of the party along with his brother Stjepan, attributing to him the 'merit [...] of having been the first to declare that the Croatian people and the Croatian peasantry are one and the same, which means that if a political struggle is to be successful, it must count upon the organised majority of the nation of Croatia', whereas all remaining social groups had servilely adopted the ideas and mentalities of other peoples.[13] Such a metonym was not infrequent, most notably wherever a strong anti-urban sentiment reared its head, like in Bulgaria. Absentee large landowners, the working class, and civil servants were symbolically excluded from the national community because they were contaminated by foreign influences and, on top of that, were considered parasites that fed off the true generators of wealth, i.e. the agricultural sector. This metonym could pave the way to a populist rhetoric and grand claims of speaking for the nation as a whole. As is logical, this was easier to achieve in places where the peasantry represented a majority of the population, which was still common in the twenties and thirties. An expression of this is the fact that sometimes these parties would call themselves *popular* parties, with no allusion to their peasant, rural or agrarian character, since it was understood that *people* meant countryside. So, when in 1931 three Polish agrarian parties came together in a singular formation, the name chosen was *Stronnictwo Ludowe* (SL), People's Party, without it being seen as necessary to clarify who exactly constituted the 'people'. When it came to the *Bălgarski Zemedelski Naroden Săjuz*, Bulgarian Popular Agrarian Union, the name even sounded reiterative.

The other image is a metaphor. Agrarian parties were distinct from the parties of liberal and conservative notables that had dominated the political scene as mass parties in most of Europe up until the Great War. This was principally due to their links with cooperatives, and additionally associations for women, agricultural technicians, students,

sport or cultural organisations, as well as local and national press outlets. Such connections with civil society gave them a solid foundation, a source of future party leaders and, in periods of repression, a place of refuge where members could await a return to normality. In the most consolidated parties, party members and voters strengthened these links through day-to-day activities like selling their products in a cooperative, reading a particular newspaper or participating in common leisure pursuits. These quotidian associations recreated Benedict Anderson's 'imagined communities' by offering a channel through which the desired agrarian national community could be embodied.[14] The local community as a metaphor for the national community, as theorised by Anderson, here manifested itself in a way that was far more direct and noticeable than what can usually be observed.

Agrarian Parties, National Matters: Some Patterns

When examining dozens of parties along the length and breadth of the continent, each with its own idiosyncrasies, and their interactions with an issue as complex as the national question, the debates around which varied from country to country, it becomes necessary to attempt some degree of classification. Greater clarity is gained by doing this, though with a trade-off in the form of simplification.

Four conditioning factors and three state models define the system of classification. The former are:

a) The percentage of the active agrarian population in a given country

b) The distribution of land ownership and the dominant modes of access to landed property for farmers

c) The relative strength of the agrarian party in electoral terms

d) How far national identity is questioned or debated at the state level

The three state models would be: a) countries where national identity is unquestioned, b) countries where national identity is questioned and the agrarian party aligns with an ethnic minority, and c) the same, but agrarian parties represent the interests of the majority group. In those countries where national identity is not an object of debate, agrarian parties assume said national identity as their own but work to integrate elements of their particular worldview into it. Their success depends on their electoral weight and that of the local agrarian population, among other things. Historically, this strategy did not exert a destabilising influence because in general nationalisms had a strong rural component to them, so agrarian revindications were no more than a question of emphasis. In countries where they represented specific areas with a differentiated regional character, they leaned towards regionalist positions, but in the sense of a 'regional pride' that would ultimately reinforce national identity.[15]

The French, Danish and Bulgarian cases are illustrative. The *Parti Agraire et Paysan Français* was founded in 1927 and was able to feed upon the malcontent caused by the Great Depression and the perceived disinterest of the Third Republic's governments towards agrarian groups in relation to other sectors of society. It directly criticised the flaws of the regime and promoted decentralising and corporativist reform.[16] Its activities peaked around 1936 but soon after the death of its founder, the journalist Fleurant Agricola, it was split by personalisms and political alliances, particularly the clash between supporters and detractors of collaborating with Henri Dorgères' more radical *Comités de Défense Paysanne*.[17] Symbolically, the PAPF's flag consisted of a green background with the tricolour to the top left; the PAPF touted its French patriotism but insisted on placing the contributions of the rural world in the foreground. As such, Fleurant Agricola revindicated 1789 as a

peasants' revolution, 'which thanks to the energy of its peasants had brought ideas of liberty to the whole world'.[18] In each party congress, a wreath was laid beside the monument to the fallen in the First World War as a reminder that it had been the peasantry who had made up the majority of casualties and shown the most striking loyalty to the fatherland.[19] The backing of agrarian sectors that was demanded from the state was based on the idea that the most authentic expression of French identity was to be found in villages, as well as the fact that national produce would prove fundamental for national self-sufficiency in the event of another war.

The Danish *Venstre* could be considered a success story in this category, with the difference that the reformulation of national identity happened before its creation but then worked to the party's benefit. After Denmark's defeat in the Second Schleswig War in 1864 and the consequent shrinking of its territory, the country was forced to carry out a revision of its history and values that was underpinned by pastor N.F.S. Grundtvig's movement of religious reform.[20] Starting in 1888, the *Venstre* became the political expression of popular schools, the cooperative movement, and pro-peasant historical and cultural revisionism in the wake of the failures of the bourgeoisie and traditional elites. Afterwards, it managed to hold a significant level of political influence even as the active agrarian population progressively declined.[21]

Most agrarian parties were of a small or medium size and so were never well positioned to impose the entirety of their interpretation of a dominant national identity upon the rest of the population. The most they could aspire to was for rural values to be given the level of recognition they deserved within said identity, or what the party judged to be the level they deserved. The situation would be completely distinct in a country where the peasantry still represented the majority of the population, meaning that their support would grant an agrarian party a

parliamentary majority. Moreover, this is not a hypothetical scenario because it is exactly what occurred in Bulgaria between 1919 and 1923. In the chaos of humiliating defeat, territorial losses and economic disaster that followed on the heels of the Great War, the charismatic Alexandr Stamboliski's (1879-1923) Agrarian Union came into its own as an alternative to the disgraced traditional parties and monarchical power in a country where three quarters of the population lived off agriculture. In this case, the agrarian party in question did not intend to add nuances to the definition of national identity, but rather believed that its absolute majority in parliament would allow it to substantially remodel the definition and impose it on everyone else. For the duration of his 'agrarian dictatorship', as Western diplomats were wont to call it, Stamboliski clashed with multiple social and political groups over his revolutionary policies. Among other measures, his government enforced periods of mandatory labour to familiarise young people with the virtues of agricultural work. With rhetoric characterised by a style of anti-intellectualism not unusual among agrarian politicians, Stamboliski also clashed with Sofia University over his plans to reform the Cyrillic alphabet to make it more accessible to the lower classes, which would facilitate his pro-literacy campaigns and indirectly increase mass participation in politics.[22] Whereas Bulgarian identity had been built on hostility towards Turks and Greeks as the *other*, Stamboliski headed a pacifistic foreign policy that meant renouncing ideas of revanchism, accepting the territorial losses enshrined in the Treaty of Neuilly, and making efforts to establish neighbourly relations with surrounding countries, including Yugoslavia in spite of the explosive Macedonian question. All of this led to the definition of national identity swinging away from ethnic elements towards civic ones, for which reason the Agrarian Union's programme recognised the need to respect minorities (Greeks, Jews, Turks…) and their right to schooling in their own languages.[23] The caveat was that these civic values were founded upon an extreme pro-rural ideology, a worldview theorised by Stamboliski

himself according to which humanity was not stratified by class as Marxists claimed, but split into professional or corporative groups, among whom those who worked the land were the essential and indispensable caste upon which everyone else depended. Stamboliski's attempt to remodel Bulgarian society from top to bottom ended when a multi-sector coalition was formed against him by the crown. In 1923, a bloody coup put an end both to his government and his life.

In those countries where national identity was contested, two possibilities were open. Firstly, an agrarian party might identity with one of the minorities within that state. If such a party managed to gain a predominant position in its zone of influence, then it would become something very similar to a nationalist party, as was the case of the Croatian Peasants' Party (*Hrvatska seljačka stranka*, HSS), which displaced all other Croatian parties. Despite enjoying only minor electoral success prior to 1918, the HSS was the most-voted formation from that year onwards, becoming the paladin not only of the Croatian peasanty but of all Croatians in the struggle against Belgradian centralism, the overwhelming presence of Serbs in state apparatus, fiscal aggrievements etc. It oscillated somewhat when it came to specific issues, but its acceptation of the political system always hinged upon the adoption of federal structures as a bare minimum.[24] In any case, the most significant point here is that Belgrade perceived Stjepan Radić not to be the leader of the Croatian peasantry, but the supreme representative of Croatians across the board. And this was true regardless of whether it entailed repression (Radić endured several stretches of prison time for not obeying the Constitution of 1920) or negotiation, such as when the Radical Party agreed to form a coalition government with him in 1925.

The programmes of agrarian parties that represented the dominant group in multi-ethnic states tended to be less nationalistic in their policies than other parties. Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that they proved themselves capable of reaching agreements with parties

that represented minorities, in particular, though not exclusively, other agrarian parties with which they might share a good portion of their social and economic proposals. The most obvious example is the Czechoslovakian Agrarian Party, with representation in all the governments of the First Republic and almost constant control over the post of prime minister. It was this party, or more exactly its leader Antonín Švehla, that orchestrated the entry of German minority parties into the coalition government of 1926. This was a brave step towards the integration of this minority into the new state, yet the process would eventually break down with the economic crisis and the rise of the Sudeten German Party in the thirties.[25] Therefore, it is relevant that the agrarian party was the only one to oppose the expulsion of the German minority on the principle of collective guilt after Czechoslovakia was reconstituted in 1945.[26] Likewise, in Yugoslavia, the only Serbian party that was open to negotiating decentralising solutions and kept amiable relations with the Croatian peasants' party was its agrarian equivalent, the *Zemljoradnička stranka*.[27] These experiences gave some credibility to Milan Hodža's (agrarian Slovak leader and Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia in 1935-38) claim that in interwar Central-Eastern Europe 'agrarian democracy' was the best path towards solving the minority problem".[28]

Just one year before the dismemberment of his country, the leader of the Czechoslovakian Agrarian Party, Rudolf Beran, proclaimed in the daily organ of his party that they were 'resolute nationalists', but open to peaceful agreements both internationally and nationally regarding minorities. After invoking the usual chants to peasants as the most patriot class because they tilled the land, felt a personal connection to it, and fed the rest of the population, Beran assured that peasants would guarantee the survival of the state. That was not to be, scarcely a year later Beran was the PM of the Second Czechoslovakian republic

immolated in the Munich agreement, as a symbol of the limits of agrarian parties in the broad scenario of *Realpolitik* in the 1930s.[29]

Conclusions

Nationalism was not a part of what may be called the true nucleus of agrarian parties' ideology. Studying the circumstances of their creation, it can be appreciated that these parties were born either as an emanation of pre-existing associative movements or as splinter parties of already established formations whenever it became apparent to wide social sectors that their interests were not well represented by them. In fact, at many points along their trajectories, agrarian parties were accused of only servicing the practical concerns of their voters without professing any solid ideals and principles. As such, they were able to deal with parties of differing ideologies in exchange for concessions (the lowering of taxes, tariffs on imports, systems to guarantee minimum prices for agrarian produce…), all of which was the worst kind of political horse-trading in the eyes of their detractors. Another interpretation is that these parties became a factor of stability in the convulsive Europe of the interwar years because they facilitated the consolidation of coalition governments, although that is not the topic studied here.

Even if the national question was not decisively present, changes in the situation could lend it more weight later on and turn it into a priority. This happened in those regions where there was notable ethnic opposition between landowners and peasants, such as in Estonia.[30] Alternatively, a party's success could lead it to monopolise the votes of a certain minority within a state and transform itself into that minority's maximum interlocutor with the holders of power, like the previously cited Croatian HSS. In this sense, it seems reasonable to second Alex Toshkov when he writes of the 'contingency of national expression' for

these parties, which was not a part of their essence but did manifest itself with greater or lesser intensity according to the context.[31] In multi-ethnic societies, and few societies in Europe were not multi-ethnic at least to some extent, the land question, for example, unavoidably became intertwined with the national one. In the proposals for agrarian reform that were made after the First World War, set down by agrarian parties in positions of government or supported by them from the benches of the opposition, ethnic factors counted as much as or more than economic factors, so that selected groups were favoured (generally to the detriment of Hungarians and Germans) in the expropriation of property and the apportioning of settlers. The justification for this lay in the avenging of ostensible historical grievances and the creation of a peasantry that identified with the new nation-states born from the ashes of fallen empires, since it was these nation-states to which they owed their access to the land.[32]

Another important question is what constituted the idea of nation that to a greater or lesser extent these parties disseminated. Making use of the ethnic/civic dichotomy, though this has been criticised, at first glance it appears that ethnic elements were clearly dominant given that the cultural expressions emanating from agrarian parties extolled folklore, traditional know-how etc.[33] Both the agrarian party press and writers who were sympathetic to their cause favoured a costumbrista style of literature that focussed on the countryside or on historical events in which rural folk virtues (patriotism, frugality, solidarity, ingenuity…) could be highlighted. Nevertheless, the praxis of agrarian parties did introduce civic elements via their defence of parliamentarism, universal suffrage (for women and men), clean elections, the fortifying of civil society through associationism… all of which in many countries meant making the jump from liberalism to democracy. In this way they made a considerable contribution towards opening up spaces for civic

participation and citizens' mobilisation, thus indirectly fomenting nation-building processes.

It could be argued that the aforementioned initiatives were carried out on the assumption that the weight of the rural population in the electorate as a whole would affect a country's society, culture, and politics at all levels. Stamboliski's Bulgaria was the place where this ambition came closest to being realised. Through the reproduction of a national identity tailored to fit the interests of the peasantry and with which they could easily feel identified, agrarian parties (especially in Central-Eastern Europe) helped to erode the phenomenon of 'national indifference' that disproportionately affected the rural masses.[34]

The ability of agrarian parties to pivot towards openly nationalist positions under determined circumstances was to be confirmed in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. During the brief transition between the retreat of the Axis armies and the imposition of communist regimes in the Soviet sphere of influence, agrarian parties adopted a new role in representing a firm obstacle to the communists' seizure of power because they managed to attract electoral backing that went beyond their natural base of support. This was achieved precisely by agglutinating nationalist, anti-Russian sentiment and the votes of many Poles, Hungarians, Romanians or Bulgarians who had little or nothing to do with the countryside and agriculture.[35]

A consistent trait among agrarian parties was their approach to foreign policy, based on pacificism and the building of confederal structures in preparation for a hypothetical European confederation.[36] And though that could sound like mere rhetoric, there is factual evidence to demonstrate that this was not the case. Agrarian parties opposed their countries' military adventures whenever feasible, just as they did with the non-negotiated reshuffling of borders. Stamboliski stands out once again as the most obvious paradigm of such convictions, although it is

also worth mentioning some agrarian parties that worked together despite the tense relations that existed between their countries, like the cooperation between Bulgarians and Serbs or Poles and Czechoslovakians.

Diverse supranational schemes were managed through rural organisations, both in the interwar years and among exiles during the Second World War, although the division of Europe after Yalta and Potsdam doomed them to be little more than empty gestures. The Prague Green International was represented in several Europeanist projects, such as Coudenhove-Kalergi's Paneuropean Union, as well as multiple international organisations with or without ties to the League of Nations (the International Labour Organisation, the International Institute of Agriculture etc.). Europeanism was built on the notion, which can often be seen in contemporary speeches and publications, that peasants had a great deal in common and instinctively understood each other regardless of how many borders divided them, and as such it was necessary to reject war and xenophobia.[37] From a national perspective, this is certainly one of the most constructive facets of these parties. Lastly, as a general consideration, it can be recalled that agrarian parties did not promote the authoritarian nationalist regimes that proliferated in interwar Europe, but rather were victims of repression under them.

The balance is less favourable on other points, such as the abovementioned difficulties in reflecting states' multi-ethnic composition within party membership and voter bases, and the persistence of an antisemitic streak which rose to the surface when Jews were singled out as middlemen or, in certain periods, because of their supposed communist ties. This antisemitism reflected the general attitudes of the population and the cooperative movement in many countries, and its manifestations were less virulent that in most other parties, but it was cause for concern regardless, and even when it found no expression in the upper echelons of a party, it could still be detected

at a grassroots level and among local party committees.[38] The Austrian *Landbund* was probably the agrarian party in which antisemitism was more acute, within the context of a programme based on enmity against Vienna, hostility against the Socialdemocrats with a strong antisemitic tint and unification with Germany.[39] However, even the *Landbund* was first and above anything else a party focused on the representation of agrarian producers and national issues, and the former was the priority for example when establishing alliances with other parties and determining its attitude towards governments. Its appeal was however limited by the fact that the Christian Social Party of Engelbert Dollfuss (who himself had a background as agrarian activist) managed to establish a solid link with agrarian associations.

All things considered, in a historical context in which the worst excesses of nationalism led to widespread intolerance and violence, the nationalist strain that ran through agrarian parties was far from being the most toxic. It therefore appears that Tom Nairn's equating of ethnic nationalism with peasant values and violent conflicts cannot be sustained.[40] There may be more truth to the Slovak agrarian politician Milan Hodža's words when he said that if agrarians were nationalists, by all accounts theirs would be a 'quiet nationalism', although further research and a more systematic comparison of case-studies is required.[41] 'Quiet nationalism' seems promising as a concept and it could be applied to most of the agrarian parties but not necessarily all the time. In order to be useful as an analytical tool, it should be refined in academic terms. To sum it up, it would imply tolerance towards ethnic minorities, a pacifist approach to redefining borders and foreign policy and a combination of civic and ethnic elements when defining national identities. A sample of parties under different circumstances (in power or in opposition, governing alone or in coalition with other forces, representing minorities or ethnic majority groups and so one) would allow to test the suitability of the hypotheses proposed in this article.

Endnotes

[1] University of Santiago de Compostela (Galicia, Spain), Histagra research group (GI-1657). miguel.cabo@usc.es https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8099-3895. I am thankful for the suggestions of both internal and external reviewers. Translated by Philip Webb

[2] The term 'golden age' is taken from A. Toshkov, *Agrarianism as Modernity in 20th-Century Europe. The Golden Age of the Peasantry* (London, 2019). For recent works on this topic, R. Bideleux, 'The Peasantries and Peasant Parties of Interwar East Central Europe', in: S.P. Ramet, (ed.), *Interwar East Central Europe, 1918-1941. The Failure of Democracy-building. The Fate of Minorities* (London, 2020), 281-331 and M. Cabo, 'Agrarian parties in Europe prior to 1945 and Beyond', in: L. Van Molle, L. Brassart, C. Marache & J. Pan-Montojo (eds.), *Making Politics in the European Countryside, from the 1780s to the 1930s* (Turnhout, 2021). The classic study is that of H. Gollwitzer, (ed.), *Europäische Bauernparteien im 20.Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 1977).

[3] R. Daskalov & D. Mishkova, *Entangled Histories of the Balkans. Volume Two: Transfers of Political Ideologies and Institutions* (Leiden, 2014), 350-352.

[4] The main absences were the Hungarian and Nordic parties (apart from the Finnish one). Initially, the project had a clear pan-Slavic component which was to be diluted as time went on. For works on the Green International, H. Haushofer, 'Die internationale Organisation der Bauernparteien', in: H. Gollwitzer (ed.), *Europäische Bauernparteien im 20.Jahrhundert*, (Stuttgart, 1977), 668-690; E. Kubů & J. Šouša, 'Sen o slovanské agrární spolupráci. (Antonín Švehla - ideový a organizační tvůrce Mezinárodního agrárního bureau)', in: *Agrární strany ve vládních a samosprávných strukturách mezi světovými válkami* (Uherské Hradiště, 2008), 35-41.

[5] G.M. Dimitrov, 'Agrarianism', in: F. Gross (ed.), *European Ideologies, a Survey of 20th Century Political Ideas* (New York, 1948), 396.

[6] D. Mitrany, *Marx against the Peasant: A Study in Social Dogmatism* (Chapel Hill, 1951).

[7] *S.M. Lipset & S.* Rokkan (eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-national Perspectives (New York, 1967). Another issue is that in some countries the opposition between centre and periphery, Church and State or capital and labour might overlap, but the major cleavage was between city and country.*

[8] L. Fernández Prieto & M. Cabo, 'Agrarian movements, the National Question, and Democracy in Europe, 1880-1945', in: X.M. Núñez Seixas (ed.), *The First World War and the Nationality Question in Europe* (Leiden, 2020), 226-290.

[9] 'Idée de l'agrarisme universel', in: *Bulletin du Bureau International Agricole* 1 (1923), 3-7. The same concept in Švehl, who thought Poles resisting the assimilation policies of Prussian governments a telling example, in Eduard Kubu & Jiri Sousa (eds.) *Rozmluvy s Antonínem Svehlou a o Svehlovi. Vzpomínky agrárnhího diplomata Karla Mecíre*, (Prague, 2018), 83-85.

[10] J. Rutaj, *Peasant International in Action* (London, 1948), 7.

[11] T. Varley, 'On the Road to Extinction: Agrarian Parties in Twentieth-Century Ireland', in: *Irish Political Studies* 25/4 (2010), 581-601.

[12] K. Lorenz (ed.), *Cooperatives in Ethnic Conflicts: Eastern Europe in the 19th and early 20th Century* (Berlin, 2006).

[13] 'Ante Radić Le Père du Mouvement Paysan Croate', in: *Bulletin Union Internationale Paysanne* 1 (1950), 7-8.

[14] B. Anderson, *Imagined communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, 1987).

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[17] On Dorgères, R.O. Paxton, *Le temps des chemises vertes. Révoltes paysannes et fascisme rural, 1923-1939* (Paris, 1996).

[18] *Bulletin du Bureau International Agraire* 1928-4, 262.

[19] The peasant-soldier myth was commonplace among other parties; E. Lynch, 'Les usages politiques du soldat laboureur: paysannerie et nation dans la France

et l'Europe agrariennes 1880-1945', in: J.L. Mayaud & L. Raphael (eds.), *Histoire de l'Europe rurale contemporaine. Du village à l'État* (Paris, 2005), 332-349.

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[22] J.D. Bell, *Peasants in Power: Alexander Stamboliski and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, 1899-1923* (Princeton, 1977). Toshkov, *Agrarianism*, 65.

[23] A. Stamboliski, *Œuvres choisies* (Sofia, 1981), 48-50.

[24] M. Biondich, *Stjepan Radic, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 1904-1928* (Toronto, 2000).

[25] S. Sobieraj, *Die nationale Politik des Bundes der Landwirte in der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Verständigung zwischen Tschechen und Deutschen (1918-1929)* (Frankfurt am Main, 2002). It is significant that the Green International congress of 1929 entrusted the *Bund der Landwirte* with the presentation of a report on the national question, which concluded that pacts with agrarian parties at home and abroad were the first step towards its solution; *Neuer Morgen* 27/5/1929.

[26] Nevertheless, it did not have the opportunity to defend this position because it was immediately illegalised under an agreement between president Edvard Beneš and the communists. See for example the following editorial from the party's newspaper in exile, in which it is maintained that tolerance had been increasing during the First Republic thanks to the bridges laid by agrarian parties, 'Pomêr Republikánské strany na národním menšinám', in: *Agrární politika. List Čs. Republikánské Strany v Zahraničí*, 1/1/1954.

[27] I. Avakumovic, 'The Serb Peasant Party, 1919-1945', in; I. Volgyes (ed.), *The Peasantry of Eastern Europe* (N. York, 1979), 57-78.

[28] M. Hodža, *Články, reči, štúdie. IV Cesty Stredo-Evropskej agrárnej demokracie 1921-1931* (Prague, 1931), 276.

[29] *Venkov* (25-12-1937).

[30] A-M. Koll, 'Agrarianism and Ethnicity', in: H. Schultz & E. Kubů (eds.), *History and Culture of Economic Nationalism in East Central Europe* (Berlin, 2006), 141-160; J. Eellend, 'Agrarianism and Modernization in Inter-War Eastern Europe', in: P. Wawrzeniuk (ed.), *Societal Change and Ideological Formation among the Rural Population of the Baltic Area 1880-1939* (Huddinge, 2008), 35-56.

[31] Toshkov, *Agrarianism*, 61.

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[37] B.Trencsényi, M. Janowski, M. Baár, M. Falina & M. Kopeč, *A History of Modern Political Thought in East Central Europe* (Oxford, 2018), 484; P. Swacha, 'European Integration in the International Peasant Union Concepts', in: J.Rychlík, L. Holec & M. Pehr (eds.), *Agrarismus ve strední východní Evrope 19. A 20. Století* (Prague, 2015), 281-294**; S.** Leček, 'Dream of World Peace: Croatian Peasant Party and Two Concepts of the Community of Nations', in: J. Gmitruk &

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[40] T. Nairn, *Faces of Nationalism. Janus Revisited* (London, 1997), 90-110.

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The challenges of stateless nation-building. Comparing the paths of ERC and the PNV (1930-1939)

PEDRO ÁLVARO HERVALEJO SÁNCHEZ

University of the Basque Country

When comparing Basque and Catalan nationalism, research has often focused the very visible ideological and political differences between the two movements. This paper puts forward an alternative perspective, grounded in the comparative analysis of the discourse produced by the *Catalan Esquerra Republicana* de Catalunya (ERC) and the *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* (PNV) during the 1930s. Its main argument is that these two parties led parallel and essentially similar nation-building processes directly linked to the achievement of home rule and the establishment of national institutions. The article also addresses how these processes were affected by the different Basque and Catalan political contexts, and by the final challenge posed by the Spanish Civil War.

Keywords: nation-building, hegemony, nationalism, Catalonia, Basque Country.

Introduction

Research often looks at stateless nationalist movements with a focus on their particularities. A common approach is to map the visible differences between two or more movements and then proceed to offer

explanations for these. This paper presents an alternative use of the comparative method, which instead brings the search for patterns of similarity to the centre stage. It revolves around the concrete cases represented by the *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* (PNV), and *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC), during the Second Spanish Republic and the subsequent Civil War. These two political parties were the dominant actors within the Basque and Catalan nationalist movements, respectively.[1] Given their shared characteristics – both emerged at the end of the nineteenth century, both claim to represent nations within the borders of the Spanish and French states – these two movements are particularly prone to compared studies. However, they have often been perceived as being fundamentally different from each other, and some past studies have virtually revolved around explaining such differences.[2] This paper argues that, specifically during the years between 1930 and 1939, ERC and the PNV essentially led two parallel paths towards Basque and Catalan alternative nation-building – i.e. two alternatives to the official Spanish state's nation-building.

The Czech historian Miroslav Hroch defined national movements as a particular path towards nation-building which is initiated not by a state, but within a 'non-dominant ethnic group':

> '[...] nation-building within these ethnic groups assumed the form of national movements seeking to attain all the essential attributes of a distinct nation – i.e. to develop a complete social structure with its own business and academic elites, create a national culture in its national language, and gain a political voice, although not necessarily as a state.'[3]

Hroch also developed a well-known sequence to monitor the development of national movements. It distinguished an initial phase A, in which small groups of intellectuals tasked themselves with a cultural assertion of the nation. This was followed by a phase B, in which political

activists promoting political demands took the lead. Finally, a phase C would be reached once the nationalist groups were able to appeal to a significant portion of the population, becoming a mass movement.[4] Later scholars have further developed Hroch's schema. Terry Martin, Tomasz Kamusella, and John Coakley all propose an additional phase D, termed 'national consolidation' by the latter author. This stage involves the national movement gaining access to some form of state power from which it is able to carry out its own institutional nation-building.[5]

This is precisely what Basque and Catalan nationalists achieved during the time period 1930-1939, which saw both obtaining home rule within the legal and political framework of the Second Spanish Republic. The creation of Basque and Catalan self-governing – albeit not sovereign – institutions meant both national movements could dispose of new tools which could potentially allow a qualitative leap in nation-building. It is therefore reasonable to approach a comparative study of Basque and Catalan nationalist movements during this period as the development of two parallel paths towards the national consolidation phase D in their respective nation-building processes. This paper focuses on ERC and the PNV – although both Basque and Catalan nationalism were complex realities with their own internal ideological cleavages – as the agents actually leading these attempted transitions from phase C to D.

Political hegemony and nation-building

ERC and the PNV, despite their different ideological traditions, strategies, and political circumstances, were equally bent on achieving home rule. They both wanted to obtain as much self-government as possible, but also maintained a *realpolitik* outlook, adapting to the changing Spanish political climate. The Second Spanish Republic had been born from the collapse of Primo de Rivera's dictatorship, a regime that had begun in

1923 with a Crown-supported military coup. A republican victory in the state-wide local election of the 12 April 1931 prompted a wave of republican proclamations two days later and the exile of King Alfonso XIII. In that early context, for both the PNV and ERC, self-government initially meant the parallel creation of Basque and Catalan republics, implying some kind of confederate framework for the Spanish state.[6] When this possibility dissipated, the two parties took up the task of securing self-government by means of an *Estatuto* – a home rule charter. During the summer and autumn months of 1931, the PNV and ERC put forward proposals for *Estatuos* which were both grounded in the concept of Basque and Catalan sovereignty and still hoped – rather wishfully – for some form of federal Spanish political arrangement.[7] When this was made impossible by the new republican constitution, passed in December 1931, the PNV and ERC toned down their demands. The *Estatutos* that were finally enacted – which was in September 1932 for the Catalan home rule charter, and October 1936 for its Basque counterpart – had moved from sovereignty to 'regional autonomy'.[8] So Basque and Catalan nationalists both adjusted their claims to the evolving political opportunistic structure.

Neither ERC nor the PNV planned on struggling for home rule on their own. Both parties directed their efforts through coalitions which involved other political agents. This was in many ways a strategic necessity – the legal process for the approval of an *Estatuto* required a very solid majority[9] – but it also made sense in terms of nation-building. ERC and the PNV were already mass movements but achieving home rule – moving from phase C to phase D – meant creating institutions that were supposed to represent the sum of the population living in their respective territories. This idea of a 'nation beyond the nationalists' was promoted in the political discourse of the two parties. Both the Basque and Catalan *Estatutos* were framed not as the heated claims of determined patriots, but as cross-party efforts responding to the will of

'nations of well-meaning citizens'.[10] This projection of the nationalists' claims to the rest of the nation, which often also involved the blurring of the line between party and people, closely resembles what Michael Billig describes as the 'battle for [national] hegemony, by which a part claims to speak for the whole nation and to represent the national essence.'[11] A close analysis of the discourse employed by ERC and the PNV reveals the frequent use of what this author identifies as the syntax and rhetoric of hegemony.[12] These two fragments, published the same day in the context of the 1933 Spanish general election campaign, serve as good examples of this language:

> Our candidates are *Euzkadi* and are from *Euzkadi*, and will be for *Euzkadi* and will be because of *Euzkadi*, that is, because of you, their voters, who in being good patriots you are *Euzkadi* herself [...]. Voting for them is voting for *Euzkadi*. Not voting for them is to forsake *Euzkadi*.[13]

> Vote for *Esquerra*, men and women of the new Catalonia! Your fatherland wants to live to the rhythm of the free peoples of modern Europe [...]. Let the enterprise that has been started so heroically not be interrupted and maimed by the barbarians, [...] because [...] they are the eternal enemies of our land.[14]

In these two texts, limits between party and nation are deliberately blurred. The first is particularly straightforward in portraying both the Basque nationalist voters and the PNV's candidates as a personification of *Euzkadi*, the Basque Country. The second text is a good example of what Billig describes as 'double representation', representing the nation as in describing its alleged will – 'to live to the rhythm of the free peoples of modern Europe' – and as in the party and its actions – the 'heroic enterprise' – standing for the nation.[15]

In both cases, advances towards home rule went hand in hand with ERC and the PNV assuming a leading role within their particular political contexts. ERC was quick to do this, thanks to its surprisingly good result in the local election of April 12, which in turn enabled it to play a leading role in the republican proclamations of April 14. Its leader Francesc Macià seized the initiative and proclaimed a 'Catalan Republic' – for which it formed a Provisional Government led by himself – in Barcelona. Three days later, negotiations with the new Spanish executive ended with the reconversion of the Catalan Republic into the *Generalitat*, a provisional institution for Catalan self-government pending the approval of a Catalan *Estatuto*. This effectively placed ERC at the centre of the Catalan political arena, in a position of 'political hegemony', although it struggled initially to integrate its main rival, the conservative Catalan nationalist *Lliga Regionalista* into the new system.[16] The PNV would reach a similar position, also parallel to the achievement of home rule, but it had to wait until 1936, after the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. Following the approval of the Basque *Estatuto* in October of that year, the PNV leader José Antonio Aguirre became the first *Lehendakari*, or Basque President. His party assumed key positions in the new Basque government, which included posts held by socialist and communist formal rivals.[17]

All in all, despite taking place in two different political contexts – the early days of the Second Spanish Republic *versus* the initial phase of the Spanish Civil War – both ERC and the PNV led processes which combined the achievement of both political hegemony and national self-government. By October 1936 two self-ruling institutions – the Basque government and the Catalan *Generalitat* – were in existence, with attributes often associated with sovereign states: a national flag, a national capital, and a national language which had to be protected and promoted. ERC and the PNV played a central role within these institutions, but they also had the support of other political actors.

Symbolic and political frames which had previously only existed as part of the Basque and Catalan nationalist programmes, were now material and institutional realities.[18]

Different contexts, different challenges

The aforementioned arguments must be reconciled with the fact that the practical aspects of Basque and Catalan nationalist politics between 1931 and 1939 were often markedly different. This does not invalidate the idea that ERC and the PNV were engaging in essentially similar processes in terms of nation-building. It simply underlines that these processes were very similar in their substance yet different in their practical materialisation, in terms of both form and timing. More insight into why this was the case can be gained by applying the conceptual framework proposed by Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow in their mechanism-process approach to contentious politics.[19] This methodology involves the analysis of the political actors making claims, their relationship with the existing regime(s), and the relevant political identities at work, in order to explain the roles and actions of particular players.

The PNV was the leading political actor within Basque nationalism after its reformation in 1930, when two factions created by a previous split in 1921 agreed to reunify. Founded by Sabino and Luis Arana in 1895, the PNV came from an integralist Catholic political tradition, and it was positioned to the right of the political spectrum. Those who had wished to move the party towards a more liberal progressive position left to create *Acción Nacionalista Vasca* (ANV) in 1930.[20] In the years preceding the start of the Spanish Civil War however, the PNV would gradually transition to a more centre-right, Christian democratic stance, influenced by leaders such as José Antonio Aguirre and Manuel Irujo. The dominant

Catalan nationalist player emerged in 1931 as *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC). Unambiguously to the left of the political spectrum, ERC was grounded in a convergence of the Catalan republican and nationalist traditions. Its leaders included Francesc Macià, an ex-Colonel in the Spanish army and founder of the pro-independence party *Estat Català*, who had become a symbol of resistance to Primo de Rivera's dictatorship during the previous decade. Another key figure was Lluís Companys, a labour lawyer on good terms with the anarcho-syndicalist union CNT and with a long history in republican activism.

These two different ideological backgrounds would have direct impact on the two agents' relationship with the new regime. On the one hand, ERC became what Tilly and Tarrow describe as a 'regime member', i.e. a political actor with a 'secure standing in day-to-day politics'. Conversely, the PNV soon adopted the role of 'regime challenger', still influential but not on very good terms with the ruling actors.[21] ERC was bound by a strategic agreement with the Spanish republican left. Its founders had taken part in the *Pacto de San Sebastián*, an alliance brokered in August 1930 which included Spanish republican parties and the socialist PSOE to bring down Primo de Rivera's dictatorship. When this alliance triumphed after the 14 April 1931 proclamations, ERC naturally assumed a position of closeness with the new regime led by President Niceto Alcalá-Zamora. The PNV, on the other hand, was absent from the San Sebastian pact, as it prioritized its party reunification process. Moreover, it had little sympathy for the now ruling Spanish left, which had been its historical rival (the PSOE in particular), given its strength in the Basque industrial areas of Biscay and Gipuzkoa.

Besides their different relationships with the republican regime, ERC and the PNV had to deal with different balances of power within their respective political contexts. Basque nationalism, after its emergence in the late-nineteenth century, had developed unequally through the Basque territory. It was dominant in the rural areas of Biscay and

Gipuzkoa, less so in the more urban and industrial parts of these two provinces, and quite weak in the Carlist-dominated Araba and Navarre. In absolute terms, the Basque political arena was similar to 'an almost equilateral political triangle', drawn between the PNV, the socialist and republican parties, and the monarchist right which included the Carlists.[22] Catalan nationalism was much more evenly distributed throughout Catalonia, its four provinces falling under the shadow of Barcelona's specific economic, political and cultural weight. Of the three forces that can be considered to form the Catalan political triangle, two – ERC and its conservative rival, the *Lliga Regionalista* – can be described as Catalan nationalist. The third key player was the anarcho-syndicalist union CNT, which mostly stayed out from institutional politics.[23]

The regime member *versus* challenger situation between ERC and the PNV created a strategic barrier which had profound effects. During the summer and autumn months of 1931, the new Republic was engaged in a process to draft its constitution. In this context, both the PNV and ERC were pressing to secure home rule by means of an *Estatuto*. ERC mustered support from different corners of the political spectrum, but its winning card was again maintaining a good relationship with the Spanish republican left, which would prove ultimately decisive in the final approval of the Catalan *Estatuto* in September 1932. The PNV, on the other hand, turned to some of the regime's worst enemies for help: the Carlist monarchists, with whom it formed a coalition for the June 1931 general election. Madrid was unwilling to allow a quick implementation of Basque home rule, not even in provisional terms as it had allowed in Catalonia, fearing a Basque self-governing institution would fall into the hands of the Basque nationalist-Carlist coalition.[24]

In terms of political identities, a major factor behind the different politics of ERC and the PNV was the religious question. True to its leftist republican tradition, ERC was an enthusiastic supporter of the new regime's secularisation policies. The PNV, on the other hand,

represented the opposition by many Basque Catholics to diminish the Catholic Church's social and political influence. Its stance on religion was one of the reasons why it was able to join forces with the Carlists in 1931. In fact, their joint proposal for a Basque *Estatuto* was framed in religious terms and even included a provision for a separate Basque concordat with the Vatican. The idea, dubbed 'a vaticanist Gibraltar' by the Basque PSOE leader Indalecio Prieto, was to revolt to the Spanish left and to the provisional executive in Madrid. The religious question was particularly damaging to the relations between ERC and the PNV. As tension rose, many in the former saw the latter as backward 'troglodytes' clinging to oppressive traditionalist principles. Meanwhile, the PNV's press would often depict ERC as furiously anticlerical and 'sectarian'.[25]

With the leftist defeat in the Spanish 1933 general election came the end of ERC's status as a regime member and the gradual erosion of the strategic barrier with the PNV. This brought the two parties closer together, which did not prevent them from continuing to make different strategic and tactical decisions over the next years. In October 1934, the PSOE and other leftist agents led an insurrection against the Spanish government, after Alejandro Lerroux's Radical Party formed an executive which included ministers from the authoritarian right-wing *Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas* (CEDA). ERC joined in from its position of institutional power in Catalonia. Lluís Companys proclaimed a 'Catalan State of the Spanish Federal Republic' before the rising was crushed by the Spanish army. Meanwhile, the PNV remained passive and, beyond some local-level incidents, had nothing to do with the insurrection. Its position on the political spectrum meant the Basque nationalist party could not lend its support to a rebellion that was being spearheaded by socialists and communists demanding radical social change. In February 1936, ERC and the PNV also took different positions with regards to the general election. The former enthusiastically sided with the broad alliance formed by the Spanish left, the Popular Front,

represented in Catalonia by the *Front d'esquerres*. The latter fielded its own candidates despite the growing left-right polarisation that would eventually give rise to the Spanish Civil War.

The Spanish Civil War and the limits of Basque and Catalan nation-building

The circumstances created by the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War allowed a series of developments which can be seen as a continuation of the pattern described above. On the one hand, the conflict represented an unprecedented opportunity for Basque and Catalan nation-building. The initial chaos caused by the fighting and Madrid's initial erratic response to the rising of the colonial Army of Africa in July 1936 severely reduced the republican government's capacity to exercise firm control over its territory. This meant that Catalan and Basque self-government, which *de jure* was significantly limited, became *de facto* almost of a state-like nature. Both the *Generalitat* and the new Basque government assumed power attributions that went well beyond the limits established by their respective *Estatutos*. With the ability to exercise control over military units, justice systems, currency and foreign relations, the potential for a full transition from phase C to D in terms of nation-building was very real.

On the other hand, the war also posed enormous challenges. This was true for both cases, although once again the particularities of each context determined each specific picture. In Catalonia, perhaps the greatest challenge was the fact that in the aftermath of the defeated military coup, armed worker's militias had effectively seized control. The *Generalitat* slowly reversed this power-duality situation during the autumn of 1936, but the revolutionaries, particularly the CNT, retained a significant degree of power until May 1937. In the Basque Country,

Aguirre's government's main handicap was that most of the Basque territory had actually been taken over by Franco's advancing armies. This included the whole province of Navarre, as well as the vast majority of Gipuzkoa and Araba. The remaining territory under the Basque government's control was part of a larger republican pocket which included Cantabria and Asturias. This isolation, which enabled the Basque government to operate with little interference from the central republican executive, also created a dangerous military situation.

Perhaps the epitome of how the war could create combinations of opportunities and challenges for Basque and Catalan nation-building was the actual military dimension of the conflict. Eugene Weber showed the crucial role played by mass military service in French nation-building.[26] Surely, mass conscription under the banners of the Basque and Catalan governments would have had a large potential for nation-building. In practice, however, this faced several complications. For a significant portion of the conflict, military units were openly party or union based and made up of volunteers, and only Basque or Catalan nationalist units had what can be described as a Basque or Catalan 'nationalising climate'. It is difficult to measure the 'nation-building effectiveness' of both cases, but existing studies show that Basque nationalist units were more effective in this endeavour than their Catalan nationalist counterparts.[27]

This high-water mark in Basque and Catalan self-government was short-lived. In neither case did it manage to survive the spring of 1937. The March 31 rebel general Emilio Mola began an offensive which, despite strong Basque resistance, managed to take Bilbao on June 19. The Basque government was forced into exile, relocating to Barcelona via France. Beginning in May, the republican government under Juan Negrín began to take steps to erode Catalan home rule. Catalan military units – included those created by Catalan nationalists – were integrated into the centralised *Ejército Popular Republicano*. After November, the Spanish

republican cabinet moved to Barcelona, where it took over many of the *Generalitat*'s functions, including war industries, supplies, and foreign trade.

Franco's final victory over Catalonia in January 1939, which resulted in the Basque and Catalan presidents crossing the border with France together, was a hard blow to both nationalist movements' nation building processes. Under the Francoist 'New Spain', phase D was unattainable, and both movements were forced to an underground version of phase C.

All in all, the particular approach outlined in this paper shows that the political paths of ERC and the PNV during the 1930s can be viewed, not in the light of the two parties' many ideological differences, but as leading agents in parallel nation-building processes. This perspective brings some more light to transition from phase C to D in cases in which national self-ruling institutions are achieved, but are not sovereign. The cases of ERC and the PNV during the Second Spanish Republic clearly show how home rule, despite providing a significant qualitative leap in nation-building, came with its own challenges and remained contentious up to its complete reversal in 1939

Endnotes

[1] For the most complete study available for ERC during the Second Spanish Republic see M.D. Ivern i Salvà, *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (1931-1936)* (Barcelona, 1988) 1 & 2 vols. Another key reference is J.B. Culla, *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, 1931-2012: una història política* (Barcelona, 2013). On the PNV, see S. de Pablo, L. Mees & J.A. Rodríguez Ranz, *El Péndulo Patriótico* (Barcelona, 1999 & 2001) 1 & 2 vols. On the PNV's internal organisation and

support base during the Second Spanish Republic, see J.M. Tápiz Fernández, *El PNV durante la II República (organización interna, implantación territorial y bases sociales)* (Bilbao 2001).

[2] The impact of comparative research on Basque and Catalan nationalism has been quite limited considering the relative popularity of both movements as individual objects of study. Sociology, rather than historiography, has produced the two complete comparative studies available to date: J. Díez Medrano, *Divided nations: Class, Politics and Nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia* (Ithaca, 1995); D. Conversi, *The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation* (London, 1997). This is not to say that historians of Basque and Catalan nationalism have ignored the comparative perspective, but within historiography comparison has been often limited to very specific issues or remained a secondary feature within wider pieces of research. Díez Medrano's aforementioned work can be seen as an example of the 'difference hypothesis' approach, influenced by the earlier Elorza, 'Ideología Nacionalista y Antiguo Régimen: elementos para una comparación', in: *Industrialización y Nacionalismo: Análisis Comparativo. Actas del I Coloquio Vasco-Catalán de Historia*, (1985), 401-413.

[3] M. Hroch, *European Nations. Explaining their Formation* (New York, 2015), 31.

[4] M. Hroch, *Social preconditions of national revival in Europe: a comparative analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations* (New York, 2000).

[5] Maxwell, 'Typologies and phases in nationalism studies: Hroch's A-B-C schema as a basis for comparative terminology', in: *Nationalities Papers*, 38/6 (2010), 871; J. Coakley, *Nationalism, Ethnicity and the State: Making and Breaking Nations* (London, 2012), 194, 214.

[6] The Catalan Republic was proclaimed by Francesc Macià on 14 April 1931, partly as a reaction to the spreading wave of generic – i.e. Spanish – republican proclamations, including an earlier proclamation in Barcelona by Lluís Companys. Macià formed a provisional executive and a 'civic guard' to further assert his position. Madrid decided on a negotiated deactivation of the Catalan Republic, given Macià's prestige and position of relative strength, as well as his leftist sympathies with the Spanish Republican cause. See Ivern i Salvà, *Esquerra*

Republicana de Catalunya, vol. 1, 99-100. On the other hand, the Basque Republic was never proclaimed as such, although the concept was included in an official note read by the newly elected Basque nationalist representatives. When the PNV tried to move on to something more serious by calling for an assembly of Basque town councillors in Gernika, the Spanish Government sent the army and aborted the meeting. See de Pablo e.a., *El Péndulo Patriótico*, vol. 1, 211; 'Lo ocurrido en Gernika', in: *Euzkadi* (18-4-1931).

[7] The initial proposals for a Basque and Catalan *Estatutos* made in the summer of 1931 were known by names of the towns that had played a key role in their creation, Estella and Núria respectively. Both contained assertions of Basque and Catalan sovereignty but differed greatly in other key aspects. The Catalan Núria text was much more in line with the republican and secularist spirit of the new Spanish regime, while the Basque Estella proposal showed clear influences from corporatism and traditionalism. See X. Bernadí Gil, *El Traspàs de Serveis de l'Estat a la Genrealitat: de l'Estatut de 1932 a l'Estatut de 2006* (Barcelona, 2010), 45-52; 'El Proyecto de Estatuto Vasco', in: *Euzkadi* (17-6-1931).

[8] The 1931 Spanish Constitution defined Spain as a *estado integral*, an ambiguous term which was meant to allow administrative decentralisation without adopting the federal formula and safeguarding Spanish national sovereignty. The Catalan *Estatuto* that was finally passed by the Spanish Parliament, or *Cortes*, in September 1932 was a heavily modified version of the Núria text. See Bernadí Gil, *El Traspàs de Serveis de l'Estat a la Generalitat*, 53-58. The Basque Estella *Estatuto* was discarded after the approval of the republican Constitution in December 1931. Later proposals failed to progress because of the continued animosity between the PNV and the Spanish left, and after November 1933, because of the opposition of the Spanish political right. See *Proyecto de Estatuto del País Vasco-Navarro* (Bilbao, 1932). Navarre was included in the initial *Estatuto* texts, but the province abandoned the project in 1933 following the combined rejection of the Carlists and some leftists. See de J.L. la Granja, *Nacionalismo y II República en el País Vasco* (Madrid, 2008), 298-304. The Basque *Estatuto* that was finally enacted in October 1936 was essentially a copy of its Catalan counterpart. It was meant *de jure* for the provinces of Araba, Gipuzkoa and Biscay, although only applied *de facto* to the former. See *Gaceta de Madrid* (7-10-1936).

[9] The 1931 Spanish Constitution established that, before being taken to Parliament, an *Estatuto* needed the support of the majority of municipalities within the region it sought to represent and a favourable plebiscite of at least two thirds of the electoral census. See *Gaceta de Madrid* (9-12-1931).

[10] *La Rambla* (18-5-1931); *Euzkadi* (21-5-1931).

[11] M. Billig, *Banal nationalism* (London 1995), 27.

[12] Billig, *Banal nationalism*, 88.

[13] *Euzkadi* (19-11-1933).

[14] *Esquerra* (19-11-1933).

[15] Billig, *Banal nationalism*, 98.

[16] A. Sallés, *Quan Catalunya era d'Esquerra* (Barcelona, 1981).

[17] J.L. de la Granja, *El Oasis Vasco* (Madrid, 2007), 383-384.

[18] It is important to note that two of the most important Basque nationalist symbols that became institutionalised in 1936 – the Basque nationalist's name for the Basque Country, *Euzkadi*, and the Basque nationalist *ikurriña* flag – had only been created by the Arana brothers at the end of the nineteenth century. For decades, these symbols had remained associated exclusively to the PNV and the Basque nationalist community, so their adoption by the Basque government in 1936 was a rather dramatic change. See Casquete & de la Granja, 'Ikurriña', in: *Diccionario Ilustrado de Símbolos del Nacionalismo Vasco* (Madrid, 2012), 508-516; L. Mees, 'Euskadi/Euskal Herria' in: *Diccionario Ilustrado de Símbolos del Nacionalismo Vasco* (Madrid, 2012), 294-319. On the other hand, the term *Catalunya* and the Catalan *senyera* flag had a previous tradition of both institutional and popular use that could be traced back to the Middle Ages, so they were not exclusively associated to Catalan nationalism. See P. Anguera, *Les Quatre Barres: De Bandera Històrica a Senyera Nacional* (Barcelona, 2010).

[19] C. Tilly, & S. Tarrow, *Contentious Politics* (Oxford 2015). For a recent application of the 'contentious politics' concept to the case of Basque nationalism and the Basque conflict, see L. Mees, *The Basque Contention* (New York, 2020).

[20] For the most comprehensive study on ANV to date see de la Granja, *Nacionalismo y II República en el País Vasco*.

[21] Tilly e.a., *Contentious Politics*, 240.

[22] De la Granja, *Nacionalismo y II República en el País Vasco*, 607-608.

[23] I. Molas, *El sistema de partidos políticos en Cataluña (1931-1939)* (Barcelona, 1974), 19-21.

[24] A lucid perspective on the apparent inability of the PNV to grasp the reality of the political situation – and why its claims for self-government were not treated in the same way as those of Catalan nationalists – can be found in Sallés, Ucelay Da Cal, 'L'analogia falsa: el Nacionalisme Basc davant de la República Catalana i la Generalitat Provisional, abril-juliol del 1931', in: *Industrialización y Nacionalismo: Análisis Comparativo. Actas del I Coloquio Vasco-Catalán de Historia*, (1985) 443-470.

[25] *La Rambla* (31-8-193)1; *Euzkadi* (18-10-1931).

[26] E. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen. The modernisation of rural France, 1870-1914* (Palo Alto, 1976).

[27] X.M. Núñez Seixas, *¡Fuera el invasor! Nacionalismos y movilización bélica durante la Guerra Civil española (1936-1939)* (Madrid, 2006).

Sub-state nationalisms in Spain during the Moroccan War and the Rif War (1909-1927)

ALFONSO IGLESIAS AMORÍN

University of Santiago de Compostela

This article analyses how the Spanish colonial wars in Morocco in the early 20th Century influenced Catalan, Basque and Galician nationalisms at an absolutely key moment in their development. It assesses the aftermath of the Versailles settlement and the new claims of colonial peripheries, which coincided with the Disaster of Annual in 1921, Spain's great defeat in Morocco, which served as a weapon against the State for sub-state nationalisms, and led to the appearance of the Rif Republic, a benchmark in the anti-Spanish fight.

The article examines how the war was used to mobilize people against prevailing Spanish nationalism, the warmongering, colonialist, anti-war and anti-colonial discourses of the nationalisms in question and the positions of the main political parties and leaders. In short, it seek to measure the impact that this long and important war had on different Spanish national identities during the first decades of the 20th century.

Keywords: Nationalism, colonialism, Hispano-Moroccan Wars, sub-state nationalisms

Introduction

Although Spain did not take part in the major military conflict of the first third of the twentieth Century (i.e. the Great War), it had to maintain a war effort for most of that period. The colonial conflict in Morocco turned particularly violent from 1909 onwards, and the area of Spanish influence in the north of the sultanate would be in an almost constant state of war until 1927. Spanish historiography tends to treat this period as a single conflict[1], often referred to as the Rif War[2], although outside Spain, the term usually alludes solely to the war that took place between 1921 and 1926 between the Spanish army and the Rif Kabyle people led by Abdelkrim after the Disaster of Annual. This article will focus on this entire series of conflicts, which posed a great challenge for Spain that underwent several setbacks in what was a key episode in twentieth-century Spain. For example, it was one of the triggers for Miguel Primo de Rivera's coup in 1923,[3] contributed to the appearance of the military elite that rebelled against the Second Republic in 1936,[4] and from 1909 onwards was one of the main arguments in the protests of a growing labour movement that used popular discontent for propaganda purposes.[5]

In terms of an analysis of national identities, the war was closely linked to Spanish nationalism.[6] Patriotism was very intense amidst the military exaltation of a conflict that increased 'nation consumption'.[7] However, not everything was positive for Spanish nationalism, and both the military disasters and the continuous 'blood tax' made the war unpopular, abating even the most bellicose patriotism. In this context, peripheral nationalisms found a favourable scenario for creating some distance by highlighting the link between the war and Spanish nationalism in order to discredit it. Positions ranged from moderate, which opposed the conflict by expressing an anti-war sentiment, to the most radical (especially in Basque and Catalan nationalism, although

much less in their Galician counterpart). They expressed their support for the Rifian cause in the sense that if the Rifians were enemies of Spain, then that made them allies. Furthermore, there were also sectors of those nationalisms, especially in Catalonia, that viewed this colonialism positively, particularly in terms of economic interests.

Although some publications have analysed how Catalan, Basque, and Galician nationalism interacted concerning the Spanish wars in Morocco,[8] the three have scarcely been assessed together, and shall therefore be the focus of this article. Through available bibliography and primary sources (especially periodical archive sources), this study will examine how these sub-state nationalisms made use of the war in order to mobilize people against the predominant Spanish nationalism. The warmongering, colonialist, anti-war and anti-colonial discourses of these nationalisms will be analysed, and the positions of the main political parties and leaders discussed. In short, this article seeks to measure the impact that this long and important war had on different Spanish national identities in the first third of the twentieth century.

Morocco and nationalisms in Spain

During the nineteenth century, when the nation was conceived as the social unit par excellence in Europe, there was a rapid process of the creation of national identities and imaginaries that enabled individuals to assert themselves as members of a differentiated community. In this creation of identities and imaginaries, wars have always been crucial, often for increasing social cohesion by consolidating communal ties, as well as to encourage self-identification in contrast to a common enemy.[9] In the case of sub-state nationalism, this occurs with wars of national liberation, in which the common enemy is precisely the state from which independence is sought. On the other hand, the conflicts in which the

state is involved abroad, such as the colonial war that is the subject of this article, can be employed by sub-state nationalisms in order to discredit the state which they believe is subjugating them, and where they even identify with those who should have been regarded as their enemies.

In the nineteenth century, there was a significant Spanish conflict in Morocco, the Hispano-Moroccan War,[10] which took place in 1859-1860. The way in which this conflict affected identities in Spain was very different to what would occur half a century later. At that time, national unity was the prevailing theme, and where there were alternative identities,[11] these were integrated without any apparent contradiction to that of Spain. They even left some references for posterity, such as the famous Catalan Volunteers, a military unit conceived at the local level to fight for the 'great homeland', and which boasted a specifically Catalan discourse and symbols, such as, for example, the *barretina*, or traditional red Catalan cap, but whose Spanishness was beyond all doubt.[12] They also left notable celebrations to remember, such as those that took place throughout the country after the victory at the Battle of Tétouan or the reception in style of the victorious troops in Madrid, both in 1860. However, despite the intensity of patriotic fervour, it was quite ephemeral and had little impact, exposing the disproportion between the nationalist discourse employed by an intellectual elite and the limited capacity and willingness of the liberal state to carry out a 'patriotic' programme.[13]

The general patriotic enthusiasm surrounding the Hispano-Moroccan War of 1859-1860 never occurred with the Moroccan War from 1909 and the Rif War from 1921. In general, since the loss of Cuba in 1898, which dealt a terrible moral blow to Spain, belligerent patriotism decreased notably. There were some celebrations and send-offs with large crowds, but these were less frequent than in previous periods. Episodes such as the occupations of Tétouan (1913) or Chefchaouen

(1920) barely caused celebration, although this was partly because they were occupied due to diplomacy rather than victory on the battlefield. The capture of Gurugú or the citadel of Selouane in 1909 had generated somewhat more enthusiasm, but this pales in comparison with that of half a century earlier, and the sustained duration of hostilities increased the weariness of the population. It might even have prejudiced Spanish nationalism due to the disrepute that the ongoing 'blood tax' paid by the population entailed, but ultimately such disrepute fell primarily on the political class, and the anti-war sentiment may also be a factor that boosted nationalist sentiment.[14]

The terrible Disaster of Annual in 1921 reactivated Spanish patriotism in a sense, and was in part linked to a clamour for vengeance, often with aspects of extreme nationalism. However, this was also linked to a greater concern for soldiers and more initiatives to support them. Although this was almost always enveloped in a strongly pro-Spanish discourse, it did not necessarily have to be linked to patriotism, and in fact the normal tendency was that the 'patriotic' mobilization was due to a clear desire to help soldiers with little interest in national exaltation.

The conflict started in 1909 and coincided with a moment in which Spanish nationalism was already fully consolidated, but its Basque, Catalan and Galician equivalents were still in development and in search of points of reference. Nationalisms often construct their idea of the fatherland by imitating other nations which act as models to be emulated, whether due to the success of their independence process or by having a common enemy.[15] The emerging sub-state Spanish nationalisms had above all European reference points like Ireland, and some non-European cases which proved relevant, such as Cuba may have been. Although in Morocco, and also specifically in the Rif, there were struggles for independence with a common enemy such as Spain, these never became one of those points of reference, although as shall be

seen, great attention was paid to their progress and contact would be sought when this was regarded as useful.

Nineteenth-century colonialism and Spanish sub-state identities

The nineteenth century is the most significant epoch for imperialist colonialism, a phenomenon closely linked to the nation-state and the need for international assertion through the domination of other territories. Although in the Spanish case this colonialism was very weak, and liberal Spain had to create its project with an empire in decline following the independence of former colonies in Latin America, colonial territories like Cuba or Morocco played an important role in Spain's national assertion, largely because of the conflicts that took place there. Therefore, the Hispano-Moroccan War became of interest again because it reveals the state of affairs in the mid-nineteenth century and the great change that occurred in just half a century. If its reception by sub-state Spanish identities (which at that time were still regionalist and provincialist, and yet to become nationalist) is examined, the aforementioned unity can be studied in depth by referring to Catalan regionalism.

It is clear that the war gave an impetus to cultural Catalanism, and favoured the recovery of historical points of reference, such as the Almogavars,[16] who would subsequently enjoy a lengthy period of relevance. In 1859-60, they were both Catalan and Spanish reference, points, but over time would come to be exclusively Catalan. The most notable Catalan example was the aforementioned Catalan Volunteers,[17] a military unit of almost 500 soldiers who fought in the final battles of the war. They were highly present in subsequent memory and history, in the same manner as General Juan Prim, a Catalan who achieved great

popularity through his participation in the campaign. The return of these troops in 1860 was referred to by the sources of the time as an overwhelming event: triumphal arches, street decorations, music and choirs, theatrical functions, banquets and a long list of festive activities that went on for several days.[18] The impact of the war in Catalonia was such that half a century after the conflict it would once again be highly relevant, and cultural creations, such as the choral composition by Anselm Clavé, *Los nets dels almugàvers* [The Almogavars' Grandchildren], which was heard for years, or the paintings of Mariano Fortuny, such as *La Batalla de Tetuán* [*The Battle of Tetouan*], which became a visual symbol of the campaign, were still present.

In the Basque case, the memory of the Hispano-Moroccan War would also be retained, although with much less intensity than in Catalonia.[19] There were also the Basque Regiments, but they appeared later, and their impact was lesser. The integration of regional and national features was repeated in them. The love of the homeland, Spain, was not at odds with the charters of local privileges (which were to be defended), and recruitment could serve to demonstrate how well the decentralized system worked. A strong sense of Spanishness characterised the discourse employed in the Basque case, including in historical references, and with less exclusively regional content than in the Catalan case. Finally, the project to create a volunteer unit did not come to fruition in the Galician case; the ardently pro-Spanish discourse was employed, although with particular attention to points of reference regarded as being Galician, such as the kings Alfonso VI and Alfonso VII or the apostle, St. James. Provincialism, precedent of the future Galician nationalism, even depicted Galicia as the most faithful member of the Spanish nation.[20] In short, it can be concluded that in all three cases there was a regional identity that was complementary to and interdependent of Spanish identity,[21] to which it was subordinated and with which it was integrated in perfect symbiosis, without contradictions.

Changes took place towards the end of the century, and in the Catalan and Basque cases resulted in a transition from regionalism to nationalism, which in the Galician case did not occur until well into the twentieth century. However, the presence of anti-colonialism was quite scarce. Although the hegemonic current of Catalan historiography has sought to characterise the political and cultural Catalanism of the latter nineteenth century and the nationalism of the early twentieth century as anti-colonialist, authors such as Eloy Martín Corrales or Enric Ucelay have demonstrated that this was not the case.[22] The Catalan bourgeoisie, closely linked to the regionalist project, had clearly supported the wars in Cuba and the Philippines. Defeat made them return to the national market, and regionalism was an interesting route by which to seek state and social reform,[23] which contributed to seeing the events of 1898 as a key moment in Catalanist awareness. However, even though there was a change in approach, the *Lliga Regionalista* (Regionalist League) cannot be defined as anti-colonialist, and indeed influential figures such as the politician Enric Prat de la Riba publicly expressed imperialist positions.[24] Furthermore, with Galician regionalism, the defence of Cuba's Spanishness was a constant factor, with figures such as the writer Alfredo Brañas decisively supporting the war. The contrast lay in the principal tendency of latent Basque nationalism, that of the PNV and its founder, Sabino Arana, who applauded Cuban independence and regarded the Africans as 'legitimate masters' of the territories colonized by the Europeans, which gave them the right to reconquer them. In this way, the PNV would regard the Spanish occupations in Morocco as unjust. This anti-colonialism is a modern feature in the general traditionalism of Sabino Arana, although it was clearly instrumental in nature,[25] and the pejorative use of terms such as *moro* (Moor) demonstrates that it had assumed stereotypes that were common at the time.[26]

Emerging nationalisms amidst the tensions of a colonial war

Barely a decade after the colonial and imperialist conflict in Cuba, the Spanish army once again had a place to fight for prestige and medals: northern Morocco, declared by the European power as an area of Spanish influence in the Algeciras Conference of 1906. Imperialist aims once again had an objective, and Spanish nationalism not only aligned with the aims of other nationalist movements in the state, but the aforementioned tendency continued within Catalan nationalism in spite of the contradictions this entailed, as it was aware that the only imperialism feasible for Catalonia was through alignment with Spain and its army: an army whose major concerns included Catalanism. However, it is clear that the situation in Catalonia was changing although there were important differences between the bourgeoisie, which accepted the theoretical rationality and practical reason for imperialism, and the clear popular rejection of waging a war that would lengthen over time.

In Catalonia, the war which began in 1909 had an impact which went beyond the sending of troops or ideological aspects, especially due to its role in the Tragic Week in Barcelona in 1909. The origins of that violent series of strikes, disturbances, and fires, which marked Catalan and Spanish society over subsequent years, lay in the dispatch of troops to Morocco, whose send-off led to a riot that triggered everything.[27] From that point onwards, the constant state of war in Morocco in the subsequent years made the unpopularity of the war a long-term issue.

It is clear that the war was unpopular amongst the populace, not only due to the increase in social protest, but also due to the high rates of desertion and recruits paying in order to avoid service. In the Catalan case, it was extremely common to avoid the draft by fleeing to France, especially during the period of the First World War,[28] whilst in Galicia it

was increasingly common to emigrate to Latin America as an escape route. The absolute lack of enthusiasm with which many were forced to go to war can be ascertained through the soldiers' accounts; if they identified even slightly with centripetal nationalism, it was not difficult for them to affirm such convictions. A good example is the Catalan writer Josep María Prous i Vila, who would write in his diary about the enemy: 'In truth, I did not wish to kill anyone, but neither would I like it if they killed me'.[29] A clear anti-war spirit which was complemented with a defence of peace and the rights of peoples, and which he shared with another fine writer from the Galicianist camp, Xosé Ramón Fernández-Oxea,[30] who also empathized with the Rifians. Although none of their observations went against pro-Spanishness, they reveal how the war succeeded in intensifying a sense of Catalanism or Galicianism, respectively, in tandem with a 'denationalising' of their sense of Spanishness. Although this effect would be negligible in the entirety of the Spanish contingent, it seems relevant for centripetal nationalisms at a decisive point in their political development.

The First World War had a notable impact on sub-state nationalisms. Wilson's Fourteen Points seemed to augur the liberation of smaller nationalities and the end of absolute monarchies and reactionary militarism. In this context, the politician Francesc Macià became the leader of a Catalan nationalism far more radical in tendency than the *Lliga*. After the failed campaign for the Statute of Autonomy in 1918-1919, Catalanist mobilisation focused more on Morocco, viewing the Spanish militarism that held up the monarchy of Alfonso XIII as a cheap copy of the Kaiser's Prussian militarism,[31] and wishing the same outcome for it.

In this climate of opposition to the war, the first open expressions of solidarity with the enemy appeared. In October 1919, for example, a National Catalan Committee in Barcelona circulated a pamphlet addressed 'To His Excellency El Raisuni' with texts in Arabic and Catalan

under the red flag of Yebala and the separatist *senyera* with the 'single star'. The signatories celebrated the valiant defence of the 'Moroccan homeland menaced by Spain' by Raisuni, and the 'sons of Catalonia' sent him a 'message of support' which served as a reminder that it was not the first time that the Catalans had protested against the invasion of Morocco, recalling somewhat advantageously what had occurred in 1909. They also condemned the military methods of the Spanish army in Morocco and wished Raisuni good health and courage.[32] In spite of being written in Arabic and Catalan, the text's principal objective was to cause provocation, in an atmosphere of tension and confrontation that was typical in the Catalan capital at the time. Indeed, the appearance of organizations like the *Liga Patriótica Española* [Spanish Patriotic League], formed above all by officials from the Barcelona garrison, and regarded as the possibly first expression of fascism in Spain,[33] was due in some part to this tense situation.

In Galician nationalism, as in other aspects, matters proceeded at a slower pace, and it was harder to perceive this kind of empathy with the Moroccans, whether sincere or not. Antón Vilar Ponte, one of the founding fathers of Galician nationalism, made pejorative statements in this regard in 1918: 'Throughout history, the Arab race hardly had any contact with us. Galicia remained untouched by the African influence'.[34] He also demonstrated that he knew very little about Moroccan affairs when referring to the territory as if it were entirely made up of desert and using Arab and Muslim as if they were synonyms. In general, there was little concern for the war amongst the leading figures of Galician nationalism such as Alfonso Castelao or Vicente Risco, although their opposition to it was clear.[35]

Both Catalan and Basque nationalism referred to Morocco in anti-Spanish and anti-military terms, rather than anti-imperialist. The type of sympathy such as that evoked by El Raisuni was simply that of a 'good barbarian', which served as a contrast to the 'barbaric methods of the

Spanish army'.[36] The defence of Morocco often seems more practical than sincere. After 1921 and the Disaster of Annual, the Moroccan who received the greatest sympathy was Abdelkrim. Both he and the Republic of the Rif that he founded began to be acclaimed frequently at events by groups such as *Estat Català* (Macià's party) or *Acció Catalana*.[37] In the case of *Euzkadi* (the Basque Country), the *Aberri*-PNV party, which had split from *Comunión Tradicionalista Vasca* [Basque Traditionalist Communion], and was led by Elías Gallástegui 'Gudari', stood out.[38] This party defended in no uncertain terms the right of the Rifians to their independence, and even the idea of a 'Quadruple Alliance' of which the Republic of the Rif would be a member together with Euzkadi, Catalonia and Galicia. In the words of Gallástegui: 'A new and brilliant light shall shine on the Triple Alliance from the most distant southern land. Over the Strait of Gibraltar and crossing this Spain that humiliates us [...], the Quadruple Alliance shall be sealed'.[39] This idea would also be supported in the most radical sectors of Catalan nationalism. Gudari was very critical of the *moors* who let themselves be bought by Spain and defended those who fought against it, especially Abdelkrim, due to his defence of Moroccan independence: 'Our greeting of admiration, respect and support is sent to and for you, Moorish chief!'[40]

Although less frequent in Galicia, Abdelkrim was also defended by groups such as *Irmandade Nazonalista Galega* [Galician Nationalist Brotherhood], which was firmly opposed to the war.[41] In spite of his vague ideas at the beginning, Antón Vilar Ponte ended up exalting the 'civilized' Abdelkrim and his independent and federative Republic, which he regarded as having more opportunities to Europeanise the Rif than the 'monstruo antediluviano del Estado centralista español' [anti-diluvian monster of the centralist Spanish state], and even recognised that it could be an example for the Iberian peoples of how to attain freedom.[42] A similar line was taken by the Ourense newspaper, *La Zarpa*, founded by the agrarian reform movement leader, Basilio Álvarez. Many

figures from Galician nationalism collaborated with Álvarez, one of the most vehemently anti-war voices in Galicia. He published the articles of Xosé Ramón Fernández-Oxea and came to express a certain anti-colonialism by stating that the Rifian cause was just, that Abdelkrim was the sole hero of the war and that those who deserted the Spanish army deserved to be praised.[43] The poet Manuel Antonio, who defended the cause of the Rifian people and their right to self-determination, is an example of decisive anti-colonialism in the Galician case. He even urged his friend Rafael Dieste, another leading figure of Galician nationalism, to support the side of Abdelkrim or to desert.[44] These calls to refuse to do military service or desert, more habitual in the Catalan and Basque cases, hardly occurred in Galicia, which adds interest to the texts of Manuel Antonio and also make him an all too infrequent exception.

In spite of being more moderate than *Aberri*, the *Comunión Tradicionalista Vasca* also displayed a certain anti-colonialism, to a greater extent than that of the *Lliga in Catalonia*, albeit nuanced. For example, Manuel Aranzadi, one of the leaders of the group, was highly critical of Spanish imperialism, which he regarded as unjust and inhumane, and believed that Morocco should be free. This colonialism was evident and not simply pacifist, as is shown by his similar evaluation of the case of Guinea, for example, in the article 'Africa for the Africans', by Alberto Olabarría, published in *Euzkadi*, the principal mouthpiece of *Comunión Tradicionalista Vasca*.[45]

The Moroccan war acted as a basis around which the nationalist mobilisation in Catalonia and Euzkadi could assemble. However, understanding of the Rifian independence movement was far less, especially in the Catalan case. A defeatism that focused on benefits such as the end of economic expenses and human lives in the war prevailed, especially in relation with forced conscription. Gudari pointed out in *Aberri* that the nationalists should unite to wage 'war on the war' and 'impede decisively that the race and youth endure a bloodbath in this

fatal tragedy for Catalonia, Galicia and Euzkadi'. Also, that 'if the Spanish wish their own territory to be respected, they must start by respecting that of others. Africa for the Africans! Spain for the Spanish! AND EUZKADI FOR THE BASQUES!'[46] In addition, the clamour for accountability for the Disaster of Annual, which had a notable repercussion in Spain, was vehemently backed by many of the nationalist formations analysed. *Aberri* harshly pointed out that 'the thousands and thousands of Spanish soldiers, and countless numbers of Basques mixed in with them, who fell there in the sun, dry and blackened, are calling for redress'. It was emphasized that they should not stop holding them accountable because it was a Spanish problem: 'the same should be demanded of the Basque race, which has lost thousands of victims on Moroccan soil and does not wish to be Spanish', and which in addition was a territory which had not been obliged to render the 'blood tribute' until 1876.[47] In the case of Galician nationalism, the Disaster of Annual strengthened vague positions against the war, which now became firmer. Nevertheless, there was a certain heterogeneity and even in progressive publications such as *A Nosa Terra*, positions that almost supported the war could be detected, such as that of Xavier Fraga: 'We were expecting that by adopting all those means and systems that could be employed in the Rif, they would impose the superiority of the civilization and organization of the Spanish state, ensuring decisively and swiftly the domination of an entire area subject to Spanish influence'.[48] However, these ideas were not shared by other Galicianists, such as Jaime Quintanilla or Antón Vilar Ponte, who had to leave the *El Correo Gallego* newspaper due to his criticisms of the war in Morocco. They were, however, defended in *A Nosa Terra*, which stated that they were being attacked for their nationalist and European ideas.[49]

The dictatorship that ended the war and the road towards the Republic

Primo de Rivera's coup d'état entailed a curbing of the growth of sub-state nationalisms, upon which he waged all-out-war, as their defiance of the Spanish nation had been one of the most decisive factors in mobilizing the military. In fact, the last *Diada* (the National Day of Catalonia), on 11 September 1923, when the Republic of the Rif was cheered and a Spanish flag was destroyed, was particularly symbolic.[50] The majority of the Madrid press reported the events generally in a shocked and indignant tone. The cries of 'Long live Free Catalonia! Long live the Republic of the Rif!'[51] encapsulated the two greatest concerns of a large part of the Spanish political and military classes: Catalan separatism and the war in Morocco. These had been decisive triggers for Primo de Rivera's coup d'état, which occurred just two days after these events, although its preparation had begun a long time before. Morocco, which due to the war and above all the great defeat of 1921, had been a weak point in the constitutional monarchy of Alfonso XIII, continued to be so during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera until 1925, when the landing at Alhucemas succeeded in improving the situation for Spain.

In the Catalan case, one of the greatest changes with the dictatorship was the exile of many figures from the most belligerent ranks of nationalism, including Francesc Macià, its most active leader. Therefore, part of the nationalists' activities was undertaken from abroad, especially from France. Amongst other things, as broad an alliance as possible was prepared against the Spanish state, and the Rifians, with their struggle at the decisive point in 1923, became natural allies. This is reflected in *Butlletí de l'Estat Català*, published in Paris, which excoriates the Spanish and praises Abdelkrim and his struggle: it was seen as a model for those Catalans who did not display sufficient virility to rebel against the

occupation. They could not avoid regarding the Rifians as savages, but a political agreement was sought with the Republic of the Rif.[52]

For Galician nationalism, the greatest blow dealt by the dictatorship was its censorship of the press, which was the principal channel through which anti-war ideas were expressed. This was unlike the situation in Euzkadi and Catalonia, where such ideas had hardly featured in the repertoire of mobilization. Magazines like *Galicia* had to close, and others ignored the war in order to avoid problems. This was not the case with nationalist groups abroad, which during this period expressed their position with greater clarity than groups elsewhere in Spain. For example, the Federation of Galician Societies of Buenos Aires spent years regarding the withdrawal from northern Africa as an important cause, equal in importance to the abolition of chartered tenancies in Galician land ownership.[53] During the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, their position became more radical: they declared their hope in a victory for the Rifians in order to cause the fall of the dictator and the ushering in of a Republic.[54] The *A Fouce* newspaper, in Buenos Aires, was one of the most decisively anti-colonialist publications, and in several articles defended the right of peoples to their independence and freedom, although in truth paid little attention to Morocco.[55] The only article of this publication which focussed exclusively on Morocco was from July 1930. It was written by Urbano Hermida, a member of the *Sociedade Nazonalista Pondal* [Pondal Nationalist Society] and refers to the protectionist measures applied in Spain to avoid the import of Moroccan wheat: 'Poor Morocco, they are still not brave enough to call you a colony and yet you have to endure the mistakes of the Spanish government'. In an anti-colonialist article that was highly critical of Spanish conduct throughout history, the Rifians are portrayed as brothers, and a sarcastic request made that Spain should at least make Galicia a protectorate like Morocco if the Galicians were not to attain independence.[56] Due to the ideology of its members, it is probable that *A Fouce* would have supported the

Rifians in the war as had the poet Manuel Antonio, but the magazine was launched when the campaign was in its final stage (the first issue was published in 1926).

At the end of 1924, Macià explored the effective alliance between the Catalan resistance and the Rif rebels, proposing a League of Oppressed Nations with Catalonia, Euzkadi, Galicia, the Philippines, Ireland, the Rif, Egypt and India. Macià shared Catalanism's admiration for the League of Nations, to which he wished to give a revolutionary twist, but the project remained just a theory. More viable was the *Comitè de l'Aliança Lliure* [Free Alliance Committee], which would include *Estat català*, PNV, CNT or PCE,[57] and which would try to organize an effective resistance, where the full sense of the integration of the Republic of the Rif would be evident, but interest vanished after the landing at Alhucemas. This committee in exile attempted anti-war protests, but this also proved largely unsuccessful. The last use by the nationalists of the war was in Paris in July 1926, at the great parade to which Primo de Rivera and the sultan of Morocco were invited as guests of honour, and to which *Estat Català* contributed boos and had run ins with the police.

In 1931, the Second Republic put a temporary end to the authoritarian measures of the previous decade and marked the beginning of a new period. Although it was a much more favourable moment than the preceding ones, the anti-colonialism aimed at Morocco was scarce amongst the Spanish Left, including sub-state nationalisms, which demonstrated that the most significant tendency had been against the war, and that with the end of the war, other concerns dissipated. For example, the PNV, which reunified in 1930 through the merger of *Comunión Tradicionalista Vasca* and the *Aberri* group, paid hardly any attention to Morocco,[58] and this was also the case with the leading nationalist groups in Catalonia and Galicia. The Communist Party of Catalonia was one of the few during that period that regarded the self-determination of Morocco as important, although little effort was put

into the matter.[59] Furthermore, the progress made by the Republic by sub-state nationalisms in Spain was the envy of Moroccan nationalism, which in 1936 requested the right to have a statute of autonomy similar to that of Catalonia. Abdelkhalek Torres, from the Moroccan nationalist ranks in Tetuán, visited Lluis Companys after his reinstatement as president of the *Generalitat* in February 1936, and the Catalan political forces supported their requests after the start of the Civil War with a delegation sent to discuss the matter with the Largo Caballero government. However, the latter refused to grant autonomy to the Spanish protectorate of Morocco and continued to follow the policy of bribing local leaders. This was of little interest for Torres, who had already been guaranteed this by Franco and the rebels, whose power in the territory was greater. Following the failure of those negotiations, Catalanism could now use all the mythology of the *moros* against the rebels,[60] who would take on numerous 'African' features in depictions of them produced by the Republicans.

Conclusions

The Moroccan War and the Rif War, which conditioned Spanish domestic policy to such a large degree in the first decades of the twentieth century, also had a significant effect on sub-state nationalisms in Spain. Furthermore, these were at an early stage of development, unlike Spanish nationalism, which was already well-established. Precisely for this reason, the comparison with reactions to the Hispano-Moroccan War of 1859-1860 is very interesting, because it demonstrates how in just half a century there was a change in regional identities (Catalan, Basque and Galician or others) and Spanish national identity, which co-existed in perfect harmony, and the existence of new nationalisms, in this case centripetal and directly opposed to Spanish nationalism.

The differences between the different nationalist sectors in each case have also proved revealing. An anti-war and anti-colonial approach was most present in Basque nationalism, even in the more conservative sectors. On the other hand, in the Catalan case, there was support for imperialism in conservative groupings, above all at the start of the twentieth century. The majority of anti-war and all anti-colonialist positions were to be found in left-wing sectors. Galician nationalism, which did not even exist when the war began in 1909, was slower in all senses, although it has also been shown that there were cases of anti-colonialism and the anti-war position was commonly held.

The most striking positions were those of empathy and those seeking an alliance with the Rifian enemy. The former could be seen in some left-wing or even liberal outlets. However, the latter tendency was practically only found in these sub-state nationalisms because they saw Spain as the enemy and were prepared to fight against it. The examples of *Estat Català* and *Aberri*, as well as its leaders Francesc Macià and Elías Gallástegui, are the best of a tendency that was shared by sectors that were very much the minority, but which were noted for their mobilisations. Therefore, although these ideas had not become strongly established in Spain at that time, or even in Catalonia or Euzkadi, they were conspicuous, and were well known among the most fervently pro-Spanish sectors, which used them as a justification to combat what they regarded as internal enemies of the homeland.

The Disaster of Annual in 1921, which caused the start of the Rif War, was a turning point because it increased the strength of the anti-war position. It also entailed the appearance of an undisputed leader, Abdelkrim, and a political project that became a point of reference for those who believed that in northern Morocco an ally could be found to fight against the Spanish state. The other turning point was the coup d'état in 1923: it notably slowed down the mobilisation and diffusion of ideas in Spain by Catalan, Basque and Galician nationalisms. Even so,

they continued their fight, some from abroad, and most proposals were made during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship for an alliance between nationalisms that would include the Rifians.

However, in spite of the propagandistic use of the Moroccan war, radical Catalan and Basque nationalism never organized jointly in an effective manner with the cause of Abdelkrim. Furthermore, their anti-colonialism must be nuanced, as many prejudices and pejorative stereotypes continued to exist behind a rhetoric of respect and admiration. In this way, the view of the Moroccans as being savages was significantly maintained, although often the Spanish 'civilisers' were regarded as scarcely as civilised as the Moroccans were. The Rifian victories against the Spanish army and the establishment of an independent Rifian state generated fascination amongst radical nationalisms which also sought to 'gain emancipation from the Spanish protectorate',[61] and they tried to approach a point of reference that was as promising as it was short-lived.

Endnotes

[1] For an overview of the conflict, see S. Balfour, *Abrazo mortal: De la guerra colonial a la Guerra Civil en España y Marruecos (1909-1939)* (Barcelona, 2002); M. R. Madariaga, *En el Barranco del Lobo. Las guerras de Marruecos* (Madrid, 2005).

[2] The term refers to the Rif as the entire northern area of Morroco and was a geographical reference common at that time. However, it does not cohere with administrative names, as the Rif would be just one of the regions of the Spanish protectorate established in Morocco in 1912, and the war also affected others such as Yebala and Lucus.

[3] For the relationship between the conflict and the dictatorship, see S. Sueiro, *España en el Mediterráneo. Primo de Rivera y la «Cuestión Marroquí», 1923-1930* (Madrid, 1992).

[4] For Spanish military interest in Africa, see S. Balfour & P. La Porte, 'Spanish Military Cultures and the Moroccan Wars, 1909-36', in: *European History Quarterly*, 30 (2000), 307-332. A. Iglesias Amorín, 'La cultura africanista en el Ejército español (1893-1975)', in: *Pasado y Memoria*, 15, 99-122.

[5] A subject examined in the now classic study: A. Bachoud. *Los españoles ante las campañas de Marruecos* (Madrid, 1988).

[6] See A. Iglesias Amorín, 'The Hispano-Moroccan Wars and the (de)nationalization of the Spanish People', in *European History Quarterly* 50/2, 290-310.

[7] For a definition of the concept of 'nation consumption' see A. Quiroga, 'La nacionalización en España, una propuesta teórica' in *Ayer* 90/2013 (2), 31 and ff.

[8] One of the most significant is E. Ucelay, 'Els enemics dels meus enemics. Les simpaties del nacionalisme català pels «moros»: 1900-1936', in: *L'Avenç. Dossier: El colonialisme espanyol i l'Àfrica* 28 (1980), 29-40; S. De Pablo, '¡Grita Libertad! El nacionalismo vasco y la lucha por la independencia de las naciones africanas', in: *Memoria y Civilización* 15 (2012); D. Pereira, *Galegos nas guerras do Rif. Paisaxe bélica e imaxinario anticolonial (1860-1927)* (A Coruña, 2016).

[9] X. M. Núñez Seixas, *¡Fuera el invasor!: Nacionalismos y movilización bélica durante la guerra civil española (1936-1939)* (Madrid, 2006), 11.

[10] Known in Spain as the "African War", a name regarded by historiography as pompous, and which demonstrated that at that time, Spain showed little interest in Africa beyond Morocco.

[11] Under the form of regionalism, as nationalism did not emerge until the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth Century.

[12] See A. García Balañà, 'Patria, plebe y política en la España isabelina: la guerra de África en Cataluña (1859-1860)', in E. Martín Corrales (ed.), *Marruecos y el colonialismo español [1859-1912]* (Barcelona, 2002), 27 and ff.

[13] See X. M. Núñez Seixas (ed.), *La construcción de la identidad nacional en Europa y España (siglos XIX y XX)*, monograph of the journal *Ayer*, no. 64 (2006).

[14] See Iglesias Amorín, 'The Hispano-Moroccan Wars'.

[15] X. M. Núñez Seixas, 'Irlanda', in: S. De Pablo, De la Granja, J. L., Mees, L., et al. (eds.), *Diccionario ilustrado de simbolos del nacionalismo vasco* (Madrid, 2012), 547.

[16] Troops of the crown of Aragón, famous for their role in the medieval conquests by that kingdom in the Mediterranean.

[17] García Balañà, 'Patria, plebe y política…', 27 and ff.

[18] R. Olivar, *El caballero Prim (vida íntima, amorosa y militar)* (Barcelona, 1952), 221.

[19] Concerning this patriotism displayed, see A. Cajal Valaero, 'La Guerra de África (1859-1860) y las expresiones patrióticas en el País Vasco', in M. Esteban de Vega & Mª D. de Calle Velasco (eds.), *Procesos de nacionalización en la España contemporánea* (Salamanca, 2010).

[20] J. Beramendi & S. Taboada, 'Guerras y nacionalización en la Galicia del siglo XIX', in: Esteban & Velasco, *Procesos de nacionalización,* 226.

[21] The words used to describe the Basque case by F. Molina Aparicio, *La tierra del martirio español. El País Vasco y España en el siglo del nacionalismo* (Madrid, 2005), 44.

[22] E. Martín Corrales, 'La Conferencia de Algeciras en la prensa catalana: entre el pragmatismo económico de *La Vanguardia* y el imperialismo orsiano de *La Veu de Catalunya*' in: E. Martín Corrales & J. A. González Alcantud (eds.), *La Conferencia de Algeciras en 1906: un banquete colonial* (Barcelona, 2007), 220. See also E. Ucelay-Da Cal, *El imperialismo catalán. Prat de la Riba, Cambó, D'Ors y la conquista moral de España* (Barcelona, 2003).

[23] Ucelay, 'Els enemics dels meus enemics', 31.

[24] E. Prat de la Riba. *La nacionalitat catalana* (Barcelona, 1934), 103-104.

[25] Pablo, '¡Grita Libertad!', 270.

[26] For example, he referred to Spanish immigrants in *Euzkadi* as 'nuestros moros' ['our Moors']: S. Arana, 'nuestros moros', in *Bizcaitarra*, 17/2/1897.

[27] See J. Connelly, *La Semana Trágica* (Barcelona, 2009).

[28] Ucelay, 'Els enemics dels meus enemics', 33.

[29] J. M. Prous i Vila, *Cuatro gotas de sangre* (Barcelona, 2011), 42. Enric Ucelay tells the anecdote of a group of Catalan peasants sent to Morocco in 1922 who agreed not to shoot anyone because the Rifians were peasants just like them: Ucelay, 'Els enemics dels meus enemics', 33.

[30] Ben-Cho-Shey, *Crónicas de Marruecos* (Barcelona, 2005).

[31] Ucelay, 'Els enemics dels meus enemics', 36.

[32] Ibid.

[33] X. Casals i Meseguer, 'Auge y declive del 'partido militar' de Barcelona (1898-1936)', in: *Iberic@l. Revue d'études ibériques et ibéro-américaines* 4 (2013), 176.

[34] A. Vilar Ponte, 'A visita do rei moro', in: *A Nosa Terra*, 30/7/1918, 3.

[35] A. Iglesias Amorín, 'El nacionalismo gallego y la independencia de Marruecos', in: E. Martín Corrales & J. Pich Mitjana (eds.), *España frente a la independencia de Marruecos* (Bellaterra, 2017), 305.

[36] Ucelay, 'Els enemics dels meus enemics', 36.

[37] Madariaga. *En el Barranco del Lobo*, 200; S. G. Payne. *Los militares y la política en la España Contemporánea* (Paris, 1968), 161.

[38] The *Aberri* group recovered the traditional name of *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* [Basque Nationalist Party], which had been abandoned by the mainstream (which opted for a moderate strategy seeking first political autonomy and not direct independence). The CNV also opposed the war in Morocco, although with less forcefulness than the sector which in 1921 would found the *Partido Nacionalista Vasco*. See A. Ugalde Zubiri. *La Acción Exterior del Nacionalismo Vasco (1890-1939): Historia, Pensamiento y Relaciones Internacionales* (Bilbao, 1996), 286-287.

[39] Gudari, 'Triple Alianza', in: *Aberri*, 15/7/1923, 1.

[40] Ugalde Zubiri, *La Acción Exterior del Nacionalismo Vasco*, 303. The project of Abdelkrim was actually not Moroccan but specifically Rifian, although Gallástegui did not allude to this.

[41] As confirmed by Dionisio Pereira for the branches of Santiago, Ourense, A Coruña, Viveiro or Muxía: Pereira, *Galegos nas guerras do Rif,* 61.

[42] Pereira, *Galegos nas guerras do Rif,* 63.

[43] See, for example, *La Zarpa*, 28/7/1922, 1.

[44] Manoel Antonio to Rafael Dieste, undated letter, October 1921. Quoted in Pereira, *Galegos nas guerras do Rif*, 43.

[45] Ugalde Zubiri, *La Acción Exterior del Nacionalismo Vasco*, 347.

[46] Gudari, 'La primera preocupación de la triple alianza', in: *Aberri,* 31/7/1923, 1; 'La aventura española de Marruecos va a reanudarse trágicamente', in: *Aberri*, 24/7/1923, p. 1.

[47] Gudari, 'El proceso de Berenguer. El País Vasco debe exigir responsabilidades', in: *Aberri*, 27/6/1923, 1.

[48] X. Fraga, 'O pesadelo de Marrocos: hai que rectificar os procedementos', in: *A Nosa Terra*, 1/9/1923, 1.

[49] 'Um xornal que quere a escravitude da Terra', in: *A Nosa Terra*, 15/12/1921, 4.

[50] J. L. Vila-San Juan, *La vida cotidiana en España durante la dictadura de Primo de Rivera* (Barcelona, 1984), 15.

[51] As reported in many newspapers. See for example 'Banquete de separatistas', in: *La Voz*, 11/9/1923, 1. 'Gritos antiespañoles, cargas, heridos y detenciones', in: *El Sol*, 12/9/1921, 1.

[52] See for example 'Al Marroc ataquen. L'exemple al Marroc', in: *Butlletí de l'Estat Català*, 3 (August 1924), 3; 'Com parlen els patriotes i com actúen', in: *Butlletí de l'Estat Català*, 5 (1 October 1924), 2; 'L'abandó del Marroc', in: *Butlletí de l'Estat Català*, 5 (1 October 1924), 3.

[53] Agrarian contracts that were medieval in origin and whose duration was lengthy and often perpetual. They were a burden for the Galician peasantry until they were finally abolished in 1926.

[54] X. M. Núñez Seixas, *Emigrantes, caciques e indianos* (Vigo, 1998), 296; 301.

[55] The most numerous references alluded to Irish nationalism; references to cases such as those of India, China or Egypt were also habitual.

[56] U. Hermida, 'Irmáns do Rif', in: *A Fouce*, 16 (1/6/1930), 4.

[57] CNT: *Conferencia Nacional del Trabajo* [National Confederation of Labour], a trade union organization whose ideology was anarchist; PCE: Communist Party of Spain.

[58] In 1934 the occupation of Ifni was scrutinized, making the matter relevant again, but this was an exceptional case.

[59] Ucelay, 'Els enemics dels meus enemics', 39

[60] Ibid., 40

[61] 'La triple alianza de la península', in: *Aberri*, 28/7/1923, 1.

Archival Review: The International Centre for Archival Research (ICARUS)

KARL HEINZ

The International Centre for Archival Research (ICARUS) is a network of archives and archival institutions that aims to promote exchange among participating institutions at all levels. ICARUS is legally an association under Austrian law with headquarters in Vienna but considers itself as a supranational organization without national orientation or preference.

Foundation and Partners

ICARUS was founded in 2008 and can be seen as the successor organization of a loose consortium that had already been formed in 2004 in the course of the organization of the document platform Monasterium (see below). The main concern from the very beginning was to convey to the participating institutions that a regular exchange and a joining of forces in achieving goals is more resource-saving and effective than going it alone. Currently (fall 2021), ICARUS includes more than 180 members from 35 countries from Europe and overseas, including

Karl Heinz, 'Archival Review:
The International Centre
for Archival Research (ICARUS),
in: *Studies on National Movements* 8 (2021).

archives of various types and sizes (state and national archives, provincial archives, municipal archives, diocesan and abbey archives), universities, research institutions and partner networks.

In the meantime, very active sister organizations have been developed in various regions of Europe (ICARUS Hrvatska, ICARUS Italia), which are increasingly taking care of the association's concerns in their catchment areas.

Activities

One focus of the association's activities has been and continues to be the initiation and support of digitization projects in the archival field and the provision of expertise in the various related projects of the partner institutions. In this context, a mobile scanning unit has been in use throughout Europe for several years to digitize document collections of smaller and larger archives. On the other hand, improving the exchange between archives and their users has been a major concern of ICARUS, too.

A core activity of the association in recent years has always been the participation in projects funded by the European Commission within different framework programs, in which ICARUS several times was the lead partner. Examples of larger EU projects under the administration of ICARUS, running up to four years and already completed, were CrArC - Crossborder Archives (www.crossborderarchives.eu), ENArC - European Network on Archival Cooperation (https://enarc.icar-us.eu) and Co:Op - Community as Opportunity: the Creative Archives' and users' Network (www.coop-project.eu).

Currently, ICARUS is participating in the European project 'European Digital Treasures: Management of centennial archives in the 21st century'

(www.digitaltreasures.eu) within the Creative Europe programme. The project aims to improve the visibility of archives as the custodians of Europe's historical heritage in the perception of a wider public. The implementation of this plan will be achieved through a huge variety of activities, such as transmedia exhibitions across Europe with very current topics, the development of new business models for archives, the programming of smart games to introduce the younger generation to the archives, or the involvement of the older generation and their special skills in reading old documents through crowd sourcing initiatives for the transcription of serial primary sources.

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Key facts Project consortium Mission

<h1> **European Digital Treasures:** </h1>
Management of Centenary Archives in the 21st Century

<h2> Key facts </h2>

<p> European archives are fundamental primary sources for discovering and reinforcing shared European culture and history. The project **European Digital Treasures** aims at bringing joint European heritage, and especially its digital versions, major visibility, outreach and use. European Digital Treasures addresses the challenges of the **digital society,** related to the management and transmission of **European historical and documentary heritage.** </p>

<h2> Project consortium </h2>

<p> The project consortium is comprised of **7 partners from 7 countries** uniting a multi-stakeholder team. Each partner has specific qualifications that together form an effective consortium. </p>

- **Spanish State Archives** (project lead)
- **Cork Institute of Technology** (Ireland)
- **ICARUS** – International Centre for Archival Research (Austria)
- **National Archives of Hungary**
- **National Archives of Malta**
- **National Archives of Norway**
- **National Archives of Portugal**

<h2> Mission: Unlock the past to build capacities </h2>

A very forward-looking initiative is the participation in the Time Machine project (www.timemachine.eu), which aims at a technological revolution in the digital processing of archival material. Innovations in scanning technology and the further development of machine handwriting recognition are intended to provide the prerequisites for the most comprehensive possible digital recording of initially serial resources throughout Europe, and the linking and networking of Local Time Machines created in this way all over the continent is to provide with the time answers to historical questions at the push of a button. The leading body to promote this idea and to drive the development forward is the Time Machine Organization (TMO), which has its headquarters in Vienna.

As mentioned above, one of the main concerns of ICARUS was and still is the unbureaucratic exchange of information and experience on a collegial level and the overcoming of institutional and national hurdles and restrictions. In practice, this is carried out at biannual network meetings, the ICARUS Conventions, which are always hosted by a different partner institution in always other parts of Europe and take place in the spring and fall of each year.

The ICARUS Portals

ICARUS itself meanwhile operates three major digital platforms.

Monasterium

Monasterium (www.monasterium.net) is the oldest platform of ICARUS and one of the world's largest digital resources for medieval and early modern charters, which are presented in words and images, enriched by metadata of different indexing depth. The portal started in 2004 with the

first 20.000 charters from the abbey archives of the province of Lower Austria. In the meantime, around 660.000 medieval and early modern charters from 192 archives from 15 countries are shown in the portal with all together more than 900.000 images. The data are structured according to the standard of the Charters Encoding Initiative (CEI - www.cei.lmu.de), which, based upon the TEI standard, was created especially for the description of the source genre 'charter'.



In addition to the classic archive holdings, Monasterium also has so-called 'collections'. In this context, this term refers to collections of documents that do not form a classic archive fond but are thematic compilations. These can be virtually merged, former archive holdings, which in reality have been widely dispersed but also digitized editions (charter books) belong to the area of collections.

The system has a collaborative editing environment through which improvements and enhancements can be entered individually online and new holdings can also be uploaded. As a special feature registered users are enabled to create personal collections according to their research topics. Another speciality is that the system is available in 14 different languages, mirroring the countries, contributing to the virtual archive with their holdings.

Currently, a new conception of the portal is under discussion, which should bring this resource up to the latest technical standard.

Matricula



The Matricula-online portal (www.matricula-online.eu) provides several million digital images of church records (baptism, marriage, and death registers) of different religious communities (Catholic, Protestant, Jewish) from eight countries (Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Luxembourg, Poland, Serbia, Italy and Bosnia-Herzegovina). By eliminating the need for lengthy and costly travel to view these sources, Matricula has proven

to be indispensable for the vast community of family and genealogical researchers all over the world in recent years and has recorded by far the largest number of hits in a comparison of the three portals of ICARUS.

Topotheque

The third portal – the Topotheque (www.topothek.at/en) – houses materials that are of great importance for local and regional lore, such as old photographs, postcards, films or other documents that illustrate the diversity of life in the community. These are mainly privately owned objects that are particularly at risk of being lost. But the aim is not only to secure and publish the material, but also to make its content accessible through dating, geo-referencing and keywording, thus making the source material, which has now grown to over one million items, searchable. In total, there are about 400 'Topotheques' in 15 European countries.

The feed of data is decentralized via local topothecarians based in the individual municipalities, who work on a voluntary basis and receive the analogue materials from the owners, digitize them, upload them to the system and ensure that they are indexed accordingly. The great



advantage of this is that questions about content can be communicated to the entire population via the site and thus previously white spots in the tradition can be erased.

A common feature of all three portals is the low-threshold and completely free access to the material (charters, church records, local history material), what can be seen as a direct contribution to bringing people closer to their own history.

ICARUS4all

According to the statutes, membership in the ICARUS network is only possible for institutions and corporations. Nevertheless, it is primarily individuals who benefit from the work of the network and the digital offer of the described resources. In order to be able to give users a better insight into the world of archives 'behind the scenes' and also to perceive suggestions from the user community, the friends´ association ICARUS4all was founded in 2016. Within the framework of this association, current developments in the archive world are regularly communicated to interested parties, excursions to domestic and foreign archives are organized, and archivists can be directly interviewed at 'meet & greet' events. In addition, ICARUS4all gives members the opportunity to directly support ICARUS and ensure the maintenance and further development of the portals.

Outlook – Agenda 2023

In order to ensure that the network continues to be optimally geared to the needs of its members in the future, an internal reorganization process (AGENDA 2023) has been underway for some time, which is

intended to sharpen the profile of ICARUS and redefine the way in which the network functions.

All important areas such as community, communication, event management, project acquisition, but also the future technical-strategic orientation of the existing portals is to be evaluated and, if necessary, adapted to the changing requirements. The plan is to lead this reform process through 2023 and complete it by the fall of that year.

Archival Review: History and (Private) Document Collections in the Basque Nationalism Archive

EDUARDO JAUREGI

The Historical Archive of Basque Nationalism, managed by the *Sabino Arana* foundation, was established in the town of Artea (Bizkaia) on 26 January 1993. Right from the outset, the foundation has strived for openness and to be at the service of researchers. It contains important historical documents in its newspaper and book libraries, and archive collections. Its purpose is to gather, preserve, organise, and disseminate the cultural heritage of Basque nationalism.

It specialises in Basque nationalism and particularly the emergence, history, and development of the Basque National Party. It focuses on the documents of the Party's leaders, members, supporters, and similar organisations throughout history, worldwide, and focusses particularly on the fields of culture, politics, economics, and society.

The archive preserves a wide range of materials related to *Euskadi* [Basque Country], either under Spanish or French administration, and

Eduardo Jauregi, 'Archival Review:
History of, and (Private) Document Collections in the
Basque Nationalism Archive,
in: *Studies on National Movements* 8 (2021)

anything related to Basque culture or the Basque identity in general since the nineteenth century, regardless of the geographical area. Its fields of interest include emigration, exile, the Spanish Civil War and both World Wars, the underground resistance, and the anti-Franco movement.

The Archive's Document Collections

Basque National Party Collection

While the historical and current newspaper and bibliographic collections built up over the 30 years of the Foundation's activity are of great importance, the recovery and preservation of the archival documentation is the key feature that makes the Nationalism Archive unique. The most important series (and unique feature of the archive) are the collections comprised of materials dating back to 1936 and covering the four decades of the dictatorship, the Basque underground, and the Basques in exile.

The most extensive collection of the Basque Nationalism Archive is the archive of the Basque National Party, dating back to 1905 and featuring documentation gathered by the *Euzkadi Buru Batzar* or the EAJ-PNV National council. The collection (luckily) survived due to its preservation by Basques in exile.

Prior to the Spanish Civil War, the archive of the Basque National Party's executive bodies (*Euzkadi Buru Batzar*, *Bizkai Buru Batzar*, Basque General Secretariat, etc.), preserved, at its Bilbao headquarters, numerous documents from 1931 onwards: meeting minutes, session files, records of assemblies, correspondence with the local General Assemblies, members, and with satellite organisations of the party, such

as Basque Youth (*Euzko Gaztedi*) and the organisation of nationalist women (*Emakume Abertzale Batza*). The collection also holds electoral, political propaganda, financial documents, etc.

When the civil war broke out, this extensive archive was split up, plundered and partly destroyed, constituting in that sense a typical example of the fate of Basque political collections during the war.

After Bilbao was conquered in 1937, Franco's troops seized a significant part of the archive, transporting the documents (along with those looted from other institutions, private individuals, companies, etc.) to Salamanca. After 74 years of absence, these historical PNV documents were returned in the summer of 2011, and have been kept in the Nationalism Archive ever since.

During the war, another series of documents (comprised of the oldest ones) were hidden on the Spanish side of the border. They would remain concealed, along with other documents generated by the underground movement, until the mid-1980s. The documents included: the minutes of the PNV National Council (EBB) after the union of the *Aberri* and *Comunión* movements from November 1931 until 1935, and minutes of the Bizkaia Assembly and Territorial Council (BBB), from 1930-1936. Other documents include, among others, PNV membership cards from the 1930s, Basque Government and Republic passports, reports, lists of people sentenced to death, of prisoners in different jails, of refugees and

people in exile, minutes of the Delegated Council and the Resistance Committee operating on the Spanish side of the border.

A final part of the archives was taken (and produced) into exile. The fortunes of the documents were the same as the people who produced them (exile, dispersion, etc) and are therefore testimony and evidence of what happened during those years.

After the Basque territory was brought under Franco's control in 1937, the EAJ-PNV's *Euzkadi Buru Batzar* moved its headquarters to Iparralde (the northern area of the Basque country under French administration), specifically to 'Villa Endara', in Anglet (near Bayonne).

The nationalist executive in exile made serious efforts to establish and maintain contacts between the refugees and those who were imprisoned or had gone underground at the other side of the border. It also tried to redefine and organise its duties as best as possible. Its actions were reflected in series of correspondence, minutes of meetings, reports on refugee aid and of the situation at the Spanish side of the border. They offer valuable insights in the executive activities in the Basque territory in France.

The EBB remained in Villa Endara for just four years. The German invasion of France in May 1940 with the Nazi troops steadily making their way towards the French-Spanish border, implied that the Basque leaders were forced to flee and to go into hiding once again.

Given the risk of the PNV-files being seized by the Gestapo and handed over to Franco's troops, the decision was taken to burn the most sensitive documents.

According to different accounts, it was because of the intervention of Ramón de la Sota, a Basque industrialist and shipowner, who offered to hide the collections in various some of the villa's he owned, that the destruction of the documents could be prevented. Apart from the archival collections, some furniture and the library of the EBB were also hidden on his property close to Biarritz.

Photo: 'Villa Izarra' (Beyris-Bayonne) the PNV's EBB headquarters from 1957 onwards

The end of the war and ensuing peace in Europe meant that the Basque National Party could act with greater freedom from Iparralde from 1945 onwards. Progressively, the nationalist leaders scattered throughout England, Iparralde and France, gathered together in the Beyris neighbourhood of Bayonne. 'Villa Antoinette' would be the new EBB

headquarters in exile from 1946 onwards, and all hidden documents were filed and preserved there.

At the new residence, and starting in 1947, the EBB would change the status and competences of its Secretariat, which marked the start of a period of great activity of upholding contacts and relations with not only its members on the Spanish side of the border, but also with the Basque government, with trade unions and political parties of the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, Spain and other European peoples. The PNV's pro-European policy resulted into its representation on various international forums and PNV being a founding member of various movements of the new Europe like the NEI (New International Teams), the Christian Democrats or the European Movement. All that activity is perfectly reflected in the present EEB Secretariat archives.

In 1957, the archives of the nationalist movement were moved again – for the last time – to 'Villa Izarra', a mansion closely located to the previous residence and situated in the Beyris neighbourhood as well. For 20 years Villa Izarra would be the headquarters of the EBB, and it would be the EBB's last residence in exile. It constituted the beginnings of what is now the Historical Archive of Basque Nationalism, as that villa inherited everything that had been kept in the previous residences, along with the reports, accounts, photographs, members' correspondence, briefing notes, press cuttings from around the world, etc., generated over several decades.

Consequently, the Nationalism Archive contains documents on the structure and organisation of the Basque National Party from very different eras: one of expansion and legality, i.e. the Republican era (1931-1936), the time of the Basque underground and when action met fierce opposition (1945-1950), and a third, longer in time (1936-1975),

with the documents generated from Iparralde, covering all PNV's activities during exile, and which were collected and preserved in the archive of the EBB Secretariat. Among many other documents, we should mention the briefing papers on the 1947 and 1951 strikes in the Basque Country, the steps taken to raise money for the strikers, scripts and other materials of the first 'Radio Euzkadi', photographs or correspondence of the nationalist leaders with representatives of anti-Franco political groups (Companys, Tarradellas, Prieto, etc.).

These documents are closely related to other collections kept in the Meñaka Building in Artea (until 2011) and in our current premises (in Bilbao since then) and were obtained via private donations. Many of the latter are documents provided by relatives of EEB members or members themselves, local PNV organisations, and leading national or regional figures in the political party.

Along with the collections generated prior to the start of the PNV's political transition (within Spain and in exile), the Archive is also home to a large part of the documentation of the Basque National Party from the last 30 years.

Spanish document collections in the Basque Archive

The documents in the Basque Nationalism Archive include a series of Spanish collections, both from the Republican and Franco sides, generated between 1936 and 1940.

The presence and preservation of those archives at *Sabino Arana Fundazioa* dates back to the Spanish Civil War and the post-war years in France, consisting of the archives that the Spanish Recovery Committee in France seized between 1939 and 1944. The committee stored these archives at its premises, which were none other than those of the

headquarters of the Basque Government on Avenue Marceau in the French capital and which Franco's forces had unlawfully occupied.

In August 1944, only days prior to the liberation of Paris, Franco's supporters fled the building, leaving behind not only their own archives, but also the documents that they had seized earlier. After years of those historical collections being preserved in Paris, the Basque nationalist leaders finally decided to move them to Villa Izarra, the EAJ-PNV headquarters in Bayonne, in the mid-1960s.

In the summer of 1992, all documents preserved at the Villa Izarra, including more than 300 packages of Spanish archival materials dating back to the 1940's were deposited in Artea. Those documents include the archive of the Spanish Technical Committee, SERE documents, the archive of the National Committee for Aid to Spain, and the archive of the aforementioned Recovery Committee (1940-1944) which includes the correspondence between the head of the committee (Colonel Antonio Barroso) and institutions of the Franco Regime in Madrid and Burgos (ministries), the Paris Embassy, and German authorities.

The collections amassed by members of *Euzkadi Buru Batzar* during the war, within the Basque Country and in exile – on the relations with anti-Franco political forces, the Basque government, members, minutes of meetings, agreements, etc. – remains to be one of the most consulted series by researchers.

Relevant information

Document collections

- Archive of the Basque National Party
- Personal collections
- Archives of other institutions (political/cultural).
- Private donations.

Size: 4,500 installation units (approx.)

Book and Newspaper libraries:

Specialised in: politics (Basque nationalism and other ideologies), contemporary history, anthropology, law and social sciences.

Size:

- Monographs: 37,500 different titles
- Newspapers and magazines: 7,400 titles, with over 192,000 copies

Sabino Arana Fundazioa

Mandobide 6 - 3º
48007 Bilbao

Tel: 94 405 64 50

Secretary: idazkaritza@sabinoarana.eus

Press office: prentsa@sabinoarana.eus; Tel: 94 405 64 48

Hermes magazine: osaez@sabinoarana.eus

Basque Nationalism Archive: agiritegi@sabinoarana.eus
https://www.sabinoarana.eus/Archivo

Archive consultation times (prior appointment recommended)

Monday to Friday: from 9.00 a.m. to 2.00 p.m

State of Nationalism (SoN): Nationalism and Globalization

GAL ARIELY

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.

Are we witnessing the fall of nationalism to globalization? In his classic *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*, Eric Hobsbawm argued that over the course of time nationalism would no longer be a vital political program and the world would become 'largely supranational'.[1] Or do we take Anthony Smith's conclusion in *Nation and Nationalism in the Global Era* (1995) that such predictions are too optimistic and that supranational identities will not replace national culture any time soon? Hobsbawm and Smith's writings reflect the leading approach toward globalization, which was understood to be the dominant force in the post-Cold War years of the 1990s. The rise of nationalism across the world since the 1990s demonstrates that the belief in the triumph of globalization (and liberalism) was probably too optimistic; an increase in globalization processes does not imply the decline of nationalism across all the spheres – the relationship between nationalism and globalization is far more complex. This relationship is a key unresolved issue in the field and this overview looks to highlight some of its central aspects.

Part of the challenge of addressing the relationship between nationalism and globalization is the plurality of perspectives on how to define these concepts. Is globalization separate from the process of modernization?[2] What is the distinction between globalization and Westernization? There

Gal Ariely, 'State of Nationalism (SoN): Nationalism and Globalization', in: *Studies on National Movements* 8 (2021).

is no attempt here to offer any definitive definition of globalization; rather, this overview follows the functional definition of globalization as a process of 'increasing cross-border flows of goods, services, money, people, information, and culture' that promotes international interconnectedness.[3] According to this definition, globalization constitutes a puzzling process of contradictory effects on many aspects of politics and society due to its multifaceted nature. It should thus be understood as a process or a set of processes which do not follow linear logic or have equal impact on societies across the world.

The key aspect of this definition, however, is its emphasis on the crossing of borders – these can be different kinds of social and political borders. Any adopted definition of nationalism reflects its inherent tensions with globalization, as the key criteria for any such definition is the nation's differentiation from other nations and its continuity over time. The nation is a collective identity rooted in past symbols, memories, and values, as well as a group that projects into the future. It links symbols, memories, and values to a specific territory while distinguishing itself from other nations (Guibernau 2001).[4] Accordingly, it is clear that the nation requires some type of borders while globalization is the process challenging these borders. It is no wonder then that the dominant view in the field is that nationalism and globalization are an inherent contradiction.

Nationalism and Globalization as Contradictions

The influence of globalization on nationalism is subject to dispute.[5] Of the two dominant interpretations – one argues that globalization undermining nationalism while the other is more sceptical, arguing that globalization might, in fact, reinforce nationalism.

Globalization undermines national identity due to the fact that the cross-border flow of information makes it harder for any single national identity to retain its unique significance and distinguish itself from other national identities. In the global village, the ability to produce and maintain a homogenous national identity is challenged as people become global consumers of goods and information; in a wired world, the government no longer has the exclusive capacity to exert cultural control over its citizens and territory.[6] The effects of globalization on nationalism are not only in the sphere of culture and identity but also in politics and the economy. The increased participation in international organizations and supranational bodies undermine the function of the nation state. Similarly, the increased relevance of international trade and economic interdependencies challenge the functions of the nation state in allocating resources. These processes therefore reduce the nationalist orientations of citizens.

Although the impact of globalization has long been a subject of study in general, theorists of nationalism have only recently begun to investigate its impact.[7] The customary distinction between modernist and primordial theories of nationalism is also reflected in their conflicting interpretations of the influence of globalization on national identity.[8] The modernist approach posits that nationalism is the product of a specific historical period – modernity – rather than constituting a permanent feature of human society. Consequently, the transformation of social, economic, and political aspects of modern society under globalization changes the meaning of nationalism as an instrument of mass identification and mobilization. Hobsbawm (1992) argued that nationalism had become less important and predicted that, over the course of time, it would no longer be a vital political program. Fifteen years later, he reached the same conclusion, claiming that the emergence of national movements and national claims since the 1990s had not

undermined his contention that nationalism's role as the main force shaping politics was decreasing.[9]

The primordial account of nationalism, on the other hand, emphasizes that nations are neither a modern phenomenon nor social constructs created by changing circumstances, as the modernist approach argues. Rather, nationalism represents the importance of identity and belonging that reaches way further back than the modern period (Horowitz 2004).[10] A variation of the primordial account, as develop by Smith, combines the acknowledgement of modernity for national mobilization while asserting that nationalism also embodies pre-existing ethnic traditions;[11] in other words, nationalism has deeper roots in human society than the modern approach would suggest. The transformation of social, economic, and political aspects of human society under globalization does not, therefore, eradicate nationalism. Smith concluded *Nation and Nationalism in the Global Era* by rejecting the modernist approach and suggesting:

> It would be folly to predict an early supersession of nationalism and an imminent transcendence of the nation....For a global culture seems unable to offer the qualities of collective faith, dignity and hope that only a 'religious surrogate' with its promise of a territorial cultural community across the generations can provide.[12]

In a later account, Smith argued not only that global culture cannot replace national culture but that national identity can, in fact, withstand the force of globalization. While the existence of culturally diverse waves of immigrants has, according to Smith, reshaped the meaning of national identity, this process also leads members of the nation to reflect on their national identity and reinforce its meaning and functions for the nation. He therefore maintains that, despite globalization, 'self-reflective and

self-celebrating communities, nations and nationalism are still very much alive'.[13]

Others view the continuation of national identity in a globalized world as a consequence of the necessity to organize public life. According to Calhoun's influential perspective, national identity organizes ordinary people's 'sense of belonging' and globalization makes the sense of belonging even more important than previously.[14]

From the perspective of global history, nationalism is not a simple reaction to globalization nor is it independent from global connectedness. Instead, nationalism has emerged in tandem with globalization. It is not an opposition to the global processes but it is 'inherent element of certain political or social projects to manage global flows'.[15]

Nationalism and Globalization: Differential Effects

Beyond the conclusive perspectives on the contradiction between nationalism and globalization, there are also those that focus on globalization's differential impact, i.e., the way in which it influences different segments of society in different ways. While globalization may thus push some citizens toward cosmopolitanism, other groups develop 'resistance identities' that reinforce national feelings.[16] National identity can serve as a counterforce against the destabilization of people's sense of security induced by globalization, functioning as a set of stories and beliefs that are particular powerful 'because of their ability to convey a picture of security, stability, and simple answers'.[17]

Globalization has created a new conflict between 'winners' and 'losers,' with the former enjoying the benefits created by the opening up of borders and the latter possessing less resources (such as education) to

cope with the impact of globalization on their status in the labor market and their earnings prospects.[18] This distinction between the 'winners' and 'losers' from globalization can be located across economic or cultural spheres. Economic 'losers' are those who find themselves in increasing competition in the labor market with immigrants. Such competition is common among the less educated because migrants tend to search for jobs in similar sectors of the economy. Where there is a lack of welfare protection, there is growing nationalism and increased voting for the far right.[19] Likewise, in the cultural sphere, there is evidence of competition in the face of growing globalization and immigration. This is not a competition over jobs or welfare resources; instead, it is a competition between the dominant national identity and rising diversity. This results in a sort of cultural backlash that causes the 'losers' from globalization to increase their support for populist leaders who promise to make their countries 'great again'.[20] The question of the extent to which economic or cultural factors are responsible for the gaps between the 'winners' and 'losers' from globalization is open to debate. Nevertheless, it is clear that 'the central psychological consequence of globalization is that it results in transformations in identity, that is, in how people think about themselves in relation to the social environment'.[21] It is therefore little wonder that members of this lower social strata view globalization as a threat to their status and their national identity, which, in turn, leads to an increase in nationalistic feelings. This scenario is talked up by the far right as part of their effort to mobilize support – and intensify national sentiment – among those who attribute their (economic and cultural) losses to globalization. According to this perspective, globalization influences people in different ways depending on their status and their nationalist feelings.

Another take on this issue is through the concept of glocalization. Glocalization is, in short, the way in which global processes are transformed according to the local context. As Roudometof argued:

> If globalization accounts for the cultural uniformity of the formal aspects of nationhood, glocalization is about realizing (and accounting for) the specificity and 'uniqueness' of each national experience. Glocalization is involved in nation formation precisely because the purely formal elements of nationhood are clearly insufficient to differentiate one nation from the other.[22]

The local context can differ between the different segments of society which may have varying reactions toward the process of globalization due to their social status and the extent to which they view themselves as winning or losing from globalization.

The theoretical arguments can thus be seen to support various views of globalization and its effect on national identity. While globalization may reduce the relevance of national identity, it may also create a nationalist backlash which affects people in different ways. Any consideration of the effect of globalization on national identity must therefore consider the multidimensionality of national identity as the well as the complex psychological aspects of identity.[23]

Nationalism and Globalization: Empirical Findings

In addition to the various theoretical views concerning the relationship between nationalism and globalization, there have been growing research efforts to assess the impact of globalization empirically. Given the multidimensionality of both nationalism and globalization, it is not surprising that these studies – whether conducted in a single nation or across several – have produced mixed results. In Germany, for example, a study conducted among German citizens found that people with greater exposure to globalization (in terms of experiences of border crossing and transnational social relations) are more likely to adopt

cosmopolitan attitudes toward foreigners and global governance than those with less exposure.[24] In Britain, the younger generation was found less attached to and less proud of their country than the older generation.[25] While this may be due to greater exposure and a more positive attitude toward globalization, it may also represent a life-cycle effect; in other words, no decline in national identity has actually taken place.[26] In Australia, globalization has been shown to influence both people's conceptions of their national identity and their perceptions of the indigenous population as an integral part of the nation.[27] While such studies support the argument that globalization has an impact on national identity, other studies have suggested that this influence is relatively limited. For example, a longitudinal study of cosmopolitan orientations among Swedish citizens found, conversely, that protectionist attitudes tended to emerge.[28]

Although most studies have focused on single countries or on Europe, some have adopted a more global research design. The availability of cross-national survey data, such as the World Value Survey (WVS) and the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) National Identity Modules and the European Social Survey (ESS) facilitates exploration of the interaction between globalization and national identity across many more countries. Despite reliance on the same set of data, researchers have, nonetheless, reached inconsistent conclusions. Using WVS, Norris and Inglehart found support for the claim that supranational identity and cosmopolitan citizenship rates are on the increase, with the additional result that living in a cosmopolitan society is strongly related to less nationalistic attitudes.[29] Nonetheless, Jung, also using WVS, reached a completely different conclusion: 'It is a myth to expect cosmopolitan attitudes and supranational identities to increase significantly in the current globalizing world'.[30] Likewise, an analysis of elite cosmopolitan orientations using the same set of data drew similar inferences.[31]

By analyzing quantitative (Eurobarometer) and qualitative data from Western Europe, Antonsich found that national pride had increased, national attachment was exhibiting a stable trend, and the meanings associated with the nation remained 'thick'.[32] Another study combining several cross-national surveys found that while globalization is generally associated with greater support for nationalist attitudes, some countries demonstrated a negative correlation between them. By measuring nationalism as 'national pride,' Bekhuis, Lubbers, and Verkuyten indicated that globalization has virtually no effect on nationalist attitudes among the highly educated but increased nationalist attitudes among the less educated.[33] Such contradictions can be found in other studies. When isolating certain aspects of national identity like national pride or ethnic identity, there are indeed findings that such feelings are less common in the more globalized countries; however, when other aspects, like national chauvinism, are examined, there is no evidence of a connection with globalization.[34]

Immigration, as a key component of globalization, has also been the topic of numerous studies that seek to inspect public attitudes toward immigrants and immigration.[35] Among the many factors that shape such attitudes, national identity was found to be a key component.[36] These studies have indicated that although national identity is multidimensional, there is a clear distinction between nationalism and patriotism: while nationalism is directly related to xenophobic attitudes toward immigrants, this is not always the case for patriotism.[37] Studies on national identity and attitudes toward immigration comprise single country studies as well as cross-national studies that use data sources like the ISSP National Identity Modules[38] or the ESS.[39] Despite the several studies conducted so far, the interplay between national identity, globalization, and attitudes toward immigration seems to raise more questions than provide clear answers.

Empirical findings should not be seen to resolve the historical or the sociological debate on the nature of the relationship between nationalism and globalization. There are inherent caveats, such as the use of cross-sectional studies, which cannot address questions of causal relations or issues regarding the operationalization of national identity and globalization.[40] The only definite conclusions to be drawn from such empirical studies is that relations between nationalism and globalization are indeed complex.

Concluding Remarks

Hobsbawm argued that nationalism is 'past its peak. The owl of Minerva which brings wisdom, said Hegel, flies out at dusk. It is a good sign that it is now circling nation and nationalism'.[41] However, the question remains: is the owl of Minerva flying due to the wind of globalization? This overview attempted to show that the effects of globalization on national identity are widely disputed. While some regard globalization as undermining national identity and increasing cosmopolitanism, others argue that it works in the opposite direction, possibly even reinforcing national feelings in the form of a backlash, or that it impacts different segments in society differently. Given the complex relationship between nationalism and globalization, this debate cannot be resolved either theoretically or empirically using current tools. Perhaps adopting other approaches (e.g. complexity theory[42]) will enable us to better understand this debate.

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SoN is jointly supported by two institutes: NISE and the University of East London (UEL). Dr Eric Taylor Woods and Dr Robert Schertzer are responsible for overall management and co-editors-in-chief.

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State of Nationalism (SoN): Nation-Building

HARRIS MYLONAS

George Washington University

A new approach to the study of nation-building: onset, process, outcome

Nation-building refers to the policies that core group governing elites pursue toward non-core groups in their effort to manage social order within state boundaries in ways that promotes a particular national narrative over any other. Such policies may vary widely ranging from assimilationist to exclusionary ones.[1] Moreover, the content of the national narrative or constitutive story varies dramatically from case to case.[2] The systematic study of the process of nation-building intensified following the Second World War primarily in relation to decolonization movements and the associated establishment of postcolonial independent states around the globe.[3] However, the field was initially dominated by assumptions and logics developed based on European experiences with nation-building.

We would not be that interested in nation-building were it not for its far-reaching impact on state formation and social order, self-determination movements, war onset, and public goods provision. The desired outcome of nation-building is to achieve social order and national integration.[4] Nation-building, when successful, results in societies where individuals are primarily loyal to the nation. This process of national integration facilitates military recruitment, tax collection, law enforcement, public

Harris Mylonas, 'State of Nationalism (SoN): Nation-Buidling',
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goods provision and cooperation.[5] There are also negative aspects of this process as well including violent policies, at times chauvinistic nationalism, even cultural genocide. When nation-building is either not pursued or is unsuccessful it leads to either state collapse (through civil war and/or secessionists movements) or to weak states.[6] In fact, many civil wars or national schisms can be understood as national integration crises.[7]

Nation-building has been conceptualized in a variety of ways. For the purposes of this review essay, I focus on an overlooked distinction in the study of nation-building: works that focus on the *onset*, those studying the *process*, and finally the ones that try to account for the *outcome*: success or failure. While there is overlap between these fields, each approach is focusing on a different question. Studies of *onset* are preoccupied with *when*, *where*, and *why* does nation-building take place to begin with. Works that focus on *process* are exploring the alternative paths to nation-building that could or have been taken. Finally, studies concentrating on the *outcome* analyze the societal consequences of the various paths to nation-building. Distinguishing between *onset*, *process* and *outcome* allows us to avoid several methodological pitfalls when testing arguments. For instance, oftentimes a theory focusing on onset is mistakenly tested on outcomes. We should not expect arguments aiming at explaining variation in nation-building policies, i.e., focusing on *process*, to also explain success or failure, i.e., *outcomes*. Similarly, once we internalize the importance of this distinction, we can be more careful in articulating our scope conditions. For example, if a place did not ever experience nation-building efforts then it probably should not make it into the universe of cases of studies that are trying to account for outcomes of nation-building policies. This theoretical move will help scholars unearth the linkages between aspects of nation-building and important effects such as military recruitment, civil war onset, or public goods provision.

Onset

For scholars like Anthony Smith, nation-building can be traced to the ethnic origins of a particular core group.[8] Nation-states without pre-existing ethnic content face a problematic situation because without it, 'there is no place from which to start the process of nation-building,' as Smith put it .[9] In the early 1990s, Barry Posen proposed an alternative argument for the onset of nation-building in his 'Nationalism, the Mass Army and Military Power'.[10] Posen identifies imitation of advantageous military practices as the mechanism that accounts for the spread of nationalism and the adoption of nation-building policies. Given the anarchic condition of the international system, states either adopted this new model to match external threats or perished. This critical juncture accounts for the spread of nationalism through nation-building policies, initially in the army. Eric Hobsbawm locates the source of states' interest in spreading nationalism mainly in the need of new or increasingly centralized states to find new sources of internal legitimacy.[11] Similarly, Michael Hechter locates the origins of nation-building in the transition from indirect to direct rule identifying different types of nationalism: State-Building Nationalism, Peripheral Nationalism, Irredentist Nationalism, Unification Nationalism, and Patriotism.[12] In a more recent article, Darden and Mylonas suggest that state elites pursue nation-building policies only in parts of the world that face heightened territorial competition, particularly in the form of externally backed fifth columns.[13]

Process

Before we dive in the theoretical debates in this category, I should note that the theoretical underpinnings of the theories discussed here have been influenced by some seminal case studies.[14] Three main causal

pathways lead to national integration according to scholars who focus on the process of nation-building. The central debate is between those that understand nation-building as an outgrowth of structural processes taking place in modern times – industrialization, urbanization, social mobilization, and so forth – and those that highlight the agency of governing elites that pursue intentional policies aiming at the national integration of a state along the lines of a specific constitutive story. The third causal path emphasizes how bottom-up processes can reshape, reconceptualize, and repurpose nation-building trajectories.

Structural accounts understand **nation-building as a by-product** of broad socioeconomic or geopolitical changes. Karl Deutsch's classic argument that modernization opens up people for new forms of socialization constitutes the core of this approach.[15] For Deutsch the process of social mobilization led to acculturation in a new urban environment, facilitated social communication, and ultimately *caused* assimilation and political integration into a new community. Works by Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner could be categorized as being part of this modernization paradigm.[16] Posner's empirical work tracing linguistic homogenization in Zambia serves as an illustration of such structural arguments.[17] But there are several other types of arguments that highlight the importance of other structural aspects of modernity. Adria Lawrence suggests that disillusionment with the French empire – in places where the French administration failed to extend equal rights to its colonial subjects – led to the abandonment of mobilization solely for equal rights.[18] Disruptions/triggering factors (in the form invasion, occupation, or France's decision to decolonize) then offered opportunities for mobilization that account for the variation in the patterns of *nationalist* mobilization across the empire and within particular colonies. Dominika Koter suggests that in the Sub-Saharan African context citizens developed national identities through

impersonal comparisons with neighbors during the post-colonial period despite the information-poor setting.[19]

Other scholars see **nation-building as a top-down process**. Clearly, these accounts that emphasize the top-down aspects of nation-building are developed and tested in cases where nationalism has already been introduced and dominated the political imagination of at least the ruling elites. Moreover, some of the processes discussed by modernization theorists are prerequisites for most of the top-down nation-building arguments to unfold. One of the first scholars to criticize modernist accounts for leaving elites' agency out of their accounts was Anthony Smith.[20] According to Rogers Smith, we should try to explain the social mechanisms of nation-building and identify political goals that motivate elites initiating and directing these mechanisms.[21] Soviet policies of ethnofederalism and affirmative action were particularly consequential instances of state-planned nation-building policies in the twentieth century.[22]

Andreas Wimmer builds on the work of Fredrick Barth and describes the means of ethnic boundary making such as discourse and symbols, discrimination, political mobilization, coercion and violence.[23] McGarry and O'Leary have offered an accessible overview of different strategies available to state elites in this pursuit,[24] yet scholars have also sought to explain why policy choices vary across states,[25] across non-core groups within the same state,[26] across different parts of the same country,[27] and across historical periods.[28] Some authors have argued that state strategies are strongly shaped by historical legacies.[29] Nation-building strategies have also taken violent forms.[30] In fact, a few authors have noted that in ethnically diverse states, the introduction of democratic mass politics can actually lead to violent national homogenization.[31]

Han and Mylonas try to account for variation in state-ethnic group relations in multiethnic states, focusing on China.[32] They argue that

interstate relations and ethnic group perceptions about the relative strength of competing states are important – yet neglected – factors in accounting for the variation in state-ethnic group relations. In particular, whether an ethnic group is perceived as having an external patron matters a great deal for the host state's treatment of the group. If the external patron of the ethnic group is an enemy of the host state, then repression is likely. If it is an ally, then accommodation ensues. Given the existence of an external patron, an ethnic group's response to a host state's policies depends on the perceptions about the relative strength of the external patron vis-à-vis the host state and whether the support is originating from an enemy or an ally of the host state. They test their theoretical framework on the eighteen largest ethnic groups in China from 1949 to 1965, tracing the Chinese government's nation-building policies toward these groups and examining how each group responded to these various policies. All in all, these top-down accounts are better calibrated to account for the *form* that nation-building practices take compared to the modernization scholars that see nation-building as a by-product of other processes.

Another approach to nation-building refocuses our attention on situations in which nationhood emerges as an active force in political life through various forms of **bottom-up actions by ordinary people**. These bottom-up processes of identification are treated as independent causes, but they are also structured, and are themselves restructuring a particular historical and institutional context that gives meaning to social action.[33] Lisa Wedeen is interested in how seemingly quotidian social practices create and reproduce a sense of national belonging even in the absence of a strong state, applying her argument to Yemen.[34] Michael Billig's work on banal nationalism – referring to the everyday representations of the nation aiming at reproducing a shared sense of national belonging – is also pertinent here, since pride in victory in sports or prominence in cultural affairs could be the source of a bottom-

up nation-building process.[35] In the African context Crawford Young suggested that the arbitrary territorial borders have been internalized over time, thus becoming a primary component of national identity.[36] Authors of this strand implore us to think about the nation not as a thing with fixed relevance and meanings but as one of the possible outcomes of partially contingent social processes of identification.[37] Dominika Koter argues that electoral outcomes have consequences for national identification.[38] She finds that the election of one's co-ethnic increases the sense of belonging to the nation.

Isaacs and Polese have put together a special issue published in *Nationalities Papers* on nation-building in Central Asia focusing both on the efforts of 'the political elites to create, develop, and spread/popularize the idea of the nation and the national community' and 'the agency of nonstate actors such as the people, civil society, companies, and even civil servants when not acting on behalf of state institutions.'[39] Thus, they suggest a more dynamic understanding of the nation-building process, with elites proposing and implementing policies which are, in turn, accepted, renegotiated, or rejected by those targeted by them.

Finally, Darden and Mylonas offer a conceptually and theoretically reflective discussion of the challenges and limitations of **externally promoted** nation-building.[40] They argue that effective third-party state-building requires nation-building through education with national content. Nation-building, however, is an uncertain and long process with a long list of prerequisites, making third-party state-building a risky proposition.

A conceptual clarification is in order here. Journalists, policy commentators, as well as several scholars have recently used the term 'nation-building' in place of what the U.S. Department of Defense calls 'stability operations.' In other words, they often use the term 'nation-

building' to signify 'third party state-building,' efforts to build roads and railways, enforce the rule of law, and improve the infrastructure of a state. This literature grew following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and the US attempts at state-building in Afghanistan and Iraq.[41] But, state-building and nation-building, although related, are analytically distinct concepts. Nation-building refers to the development of a cultural identity through constitutive stories, symbols, shared histories, and meanings. To be sure, state-building can and often does influence the national integration process over the long term, just as the existing patterns of national loyalties may facilitate or hinder state-building projects.

Outcome

Important works also exist that try to account for the success or failure of nation-building projects. For instance, Keith Darden's stand-alone forthcoming work points to mass schooling as a mechanism that explains both the initial fluidity and the consequent fixity of national identities.[42] Darden's argument is that in countries where mass schooling with national content is introduced to a largely illiterate population for the first time and it is implemented on more than 50% of the population, then the national identity propagated in this round of schooling will become dominant. He proposes a few mechanisms for this effect, including western style formal schooling, status reversal within the family, and consequent gatekeeping to keep their children aligned with their initial national identity. Darden and Grzymala-Busse have shown that mass schooling with national content is a particularly effective strategy of inculcating the population with national loyalties that can endure long periods of foreign-sponsored authoritarian rule.[43] Balcells finds supports for Darden's argument in the Catalan case.[44] Despite similar initial conditions, Catalan national identity is not salient in

French Catalonia today because the first round of mass schooling with national content took place under French rule. In contrast, mass schooling in Spain was introduced in Spanish Catalonia during a period of Catalan nationalist upheaval.

Sambanis et al. argue that favorable outcomes in interstate wars significantly increase a state's international status and induce individuals to identify nationally, thereby reducing internal conflict.[45] Thus, leaders have incentives to invest in state capacity in order to solve their internal nation-building problems. The key assumption here is that strength depends to a great extent on nationalist sentiment. An important implication of their model is that the 'higher anticipated payoffs to national unification makes leaders fight international wars that they would otherwise choose not to fight.' The authors illustrate their argument and test its plausibility through a thorough case study of German unification after the Franco Prussian war.

Vasiliki Fouka has recently argued that discrimination against German immigrants in the US led these immigrants to pursue assimilation efforts, i.e. change their names and seek naturalization.[46] However, in another article she finds that forced assimilation policies, such as language restrictions in elementary schools, had counterproductive effects.[47] In particular, those individuals that were not allowed to study German in several U.S. states following WWI, were less likely to volunteer in World War II, more likely to practice endogamy, and to give German names to their children. These articles are part of a broader project where Fouka tries to identify the types of initiatives that contribute to or hinder immigrant incorporation.[48] She tests her intuitions studying the integration programs during the Americanization movement. Overall, she finds that nation-building policies that increase the benefits of integration are successful in promoting citizenship acquisition, linguistic homogeneity, and mixed marriages with the native-born. Conversely, prescription-based policies – where a reward is tied to a specific level of

effort – are either ineffective or counterproductive. However, this is an approach that may not travel in contexts where assimilation cannot be assumed as the government's intended outcome for all non-core groups in a country.[49]

Andreas Wimmer's latest book asks: Why does nation-building succeed in some cases but not in others? For Wimmer successful nation-building manifests itself in having forged 'political ties between citizens and the state that reach across ethnic divides and integrate ethnic majorities and minorities into an inclusive power arrangement.'[50] He operationalizes successful nation-building through the degree of ethnopolitical inclusion in a country's power structures and citizens' identification with their nation-state. The crux of the argument is that state centralization in the nineteenth century – in turn a product of warfighting, in Europe, topography facilitating state control 'where peasants could not escape',[51] elsewhere, combined with population density high enough to sustain a nonproductive political elite at the end of the Middle Ages – facilitated the conditions for the linguistic homogenization of populations and the construction of central governments able to provide public goods. These two factors, along with the presence of civic society that spans ancestral/ethnic divisions, both lead to successful nation-building. The most exogenous part of Wimmer's argument is that variation in topography and population density explain the success of initial state building efforts. But could there be an alternative argument that accounts for variation in initial state- or nation-building efforts? Darden and Mylonas argue that a threatening international environment leads to state capacity and public goods provision in the form of nation-building policies (in particular public mass schooling) that in turn, when successful, account for variation in linguistic homogeneity *and* national cohesion.[52] Comparing cases with similar levels of initial linguistic heterogeneity, state capacity, and development, but in different international environments, they find that states that did not face

external threats to their territorial integrity were more likely to outsource education and other tools for constructing identity to missionaries or other groups, or to not invest in assimilation at all, leading to higher ethnic heterogeneity. Conversely, states developing in higher threat environments were more likely to invest in nation-building strategies to homogenize their populations.

Amanda Robinson focuses on Africa and attempts to evaluate the impact of modernization and colonial legacies on group identification utilizing survey data from sixteen African countries.[53] She is focusing in particular on national vs. ethnic group identification. Robinson's findings are consistent with the classic modernization theory. Living in urban areas, having more education, and being formally employed in the modern sector are all positively correlated with identifying with the nation above one's ethnic group. Further, greater economic development at the state level is also associated with greater national identification, once Tanzania is excluded as an outlier.

Depetris-Chauvin, Durante, and Campante focus on sub-Saharan Africa and find that national football teams' victories in sub-Saharan Africa make national identification more likely, they boost trust for other ethnicities in the country, and also reduce violence.[54] Blouin and Mukand examine the impact of propaganda broadcast over radio on interethnic attitudes in postgenocide Rwanda.[55] They exploit the variation in government's radio propaganda reception due to Rwanda's mountainous terrain. They find that individuals exposed to government propaganda decreases the salience of ethnicity, increases interethnic trust, and willingness to interact face-to-face with non-co-ethnics.

Dominika Koter puzzles over the existence of national identification in the absence of traditional nation-building projects and asks: what is driving national attachment in Africa?[56] For Koter 'the process that results in individuals identifying with their nation is nation-building.'

Which places her squarely in the 'outcome' group of scholars. However, Koter points out that Robinson's finding that wealthier countries report higher levels of national identification worked on the third round of the Afrobarometer survey data but the correlation vanishes in subsequent four rounds of the surveys (rounds 4 through 7). In fact, the relationship appears to be skewing in the opposite direction as more countries were surveyed. Koter zooms in on Ghana and proposes an alternative pathway to understanding national identification, suggesting that national integration is an accidental by-product of shared experiences and distinct country-level trajectories which allow contrast with other national communities. In particular, Ghanaian national identity is most consistent with the role of socio-political developments in the country, rather than cultural factors or state-led nation-building.

Conclusion

The field of nation-building has developed tremendously in the past two decades, but more empirical interdisciplinary work, involving economists, anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, and political scientists, remains to be done. In particular, work that involves cross-regional comparisons and perspectives will push our theories in a direction that can account for global patterns rather than rehashing the European experience and assumptions. Moreover, a more conscious effort thinking of onset, process, and outcomes as distinct stages when theorizing nation-building will move the field forward by improving our causal identification strategies.

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SoN is jointly supported by two institutes: NISE and the University of East London (UEL). Dr Eric Taylor Woods and Dr Robert Schertzer are responsible for overall management and co-editors-in-chief.

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Book Review

Sergej Flere and Rudi Klanjšek, *The rise and fall of socialist Yugoslavia. Elite nationalism and the collapse of a federation.* Lanham, London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019. 334 pp.
ISBN 9781498541961

'Why another book on Yugoslavia?', the authors rightly ask. Plenty of books on the topic have been published since 1991, and even more were published after 1948. On the other hand, while in recent years there has been an upsurge of books on the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has not been any equivalent appearance of books on the end of Yugoslavia. This simple fact should lead to some reflection. Yugoslavia is no longer on the mind of European politicians, let alone potential readers.

This is a highly promising book. The first author (Flere) is a well-established sociologist, with special reference to the sociology of religion (a topic which was impossible to avoid in the Yugoslav context). The second author (Klanjšek) is a promising young sociologist. The division of labour between the two is not specified, but in most cases Flere's scholarly and professional experience (which included briefly working as a 'junior political associate' at the League of Communists of Yugoslavia at the end of the 1960s) is likely to have prevailed.

The book is packed with interesting facts and anecdotes, which in themselves make it worth reading. It also strives to provide a

comprehensive overview of research on the dissolution of the second Yugoslavia, but in so doing it stretches itself too thinly. Many of the usual authors are mentioned and discussed, but quite a few are not. Furthermore, many authors are discussed in a cursory and imprecise manner. If one really needs to refer to Zbigniew Brzezinski's views on totalitarianism, one should at least check what he was saying in the 1960s, and not only in the 1950s. All too much space is devoted to punctilious critiques (often justified) and not enough to making a positive argument.

As befits a book written by an author of Flere's generation, the first two chapters, covering the creation of Socialist Yugoslavia, are the most rewarding. They offer a detailed description of the state-building process, with a degree of attentiveness which is often lacking in many accounts of this period. The third chapter addresses the contentious issue of 'Was 'Tito's' Yugoslavia Totalitarian?'. Predictably, this remains a highly controversial one in political and scholarly debates in the ex-Yugoslav republics. The authors give a negative answer to the question, and they have been frequently attacked for this reason. But to an outsider this appear an incredibly provincial debate. In the West, from the 1960s onwards (and perhaps even earlier) nobody seriously considered Tito's Yugoslavia 'totalitarian'. But, for that matter, at the time few would have considered Poland or Hungary 'totalitarian'. Nor would the Soviet Union have been seen as 'totalitarian'. Even the neo-conservative revival in the USA of such a notion proved to be a relatively short-lived affair.

Undoubtedly, the Yugoslav system was a Communist dictatorship. The real historical issue is not whether this dictatorship required a 'totalitarian' label but, rather, how did Yugoslav citizens perceive it at the time, and, even more importantly, how do they perceive it now, in retrospect? For example, how did the son of a Chetnik father perceive the system? The results of the first free elections in 'post-communist' ex-

Yugoslav republics give the impression that many voters did not hold 'Tito's Yugoslavia' in such high esteem. These disillusioned Yugoslavs may even have been a minority at the time, but they were sufficient to condition political developments after 1990.

The subsequent two chapters focus on the 1970s and 1980s, the last two decades of the Yugoslav Socialist system. When it comes to factual matters, the book is always rewarding, and deserves attentive reading, regardless of whether one always shares the authors' point of view. They essentially provide a description of what has been termed the process of 'republicanisation' of the elites of the Yugoslav republics. The crucial role of this process in leading to the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic (SFRY) should be undisputable.

The last three chapters are devoted to a description of the actual process of dissolution, to its theoretical explanation and to its relevance for the outside world. These chapters are less satisfactory, at least from a historian's point of view. The theoretical analysis is overambitious in trying to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the theoretical debates on the Yugoslav dissolution (as if these had not already been surveyed in other studies). A more circumscribed approach would have been more productive from any point of view.

In itself, the view of the collapse of the SFRY as inevitable is nowadays relatively uncontroversial. What remain controversial are the reasons for such a collapse. The authors rightly emphasize the crucial role played by the republican elites. But they also attach great importance to the role of 'nationalism', as if such a term provided a real explanation. One of the great achievements of Ernest Gellner's theory of nationalism was its ability to properly historicize nationalism in European history, allowing it to be analysed without being demonized. Unfortunately, the authors prefer to banalize Gellner's theory, and stick to a very hazy (and perhaps traditional) view of nationalism.

Coming to the role of Western Europe in the final Yugoslav crisis, the authors seem to have rather unrealistic expectations of what the Europeans could have done to prevent it. The fact is that the key governments of the European Community (and later European Union) were not in the least willing to play an active role in saving the SFRY. The issue was not primarily that of the possibly premature recognition of Slovene and Croat independence which the German Federal Republic pushed for. The key players were the only states which had (and have) credible military force, Great Britain and France. Their action (and inaction) was the decisive factor. As David Owen pointed out in *Balkan Odyssey* (1995), when the Netherlands (on 13 July 1991) made a proposal for an international conference to promote 'a voluntary redrawing of internal borders between the Yugoslav republics', this obtained precisely zero votes, and the key abstainers were Great Britain and France. In short, 'Europe' (rather than the German-Austrian-Vatican Axis) was simply not willing to put any real effort in preventing the Yugoslav dissolution.

In conclusion, this remains a stimulating book, but it is by no means a reliable summing-up of the debates on the end of Yugoslavia.

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Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale

Book Review

Gertjan Willems en Bruno De Wever (eds.), *De verbeelding van de Leeuw. Een geschiedenis van media en natievorming in Vlaanderen.* Antwerpen: Peristyle, 2020, 381 pp.,
ISBN 9789492639400

The important role of media in forming and sustaining national and community identities is more and more acknowledged. In the 1980s Benedict Anderson coined the concept of 'imagined communities', referring to the capacity of media to build and convey feelings of community and belonging, even if there is no physical contact on an individual or group level. Since then, the concept has often been applied in research about the relation of media and national identities. The interest in this topic has grown considerably because of the increasing interest in the broader idea that media are vital in constructing cultural identities. Media are seen as crucial for cultivating a sense of belonging to a distinct culture based on a shared sexual, ethnic, or cultural identity.

It is therefore not by coincidence that the content of media is high on the research agendas in history, media studies, communication sciences and minority studies. The studies brought together in *De verbeelding van de leeuw* [The Imagination of the Lion] (the lion is a symbol of Flanders) are a very nice example. The book offers - for the first time in the historical sciences in Flanders - a nice and varied collection of studies of the way

Huub Wijfjes, 'Book Review: Gertjan Willems en Bruno De Wever (eds.), *De verbeelding van de Leeuw. Een geschiedenis van media en natievorming in Vlaanderen*', in:
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media shaped and gave direction to Flemish identity. The obvious disadvantage of a bundle like this, is the bringing together of scattered and varied research traditions. From detailed historical source study to the more methodologically driven communication sciences, it is all there.

But reading carefully, you can see that almost all studies connect to the idea of 'imagined communities' and a wide variety of more recent theories covering the same subject. Inspiration for example was Sabina Mihelj's study on *Media Nations* (2011) that stresses the ritual aspect of media and identity. In her view the most prominent role of media is to create 'rhythm of thinking' and a 'collective symbolic system'. In the same line of argument is the work of Billig and Skey & Antonsich about everyday 'banal' nationalism. This research looks at forms and contents that are always present in everyday life, but often remain unnoticed or unidentified. Newspapers for example are writing daily with an obvious set of language tools and cultural notions. Deconstructing these notions sheds light on ideas about community and identity.

One of the peculiar aspects of Flemish media identity is the very gradual and slow start of it. Most media of the nineteenth century were published in the French language, the official language of the Belgian nation since the independence of the Netherlands in 1830. In the twentieth century more and more newspapers and magazines changed to Flemish, a variety of Dutch. As Sarah van Hoof shows in a contribution on language care, a battle resulted from this growing awareness of the importance of language for Flemish culture. Elites in literature, journalism, and broadcasting favoured the standard of 'pure' or 'civilized' Dutch language. But others preferred the Flemish language of common people, including phrases and words that weren't part of standard Dutch.

Other studies also see changes in the relation of French and Flemish from the late nineteenth century. Starting with a careful and modest coming out of a Flemish cultural and literate elite, the cultural awareness of

Flemish identity spread rapidly in the twentieth century. Media like newspapers and broadcasting were the agents of the changes. In first instance it aimed for emancipation of the Dutch language equal to the dominant French. Later on, Flemish nationalism politicized the press, that began to publish stories longing for a strong Flanders with glorious stories from the past.

With the rise of mass media like radio, film, and television, Flemish identity became more and more important. After the Second World War growing pressures for equal treatment of Flemish culture resulted in the acknowledgment of the Flemish Cultural Community in the 1960s and the gradual growth to a federal Belgian state with greater autonomy of the French and Flemish communities. In this perspective it is a pity that the emphasis in the book is on the period before the war, because big questions can be raised about the role of media like television on the federalization of culture in Belgium. Only two chapters cover this topic. Communication sciences scholars give a very interesting analysis of the cultural policies of public service broadcasting and the way in which Flemish identity was constructed in fictional programs. And political media scholars try to get a grip on one of the most intriguing topics in news reporting of the last two decades: how to report on nationalistic and populist parties that promote anti-immigration and xenophobic (some even say: racist) ideas? The study shows that public broadcasting didn't choose for laying a 'sanitary cordon' around these parties. They were roughly treated the same as other parties, but the most radical party Vlaams Blok (Flemish Block) didn't get the attention they wanted on basis of the number of voters they attracted. Since then, the relation of Vlaams Blok with what they call 'the mainstream leftist media' is antagonistic, to say it carefully.

Growing pressures for the promotion of Flemish identity have culminated in a strong position of Flanders in the Belgian nation. Media have constructed this identity, but also strengthened it, gave the

emancipation for equal rights a focus and direction, created a sense of urgency, and mobilized people to adjust their norms and behaviour. The big question that follows from this is of course: are media frontrunners in the process or do they just follow what is happening in politics, culture, or society? Looking at the cases presented in this book about Flanders you can say that both arguments are valid. Media were important agents of broader developments, as well as mobilizing factors in times of great tensions.

In the interaction of media contents and cultural articulation of identities lies the secret of media power. The risk of a finalistic view on this interactive network can be felt in this book too. Finalistic in the sense that a strong Flemish identity always was there, only waiting to be awakened by new political ideas and media attention that reflected those.

History shows that processes like these are more complex; it also shows the power of politics. In almost two centuries of development Belgium has found a way to pacify the growing cultural animosity between two main identity groups (Flemish and Walloon). In doing so other minorities (like the German-speaking people) got considerable independence too. Almost all Belgian policies touching on identity nowadays are in hands of communities (education, culture, welfare, media), regions (economics, infrastructure, employment), and what is called 'language areas'. The federation Belgium therefore has become one of the most complicated nations. It still functions although there are some movements towards final separation. Resisting the burden of federal Belgium, the state that increasingly becomes a pragmatic political solution for a nation that was not able to form one powerful and overarching nationalistic feeling or identity. The monarchy, the army and the national football team were and still are almost the only symbols of the Belgian nation. But even when covering the successful national football team, the Walloon television organization RTBF focusses mostly

on the outstanding efforts of 'their' star player Thibaut Courtois, and the Flemish VRT on 'our red devil' Kevin de Bruyne. They are in the same team, but identification with successful efforts takes place through the nationalistic cultural lenses the media use to look at reality.

Huub Wijfjes

University of Groningen, department of Media and Journalism Studies