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Introduction Volume 6

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As restrictions continue to impede modern social life, our attention has diverted to oft forgotten practices or leisure activities that might at one time in the past enthralled a large amount of people. One of these, one could argue, is chess. Given a massive impetus due to the popularity of the television series *The Queen's Gambit*, many people have once again taken up the time-weathered sport. As sales of chessboards, -computers, and strategy guides have skyrocketed, new players have been confronted with the complexity of the 'noble game', searching for ways to encapsulate and grasp its intricately sublime nature. Stepping into the fray of the game, the novice immediately understands that chess is comprised of two halves: the need for a long-term strategy, and simultaneously the necessity to always be prepared to adapt or alter course should one be confronted with an unexpected move.

The intricate interplay between strategy and fluidity seems a fitting allegory for the contributions in this volume, as they all address the difficulties concerning nations and national movements which on the one hand try to envision a long-term future for their territory, whilst on the other hand are confronted with constantly changing contexts and interests.

The contributions themselves stem from two different NISE-events: the first three articles derive from the 2015 NISE-workshop in Brussels titled *Reloading the Nation? Alternative concepts of sovereignty and citizenship in national movements (1960-2014)*. The workshop focused

on the way sub-national movements in Europe and elsewhere experienced a period of 'reloading' since the 1960s and asked how these new forms of sub-nationalism and their corresponding movements might have differed from their predecessors or remained unaltered.

The other two articles are from the 2019 NISE annual conference in Warsaw which focused on the pivotal year of 1919. The articles address how different nations and (diaspora) national movements acted during the aftermath of the First World War, as the debates on the redrawing of borders, territories, and empires (most notably in Eastern Europe) gave different nations and national movements new opportunities.

In addition to the articles, this volume again stresses NISE's key tenet of connecting researchers with archival institutions that focus on (sub)national movements. The volume includes two contributions: one on the Welsh Political Archive, and one on Tresoar, the Frisian Historical and Literacy Centre. Moreover, next to the Archival Reviews, there are two articles from the State of Nationalism-project: a review of the connection between nationalism and gender, and one on the subject of 'nation branding'. And finally, the volume includes a number of book reviews.

To return one more time to the chess metaphor: this year has been an unexpected move, forcing NISE and *Studies on national Movements* to adapt its moves. But we can happily say that even though we had to change or cancel certain events, we have acquired new knowledge – including maintaining a focus on digital events in the future – which will further enrich both NISE and *Studies on national Movements*. This includes both the upcoming NISE conference in Diksmuide (Belgium) in March, and the annual NISE conference which will take place in May.

Kas Swerts

Reloading the Minority Nations after 1945: Some Transnational Suggestions*

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The articles contained in this issue constitute a selection of the papers presented at the *Reloading the Nation? Alternative concepts of sovereignty and citizenship in national movements (1960-2014)* workshop, which was held in Brussels by NISE and the Centre Maurits Coppieters on 3-4 December 2015. Five years later, the reflections contained in these contributions do not appear to be outdated. Events since then, in particular the evolution of the Catalan secessionist challenge and the new impulse that Brexit seems to give to the possibility of holding a second referendum for independence in Scotland, continue to stress the utmost relevance of sub-state nationalism in present-day European politics.

I.

It seems that the second decade of the twentieth-first century will mark a turning-point in the (relatively short) history of substate nationalist movements in Western Europe. The issue of inner enlargement of the European Union and the possible emergence of new states in that area cannot be excluded from the present-day political agenda at the international level.[1] This also creates the possibility for a substantial

reloading of the concept of nation, as well as a further exploration of its limits and possibilities.

The focus in this text will not be on present-day political developments, but rather on the comparative evolution of minority nationalisms in Western Europe after the Second World War. At that time, particularly since the 1960s, a first process of 'reloading' of the cultural and ideological contents ascribed to the nation, and also to some extent to the concept of 'nationalism' (or, if one prefers, 'minority nation'), took place among several minority nationalist elites and parties. This was their response to the several challenges they were confronted with.[2]

First, for many of these substate nationalist elites it was mandatory to overcome the enduring shadow of Fascism, collaboration with foreign occupiers and/or ideological proximity to the Axis powers. This became especially acute in Flanders, Alsace, Brittany or Frisia, but a similar dilemma also affected other movements, such as the South Tyroleans, or even the purported 'indifference' towards the antifascist war effort that Welsh and Scottish nationalists were blamed for. This heavy burden led some minority nationalists through the 1950s and 1960s to reinvent themselves, which usually meant looking for convenient external models and searching in their past for appropriate antecedents. Thus, the Bretons forgot about the *Parti National Breton* and the pro-Fascist bretonnant groups of the 1930s and focused instead on the federalist and 'europeanist' tendencies that were also attached to the movement in the 1920s.

Second, this had to be performed in accordance with the new legitimacy that was acquired by most old-established nation-states that had survived as winners after the Second World War. In most of them, their national identity was reinvented on the basis of the invention of an 'antifascist consensus': the true nationalist shared a joint opposition towards fascism in the past and in the present. This did not affect anti-

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fascist Sardinian autonomists, as well as exiled and/or clandestine Basque, Catalan, and Galician nationalists, who were the main driving forces of anti-fascist opposition in their respective territories. Therefore, the incorporation of ethnonationalist demands from the periphery was even regarded by anti-fascist projects of reshaping the Spanish political and/or national community as a crucial part of the project. However, this was not the case with Italian, French, or Belgian antifascist patriots until the 1970s.

Third, the necessity to adapt themselves to the process of European integration, and to transform their claims into a more nuanced defence of the new role that 'ethnic communities', 'regions', and substate entities would have to play in a unified Europe. This paved the way for tempering claims for self-determination and/or statehood (which nevertheless continued to be present, although at a less visible level, in almost all movements), by prioritizing claims for regional home-rule, regional devolution, federalism, and any form of territorial self-government. At the same time, most ethnonationalist elites embraced the new objective of attaining a unified Europe based not so much upon nation-states, but on 'nationalities', ethnic communities, 'regions', etc. Models and utopian projects that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s varied from a Europe of 'free peoples' to a further regionalization of the EEC member states within the context of a Europe of regions, where nonetheless 'administrative' regions and stateless nations would have to coexist on an equal footing. This wave affected 'ethnic movements' and minority nationalisms in different ways.[3]

Was this a 'reloading' of the nation, or just a strategic adaptation that sought to find a place under the sun for movements which, in the context of the Cold War, had a difficult insertion in the 'mental map' and the political agenda of European elites? What did the different projects of a new Europe based on simultaneous regional devolution and European devolution have in common? While the end of the nation-state was

constantly heralded by political scientists and international observers through the 1970s and 1980s, there seemed to be little place left for new nation-states within Western Europe. However, some political tendencies within established national movements continued to strive for this and did not give up the ultimate objective of setting up an independent nation-state. Moreover, some others considered that statehood for their own nations would come after a long process that, among other elements, would entail a complete renewal and/or reshaping of the concept of nation-state itself.

A fourth element came from the colonial peripheries of European empires: the impact on European minority nationalisms of the doctrines and strategies adopted by national liberation movements in Africa, Asia and, to some extent, Latin America (from the Cuban '26 of July movement' to the Uruguayan *Tupamaros*). This has to be settled within a *longue-durée* perspective, as colonial elites had also previously learnt some lessons from European national movements in the interwar period, and connections between 'imperial' nationalisms of the British periphery (Boers, Australians, etc.) and peripheral nationalisms of the metropolitan core had already taken place since the end of the nineteenth century. However, since the early 1950s the example of the third-world anticolonialist movements, from Indonesia and Algeria to Mozambique, gave a new generation of minority nationalists in Western Europe the chance of overcoming the burden inherited of their predecessors (the suspicion of Fascist or *völkisch* leaning), as well as the opportunity to supposedly overcome the dilemma between class and nation. This combined with the reception of the theories of Frantz Fanon, which dealt with the cultural and psychosomatic 'alienation' of colonised peoples by the colonisers. The parallel contributions by Albert Memmi (1966) and G. Balandier (1963) also emphasized the sociopsychological consequences of colonial rule on colonised peoples.[4]

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This stimulus was also taken up by some Occitanian and Breton nationalists in France. In 1962, Robert Lafont coined the concept of 'internal colonialism'. According to him, there were also 'colonies' in Western Europe, and similar solutions and strategies to those adopted by the national liberation movements could be adapted to the specific circumstances of 'internal peripheries' like Occitany, Brittany, Wales, Corsica, and Galicia, among other territories.

This new theoretical framework experienced a particularly successful diffusion among southern European minority nationalist movements. Nevertheless, the modalities of its adaptation and appropriation, as in every process of cultural transfer, diverged from one case to another. This also permitted a new generation of ethnonationalist activists to find a formula to make compatible ethnonationalism with Marxism and even Marxism-Leninism, going beyond the writings of Lenin and Stalin on the national question. According to the new paradigm of the 1960s, as expressed e.g. by the *Charte de Brest* (1974), there were 'proletarian' regions/nations by reason of the nature of their political and economic link to the nation-state they belonged to. Therefore, the fight for national liberation became just a complementary front to the internationalist struggle for achieving socialism, also fuelled by new ingredients such as the New Left after May 68, feminism, and the ecology.

Nevertheless, here the question emerges of the limits of cultural transfer and internationalism: in the end, what actually took place in most examples was a convenient reinterpretation, in the light of the new 'thirdworldist' and revolutionary theories, of their own tradition of nationalist thinking, just picking up those elements which were considered most suitable to be taken up from a left-wing outlook, from the *Bleun Brug* in Brittany to the *Félibrige rouge* in Occitania. The doubt remains: What was more important? The Basque, Corsican, Sardinian, Breton, Welsh, Galician nationalist tradition? Or just the new 'nationalist

internationalism of the left' that found some expression in documents such as the *Charte de Brest*?

A fifth element was the endogenous evolution of northern-European minority nationalist movements. The 'thirdworldist' wave had little impact on them, while a stronger continuity with their interwar tradition may be noted, and some other non-European influences, notably the powerful ideological influence of the *Québécois* movement since the 1980s, took the lead. This was the case with *Plaid Cymru*, the Scottish National Party, *Volksunie*, or even the classic 'ethnic' parties of Germanophones in South Tyrol (*Südtiroler Volkspartei*) and the Swedish-speaking Finns (SFP). The legacy of their prewar forerunners was now reinterpreted from a more liberal and mostly social-democratic perspective, while their traditional claims for self-government were also reframed in accordance with the international context. They also claimed the existence of economic grievances that affected their homelands, and blamed the states they belonged to for 'plundering', not for colonizing, their resources. This was also the case with some Southern-European minority nationalist parties, such as the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) or (with some nuances) the Sardinian Party of Action (PSd'A). Some of them also had to compete with the different social-democratic nationalist parties that emerged in some Western-European stateless nations, from the Northern Irish SDLP to the Catalan PSC, the Galician PSG, and many others. There was a dialogue between, on the one hand, the territorial sections of the statewide socialist and social-democratic parties in Scotland, Wales, Catalonia and other territories and, on the other hand, traditional ethnonationalist parties and tenets. This also had a further consequence: through the end of the twentieth century, many of these parties continued to be regarded as the best upholders of territorial interests of those stateless nations (Labour in Scotland, Socialists in Catalonia, etc.), as some Communist parties also did in other peripheries.

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All these elements may have contributed to 'reload' the concepts of nation and to make it more civic and less ethnic, although the concrete impact on each particular European minority nation, region or territory produced very different results: from fostering violence in some cases,[5] to undermining the element 'nation' in favour of 'class' in other territories.

II.

Within this general framework, many issues may be raised, which will be certainly addressed too by other contributions in this special issue. They can be summarized as followed:

(a) Did minority nationalisms in Western Europe definitively overcome the most 'ethnocentric' aspects of their political discourse, under the influence of the Cold War, the process of European unification, the need to adapt to the prevailing antifascist and democratic consensus around the maintenance of the welfare state, and, last but not least, the undeniable fact that miscegenation, plurality of identities and the increasing weight of non-European immigration has profoundly changed the structure of most European societies?

(b) What was more important: the endogenous evolution of each nationalist movement, drawing upon its own politico-ideological tradition and the specific conditions of the political and/or party system where it developed, or the transnational dimension of minority nationalism, the diffusion of principles and 'waves' throughout entire areas of Europe? Otherwise expressed: to what extent is it possible to maintain that the history of nationalist movements in the postwar period was an increasingly entangled one, or was it just as entangled as it had been before – *rien de plus international que le nationalisme*?

(c) Was first the blurring and then the almost definitive failure of the project of a 'regionalized' model of European integration a decisive push for the re-emergence and/or the re-strengthening of independence claims within Western European minority nationalisms?[6]

(d) To what extent did the image of what was going on in Eastern Europe after 1989 decisively influence (or not) strategic changes in the political agenda of Western European nationalist movements? To put it simply, during the 1990s the western minority nationalisms' outlook on Eastern-European paths to independence was first marked by fascination, later by the steady distancing from what was regarded as the worst side of nationalism. Yet, since the 2004 Eastern enlargement of the European Union, a new perspective seems to have been developed: if they managed to do it, and have made compatible the existence of national minorities within their territories with their 'national resurgence', why not us? This certainly poses again an old question: the pertinence of maintaining the supposedly existing divide between 'eastern' (i.e. ethnic) and 'western' (i.e. civic) nationalism.

(e) Minority nationalisms have also experienced, even in the most successful cases, the limits of identity politics. They were increasingly forced to include in their agenda attractive offers for non-nationalist voters (or, at least, for citizens who were not particularly sensitive to identity issues, but who saw in nationalist parties appropriate defenders of their interests), which also included a growing proportion of immigrants from other regions or from outside Europe. This was mostly regarded by nationalist elites as a pragmatic strategy of step-by-step nation building, but at the same time this also obliged them to postpone the achievement of the ultimate goals (self-government, independence, sovereignty...), and posed the dilemma of how to convince non-nationalists to endorse nationalist agendas, by using new labels and slogans ('national' and not 'nationalist' parties, 'sovereignty-ism', etc.) that reinforced the inclusive character of the proposed national projects.

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This strategy was culminated with success in some cases, in some others it has led to a lasting 'crisis of identity' of ethnonationalist parties, which perceive that a great proportion of their voters do not share the bulk of their national agendas.

National identity is supposed to be (in theory) monogamous. One may have different layers of collective identity, love his/her region, his/her ethnic origins, and his/her village or city. But he or she espouses just one nation. Yet, minority nationalisms could not, and can not, escape the internal tension of making their national(ist) tenets compatible with tolerance for individuals' double/multiple identities. In the end, abandoning the emotive cohesion and the passionate appeal to the nation in classic terms ('us' against 'them', the identification with endangered culture and language, etc.) in favour of socioeconomic claims ('colonial' exploitation, or economic grievance – 'we pay for them, it's our oil, the state steals from us', etc.) leads to a further dilemma: being accused of just pursuing self-interest. Is it possible to be Garibaldi and Bossi at the same time? Is it possible to present the aim at building new nation-states as a new opportunity for creating a better society, while at the same time denying other parts of the same state the possibility to benefit from it?[7]

Obviously, the answers to that question have varied from one case to another, and the arguments that emphasise economic grievance, cultural oppression, proactive prospects for creating a better society and alternative models of welfare and social justice are intertwined in a more complex manner. And what matters – or what interests us as social scientists – is how people perceive these frames of meaning and politically act in accordance with them, independently of how performative the arguments of territorial grievance or cultural oppression may have been.

(f) Finally, to what extent have minority nationalisms decisively reshaped the theory of the nation and crafted new concepts of national identity?[8] Given the fact that Western European nationalist movements since 1945 have not yet attained statehood, most of their elites may argue that they are not responsible for enforced cultural assimilation and violence in the past, as most 'majority' nationalisms of the established nation-states have done in the long nineteenth century and even during the twentieth century. Minority nationalism usually presents itself as a reaction to decades or centuries of enforced assimilation policies that were set up by existing states and/or ruling majorities. For this reason, a precondition for success for minority nationalisms that develop in consolidated democracies and advanced capitalist societies, and which aim at reversing centuries of nation-building processes implemented by nation-states, seems to be that they have been forced to reinvent the concept of nation and to reload it with 'post-national' contents. These contents enhance respect for democracy, human rights, social justice, tolerance, and universal values. This may prevent them from becoming, as it has happened in many areas, a new 'oppressor', such as the 'nationalizing states' (Brubaker) of the interwar period in East-Central Europe did, once statehood has been achieved.

Endnotes

* The present text is based on the position paper held as introduction to the workshop *Reloading the Nation?*, Brussels, 3-4 December 2015.

1 See, among others, F. Requejo & K-J. Nagel, *Democracy and Borders: External and Internal Secession in the EIU* (Euroborders Working Paper 14, September 2017); C. Closa (ed.), *Secession from a Member State and Withdrawal from the European Union: Troubled Membership* (Cambridge, 2017); X. Cuadras-Morató (ed.), *Catalonia: A New Independent State in Europe? A Debate on Secession within the European Union* (London/New York, 2016).

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[2] See J. W. Friend, *Stateless Nations. Western European Regionalis Nationalisms and the Old Nations* (New York, 2012); A. Gat, *Nations. The Long History and Deep Roots of Political Ethncity and Nationalism* (Cambridge, 2013); X. M. Núñez Seixas, *Patriotas transnacionales. Ensayos sobre nacionalismos y transferencias culturales en la Europa del siglo XX* (Madrid, 2019).

[3] See for an interpretation X. M. Núñez Seixas, 'Il ritorno dello stato-nazione? Alcune ipotesi sulle spinte indipendentiste nell'Europa occidentale all'inizio del XXI secolo', in: *Passato e Presente*, 105 (2018), 5-18.

[4] See T. Kernalegenn, J. Belliveau & J-O. Roy (eds), *La vague nationale des années 1968. Une comparaison internationale* (Ottawa, 2020).

[5] L. de la Calle, *Nationalist Violence in Postwar Europe* (Cambridge, 2015).

[6] A. Elias, *Minority Nationalist Parties and European Integration: A Comparative Study* (London, 2009); Ch. Harvie, *The Rise of Regional Europe* (London/New York, 1994).

[7] See E. dalle Mulle, *The Nationalism of the Rich. Discourses and Strategies of Separatist Parties in Catalonia, Flanders, Northern Italy and Scotland* (London, 2018).

[8] See J. Lluch, *Visions of Sovereignty. Nationalism and Accommodation in Multinational Democracies* (Philadelphia, 2014).

Baltic national movements, 1986-1992. Origins, trajectories, agendas

JÖRG HACKMANN

The public appearance of national movements in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is closely connected to Gorbachev's attempt to reform the Soviet Union through the politics of perestroika and glasnost. The evident similarities of these mass movements in their agendas and trajectories result from the parallel political history of the Baltic nations with the Soviet annexation in 1940 and the renewal of their independence in August 1991. Apart from this general framework the single movements show path dependencies, which are based on different social and cultural developments and shaped by the diverging scale of Russian-speaking immigrants during the Soviet period. In fact, after August 1991, the term 'Baltic' may serve only as a regional term for analytical purpose, as it does not mark an essentialist coherence within these movements.

This paper focusses on the origins and trajectories of the Baltic national movements between 1986 and 1992, when they ceased to exist as social movements after their success in restoring political independence. The origins of the 'popular fronts' (*Rahvarinne* in Estonia, *Tautas fronte* in Latvia) or 'movement' (*Sajūdis* in Lithuania) are connected first with the support of perestroika, second with public historical debates about the Molotov-Ribbentrop-Pact and Stalinist repressions, and third with the restoration of national symbols of the pre-war republics. Music performances and festivals, and in particular the 'Baltic chain' on 23 August 1989 mobilized large parts of the population of the three then Soviet republics and shaped the image of the peaceful 'singing revolution'.

Since spring 1990 divisions appeared within the independence movements between the rather reform-oriented popular movements and more radical nationalist groups striving for immediate full independence and the restoration of the pre-war nation states. These cleavages deepened after the restoration of national independence in August 1991, first of all on issues of legal restoration, language laws and de-Sovietization and largely shaped political debates in the three Baltic states in the following decades.

Keywords: Baltic nations, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Singing revolution, national movements

Introduction

In the chain of peaceful revolutions in the Soviet hemisphere from 1989 onwards, the 'singing revolution' in the Baltic region formed a much longer lasting drama than the overcoming of the socialist regimes in the Central European states, and its successful ending was still highly uncertain until August 1991, when the failure of the coup against Gorbachev paved the way for the international recognition of the restored states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Contrary to the provocative thesis by Steven Kotkin in his *Uncivil Society* that the collapse of the Socialist regimes was caused only by their internal weakness, contemporary foreign observers and scholars were impressed by the power of peaceful protests in the Baltic region.[1] Actually, no analysis of the events leading to the independence of the three Baltic states can skip discussing the role of national movements and nationalisms, and this also implies looking at their historical traditions and trajectories.

Against the official Soviet condemnation that these national mass movements adhered to the chauvinism of the pre-socialist 'bourgeois' or even 'fascist' nation states, an alternative understanding can be noticed that referred to nineteenth-century traditions of liberationist national movements in Europe, which became manifest in the 'spring of nations' and the emancipation of small nations.[2] Such a connection is not only a scholarly one ex post, but was also used as a political argument in Socialist Poland in conceiving the civic protest against the socialist regime. In his 'Letters from Prison' Adam Michnik, a leading intellectual of the Polish national movement of *Solidarność*, borrowed directly from the national Polish traditions of the nineteenth-century striving for self-determination as a major argument for establishing a democratic civil society in socialist Poland.[3] A crucial element of the historical Polish discourse was the notion of solidarity of the nations against their tyrants,

an idea which the also shaped international relations in East Central Europe in the 1990s.

International scholarly debates on nationalism fill whole libraries, but one point historical research has highlighted in the last decade is the connection between emancipation and exclusion in nineteenth-century nationalisms. The striving for political participation implied social and not least 'ethnic' integration on the fields of language, culture, and historical imagination. Such an integration was achieved, however, in particular by excluding those who were regarded as not belonging to the nation. Those developments may be described as a trajectory of moving from leftist to rightist political positions.[4] In such a perspective, the distinction between an inclusive, territorial nationalism on the one hand and an ethnic, exclusive on the other hand is not an essentialist, but an analytical one. Nationalism, thus, has to be regarded as a Janus-faced phenomenon. Such a dichotomy may serve to understand the impact and the trajectories of national movements in the Baltic region from the late Soviet period until the first years of renewed independence after 1991.

This article focusses on the origins and trajectories of the Baltic national movements between 1986 and 1992, when they ceased to exist as social movements after their success in restoring political independence and their political role was taken over by political parties.[5] Before, some basic aspects of Baltic nations and nationalisms will be discussed. Furthermore, the text sheds light on the cultural forms of the national movements and discusses their political strategies. The conclusion will then briefly address the place of the Baltic national movements within the broader context of nationalism at the end of the twentieth century. The period covered here has been closely observed by many Western journalists and scholars, many of them with an exile background being linguistically competent to follow the developments and debates. Furthermore, many of the activists involved have published memoires and reflections on that period.[6]

On the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, on 23 August 1989, a human chain formed over 600 km from Tallinn via Riga to Vilnius, the respective capitals of the three then Soviet Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Organized by a joint council of the three national movements in the Baltic republics, it involved between 1 and 2 million people[7] out of a population of circa 8 million. The statement issued by the organizers claimed a 'peaceful restoration of our statehood' and a strive for 'social security, civil rights, and economic progress to all peoples in the Baltic republics regardless of their nationality'.[8] This event marked the symbolic peak of the common striving of the Baltic national movements for political self-determination. On the occasion of the chain, a rock song was recorded addressing the common fate of the 'Baltic sister nations' and calling upon them in their three languages to awake.[9] It illustrates the image of the 'singing revolution', a term coined by one of the Estonian activists, Heinz Valk, at its very beginning in June 1988. Collective singing made language a 'core symbol in Baltic nationalism', as Smidchens argues, and highlights the double nature of inclusive and exclusive national mobilisation, which was also inherent in Valk's notion.[10]

Apart from the narrative of the peaceful singing revolution, the 'Baltic chain' also illustrates a second core narrative of the national movements: the reference to history and the claim to mark the Soviet annexation of the Baltic states in 1940 as acts of injustice, which should be made undone. In that respect, 'revolution from the past' has been another label for these movements.[11] The pasts remembered and reconstructed in the Baltic region, however, were first of all national ones, based on historical references within the single nations to their respective national movements before 1918. Against this background, the notion of unity among the three national movements worked out best in reaction to Russian (Tsarist and Soviet) repression. Actually, there had also been attempts among the Baltic states to co-operate during the inter-war

period, but the focus then was rather on a broader Baltic region including Finland and the Scandinavian states.[12] One may argue, therefore, that the phenomenon of supranational Baltic unity during the singing revolution was mainly a result of the Soviet period. This may also explain why after the restored independence in August 1991, the concord among the three movements quickly ceased to exist, although common political institutions had been created. In fact, the political and cultural trajectories of the single movements also reveal significant path dependencies. These remarks shall highlight the fact that treating the Baltic nations as one entity has been – to a large degree – a perspective from outside the region, with only limited resonance within the Baltic societies and the political elites themselves. As I have argued elsewhere, the contemporary understanding of 'Baltic' in 'Baltic states', 'Baltic nations' referring to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is largely based on the developments since the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the subsequent German and Soviet domination over the north-eastern part of the Baltic sea region.[13]

Another aspect that needs clarification before looking at the development of the singing revolution refers to the ethnic and linguistic structure of the population in the region. A major concern is the large number of usually called 'Russian-speaking' inhabitants in Estonia (35% of circa 1,5 million in 1989) and Latvia (circa 42% of 2,7 million in 1989).[14] This situation is largely, but not exclusively, due to Soviet-time labour migration into the industrial centres. However, arguments that the Baltic states have widely been nationally homogeneous before the Soviet occupation are only correct with regards to Latvia and Estonia when looking at the situation in 1944, i.e. after the forced evacuation of the Baltic Germans as a consequence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the murder of the Jewish population during and after the German occupation from 1941 to 1944. The ethnic and political situation in Lithuania is different for several reasons: First, the Russian-speaking

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people comprised only circa 12% of 3,7 million residents in 1989. Second, the Polish population (7% in 1989), which is concentrated in the region around Vilnius, has been of much higher concern for Lithuanian internal politics. Third, the Lithuanian territory saw a significant expansion since 1940 with the inclusion of two territories: the Vilnius region, which had been occupied by Poland in 1920, and the Klaipėda region, which was contested between Lithuania and the German Reich in the inter-war period. Against this background, notions of originally in ethnic terms homogenous Baltic states must be seen critically. Nevertheless, as will be discussed below, the cultural expressions of the broad social movements during the striving for independence were dominated by the languages of the three titular nations.

The social movements in the Baltic region emerged during the Gorbachev era with civic protests against ecological devastation. They focused on phosphorite open mining in north-eastern Estonia (called by Estonian activists the 'phosphorite war') in 1987 and a hydro-electric power plant on the Daugava river near Daugavpils in Latvia since 1986. The protests in the case of Latvia were launched by two writers, one of them Dainis Īvāns who later became a leader of the Latvian Popular Front, with an article in the literary journal *Literatūra un Māksla* in October 1986. Success came rather unexpectedly, when the plans – both in Estonia and Latvia – were stopped, although they had already been approved in Moscow in 1987.[15] This success was, as Andrejs Plakans suggests, largely due to the fact that the protests were not expected by the Soviet administration, which had no experience with how to deal with the new dimension of civic protests in the times of *glasnost*.[16] In Lithuania, initiatives for environmental protection had already emerged in the early 1980s. They broadened into mass movements in 1988 after the foundation of the national movement *Sąjūdis* and focused on the third block of the Ignalina nuclear power plant as well as on pollution at the Baltic shore.

In addition, these protests against environmental devastation were not only a criticism of technological projects, but were also connected to the romantic idea of protecting the homeland as well as the ethnic nation, because those large Soviet industrial projects implied the immigration of (Russian-speaking) workers from all over the Soviet Union. This connection introduced national images and symbols into the form of protests, as for instance by the Latvian Environment Protection Club (*Vides aizsardzības klubs*). The focus on the national homeland also became a core issue of the movements for the protection of monuments. In Estonia, the focus was on a large number of castles, churches, manor houses and cemeteries, although many of these monuments would not fit into a narrow ethno-nationalist reading of the Estonian nation. The Estonian Heritage Society (*Eesti Muinsuskaitse Selts*), founded in December 1987, immediately departed from understanding itself as a secret dissident organization, but strove for official approval in order to act openly in the public space, although its activities to publicly display the Estonian pre-war flag in April 1988 were still illegal. In Latvia, protests were ignited by plans to build a subway beneath the Old Town of Riga. Furthermore, the reconstruction of the Black Heads' House on the Town Hall square as central issue on the national agenda gained new momentum.[17] In Lithuania, the preservation of Vilnius' Old Town and the restoration of Catholic churches as for instance the Cathedral on Gediminas square, had a similar focus.[18]

More closely connected to national traditions were the commemorations of blank spots of the Soviet period. In Latvia, mass mobilization started with 'calendar demonstrations' on anniversaries of dates connected to national history. A first one, organized by a 'Helsinki-86' group from Liepāja, was dedicated to the deportations of 13-14 June 1941, when more than 15,000 people were transported from the Latvian SSR to various places within the Soviet Union. Held in Riga on 14 June 1987, it was joined by some 5,000 people. Further demonstrations followed on

23 August, referring to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, and 18 November, commemorating the independence of 1918. The 14 June commemoration in 1988 was then attended by 100,000 people.[19] In Tallinn, a first demonstration took place on 23 August 1987 in the Hirve Park leading to the foundation of a group for the publication of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.[20] Further demonstrations in early 1988 commemorated the 1920 Tartu peace treaty between Estonia and Soviet Russia and the declaration of independence of 1918. In Lithuania, many mass demonstrations took place since the summer of 1988: the demonstration on 23 August 1988 in Vingis Park in Vilnius was joined by 150,000 to 200,000 people.[21]

What can be noticed in this early stage is the combination of single political issues connected to the protection of the environment and cultural heritage into a quickly broadening social movement with an increasing display of national symbols. The protests initiated by individual persons and small groups did not only spread through means of singing letters of protest, but not least through their cultural dimension. Its relevance clearly was a result of the Soviet suppression of a public political sphere. The ban of pre-war national symbols thus gave them an imminent political meaning. As Plakans has argued, the display of national symbols emerged subsequently as participants challenged the new space of freedom that was promised by the slogan of *glasnost*.[22] Such activities were also stimulated, as Karsten Brüggemann suggests, by the collective disappearance of the fear of Soviet authorities.[23] But there was also a deep unsettling within the Soviet administrations on how to deal with the new public activities. On the one hand, Soviet authorities were already too weak to impose the ban of national symbols of the pre-1940 Baltic states or to introduce large scale repressions of the social movements. On the other hand, these mass movements understood themselves, as will be discussed below, as acting in

accordance with the new politics of Gorbachev, so they could initially be regarded as contributing to the process of *perestroika*.

The organization of rock concerts and song gatherings as places of non-political or half-political society-building had an important impact on mobilising large parts of the societies beyond environmental protests and collective commemoration of historic and traumatic dates. Song festivals in particular had a tradition going back to nineteenth-century Protestant and national singing traditions in Estonia and Latvia, and they were continued as official national events in the independent states after World War I. In the inter-war period, such festivals were also introduced in Lithuania. However, one should not overlook the impact of Soviet trajectories. On the one hand, the display of ethnic folk culture received official support already from the Stalinist period in the famous slogan of 'national in form, socialist in contents' and became manifest in Soviet song festivals already since 1946, which actually continued the traditions of official mass festivals from the inter-war period. The ban of pre-war national flags and anthems created voids that were filled with substitutes preserving the memory of the banned symbols. With the ban of the pre-war Estonian national anthem 'Mu isamaa, mu õnn ja rõõm' ('My fatherland, my happiness and joy'), which was an adaptation of the Finnish anthem for the Estonian Song Festival in 1869, its place was taken over by a song with similar background and contents: 'Mu isamaa on minu arm' (My fatherland is my beloved') by the poet Lydia Koidula which was also composed and performed in 1869. The song was newly arranged by Gustav Ernesaks in 1944 and then performed at the first Soviet-time Estonian song festival in 1947. After it was banned temporarily in the Stalinist period, it was sung again publicly since 1960. At the Estonian Song Festival of 1985 Ernesaks' song clearly occupied the place of the traditional national anthem, as Brüggemann and Kasekamp argue.[24]

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In Estonia, since 1987 rock music performances, in particular with Alo Mattiisen's 'five patriotic songs', contributed to national mass mobilization. Mattiisen combined texts from the nineteenth-century Estonian national movement as for instance 'Sind surmani' ('You, until death') with own rock arrangements and created new songs as 'Ei ole üksi ükski maa' ('Not a single land is alone') or 'Eestlane olen ja Eestlaseks jään' ('I am Estonian and I'll stay Estonian'). Their performance at the Tartu Music Days in April 1988 went along with the first public display of the Estonian national flag in Soviet Estonia. In June 1988, during the Tallinn Old Town Days, mostly young people spontaneously gathered at the song festival grounds during the white nights for almost a week, which coincided with the anniversary of the first wave of Soviet deportations in June 1941. According to Heinz Valk, 'participation in this festival compensated for decades of humiliation and self-denial.'[25] As Brüggemann and Kasekamp pointed out, it was the experience of forming one body through singing that triggered their political courage and inspired the image of the 'singing revolution'.[26] In September 1988, the festival Song of Estonia ('Eestimaa laul') then gathered an estimated number of 300,000 singers, which would have been 25% of the general Estonian population. This festival also included political speeches and another popular slogan created by Heinz Valk 'Ükskord me võidame niikuinii' ('One day we will win anyway') and manifested a 'mental secession from the USSR'.[27] Also at this festival, Trivimi Velliste, the leader of the Estonian Heritage Society, for the first time publicly demanded Estonian independence, and thus showed the connection between cultural and political activities. In fact, members of that association understood themselves as leaders of a new, second national awakening after the first one, which had emerged after the first Estonian song festival in 1869.

A view on Latvia and Lithuania reveals similar phenomena. In Latvia, the rock band 'Pērkons', which had already produced protest songs in earlier

years, was banned by the authorities after young people demolished a train coach in 1985. The band then received popularity (even beyond Latvia) through Juris Podnieks' documentary *Vai viegli būt jaunam?* ('Is it easy to be young?') from 1986. In Lithuania, performances by the rock band 'Antis', which also became subject of a documentary *Kažkas atsitiko* ('Something just happened') by Artūras Pozdniakovas in 1986 had a similar mobilising effect.[28] Finally, in the summer of 1990 national song festivals took place in all three Baltic republics. As Šmidchens describes, the closing of the Estonian festival continued with spontaneous songs of national contents ('Jää vabaks, Eesti meri' – 'Stay free, Estonian sea' – among others) and speeches focusing on freedom. The performances at the festivals in Riga and Vilnius saw similar national programs with unofficial anthems ('Pūt, vējiņi' – 'Oh wind' – and 'Gasimas pils' – 'Fortress of light' – in Latvia, a song by Andrejs Jurjāns from 1884) and continued singing after the official end of the program in Riga.[29] The Lithuanian song 'Lietuva Brangi' ('Dear Lithuania') by Jonas Mačiulis-Maironis served as an unofficial anthem in the 1930s and re-appeared during public events in the 1960s.[30] The intention of creating a common cultural narrative through collective singing also shaped Juris Podnieks' documentary *Krustceļš* ('Homeland') in 1990, who worked with the stark contrast between peaceful singing in choirs and gatherings on the one hand, and the military power of the Soviet army on the other.

Between April and October 1988, the various cultural and preservationist initiatives and demonstrations resulted in the formation of 'Popular Fronts' (*Rahvarinne* in Estonia, *Tautas fronte* in Latvia) or simply 'Movement' (*Sąjūdis* in Lithuania), as informal mass organizations. As initial motivation these movements stressed their support for *perestroika*, which initially was part of the movements' names in Estonia and Lithuania, but at the same time the limits of *glasnost* were tested by demands to publish the secret protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (in Estonia and Latvia) and thus disclose the

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injustice of the Soviet annexation in 1940. All three Popular Fronts served as umbrella organizations, where dissident intellectuals met with reform-oriented communists who tried to distance the republic party branches from the CPSU. In the early phase, almost 50% of the council members of *Tautas fronte* and *Sąjūdis* and more than 20% of the delegates to the first congress of *Rahvarinne* in Estonia were members of the Communist Party. The leaders of the Popular Fronts reveal the broad range of support within the Baltic societies: In Estonia, Edgar Savisaar, a leading member of the Estonian CP (and an influential politician inter alia as the mayor of Tallinn until 2015) became chairman. In Latvia, Īvāns, who initiated the protests against the Daugava hydro-electric dam, was elected, and in Lithuania Vytautas Landsbergis, a musicologist who had entered politics with the foundation of *Sąjūdis*.

The dynamics within these movements were strong, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. The Popular Fronts quickly outnumbered the members of the regional Communist Parties. Membership estimates were 100,000 members in Estonia at the end of 1988 and 250,000 in Latvia in 1989, in the case of *Sąjūdis* figures widely vary between 100,000 and up to 300,000 members.[31] In putting pressure on the regional Soviet structures, the Popular Fronts received political relevance, even before their power became manifest within the official structures of the Soviet Union with the elections first to the Congress of People's Deputies in Moscow in March 1989 and second to the Supreme Councils of the single Soviet Republics in March 1990.

Among the political steps initiated by the national movements were declarations 'about sovereignty' issued by the Supreme Councils of the Baltic republics, and hence official Soviet bodies. The Estonian declaration of 18 November 1988 was signed by Arnold Rüütel, at that time president of the Supreme Council of the ESSR. The declaration referred to the national narrative that the Estonian people have already been living on the Baltic rim for over 5,000 years and that Estonia before

joining the Soviet Union had been a nationally homogenous country. During the following years, the declaration continued, a catastrophic situation emerged in demographical, environmental and economic terms, therefore the Estonian supreme body claimed to have the right of self-determination in accordance with international law.[32]

Similar declarations were issued by the Lithuanian and Latvian Supreme Councils in May and July 1989 respectively, with corresponding legal claims of self-determination. The Lithuanian declaration, which mentioned the illegal incorporation into the Soviet Union, was already prepared at the same time as the Estonian one, but due to political pressure from Moscow was blocked by Algirdas Brazauskas, a reform communist and since October 1988 first secretary of the Lithuanian CP. The Latvian declaration referred to the national narrative of seven centuries of oppression by foreign powers. This was a traditional narrative among Estonians and Latvians from the period of the national awakenings, which originally meant the time before the independence of 1918, but was now also connected to Soviet rule.

All three Supreme Councils were dominated by the national movements after the elections of March 1990. In Estonia, *Rahvarinne* received 43 out of 105 seats; together with the 25 members of the pro-independence faction *Vaba Eesti* ('Free Estonia') and smaller parties, supporters of independence controlled 77 seats. In Latvia, *Tautas fronte* won 134 out of 200 seats, and in Lithuania *Sąjūdis* gained 96 out of 141 mandates.[33]

All three Supreme Councils issued declarations of independence in the spring of 1990 with the restitution of national symbols. Lithuania was first on 11 March, then followed by Estonia and finally Latvia on 4 May. In Lithuania, the declaration claimed the beginning of full, *de facto* sovereignty and was answered by Moscow with economic sanctions and various activities of the army and special units. After this experience, the following declarations were rather indirect, claiming *de iure*

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independence and against the background of *de facto* occupation a transition period that should then lead to full independence.[34] Apart from these declarations, all Supreme Councils named new governments in the spring of 1990, which were now led by representatives of the Popular Fronts such as Savisaar in Estonia, Kazimiera Prunskienė in Lithuania, and Ivars Godmanis in Latvia.

Although the popular movements were inclusive in political terms and did not limit themselves to the titular nations of the republics, the ideology of national independence was clearly based on their respective national culture and history. In that respect, the Estonian and Latvian movements referred to the nineteenth-century national awakening and called the new ones a 'second' (in Estonia) or 'third' one (in Latvia). One of the most crucial issues of the national movements were laws on the official language with the intention to strengthen the national languages and cutting down the role of Russian, which had become the dominating language during Soviet times. In Estonia, such a law was already adopted by the Supreme Council at the end of 1988, and in Latvia in May 1989. This issue, thus, was not limited to nationalist factions of the national movements. In Lithuania, *Sąjūdis* already demanded in 1988 that inhabitants should show a 'determination to permanently live in Lithuania, respect for Lithuania's history, culture, and recognition of the Lithuanian language as the state language'.[35] This also explains why leading figures used a national rhetoric. This does not only hold for people like Landsbergis, but also for regional communist leaders with the reform-oriented Brazauskas, who headed the separation of the Lithuanian branch from the CPSU at the end of 1989, at the forefront. In Estonia, Rüütel as President of the Supreme Court and Savisaar as prime minister represented *Vaba Eesti*, the pro-independence wing of CPE, which also opted for separation, whereas in Latvia the Communist Party was split in a reformist and conservative wing.

The Popular Fronts were no homogenous organisations, but were also comprised of more radical nationalist groups which emerged in all Baltic republics: In Latvia, *Latvijas Nacionālās Neatkarības Kustība* (the 'National Independence Movement') was formed by members of the Environment Protection Club in June 1988, in Lithuania, *Lietuvos Laisvės Lyga* (the 'Freedom League') experienced harsh reactions by the Soviet authorities in September 1988, which then led to a closer cooperation with *Sąjūdis*. In Estonia, *Eesti Rahvusliku Sõltumatuse Partei* (the 'National Independence Party'), founded in August 1988 by the group that vied for the publication of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, can be regarded as the first real political party. Furthermore, it played a decisive role in initiating so-called 'Citizens' Committees', which will be addressed below.[36]

Political conflicts within the Baltic societies after the formation of the Popular Fronts arose from two issues. On the one hand from the opposition against the independence movements formed in 'inter'-movements: in Estonia first as *Interfront*, then from autumn 1988 under the name of Inter-movement (*Interliikumine/Interdvizhenie*), Unity (*Edinstvo*) in Lithuania, and *Interfront* in Latvia. They emerged in the autumn of 1988 or early 1989 respectively, mainly within factories of a Soviet all-union relevance. The Estonian 'Interfront', however, failed to gain broader support even among the Russian-speaking population in Estonia, many of whom also participated in the independence movement. The confrontation between both movements became manifest on 15 May 1990 with an attempt by the Inter-movement to storm the seat of the Estonian Soviet in the castle on Toompea Hill and restore the Soviet flag in Tallinn after the declaration of independence. Finally, the participants of the demonstration found themselves surrounded by supporters of Estonian independence, mobilized by Savisaar via radio, but could leave the site without clashes between both groups. Similar incidents took place in Riga on the same day.[37]

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The second source of conflict went beyond the political split between supporters of national independence and those who wanted to preserve the Soviet, as it was connected to the large Russian-speaking immigration into the Estonian and Latvian Soviet Republics after World War II, which by the vast majority of ethnic Estonians and Latvians was seen as a threat to national self-determination. Although the national movements did also comprise many Russian inhabitants, the restoration of independence seemed to be unthinkable without strengthening the titular nations. Apart from language legislation, the question of citizenship served as a means to stop or even undo the Soviet immigration. This was the agenda of the 'Citizens' Committees' (*Kodanike Komiteed, Pilsoņu komitejas*), which emerged as new institutions besides the Popular Fronts in Estonia and Latvia. In Estonia, they were initiated by Velliste from *Muinsuskaitse Selts* and formed on 24 February 1989, the anniversary of the independence declaration in 1918. These committees intended to re-establish Estonian citizenship by granting it only to citizens of the pre-war independent states and their descendants. This in fact created an electorate on mainly ethnic fundaments with the intention to exclude the post-war non-Estonian and non-Latvian immigrants. Both committee movements received support from the vast majority of ethnic Estonians and Latvians by early 1990. After elections based on the principle of pre-war citizenship to a 'Congress of Estonia', the Congress convened in March 1990 and claimed to be the only legitimate parliamentary body. Although more radical representatives of the Estonian Congress rejected cooperation with the Supreme Council, there was a significant overlap between members of the Congress and the Supreme Council – 44 of the Council members also had mandates in the Congress. In negations between the Congress and the Supreme Council, the latter acknowledged the claim of the Congress, but nevertheless served as a leading body during the transition period. In Latvia, relations between the Citizens' Committees and the Popular Front were more confrontational, as the committees initially demanded

a boycott of the election to the Latvian Supreme Council in 1990, but – as their position was weaker than in Estonia – finally came to an agreement with the Popular Front, which promised to vote for independence after victory in the elections. In Lithuania, however, the situation was different: a citizenship law with a 'zero option' – meaning that all current residents of the Lithuanian SSR could apply for citizenship without further requirements – was already introduced in October 1989.[38] In effect, the vast majority of the inhabitants made use of the opportunity, with a more restrictive citizenship law introduced only at the end of 1991.

The period from the spring of 1990 onwards revealed a division within the independence movements between the rather reform-oriented popular movements as umbrella organizations on the one hand, which initially tried to achieve changes within a reformed Soviet Union, and more radical nationalist groups striving for immediate full independence and the restoration of the pre-war nation states on the other hand. This, however, was not so much a difference in goals, but rather one of strategy, as the Estonian Popular Front demanded full independence since October 1989 and the newly elected (initially still Soviet) Supreme Council re-established the pre-war state name of *Eesti Vabariik* in May 1990. A similar process can be observed in Latvia, where the Supreme Council unanimously but with absence of the members against independence, declared the restoration of Latvia on 4 May 1990.

The struggle for power with the Soviet authorities escalated in January 1991 with attacks by OMON, special forces of the Ministry of the Interior of the Soviet Union, on TV towers and the subsequent erection of barricades around the Supreme Councils, now dominated by the popular movements. In the spring of 1991, after the attacks by OMON troops in Vilnius and Riga, which left 19 people dead, in all three republics inclusive plebiscites on independence were held with overwhelming

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results supporting independence: 74% in Latvia, 78% in Estonia, and 90% in Lithuania.[39]

The time of power rivalry between the national movements and Moscow ended after the failed coup d'état in Moscow in August 1991. From that point onward, restitutionist politics clearly dominated in Estonia and Latvia and became most obvious in the citizenship laws (1992 in Estonia, 1991 in Latvia), which excluded *de facto* large parts of the Russian-speaking groups through language barriers. In addition, in 1994 Latvia introduced a so-called 'window policy', largely restricting the naturalization process. In Lithuania, as a consequence of the 'zero-option' rule, the number of non-citizens was much lower than in Estonia and Latvia. Conflicts however arose regarding the Polish minority, which was blamed for supporting the coup against Gorbachev in 1991. This conflict had its historical background in the Polish occupation of the Vilnius region in 1920 and its subsequent annexation. Disputes referred to various aspects of minority politics, such as the change of administration districts, Lithuanisation of names etc., but all in all the level of national conflicts was significantly lower than in the other two states. In Estonia and Latvia, citizenship politics became a major concern of OSCE missions implemented in 1993. The situation has changed significantly after the EU accession in 2004, but in 2009 8% of the population of Estonia and 18% of Latvia's inhabitants were still non-citizens.[40]

After the re-establishment of independence, the Popular Fronts either ceased to exist (in Estonia) or tried to transform into political parties, however with limited success in both Latvia and Lithuania. Most successful was the Latvian liberal-conservative party *Latvijas Ceļš* ('Latvian Way'), which was formed in 1993 from former members of the Popular Front and had four prime ministers until 2002. Although there are differences between the political structures in the three Baltic nations, governments were formed on coalitions, which in various

constellations included politicians from the Popular Fronts, the Communist parties as well as from rather nationalist parties like *Isamaa* ('Fatherland') in Estonia.

Conclusion

Concluding this brief overview of the Baltic national movements, it shall be addressed here whether these Baltic phenomena are to be classified as nationalism or neo-nationalism. Many observers and politicians tend to do so, partly based on (post-)Soviet convictions of alleged fascist tendencies in the region, partly in criticising tendencies of ethnic democracy.[41] Whereas it might not be so difficult to mark and dismantle nationalist political opinions, an extensive judgement on why ethnic exclusive strategies gained so much support in the Baltic states demands more attention on comparative politics than can be provided here. Instead, I will return to Adam Michnik's approach to nationalism, who in 1991 pointed out that it would be a fundamental misunderstanding to call *Sajūdis* a nationalist organization. According to Michnik, 'the aspirations to reclaim the national memory, to defend cultural identity, to have an independent state do not qualify as nationalism. Nationalism is not the struggle for one's own national rights, but a disregard for someone else's right to national and human dignity'.[42] With such an understanding, which is obviously shaped by his view on Poland addressed at the beginning, the classification of nationalism would not refer to the liberationist phase of the singing revolutions, but to the phase of consolidating power (among the victors) and the phase of reckoning (with the defeated) according to Michnik. Other authors like Andres Kasekamp, Artis Pabriks, and Aldis Purs introduced a distinction between the social or democratic movements of the Popular Fronts on the one hand, and ethno-national groups with a nationalist agenda focussing on the immediate restoration of national independence on the

other.[43] Although these groups were already co-existing before August 1991, the latter gained political relevance with the transformation into political parties, whereas the umbrella organisations of the Popular Fronts lost political weight as shown above.

If we apply the observations on nineteenth-century nationalism addressed at the beginning to the Baltic case, then it becomes obvious that there is not much explanatory sense in separating the Popular Fronts from an ethno-cultural nationalism. A similar conclusion is drawn by Mara Lazda: according to her, the focus on ethno-cultural nationalism in Latvia seems to be overemphasized, the participation in the independence movement was 'transethnic and transnational'.[44] Nevertheless, even these broad 'transethnic' national movements referred first of all to the ethno-cultural symbols and languages of the small nations. In fact, there were hardly any alternative symbols that could be associated with the national movements in a similar way. Furthermore, the impact of folk cultures itself was a result of the Soviet support since the period of Stalinism on the one hand, as well as of national counter-narratives on the other. In the Estonian case, the idea of an alleged presence of Estonians on the Baltic rim for over 5,000 years was supported not least by the film director Lennart Meri, who became the first president of the restored Estonian state. This deeply rooted ethnicization does not only refer to folk culture, but also to other fields of cultural activity, when the avant-garde artist and architect Leo Lapin for instance claimed that 'Estonian architecture must be built by Estonian architects'.[45] If such ethnocentric notions were part of an emancipative agenda in Soviet times, they could also be used for implementing exclusive strategies once the balance of power had changed. Similar developments could be shown for Latvia and Lithuania, revealing a general tendency of focusing on the titular nations' culture and history as means of exclusion since 1991.

Nevertheless, despite all similarities in their trajectories, which were shaped by Soviet politics in the region and produced by political institutions during the 'singing revolution', path dependencies remained important. They refer in particular to defining the national 'other' and related political strategies. Whereas in Estonia and Latvia the Russian-speaking minorities – except those who could prove pre-war Estonian or Latvian citizenship – were initially excluded from citizenship, there was no such citizenship issue in Lithuania. There, however, the relations with the Polish minority remained tense. Differences also occur in historical national narratives. Whereas the Estonian and Latvian discourses of suppressed small nations were quite similar, in Lithuania the relations with Poland and the role of the Lithuanian Grand Duchy as a major European power in early modern history were regarded as crucial.

Should the Baltic developments then be regarded as specific regional phenomena in the Soviet context or as part of a new wave or tide of nationalism in Europe? Not only in their cultural forms, but also in their liberationist agenda, the Baltic national movements rather follow the path of nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries' national movements, as might also be observed in socialist Poland. With regard to actors and activities, the Soviet context and the stress on the restoration of the pre-1940 nation states in legal terms as well as of political culture, however, provided a specific historical and mental framework. In that respect, it would be most appropriate to discuss the ethno-national politics after the restored independence in 1991 as an issue of regional path dependencies as well as transnational issues including neighbouring states and supranational institutions.

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Endnotes

[1] S. Kotkin, *Uncivil Society. 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment* (New York, NY, 2010).

[2] On 1848, see D. Langewiesche (ed.), *Die Revolutionen von 1848 in der europäischen Geschichte Ergebnisse und Nachwirkungen* (München, 2000); on small nations see the seminal study by M. Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe. A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations* (Cambridge, 1985).

[3] A. Michnik, *Letters from Prison and Other Essays* (Berkeley, CA, 1987); J. Hackmann, 'Civil Society against the State? Historical Experiences of Eastern Europe', in: N. Götz & J. Hackmann (eds.), *Civil Society in the Baltic Sea Region* (Aldershot, 2003), 49-62.

[4] I'm referring here to: D. Langewiesche, *Nation, Nationalismus, Nationalstaat in Deutschland und Europa* (Beck'sche Reihe, 1399) (München, 2000); and on the article 'Volk, Nation', in: O. Brunner, W. Conze & R. Koselleck (eds.), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland* (Stuttgart, 2004) vol. 7, 141-431; on social history see Hroch, *Das Europa der Nationen: die moderne Nationsbildung im europäischen Vergleich* (Synthesen, 2) (Göttingen, 2005), on ethnicity: A. D. Smith, *The Nation in History. Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism* (Oxford, 2000).

[5] On the history of the movements see for first orientation the respective paragraphs in: D. J. Smith, A. Pabriks, A. Purs e.a., *The Baltic States. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania* (London, 2002); A. Kasekamp, *A History of the Baltic States* (Basingstoke, 2010); A. Plakans, *A Concise History of the Baltic States* (Cambridge, 2011). For a broader view on the national movements see: J. Ulfelder, 'Baltic Protest in the Gorbachev Era: Movement Content and Dynamics', in: *Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, 3/3-4 (2004), 23-43; and M. R. Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State* (Cambridge, 2002).

[6] As reports by external observers see for instance M. Butenschön, *Estland, Lettland, Litauen. Das Baltikum auf dem langen Weg in die Freiheit* (Serie Piper, 1416) (München, 1992); A. Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence* (New Haven, CT, 1994); as scholarly

publications in close connection with the 'singing revolution' see: J. Hiden & P. Salmon, *The Baltic Nations and Europe. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the Twentieth Century* (London, 1991); and R. J. Misiunas & R. Taagepera, *The Baltic States. Years of Dependence 1940-1990* (London, 1993). On publications of activists see the list in: Brüggemann, K., '"One Day We Will Win Anyway": The Singing Revolution in the Soviet Baltic Republics', in: W. Mueller, M. Gehler & A. Suppan (eds.), *The Revolutions of 1989. A Handbook*. (Internationale Geschichte, 2) (Wien, 2015), 223-224.

[7] Figures in the text are given mainly for the purpose of illustration; there are hardly any exact and reliable numbers referring to mass movements and demonstrations.

[8] Quoted following R. Taagepera, 'Estonia's Road to Independence', in: *Problems of Communism*, 38/6 (1989), 21.

[9] G. Šmidchens, *The Power of Song. Nonviolent National Culture in the Baltic Singing Revolution* (Seattle, WA, 2014), 249-250.

[10] H. Valk, 'Laulev Revolutsioon', in: *Sirp ja Vasar*, 17.6.1988 3; excerpts in English translation in: Šmidchens, *The Power of Song*, 242-243, see also K. Brüggemann & A. Kasekamp, ''Singing Oneself into a Nation'? Estonian Song Festivals as Rituals of Political Mobilisation', in: *Nations and Nationalism*, 20/2 (2014), 272.

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[15] Detailed description in R. W. Smurr, *Perceptions of Nature, Expressions of Nation: An Environmental History of Estonia* (Köln 2009), ch. 6; N. R. Muižnieks, 'The Daugavpils Hydro Station and "Glasnost" in Latvia', in: *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 18/1 (1987), 63-70.

[16] Plakans, *A Concise History*, 389.

[17] J. Lejnieks, *Rīga, kuras nav. Never-built Riga. Ein Riga, das es nie gegeben hat* (Rīga, 1998), 252-257; D. Stukuls, *From Opposition to Independence: Social Movements in Latvia, 1986-1991* (Working Paper Series, 569) (Ann Arbor, MI, 2007), 27.

[18] A. E. Senn, *Lithuania Awakening* (Berkeley, CA, 1990), 38, 75.

[19] Lazda, 'Reconsidering Nationalism', 523.

[20] T. Tannberg & A. Kivisiv (eds.), *Hirvepark 1987. 20 aastat kodanikualgatusest, mis muutis Eesti lähiajalugu* (Tallinn, 2007).

[21] Senn, *Lithuania Awakening*, 123.

[22] Plakans, *A Concise History*, 392.

[23] K. Brüggemann, '"One Day We Will Win Anyway", 244.

[24] K. Brüggemann & A. Kasekamp, ''Singing Oneself into a Nation'?, 271.

[25] Valk, Laulev Revolutsioon; translation following: Šmidchens, *The Power of Song*, 243.

[26] Brüggemann & Kasekamp, ''Singing Oneself into a Nation'?'. The social mood of these gatherings is nicely caught in the documentary *The Singing Revolution* by James and Maureen Castle Tusty (2007), although the general message of the film glorifying the protagonists and featuring folk culture may be discussed.

[27] Brüggemann & Kasekamp, ''Singing Oneself into a Nation'?', 272.

[28] Detailed description in Šmidchens, *The Power of Song*, 227-237; see also the Lithuanian documentary *How we Played the Revolution* by Giedrė Žickytė (2012) with an excellent analysis by the late Leonidas Donskis.

²⁹ Šmidchens, *The Power of Song*, 193-206.

³⁰ Šmidchens, *The Power of Song*, 179-182.

³¹ Plakans, *A Concise History*, 393; Misiunas & Taagepera, *The Baltic States*, 319; a RFE/RL background report from 1989 estimated 180,000 members of *Sąjūdis*.

³² Estonian text in: Eesti Nõukogude Sotsialistliku Vabariigi Ülemnõukogu ja Valitsuse teataja, 25 November 1988, No. 685; English translation in: http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1991-2/baltic-independence/baltic-independence-text/declaration-on-estonian-sovereignty/ [accessed 22 August 2016].

³³ Numbers on the situation in Lithuania vary due to a complicated election process, cf. Misiunas & Taagepera, *The Baltic States*, 330.

³⁴ Detailed account of the situation in Lithuania in: Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution*, 230-241.

³⁵ Quotation by Vytautas Sinkevičius, following D. Budrytė, 'From Ethnic Fear to Pragmatic Inclusiveness? Political Community Building in the Baltic States (1988-2004)', in: *Ethnicity Studies/Etniškumo studijos*, 1-2 (2011), 19.

³⁶ A. Kasekamp, 'Extreme-right parties in contemporary Estonia', in: *Patterns of Prejudice*, 37/4 (2003), 403-404.

³⁷ Šmidchens, *The Power of Song*, 314-315

³⁸ Budrytė, 'From Ethnic Fear to Pragmatic Inclusiveness?', 20.

³⁹ Budrytė, 'From Ethnic Fear to Pragmatic Inclusiveness?', 15.

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⁴¹ G. Smith, 'The Ethnic Democracy Thesis and the Citizenship Question in Estonia and Latvia', in: *Nationalities Papers*, 24/2 (1996), 199-216.

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⁴³ Kasekamp, *A History of the Baltic States*, 163-164; A. Pabriks & A. Purs, *Latvia: the Challenges of Change* (London, 2001), 54 (in: Smith e.a., *The Baltic States*).

⁴⁴ Lazda, 'Reconsidering Nationalism', 519.

⁴⁵ Quoted following K. Kodres, 'Sada aastat ehitamist Eestis: Ideid, probleeme ja lahendusi', in: *Ehituskunst*, 24-26 (1999), 10.

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Italy: Old and New Territorial Claims*

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The question of sub-state nationalism in Italy assumes some peculiar characteristics because territorial fractures have existed since the birth of the Italian nation-state, and in recent decades new sub-state nationalist movements were born on the edge of these cleavages.

Although some sub-state nationalist groups are seeking apparently new declinations of the nationalist claim, the majority moves according with the traditional sub-nationalist ideology.

The devolvement of powers is one of the successful strategies to disempower the centrifugal pressures coming from ethno/regionalist/sub-state parties and movements and to accommodate ethno-regional claims. At the same time, it responds to a functional reorganization of the state. But, of course, autonomy is not independence and it does not imply any form of recognition of national identity.

On the one hand, there is a functional problem of governance and of optimal scale for policy decisions. On the other hand, there are the claims of identity/cultural type. When these two levels overlap it is highly likely that independence movements will emerge.

In border regions and islands, this overlap could have relied on fractures present for a long time and on the presence of sufficiently recognized and shared cultural markers; but at the same time, the specific institutional arrangements and accommodations have reduced the strength of the protests.

Conversely, in the case of the Northern League, the attempt to invent an ethno-cultural identity failed, leaving space first for pure territorial claims, which have had great success, and then for a transformation still underway from a territorial party into an anti-immigrant and antiEurope Italian party.

At the same time, all these strains point out the weakness of the Italian nation-state, both under the identity profile and the institutional one, and the need to define it in new terms.

Keywords: Italy, sub-state nationalism, regionalism.

Introduction

The Italian State, since the beginning of its making, has seen deep divisions with regard to both national identity and regional inequalities and disparities. To address these divisions, the Italian State initially responded with a statist and centralized model, and starting from the second post-war period, with a model that has progressively operated both in terms of identity recognition and territorial self-governance.

These two divisions are the key dimensions of the nationalist experiences, both in their sub-state forms and in the full condition of national independence recognition. The link between the territorial dimension and identity is the basis of nationalist aspirations, tending to constitute a territorial self-governing polity legitimized by a cultural identity.

The sub-state nationalist parties and movements do not have a homogeneous ideological inspiration and among them differences similar to those found in state political systems can be seen. There are significant thrusts, both in the direction of a profound transformation in the conception of the national claim and in the opposite direction toward the revival of the traditional nationalist model.

The question of sub-state nationalism in Italy assumes some peculiar characteristics because, relative to the traditional forms of these nationalisms, territorial fractures have existed – as in many other states – since the birth of the Italian nation-state, and in recent decades new sub-state nationalist movements were born on the edge of these cleavages.

Needless to say, the Scottish Referendum and the dynamics of the Catalan independence movement gave a renewed strength in recent

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years to a secessionist discourse – which, however, is rooted in quite a long and significant tradition of clashes against the nation-state.

Although some sub-state nationalist groups are seeking apparently new declinations of the nationalist claim, the majority moves according with the traditional sub-nationalist ideology claiming a segmentation of the state (i.e. toward the acquisition of more or less extensive power) that reflects by this way the same model of state-nationalism.

The origins of territorial and national cleavages in Italy

Many of the problems of the Italian nation-state, as well as their possible solutions, come from the building of the state within the European nation-state system.[1] In the construction phase of the Italian nation-state, the European system of states constituted its boundaries, and in the post-war period it promoted a redefinition of states and relations within the territories contained therein.

As with other states, the building of the Italian nation-state faced the issue of defining its external and internal borders, and both these elements remain the main components of territorial questions today. The building of the Italian state was realized by contending over territories with two giants of the European system of states: France and the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Regarding the first, the resolution of border conflicts concerning the Savoy, the Aosta Valley and the French Riviera left few scars: a few small linguistic minorities, and the lacerations the boundaries caused healed over time. The conflicts on the northern and north-eastern Italian borders had solutions quite different from those on the west side. On the eastern and north-eastern borders, the separation and the unification processes profoundly affected the society and marked its memory. The

South Tyrol/Alto Atesina question, the Istria question, Trieste, and Gorizia are wounds not yet completely healed. Italian national historiography has transmitted for a long time the rhetoric of irredentism and reunification of the motherland that greatly contributed to the bloody events of the First and Second World Wars. This is precisely a paradigmatic example of a banal nationalism that does not see the wounds inflicted by the processes of national state building.

The problems arising from these boundaries were still present at the end of the Second World War and were one of the elements that led to the constitutional configuration of the Italian state, subsequently feeding secessionist movements and sub-state national claims throughout the post-Second World War period.[2]

The fixing of the external borders took place in conjunction with the dissolution of the internal borders. This process was not painless either. On the one hand, there was the great Roman question, on the other hand there was what would become the most relevant Italian territorial issue: The Southern Italy Question, that had (and still has) two different aspects: the social-economic dimension that involves the whole South and the insular specificities. Sicily was already a different world as it was seen in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.[3] Sardinia, which is completely distinct from the question of Southern Italy, was, in the nineteenth century, already experiencing one of the major outbreaks of sub-state claims and was the first territory where a sub-state nationalist party originated.[4]

The first stage of state building was warlike and was characterised by internal (civil) and external wars that found their culmination in the First World War. The second one was the nationalist step embodied by fascism which brought about the forced nationalization of Italy. And finally, the third phase, which we will talk about, is the democratic one in which the process of nation-state building breaks down, and the sub-

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state claims find space as protagonists on the political scene and "sub-state parties" promote constitutional reforms.

It is, in fact, only after the Second World War that we can actually begin to talk about the presence of parties and sub-national state movements. In the previous period, there was only a clear sub-national-inspired party in Sardinia which, having sided against fascism, was suppressed during the dictatorship.[5]

The sub-state nationalist claims and their accommodation in a democratic state

The democratic post-Second World War Italian state deals with the territorial questions which emerged in previous periods by introducing into the unified and centralized framework of the state an almost federal compensation by the recognition of four autonomous regions with special status (i.e. Sicily, Sardinia, Trentino-South Tyrol, and the Aosta Valley), followed by a fifth region (Friuli-Venezia Giulia) many years later (Fig. 1).[6] The constitutional accommodation followed a *de facto* situation already present in the last phase of the Second World War and was debated in the peace agreement that followed the end of the war.[7]

Moreover, the recognition of the Autonomous Region of Sardinia was a response to the growth of a Sardinian national party (PSd'Az) and posed a counterweight to Sicilian autonomy. A different story unfolded in the northern regions. Both the Aosta Valley and Trentino-South Tyrol were at the centre of international tensions and, on the one side France and on the other Austria strongly pressed for the recognition of special rights to territories inhabited by French- and German-speaking people. In both cases, together with the territorial aspects, there was a definite division of identity and language.

Fig. 1: Italian Regions with Special Status
Source: Daygum

The fascist regime tried to impose a 'forced Italianization' on these territories, but their linguistic identities were not affected by this attempt, although the demographic Italianization due to a significant Italian immigration, especially in Trentino-South Tyrol, was a menace for those linguistic minorities.

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Therefore, for the post-fascist republican state the first problem was to solve the border disputes and the second was to oppose the protests coming from there and strengthen the consensus toward the national government. An important step was the creation of autonomous regions with a special status, but this choice was not without contradictions and conflicts as well.

In the Trentino-South Tyrol region, the German-speaking population, the majority of which lived in South Tyrol, became a minority within the region after it had been granted a special status. This situation caused a strong reaction both from the international standpoint and the internal one. In fact, in the decades following the end of the Second World War a secessionist movement developed that also followed the path of armed struggle.[8] The South Tyrolean secessionists wanted separation from Italy and a unification with Austria that would have allowed for the unification of Tyrol. During the 1960s there were a series of attacks. The Italian government responded to South Tyrolean secessionism on the one hand with repression, and on the other with the creation of two autonomous provinces within the region; the approval of the so-called South Tyrol package, definitively applied in 1992, ended the contest that Austria had opened at the UN.[9]

In the Aosta Valley, the establishment of the autonomous region and the recognition of its cultural distinctiveness resolved all tensions with the Italian State, and the French-speaking party (U.V.) gained a majority role, usually giving its support to the Italian government.[10]

Both in South Tyrol and in the Aosta Valley, there were (and are) regional parties representing the linguistic minorities (which are majorities in their respective territories) that negotiated with the Italian government to achieve the most favourable political and economic conditions possible. The difference is that in South Tyrol there was (and is) also a more radical movement clearly devoted to a secessionist goal.

In Sicily and Sardinia there was no more than a generic recognition of a certain cultural distinctiveness at the end of the Second World War. The Sicilian language was not regarded as a genuine language. Meanwhile, Sardinian languages had already had important scientific recognition and a wide popular diffusion but only found official recognition very late (after the nationalist mobilisation of the 1980s).[11]

In Sardinia, the *Partito Sardo D'Azione* (PSd'Az), although weakened by internal divisions, was a recognised political force which the effort towards the construction of a democratic party system had to contend with. However, during the 1980s many alternative and more radical movements were also born.[12]

The Sicilian situation however was different. The Sicilian independence movement had no political history as important as the Sardinian one, but in the final stages of the Second World War, the *Movimento Indipendentista Siciliano* (MIS) of Finocchiaro Aprile (supported by the American army)[13] appeared on the Sicilian political scene and gained a large consensus around the claim for independence.[14] The granting of autonomy and special status depowered the independence claims to the point of eliminating them (at least until the most recent years). Sicily, moreover, was among the regions with a special status, the one that has earned the highest institutional status, and the Sicilian assembly can be considered the third constitutionally relevant representative chamber.[15] Claims for independence were reabsorbed, and until the twenty-first century, the Sicilian claims would be represented within the traditional political parties.[16]

The framework of the regions with a special status was completed in 1963, with the establishment of the Friuli-Venezia-Giulia (FVG) autonomous region.[17] FVG was in the heart of the irredentist lands and it faced some bitter conflicts with the nearby Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). During and at the end of the Second World War, these

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territories witnessed dramatic events: the expulsion of Italians and the massacres of Foibe on the one hand, and the assimilation and massacres of the Slavs and Communists on the other. In short, the types of events that are common in situations of nationalisation in border areas.[18] The ideological dimension and the Cold War exacerbated the conflicts and made their resolution even more complex. The FVG border was the boundary with the rising communist regimes of Eastern Europe, and the Yugoslav army not only attempted the annexation of all the territories with a Slav population, but also the affirmation of a different political and social system. In the case of FVG, the establishment of the autonomous region was itself a reason for conflict and although it was included among the regions with a special status, regional autonomy was suspended and became effective only in 1963 when the break between the Titoist regime and the Soviets lessened the pressure on the north-east border.[19]

The Osimo Treaty formally resolved the Istria question.[20] In Trieste, there was a very small minority movement for the independence of Trieste from both the Italian and the Yugoslavian states. At the present time, the presence of a Slovenian-speaking minority is recognized, and it has gained rights as a linguistic minority.[21]

The three northern regions have, however, a complex ethno-cultural configuration[22] that induced the Constituent Fathers to recognize the rights of linguistic minorities regardless of the recognition of the regions (Fig. 2).[23] The most important territorial problem however that the Italian state faced at the end of the Second World War – and still does – is the cleavage dividing the South from the rest of Italy. Italy was and is dramatically unequal in terms of resources, level of development, and quality of life, and this division reflects an unfinished process of unification.[24]

Fig. 2: Linguistic Minorities in Italy
Source:
http://www.albanologia.unical.it/SportelloLinguistico/CZ/minoranze_linguistiche.htm

After 1945, *La Questione Meridionale* was tackled with the instruments of the interventionist state, i.e. investments and an independent body to manage them.[25]

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Beyond the constitutional arrangement, there was also a strategy of elite inclusion to support the Christian Democrat government, and of resource redistribution to alleviate the problems of the disadvantaged territories and gain popular consensus (especially, but not only, in the South of Italy).[26]

In the decades following the Second World War the Italian territorial and ethnic questions cooled down, leaving only those in South Tyrol at the front of the stage; the patterns of organization and the flow of resources had defeated any possibility of conflict.

The ethnic revival and reform of the state

The Italian constitution established five autonomous regions with special status, but it contains a more general recognition of the regional institutions for the territorial government. The ordinary regional governments began to take effect in the 1970s. In the beginning, the regional governments were not very effective, but they gained substantial power in the ensuing years.[27] At the same time, at the end of the 1970 there was also a revival of ethnic nationalist/sub-state movements in Italy that began to put national issues on the political stage, as other movements of the same kind were doing around the world.[28] The main feature of these movements was that they conflated identity and cultural claims with demands for self-determination. The declination of these two main axes of claims shapes the ideological and programmatic continuum of these movements, from the demand of recognition of the language, to the establishment of full bilingualism, to a preference for the minority language, and moving from the demand of political autonomy within the state to secession.

The ethnic revival of the 1980s moved along the same cleavages that were present in the early days of Italian nation-state building, but some movements – such as the Sardinian ones – introduced new and more current claims.

The different features of those questions resulted from border and insularity conditions, but what could be considered the most explosive and potentially disruptive phenomenon for the Italian state arose during the 1980s: the transformation of the Southern Question into the Northern Question. The Italian unification left the Southern Italy question unresolved, or rather, according to some scholars and writers, created a Southern Italy question that does not seem to have made any steps toward a solution in a century and a half.[29]

Without examining the substance of the debate, we can say that the so-called Southern Question had found its accommodation through an integration of the Southern ruling political classes within the Italian elite and, until the 1980s, through a distribution of resources, in part used to support the ruling classes.[30]

The 1980s saw a big change of this accommodation, in part because the compromise that gave resources to the South, without subtracting them from other territorial areas of Italy, was no longer sustainable. Moreover, the Italian economic and social system was involved in a deep and substantial restructuring that would have led to a deep crisis and transformation, even in the most developed areas.

The biggest change of the decade was the emergence of conflictive tension in the regions of Northern Italy, first in Veneto, and then in Lombardy and Piedmont, which amounted to more than the revival of traditional ethno-national claims in border or insular regions.

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The Veneto Region was the first region where an ethnic revival of the traditional type arose.[31] But it was the federation of *Liga Veneta* with the Lombard League and the creation of the Northern League that allowed for immense transformations in the Italian party system during the end of the 1980s and 90s.[32] Using all the rhetorical strategies and arguments of the new nationalist movements, the Northern League was able to organize the resentment against the state bureaucracy, the fiscal pressure, the corruption of the traditional political elite, the protest against immigration, and social and economic stagnation. It invented a cultural and territorial identity and pursued the development of greater self-government in the Northern regions and a different distribution of Italian resources in favour of said regions.[33] These claims were underpinned by ethno-nationalist claims, including the invention of a new territory, the Padania (Fig. 3), that would have been the new state of Northern Italy.[34]

Surprisingly, many people (journalists and opinion makers alike) gave some credit to this invention. But the substance remained; the process of rescaling the Italian state and giving more powers to the region produced an increase in the demand for power from the rising regional political elites.

What united these various movements was the discomfort of the North about 'Rome', the Italian state's 'southern' policies, and migration. The revolt of the richest against the different forms of redistribution (known as the 'St. Matthew effect') arose in Italy as in many other countries of the Western World.

Therefore, the overturning of the Southern question was the real novelty of these years, and it affected the particular northern interpretation of the (ethno)-sub-state political discourse.

Fig. 3: The "Padania", according to The Northern League
Source: Fabio Visconti, Creative Commons

The unresolved Southern Italy uestion disappears from the political scene through an inversion of terms.[35] It was the North that claimed to be exploited and that rebelled against the centralist power (and the South). The push underlying a revision of the institutional system in the 1980s associated economic and tax claims with identities (i.e. xenophobic ones) but remained basically in the minority. It was during the 1990s that an explicit request for self-government arose, and this process found its culmination in the 'federalist' reform of the Italian constitution.[36]

The fundamental moment of change, not only for Italy, was the fall of the Berlin Wall and its consequences for the world geopolitical balance. The

compromise on which the democratic Italian state was founded had worked well until then, as Italy was a vital piece in the global jigsaw puzzle, due to it being the most important boundary with respect to the Soviet area, as well as the main Mediterranean base of NATO.

There are three elements that were decisive in the changing of the world balance that were relevant to what would happen during the 1990s onward. Italy lost its essential geopolitical position, and this had an impact both on the international and domestic levels. The internal political balance, even with the difficulties that since the 1970s had tormented Italy, had found in the international position the exoskeleton for its survival. The 1990s were the years of the unravelling of the Italian political system with the crisis of its old guard, most notably those who had previously governed Italy. The crisis created a new scenario in which it was possible for new actors to become holders of interests and claims that before had rested within the old parties.

The second element is the greater permeability of boundaries following the collapse of the wall. Italy, for the first time, became a target of mass migration from Eastern Europe and other continents. Beyond the discussions surrounding the question of immigration, certainly the influx of migrants has had an impact on some areas of Italy, in particular in the regions of the north, and especially the northeast. And, as in many other parts of the world, there have been and continue to be political entrepreneurs who use anti-immigration sentiment as a political weapon.

Finally, the collapse of the wall was a decisive push for the unification of the world market, with all its consequences (e.g. competition with lower priced goods, relocation, etc.) which produced a substantial restructuring of the Italian economy (both the market of labour and of goods), affecting mainly traditional and low capital-intensive production. In fact, on the one side it forced Italian small- and medium-

sized industries to restructure and de-localize their production, thus generating a profound crisis in Italy's industrial regions, and on the other side it reduced the importance of Southern Italy as a market for goods and a labour force exporter.[37]

Consequently, in this context, the main Italian territorial fracture reappeared with all its strength in the 1990s.

The Northern League organized protests and gained a prominent position in Italian politics, rapidly becoming the kingmaker of the Italian government. The influence of the League was significant, becoming the diffuser of territorial claims and assuming a role that no other ethno-regionalist party had ever had in Italy.[38] At the centre of the claims are regional autonomy, a federal reform of the Italian state, the efforts to stop foreign immigration, and the elimination of any state economic 'aid' to the South; these claims were supported by a growing part of the population in the regions of the north and centre.

Contrary to what one might expect, protests against the unitary state had grown in the most developed and wealthiest territories. There, a political force that was not one of the traditional ethno-nationalist party/movements had questioned with considerable energy the institutional form and had promoted a radical revision of the distribution of resources and powers in the Italian state. This was possible exactly because it has gone beyond the regional borders and had been able to collect a more universal consensus on the one side and, on the other, was able to maximize its relevance to ensure a parliamentary majority in the Italian government. The other ethno-nationalist political parties/movements proposed only questions relating to their own situations, and they acted in an institutional context where there already was a substantial devolvement of state powers.

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The reform of Title V of the Italian constitution represented a turning point for the Italian institutional system and promoted a further push of territorial claims.[39] The 'Ordinary Region' that had so far remained largely subordinate assumed a prominent position, becoming the true articulation of the governmental system. It was not only an Italian process and responded both to claims that moved from below, and to a demand for a different structure of the levels of government in society.[40] The state lost some of its prerogatives in favour of supranational entities, and this process simultaneously required the creation of intermediate levels of government. Which ones were the most functional is still being debated. In Italy, a nation-state that was never completely finished, this triggered the critical process of potential dissolution.

The ethno-territorial claims in Twenty-First Century Italy

In the twenty-first century, many centrifugal political forces have renewed their strength and have reactivated issues never entirely dormant. Sardinia, South Tyrol, Friuli, and Sicily are again inflamed by separatist tensions. Conversely, the secessionist/separatism facets of the Northern League are subsiding, transforming the League into a 'National' Italian Party, parallel to the strictly territorial claims in the historical region that gave birth to the *Lega*: Veneto and Lombardy.[41]. The territorial divide remains and is exacerbated by the crisis that affected all the world, and Southern Italy went through one of the worst periods of its economic, social, and political history.[42]

In this context, one wonders why a more explicit and stronger Southern separatism giving expression to the dissatisfaction of these regions has not emerged. All forms of Southern separatism seem little more than folkloric expressions.[43] A true capacity to connect and promote an

alliance of Southern regions, as the Northern League was able to do in the northern regions, has never been realized.[44]

In summary, the claims that re-emerge in twenty-first century Italy can be classified as:

- Unresolved border issues which have left residual grievances
- Nascent internal minorities deriving from ripening national claims
- Territorial questions related to development models.

These various questions, while they reiterate issues which are firmly rooted in the building process of the Italian state, find new nourishment in the new institutional frameworks of the Italian state and the European Union, but they also feel the push to redefine themselves. In particular, on the one hand the progressive construction of the European Union tends to deprive and reduce the powers of the component states (favouring sub-state aggregations).[45] On the other hand it constitutes an extremely significant constraint to any process of redefining the state composition, as the case of Scotland reminds us.

South Tyrol and Istria were, for a long time, unresolved issues. Despite the fact that South Tyrol has acquired many privileges in the Italian state, separatist movements and parties (*Südtiroler Heimatbund*) have been active. They have been linked to the history of South-Tyrolean secessionism, which has never achieved a majority consensus of the population.[46] Only in recent years, on the wave of a general political legitimation of secessionism, have the openly secessionist parties (*Freiheit Freies Bündnis für Tirol* and *Bürger Union für Tyrol*) gained greater consensus among the population.[47] In the last election, a secessionist claim appeared with greater force and consensus (see the informal consultation of 2014 when 61,000 people over 380,000 eligible

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voters participated in the referendum and 56,000 – 14.7% of the Tyrolean eligible voters – voted for the unification of Tyrol).[48]

Although support for the secessionist proposition is always in the minority, it has found new life. On the one hand, there is the traditional claim of Tyrolean unionism, and on the other hand there has been a growing reaction against the Italian situation; the exit is proposed as an option in a state that seems unable to overcome the economic crisis that over the last ten years has been afflicting Italy (and Europe).[49]

The Northern League also sponsored a movement for self-determination and proposed a referendum for self-determination of the entire region and the two provinces, which they finalized in an attempt to renegotiate the terms of its autonomy within the Italian state.[50] But even the main ethno-regionalist party, the SVP, is against this proposal. In addition to Italy's opposition to the claims, there is also the opposition of Austria, which considers the South Tyrolean question resolved.[51]

To summarize, in South Tyrol there are two main nationalist parties: one, the SVP, is only a regional party trying to obtain the maximum advantages from Italy, the other is a truly ethno-nationalist party and advocates for the secession of Tyrol and its reunification with Austria. This second party, although it has found some success in recent years, is still in the minority and posits the terms of the national debate in traditional terms: ethno-cultural exclusive identity and reunification with the other part of Tyrol.

In Friuli, claims were mainly based on recognition of the fact that autonomy and language recognition, while formally obtained, still had to find effective implementation.[52] The secessionist forces are predominantly imitative and mostly concerned with relations within the region.[53]

Both for Trentino South Tyrol and for FVG, there exist simultaneously a conflict with the Italian state and a division within the region between South Tyrol and Trentino, and among Friuli, Venezia Giulia and Trieste.

In Sardinia the claims for independence, as we have said, have a long history and the movements and parties that propose these claims have experienced changing fortunes.[54]

Even if the political parties and movements which are clearly 'nationalist' have never gained the majority in the island's elections, 'Sardismo' permeates the entire Sardinian political system and has, perhaps, the greatest variety of expressions and internal political differences, ranging from radical left to centrist positions. In the last regional elections, there were decidedly Sardinian parties in each coalition, and in recent years, alongside the traditional Sardinian party (PSd'Az), more radical movements and parties have gained strength.[55] Despite this, an actual separatist push has remained firmly in the minority.

The peculiarity of Sardinian nationalism is that, with the exclusion of 'Sardo-Fascismo', it never had rightist or fascist sympathies and had, since its origins, a peculiarly cosmopolitan and European orientation. From this point of view, it was and is much more similar to new movements than the other nationalist parties. And since the beginning (or at least since the immediate post-Second World War period) there were different positions vis-à-vis independence, ranging from autonomy to self-determination. The peculiarity of Sardinian nationalism rises from its ideological inspiration, and this allows it to maintain the claim of cultural identity recognition with independence within a universalistic and inclusive conception of citizenship. It makes Sardinian nationalism very similar to Catalan or Scottish nationalism, albeit without the same strength.

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The Sicilian situation is quite different. The claims for independence of MIS were reabsorbed just a few years after the end of the Second World War, and until the twenty-first century the Sicilian political system was composed of only traditional political parties. It was only in 2004 that the Sicilian independence movement gained a little more strength and reappeared on the political scene. Together with the new MIS, many autonomist and independence movements are present on the Sicilian political scene.[56] The main demand remains the same: independence and the full application of the Statute of Autonomy. But it is evident that these claims are often confused with the protests against the central government (and the political caste) that is now widespread in much of the country.

The national claims that we have seen so far fall into the category of classic peripheral sub-state nationalism linked to issues of borders and insularity, and they seem unable to deal with the redefinition of nationalist discourse and with the changing realities of the world. Also, the attempt to renovate the Sardinian discourse made by the new movements/electoral coalitions like the 'Murgia coalition', proved unsuccessful.[57]

The most dramatic phenomenon in Italian sub-nationalism was the Northern League and the changes it has undergone during the last decade that affect its policy setting in a most profound way. The party of the Northern League has increasingly adopted the profile of a national-populist party of the Lepenist type, riding the opposition to the Euro and the protests against immigration. It has increasingly shifted toward a rightist position (as the alliance with *Fratelli d'Italia* shows), although always inside a frame of territorial autonomy, but that no longer has the secessionist and sub-national profile that characterized it in the previous decade. This new profile marked the passage from the first generation of League leaders to the younger ones. It seems the Northern League is

attempting to become a state-nationalist party, emphasizing the rightist and xenophobic profile it had during the past decades.[58]

Only in Veneto a stronger secessionist and ethnic component has remained. In fact, it is not accidental that a consultative referendum on the independence of the Veneto Region was promoted, and it found a significant consensus in the population.[59] Moreover, in Lombardy and Veneto the current regional government proclaimed a new consultative referendum claiming the status of autonomy (as with the five Special Status Regions) for 22 October 2017.

As in other European countries, within the various expressions of sub-state nationalism different ideological positions emerge that cut across the sub-national spectrum. There are the oldest movements with a strong cultural identity that present inclusive and post-modern positions, and new territorial parties (together with the most radical South-Tyrolean movements) that present exclusive and traditional claims (for example, against immigration and European Union).

These differences, which should be analysed in greater detail, are based on the different political cultures in which the sub-nationalist movements have immerged. Meanwhile, Sardinian sub-nationalism was much more similar – notwithstanding the oscillating positions of PSd'Az – to the radical leftist culture, while Northern or South Tyrolean sub-nationalism was born of a centre-right political culture.

Rescaling the state and reloading the nation

In 2001, the Italian constitution was amended in a federalist sense, granting the regions legislative power in regard to significant issues such as health and education. But the reform, although much debated, has not yet been fully accomplished, and more than ten years later there is great

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critical attention toward the failures of regional governments (especially in the South of Italy), and proposals to recentralize some functions of the state and to redefine territorial aggregations are under discussion.[60]

The strengthening of the regions was certainly helped by the policies of the European Union and by the increasing centrality of the regions in funding allocation, overshadowing the role of central governments. But the main push was given by the strategic relevance of the Northern League during the 1990s and later.

As we have seen, the devolvement of powers is one of the successful strategies to disempower the centrifugal pressures coming from ethno/regionalist/sub-state parties and movements and to accommodate ethno-regional claims. At the same time, it responds to a functional reorganization of the state. But, of course, autonomy is not independence and it does not imply any form of recognition of national identity.

These two issues, which should be kept distinct, are mixed in the claims and in discussions on these matters. On the one hand, there is a functional problem of governance and of optimal scale for policy decisions. On the other hand, there are the claims of identity/cultural type. When these two levels overlap it is highly likely that independence movements will emerge, but the reinforcement of one cleavage with the other is a political operation that may or may not succeed.

In border regions and islands, this overlap could have relied on fractures present for a long time and on the presence of sufficiently recognized and shared cultural markers; but at the same time, the specific institutional arrangements and accommodations have reduced the strength of the protests.

Conversely, in the case of the Northern League, the attempt to invent an ethno-cultural identity failed, leaving space first for pure territorial claims, which have had great success, and then for a transformation still underway from a territorial party into an anti-immigrant and anti-Europe Italian party.

Except in cases like the 'Murgia Coalition', nationalist and sub-state nationalist claims seem to be prisoners of the old nineteenth-century vision of the state and of sovereignty.

Either they are concerned with regions or, as in the case of Northern League, they are moving toward state representation, they are obsessed with the bond between territory, political legitimacy and sovereignty, and they try to give new life to a kind of nation-state that is no longer present, and, overall, could not respond to the contemporary problems of political representation.

At the same time, all these strains point out the weakness of the Italian nation-state, both under the identity profile and the institutional one, and the need to define it in new terms.

Endnotes

[*] This article was first accepted in 2016 but due to technical failures the journal had to postpone its publication. It is part of the themed section based on the 2015 NISE workshop titled *Reloading the Nation? Alternative concepts of sovereignty and citizenship in national movements (1960-2014)*.

[1] M. Keating, *State and Regional Nationalism: Territorial Politics and the European State* (New York, 1988).

[2] D. H. Kaplan, 'Political accommodation and functional interaction along the northern Italian borderlands', in: *Geografiska. Annaler*, 83/3 (2001), 131–139.

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3 J. Agnew, 'Italy's Other Island: Sicily's History in the Modern Italian Body Politic', in: *Emergences: Journal for the Study of Media & Composite Cultures*, 10/2 (2010), 301-311.

4 L. Del Piano, *Le origini dell'idea autonomistica in Sardegna (1861-1916)* (Cagliari, 1975); S. Cubeddu, *Sardisti. "Viaggio nel Partito Sardo d'Azione tra cronaca e storia 1919-1948."* (Cagliari, 1993).

5 The relationship between Sardinianism and fascism was more complex, since in the first phase a part of the Sardinian movement sought an agreement with fascism. See Fondazione Sardinia, *Il Sardo-Fascismo*, (Cagliari, 1993).

6 G. Nevola, *Altre Italie. Identità nazionale e regioni a statuto speciale* (Roma, 2003).

7 A. Pizzorusso, 'Regioni Speciali: Motivazioni Storiche Ed Esigenze Attuali', in: *Quaderni Regionali,* 4 (1989), 1025–1046; E. Rotelli, *L'avvento della regione in Italia. Dalla caduta del regime fascista alla costituzione repubblicana (1943 - 1947)* (Milano, 1967).

8 G. Bianco, *La Guerra Dei Tralicci* (Rovereto, 1963); G. Flamini, *Brennero connection. Alle radici del terrorismo italiano* (Roma, 2003).

9 A. E. Alcock, *The History of the South Tyrol Question* (London, 1970); S. Wolff, 'Cases of Asymmetrical Territorial Autonomy', in: M. Weller and K. Nobbs (eds.), *Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts* Edited (PENN, 2010), 17-47; J. Woelk, J. Marko, and F. Palermo, *Tolerance Through Law: Self Governance and Group Rights in South Tyrol* (Leiden, Boston, 2007).

10 E. Rotelli, and E. Vitta, *L'autonomia regionale della Valle d'Aosta: Profili storici e giuridici* (Torino, 1973); M. Vacchina, *L' Autonomia della Valle d'Aosta: origini, sviluppo, prospettive costituzionali* (Saint-Christophe (AO), 1986); G. Sandri, 'Ethno-linguistic Identity and Party Politics in the Aosta Valley', in: *Ethnopolitics*, 3 (2012), 287-317.

11 D. Petrosino, 'La costruzione dell'identità etnica: il caso della Sardegna e del Veneto', in: *Studi di Sociologia*, 26/1 (1988), 75-86.

12 From the 1980s until now, there has been an incredible flourishing of cultural and political movements along the entire spectrum of Sardinian nationalism, from the extreme left to some new types of civic parties (i.e. *Sardinna e LIbertade*, *Partidu Sardu Indipendentista*, *Indipendentzia Repubrica de Sardigna*,

Sardigna Natzione, *ProgREs*, see C. Pala, *Idee di Sardegna*, (Roma, 2016); and also D. Petrosino, *I movimenti etnici in Veneto e Sardegna*, unpublished PhD thesis (Catania 1986).

[13] M. Patti. *La Sicilia e gli Alleati* (Roma, 2013).

[14] A. Finocchiaro-Aprile, *Il movimento indipendentista siciliano* (Palermo, 1966); F. Renda, *Storia della Sicilia dal 1860 al 1970* (Palermo, 2000).

[15] F. Renda,'I caratteri speciali di uno statuto speciale: considerazioni sulle origini e la natura dell'autonomia siciliana,' in G. Alessi et al. (ed.), 'L'Autonomia regionale siciliana tra regole e storia: per il XLV anniversario della prima seduta dell'Assemblea regionale siciliana', 25 Maggio 1947 in: *Quaderni (Assemblea Regionale Siciliana)* 30 (1993), 329-368.

[16] M. Aymard, and G. Giarrizzo, *Storia d'Italia. Le regioni dall'Unità ad oggi: 5* (Torino, 1997).

[17] Constitutional Law n°1 1963, Camera dei Deputati 31, January 1963.

[18] M. Cattaruzza (ed.), *Nazionalismi di frontiera. Identità contrapposte sull'Adriatico nord-orientale, 1850-1950* (Soveria Mannelli, 2003); M. Verginella, *Il confine degli altri. La questione giuliana e la memoria slovena* (Roma, 2008); R. Wörsdörfer, *Il confine orientale. Italia e Jugoslavia dal 1915 al 1955* (Bologna, 2009); G. Valdevit, *Foibe, il peso del passato, Venezia Giulia 1943-1945* (Venezia, 1997); G. Oliva, *Le stragi negate degli italiani della Venezia Giulia e dell'Istria* (Milano, 2002); R. Pupo, and R. Spazzali, *Foibe* (Milano, 2003).

[19] M. Cattaruzza, *L'Italia e il confine orientale, 1866-2006* (Bologna, 2007); G. Sluga, *The Problem of Trieste and the Italo-Yugoslav Border: Difference, Identity, and Sovereignty in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Albany, NY, 2001).

[20] At the end of the Second World War, the FTT (Free Territory of Trieste) was divided into two zones: A under the control of the winning powers, included the province of Trieste, and B under the control of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, included a part of the Istrian territory including Capod'Istria. With the treaty of Osimo the two zones pass respectively: A under the sovereignty of the Italian state and B under the sovereignty of the SFRY

[21] M. Kacin Wohinz, and J. Pirjevec, *Storia degli sloveni in Italia, 1866-1998* (Venezia, 1988); R. Finzi, C. Magris and G. Miccoli (eds.), *Storia d'Italia dall'Unità ad oggi. Le regioni. Il Friuli-Venezia Giulia*, (Torino, 2002), v. 1-2; A. Agnelli, 'I

molteplici "diversi" del Friuli-Venezia Giulia', in: *Il Mulino*, 28/263 (1979), 387-399.

[22] In fact, some other linguistic minorities are present in these regions from Ladins, to Walser and Occitan-speaking peoples. See the fundamental work of T. De Mauro, *Storia linguistica dell'Italia unita*, (Roma-Bari, 2017); id. (ed.) *CITTÀ E REGIONE*, «Le dodici Italie». 6/3 (June 1980), and among the 'militant' researches: S. Salvi, *Le lingue tagliate*, (Milano, 1975)

[23] Art. 6 of the Italian constitution acknowledges the protection of linguistic minorities, but the specific law was emanated only in 1999 (Law 482, 1999. http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/99482l.htm). The protected languages are Albanian, Catalan, German, Greek, Slovenian, Croatian, French, Provençal, Friulan, Ladin, Occitan, and Sardinian (art. 2).

[24] D. Petrosino and O. Romano (eds.), *Buonanotte Mezzogiorno* (Roma, 2016).

[25] The bibliography is too large to be referenced, so we indicate only a few references: F. Barbagallo *Mezzogiorno e questione meridionale (1860-1980)* (Napoli, 1980); and id., *La questione italiana* (Bari, 2013); L. De Rosa, *La provincia subordinata. Saggio sulla questione meridionale* (Bari 2004); G. Fortunato, *Il mezzogiorno e lo stato italiano* (Firenze, 1973); A. Gramsci, *La questione meridionale* (Roma, 1966); C. Perrotta and C. Sunna, *L'arretratezza del Mezzogiorno, - Le idee, l'economia, la storia* (Milano, 2012); J. Schneider (ed.), *Italy's "Southern Question"* (Oxford, 1998); E. Felice, *Perché il Sud è rimasto indietro* (Bologna, 2013); and id., *Ascesa e declino. Storia economica d'Italia*, (Bologna, 2015).

[26] A. Pizzorno, 'I ceti medi nei meccanismi del consenso', in: F.L. Gavazza and S. R. Graubard*, Il caso italiano* (Milano, 1974) vol. II, 315-338; S. Tarrow, *Between Center and Periphery: Grassroots Politicians in Italy*, (New Haven, 1977).

[27] M. Keating, *State and Regional Nationalism*; M. Keating, and A. B. Wilson, 'Reforming Italy: Institutional Change and the Federal Option', in: *SSRN Scholarly Paper (*October 13, 2010).

[28] A. Melucci, and M. Diani, *Nazioni senza stato* (Torino, 1983); D. Petrosino, 'Is it possible to invent ethnic Identity: some reflections on ethnic and territorial politics in Italy', in: J. C. Beramendi, R. Mainz, X. M. Nunez (eds.), *Nationalism in Europe Past and Present* (Santiago de Compostela, 1994) vol. II, 609-644. A list of the main ethno-national/regionalist/sub-state parties in Italy can be found in

F. Tronconi, *I partiti etnoregionalisti: La politica dell'identità territoriale in Europa occidentale* (Bologna, 2011).

[29] F. Cassano, *Tre modi di vedere il Sud* (Bologna, 2009); M. Petrusewicz, *Come il Meridione divenne una Questione. Rappresentazioni del Sud prima e dopo il Quarantotto* (Sovenia Mannelli, 1998); L. Riall, 'Which Road to the South? Revisionists Revisit the Mezzogiorno', in: *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 5/1 (2000), 89–100.

[30] C. Trigilia, *Sviluppo senza autonomia* (Bologna, 1992).

[31] D. Petrosino, *La costruzione dell'identità etnica: i movimenti etnici in Sardegna ed in Veneto* (PhD diss., University of Catania,1986).

[32] I. Diamanti, *La Lega* (Roma, 1993); A. Cento Bull, and M. Gilbert, *The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics* (New York, 2001); M. Gilbert, 'Warriors of the New Pontida: The Challenge of the Lega Nord to the Italian Party System', in: *The Political Quarterly* 64/1 (1993), 99–106.

[33] J. Agnew, 'The Rhetoric of Regionalism: The Northern League in Italian Politics, 1983-94', in: *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 20/2 (1995), 156-172; D. Woods, 'The Crisis of Center-Periphery Integration in Italy and the Rise of Regional Populism: The Lombard League', in: *Comparative Politics* 27/2 (1995), 187-203.

[34] B. Giordano, 'A Place Called Padania? The Lega Nord and the Political Representation of Northern Italy', in: *European Urban and Regional Studies* 6/3 (1999), 215–230; id., 'The Contrasting Geographies of "Padania": The Case of the Lega Nord in Northern Italy', in: *Area* (2001,) 27–37; M. Cachafeiro Gómez-Reino, *Ethnicity and Nationalism in Italian Politics: Inventing the Padania: Lega Nord and the Northern Question* (Famham, 2002).

[35] G. Berta (ed.), *La questione settentrionale. Economia e società in trasformazione* (Milano, 2007).

[36] M. Keating and A. Wilson, 'Federalism …'; F. Palermo and A. Wilson,'The Dynamics of Decentralization in Italy: Towards a Federal Solution?', in: *European Diversity and Autonomy Papers* (Bolzano, 2013); S. Mangiameli (ed.), *Italian Regionalism: Between Unitary Traditions and Federal Processes* (Cham, 2014).

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[37] The effect of economic restructuring on the rising of the northern protest has been analysed in S. Wild, 'The Northern League: The Self-Representation of Industrial Districts in their Search for Regional Power', in: *Politics* 17/2 (1997), 95–100; H. Beirich, D. Woods, 'Globalisation, Workers and the Northern League', in: *West European Politics* 23/1 (2000), 130–43.

[38] It gained 8,65% in the 1992 Political Election, 8,36% in 1994, 10,07% in 1996, and in 1994 participated in the government with *Forza Italia*; also, during the twenties it was in an organic alliance with a center-rightist party called *Casa delle Libertà*. See R. Biorcio, *La rivincita del Nord. La Lega dalla contestazione al Governo* (Roma-Bari, 2010); P. Corbetta and M. S. Piretti, *Atlante storico-elettorale d'Italia 1861-2008* (Bologna, 2009).

[39] S. Mangiameli, *Letture sul regionalismo italiano. Il titolo V tra attuazione e riforma della riforma* (Torino, 2011); T. B. di Caravita *La Costituzione dopo la riforma del titolo V. Stato, regioni e autonomie fra Repubblica e Unione Europea* (Torino, 2002).

[40] M. Keating, *Rescaling the European State: The Making of Territory and the Rise of the Meso* (Oxford, 2013); N. Brenner, 'Open Questions on State Rescaling', in: *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society* 2/1 (2009), 123–139.

[41] On October 22, 2017, there will be a consultative referendum convocated by the Regional Government of Lombardy and Veneto to request special status—as with the five regions acknowledged in the Constitution—for Lombardy and Veneto. This double strategy, regional on one side and national on the other, evidences a lively debate inside the Northern League.

[42] D. Petrosino, O. Romano (eds.), *Buonanotte....*

[43] N. Zitara. 'Sinteticamente le ragioni del separatismo', in: http://www.eleaml.org/nicola/politica/ragioni.html; G. De Crescenzo, *Noi, i neoborbonici! Storie di orgoglio meridionale* (Milano, 2016). Some writers and journalists were much more influential, but they never built a political movement; see the works of P. Aprile, i.e. the last one, *Carnefici*, (Segrate, 2016); L. Patruno, *Fuoco del Sud: la ribollente galassia dei movimenti meridionali*, (Soveria Mannelli, 2011).

[44] An intellectual revision of the 'Questione Meridionale' put in a critical way the condition of South, but even if sometimes it was able to influence the political discourse, it never produced a political organization of Southern people (there

were only a few attempts, which nevertheless failed, to associate the President of the Southern Regions). One of the most influential critical thoughts was that of F. Cassano, *Il Pensiero Meridiano* (Bari, 1996).

[45] M. Keating, *Rescaling the European State*.

[46] G. Pallaver, 'I Partiti Politici in Alto-Adige Dal 1945 Al 2005', in: G. Ferrandi, and G. Pallaver (eds.), *La Regione Trentino-Alto Adige/Sudtirol Nel XX Secolo. I. Politica e Istituzioni* (Trient, 2007), 561-600.

[47] M. Scantamburlo, 'Partiti e autodeterminazione in Südtirol/Alto adige: competizione etnica e strategie dei partiti tra autonomia e secessione' in: *Nazioni e Regioni* 7 (2016), 47-70;. M. Scantamburlo, and G. Pallaver, 'The 2013 South Tyrolean Election: The End of SVP Hegemony', in: *Regional & Federal Studies*, 24/4 (2014), 493-503; id., 'Between Secession and "Full Autonomy": Party Competition over Self-determination in South Tyrol', in: *EvoNat Research Brief* 3 (2015).

[48] Among others: 'Sud-Tirolo referendum sulla secession. dall'Italia:il 92%vuole-unirsi-all'Austria', http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2014/01/13/sud-tirolo-referendum-sulla-secessione-dallitalia-il-92-vuole-unirsi-allaustria/841823/; South-Tyrol-freedom-emerging-europes-next-winning-separatist-movement', http://www.occupy.com/article/south-tyrol-freedom-emerging-europes-next-winning-separatist-movement#sthash.CUdiYOGb.dpbs.

[49] News, BBC 'Euro Crisis Turns German-speaking Italians Against Rome." BBC News, 2016 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-19813284.

[50] Consiglio Regionale del Trentino-Alto Adige, Autodeterminazione del Trentino-Alto Adige/Sudtirol, presented by Maurizio Fugatti on 10 February 2015, *XV legislatura- anno 2015, disegni di legge e relazioni n. 26*

[51] M. Di Blas, 'Secessione Del Sudtirolo_ Gelo Da Vienna' Austria Vicina, http://diblas-udine.blogautore.repubblica.it/2014/07/06/secessione-del-sudtirolo-gelo-da-vienna/

[52] P. Coluzzi, 'Minority Language Planning and Micronationalism in Italy: The Cases of Lombardy and Friuli', in: *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 27/6 (2006), 457–71.

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[53] S. Guglielmi, 'Minoranza linguistica, identità territoriale ed etnonazionalismo: il caso friulano', in: *Polis*, 2 (2010), 225-256; M. Stolfo, C. Cressati, *Cercare Il Friuli e trovare l'Europa* (Udine, 2016).

[54] E. Hepburn, 'Explaining Failure: The Highs and Lows of Sardinian Nationalism', in: *Regional & Federal Studies* 19/4–5 (2009), 595–618.

[55] A. Bomboi, *L'indipendentismo sardo*, (Condaghes, 2014); C. Pala, *Idee*.

[56] F. Cantarella, *L'indipendentismo siciliano tra mito e realtà* (Catania, 2015).

[57] The Cappellacci coalition (center-right) obtained 39.65% of the vote, the Pigliaru coalition (center-left) obtained 42.5% and the Murgia coalition obtained 10.30%.

[58] D. Woods, 'The Many Faces of Populism in Italy: The Northern League and Berlusconism', in: D. Woods and B. Wejnert (eds.), *The Many Faces of Populism: Current Perspectives* (Bingley, 2014), 27–51; G. Passarelli, 'Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe: The Case of the Italian Northern League', in: *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 18/1 (2013), 53–71; T. Perlmutter, 'A Narrowing Gyre? The Lega Nord and the Shifting Balance of Italian Immigration Policy', in: *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 38/8 (2015) 1339–46; M. Huysseune, 'A Eurosceptic Vision in a Europhile Country: The Case of the Lega Nord', in: *Modern Italy* 15/1 (2010), 63–75; R. Biorcio, and T. Vitale, 'Culture, Values and Social Basis of Northern Italian Centrifugal Regionalism. A Contextual Political Analysis of the Lega Nord', in: *Contemporary Centrifugal Regionalism: Comparing Flanders and Northern Italy*, (Brussels 2011), 171–199; J. Bartlett, J. Birdwell, and D. McDonnell 'Populism in Europe: Lega Nord', 2012. http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/26214; 'Populist Rhetoric: Lega Nord' http://counterpoint.uk.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/lega_nord_final-.pdf; A. Cento Bull, 'Lega Nord: A Case of Simulative Politics?', in: *South European Society and Politics* 14/2 (2009), 129–46.

[59] See Demos, 'Il referendum per l'indipendenza del Veneto', http://www.demos.it/a00970.php, I. Diamanti, 'L'indipendenza del Veneto non è uno scherzo. Bocciato lo stato centrale, no alla politica locale', in: *La Repubblica* (24 March 2014).

[60] B. Dente, 'End of an Era? The Monti Government Approach to Central-Local Relations', in: *LIEPP Working Paper* 6 (2012).

The National Movement within the Albanian Diaspora in 1919-1920

DEONA ÇALI

This article examines the importance of Albanian émigré societies as active supporters of Albania's membership in the League of Nations at the Paris Peace Conference, and their role in the establishment of the modern state of Albania. Albanian immigration societies such as *Vatra* (the Pan-Albanian Federation of America) as well as the Society of Albanians of Romania were critical actors in the efforts to advance the cause of their homeland during and after World War I. This article analyzes the migrant networks that operated during this period by considering the work of local and foreign representatives of these societies, such as Fan S. Noli (one of the key figures being discussed in this article), Luigj Bumçi, Dr.Mihal Turtulli, Mehmed Konica, and Edith Durham. It illustrates how these figures played an intricate role in Albania's admission process to the League of Nations via their lobbying in the European chancelleries, gradually changing the Great Powers' attitude towards the Albanian candidacy. Partly relying on a novel investigation of documents from the Albanian Central State Archive that pertain to the activity of the representatives of Pan-Albanian Federation *Vatra* in the Parliament of Great Britain, this article will clarify the postponement of the decision of the Albanian issue as part of the broader 'Adriatic question' from the Peace Conference to the proceedings of the League of Nations. As a result of the activity of the representatives and delegates of these societies, Albania was admitted to the League of Nations on 17 December 1920 without defined boundaries, constituting a special case in the history of the League of Nations.

Keywords: World War I, Albanian Diaspora, Paris Peace Conference, League of Nations, Immigration Societies, Balkans.

Introduction

In this article, the role of émigré societies supporting the Albanian national cause is analyzed and it explores how, and to what extent, delegates of Albanian emigrant and diaspora organizations shaped political life in their former homeland after World War I. A special focus is given to the analysis of the activity of *Vatra* (Hearth), the Pan-Albanian Federation of America, because of its importance in the defense of the Albanian national cause. *Vatra*'s members made a significant contribution to the Albanian cause ever since the Lushnje Congress of 1920, dominating Albanian political life from abroad until they finally returned to Albania in 1921. Communist-era Albanian historiography treated this period in a very ideological manner, and the subsequent historians who have addressed Albania's entry into the League of Nations, such as Arben Puto[1], Paskal Milo[2] and Muin Çami[3], have primarily focused on Fan Noli's contributions to this process. Nevertheless, they have not addressed how the admission took place, the role of Albanian immigration societies, and the reasons why the 'Great Powers' changed their attitudes toward the country. The policies and lobbying of members of the émigré societies in the European chancelleries however are crucial to consider, as Albanian historiography has hitherto only emphasized personalities who contributed to the process of state formation but disconnected these from the émigré societies they belonged to, and whom they drew political and economic support from.

The Great Powers' changing attitude towards the Albanian candidacy to the League of Nations is important to both Albanian historiography and the wider context of interwar diplomacy, as Albania represents a special case in the League's history in that it was eventually admitted without a defined status or borders. In this article, previously unexplored archival documents from the Albanian Central State Archive are used, examining

how the representatives of *Vatra* sought to ascertain why an important issue for Albania had been postponed by the Great Powers. The issue concerned Italy's mandate over Albania according to the frontiers of 1913, and its sovereignty over the Albanian city Vlora and its hinterland, which was crucial to Albania's economy and security. This issue was part of the 'Adriatic question',[4] a key diplomatic concern during the Peace Conference and subsequently for the League of Nations. Before analyzing the role of these societies, their creation and program will be addressed, starting with *Vatra*.

The foundation of the Pan-Albanian Federation of America, *Vatra*

Albanian emigration to America was part of a broader trend of 'new immigration' to the USA from mainly southern and eastern European destinations, with the first wave of Albanian emigrants dating back to the late nineteenth century.[5] Mostly comprised of young males who hoped to return home after making money on the 'new continent', this first wave of Albanian immigrants hailed from Korça and other areas of southern Albania, and settled around Boston, which would become the first major center for Albanian immigrants up until the 1870s. The experience acquired abroad would play an important role in the nurturing of a national movement and distinct collective identity among the Albanians.[6]

In the late nineteenth century however, the absence of an urban and intellectual elite had hampered the emergence of a national consciousness. The majority of the first wave of Albanian immigrants to the United States shared a rural background and had little knowledge of Albanian literature. Only a minority had received an education and went on to strive for national independence. Boston became a focal point for

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the movement, where the first Albanian weekly newspaper, *Kombi* (The Nation), was founded in 1906. Its founder, Sotir Peci, a graduate of the University of Athens, was instrumental in instilling a sense of Albanian nationhood among his fellow nationals and in encouraging the augmentation of immigrants' proficiency in the Albanian language.[7]

As Albanian immigration continued to grow, proposals were raised to unify all Albanian organizations in the United States. A commission, comprised of instrumental figures such as Faik Konica, Fan Noli, Kristo Floqi and Paskal Aleksi, was set up in 1911, ultimately resulting in the founding of the Pan-Albanian Federation of America, *Vatra* on 28 April 1912 by the merger of the societies *Besa-Besën, Flamuri i Krujës*, and *Kombëtare dhe Dallëndyshja*. It was officially recognized by the State of Massachusetts on 13 June 1912, as its charter was granted by State Secretary Albert P. Langtry. *Vatra* also created a journal, *Dielli* (The Sun), which was headed by Kristo Kirka[8], organizer of the Federation branch, Faik Konica and Kristo Floqi[9], and its board, the Temporary Council of Elders, appointed Fan Noli as its secretary.

Born in Ibrik-Tepe (Albanian: *Qytezë*) in Easter Thrace in 1882, Noli was a graduate from Harvard University and founder of the Orthodox Church of Albania in the United States, which was recognized as an independent diocese in 1919. Conducting his services in Albanian, Noli introduced the Albanian language in the liturgy, prompting the Church to assume a national character. In 1922 Noli was appointed as the foreign minister of Albania, and in the 1923 he was consecrated as the Bishop of Korça and the Metropolitan Area of Durrës, Albania. As one of *Vatra's* founders, Noli would fulfil an instrumental role in the society's aspirations and would ultimately serve as Albania's Prime Minister in 1924. Faik Konica, a politician, thinker, writer, and editor, completed his formal education at Harvard University. From 1897 onwards, Konica published the monthly review *Albania* in Brussels, written both in Albanian and French. This review became one of the most important propaganda instruments

during the period of the Albanian 'awakening movement.' In 1911, he started publishing the newspaper entitled *The Trumpet of Croya*. By the end of 1912, Konica returned to Europe and, in 1913, visited Albania. After the war, Konica moved to Boston to assume the leadership of *Vatra*.[10]

During *Vatra's* Sixth Assembly, held at Lewis Hayden from 1-12 July 1917, the delegates ultimately decided on the society's program. The aim was to establish – in every legitimate way, with the consent of the Great Powers – an Albania within its ethnographic boundaries, with full royal independence, an Albania that would address Albanians' political and economic woes, and would recognize the rights of Albanians through the European press and through conferences held all over the world.[11]

Before analyzing *Vatra's* activities in the European chancelleries, it is important to provide a short summary of Albania's geopolitical position in the years prior and during the war. Before the war, the regions that were to make up the state of Albania were under Ottoman dominion until Marko Adams' proclamation of Albanian independence on 24 December 1911, which ultimately resulted in the first Albanian Assembly announcing Albania's independence[12] on 28 November 1912, during a Conference of the Ambassadors from the Great Powers gathered in London. The Great Powers would recognize Albania as an independent state that was placed under the protectorate of an international regime,[13] and the new Albanian government was recognized *de jure* in 1914 by the six Great Powers (Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Italy)[14], as well as by Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece, who all sent diplomatic missions to Durrës.[15]

With the outbreak of the First World War, Albania proclaimed itself neutral. Several nations however violated this neutrality. In the autumn of 1914, Greece occupied southern Albania, including Korçë and Gjirokastër. Meanwhile, Italy seized Vlora, and Serbia and Montenegro

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annexed parts of northern Albania. Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian forces then occupied about two-thirds of the country.[16] These infringements proved problematic from the Entente perspective, as the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany was a *casus belli* for Britain, and it is still often invoked as one of the reasons that drove Britain into the war in 1914. Yet there was no similar international outrage when Italy occupied Vlora, or Greece annexed the Autonomous Republic of Northern Epirus, thereby violating the Protocol of Corfu signed in 1914.[17]

France, Great Britain, Russia, and Italy even agreed to divide Albania (and the Habsburg Croatian lands) in a secret treaty concluded in London on 16 April 1915. According to its stipulations, Serbia and Montenegro were to become access points to the Adriatic for the allied forces. A central Albanian 'Muslim' zone would be put under Italy's supervision, which would gain control of the areas south of Vlora until Himare.[18] Northern and southern Albania were to be transferred to respectively Serbia and Greece.[19] In the post-war world, Albania was a negotiable entity. The Great Powers however did nothing to consolidate the Albanian borders.[20]

For Albania, the end of the First World War did not bring any political changes, because the defeated armies of Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria were replaced by the armed forces of some of the winning countries. After the armistice was signed, it was decided that temporary occupation by the Entente troops would only be lifted after the Peace Conference of Versailles had decided on Albania's post-war status.[21] In this context, Albania, similar to other small Balkan countries, struggled to gain international recognition and develop as an independent nation-state. It was the weakest of the Balkan states, small in size, and had a deeply fragmented society divided along regional, religious, tribal, family, and geographic lines. The Great Powers exploited these weaknesses to

further their own interests, often to the detriment of Albania's political and economic development.[22]

Leaving London after the signing of the truce, Mehmed Bey Konica, *Vatra's* London delegate, hurried to Durrës where, in collaboration with Myfit Bey Libohova, he convoked a National Assembly with the aim of electing an Executive National Committee, on 25 December 1919. He welcomed those who came to the Assembly by saying how

> I should not mention today the great danger in which Albania is, as all of you are in the condition to understand well the international situation and reflect on the consequences that it might have on the freedom and integrity of our homeland. We know well that in a few days the Peace Conference shall meet, which will be attended by the representatives of all governments and where the fate of the nations of the world will be decided and the geographic map of Europe will be changed and rearranged. Knowing the great importance that this Congress has, considering that our nation nowadays does not have a national body to represent it officially to try to protect our rights, we took the initiative in collaboration with my friend M. Myfit Bey Libohova to organize this meeting...[23]

The Congress of Durrës was attended by fifty-four representatives from different regions of the country, and decided on the creation of a temporary government that would be headed by Turhan Pasha. The Congress also approved the composition of the delegation that would go to the Paris Peace Conference, and included representatives of different regions and of different religions.[24]

It was assigned a special duty to protect the country's independence and integrity, and reject all the secret provisions of the Treaty of London, along with all the subsequent benefits that Italy derived from this treaty.[25] The press attributed the creation of the temporary government

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with all her duties to Mehmed Konica.[26] The government program was similar to that of *Vatra* regarding this issue. At this time, *Vatra,* through its representative Mehmed Konica, tried to enter talks with Italian diplomats on the possibility of reaching a cooperation between the Albanian national movement and Italy for a fair solution of the Albanian issue. Kol Tromara, as head of *Vatra* in charge of talks with Italian diplomats in Washington, stated that *Vatra's* conditions for this cooperation with Italy included the cancellation of the Secret Treaty of London, and also the unification of Kosovo and Chameria with Albania. Such requests however were not supported at all by the Italian government.[27]

The activity of Albanian émigré society during the Paris Peace Conference

The representation of the country at the Paris Peace Conference was one of *Vatra's* main objectives. Its leaders and other public personalities published articles in the Boston-based journal *The Adriatic Review*; which was sent to American high officials and other distinguished American personalities. One of its issues included a memorandum sent to President Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing a few days before a delegation of Albanian-Americans left for France to join the Paris Peace Conference on 27 November 1918, at a time when the Great Powers were once again planning the separation of Albania. The memorandum stated the following:

> The aim of the text and of the delegation was to ensure the continued recognition of Albania as a sovereign state. Many of the idealized views expressed in this memorandum can still be heard among Albanians today. The document was signed by leading clergymen of the Albanian Orthodox Churches of America,

including Fan Noli. Copies were sent to the foreign ministries of the Allied Powers and their ambassadors in Washington.*[28]*

Dr. Mihal Turtulli published an appeal in *Dielli*, calling for the Albanians of America to defend their homeland. Turtulli, together with Mehmed Bey Konica, argued that it would be helpful to send delegates to Europe in defense of the rights of Albanians. The delegation's initial purpose was to secure the recognition of Albania and its ethnographic borders at the Peace Conference. It was then to head to Albania in order to secure Albania for the Albanians.[29]

The reason why *Vatra* had Albanian representation at the Paris Peace Conference as a top priority was the absence of a political organization in the country proper. As a result of this, *Vatra* became the initiator of a proposal to convene an extraordinary Convention of Albanian immigration in America, which would take the relevant decisions in this respect. The Convention met on 29 December 1918, and around seventy organizations representing the Albanian Diaspora in the USA took part in it. It eventually resulted in an expansion of the *Vatra* delegation in Paris to include personalities such as Fan Noli, Anselmo Lorekion, Nikolla Kasneci, Rasih Dino, with Telford Erickson and British military officer Aubrey Herbert as honorary delegates.[30]

The Convention also decided that the delegates should try to lobby in European chancelleries and at the Peace Conference to secure an independent Albania, which would include within its borders the territories that had been separated from it by the 1913 Treaty of London. At the same time, it decided that Albania's foreign policy should be oriented towards friendship with Italy, since it expected that Italy would have a special interest in the restoration of a strong Albania beyond the Adriatic.[31] To raise finances for the delegation's work, *Vatra* held a fundraising campaign, which was a huge success, as a significant part of

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the Albanian diaspora donated to this campaign and their contributions were acknowledged in multiple issues of *Dielli*.[32]

Immediately after the end of the First World War, Fan Noli wrote an appeal to the Albanian people in *Dielli*, arguing that 'it is a matter of life or death for us for our voice to be heard at this world conference, and Albanians have to realize that this is the most critical time in all of Albanian history'.[33]

The gravity of the situation was partly due to the delegation's weak position. At the opening of the conference on 19 January 1919, Albania was no longer recognized internationally as an independent state. Analyzing Albania's international situation, the delegation thought that securing the support of a foreign power would ensure Albania's recovery and consolidation. In this they were united with the émigré community in Romania, which also played an important role in the promotion of the Albanian cause. Their aims were to obtain the moral and intellectual support of a liberal power which would be as far from Albania as possible and not have direct political or commercial interests in the country.[34]

For both *Vatra* and the Romanian Albanians, American support was viewed with considerable enthusiasm as a way to save the country.[35] In their call to the American Albanians, the Albanians of Romania pointed out that they supported the American mandate, stating that

> We, the Albanians of Romania, heartily desire the moral support of the United States, as the only way to save the motherland from future dangers and to embark it on the path of civilization and prosperity. The principles proclaimed with great tact by President Wilson at the time when the World War was at the highest point of severity, especially the principle of securing small peoples' national territorial integrity and freedom of self-government, was greeted by Albanians with joyful hastiness as they saw the

fulfillmage of their centuries-long desires, that is, the unification of all national lands of Albania.[36]

Vatra's point of view in this matter was clearly expressed by its representative Dr. Mihal Turtulli in a letter sent to President Wilson at the end of 1918. In his letter, Turtulli mentioned political, material, financial, and legislative support as necessary conditions for the independent political life of Albania. He proposed to Wilson to supply Albania in the first instance with an armed task force meant to ensure internal order, and to affirm and maintain the government's authority. This military force would be foreign until a well-organized national militia could replace it. This was in keeping with earlier events, including the Bavarians in Greece, the Russians in Bulgaria, and the Americans in Cuba.[37] *Vatra* also asked Wilson in November 1918 to support the Albanian demands at the Paris Peace Conference. In the end, Albania and the Albanian case were not mentioned in the famous 'Fourteen Points' of the American President, but its eleventh point noted the following:

> Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.[38]

Noli believed in Wilson's rhetoric about the rights of small nations to 'self-determination' and the effect that it had around the world, in what Erez Manela calls 'the Wilsonian moment'.[39] On 4 July 1918, the United States' Independence Day, the representatives of all national groups in America had been invited to accompany Wilson aboard the Mayflower in his pilgrimage to the tomb of George Washington at Mount Vernon.[40] On the return trip, the Albanian representative Fan Noli had the opportunity

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to state the case of Albania informally before the President, and made his case to him for the country's restoration. President Wilson listened to his plea with a benevolent interest, assuring him of his sympathy and expressing his solemn determination to help Albania in her hour of need.[41] He replied as follows:

> I shall have one voice in the next Peace Congress, and I shall use that voice on behalf of Albania. I need not tell you how strong that voice is and what a respectful and submissive attention it commands all over the world, prompted as it is by justice and backed by mighty American hosts, the mightiest the world has ever seen.[42]

During this time, Fan Noli also arranged a meeting with Theodore Roosevelt at the Harvard Club of New York, from which he understood that he was well informed not only specifically on the Albanian issue, but more generally about the Adriatic one. Noli noticed that Roosevelt had studied the Albanian issue carefully, and put forward a detailed solution, which hardly deviated from the one desired by the Albanians. In Roosevelt's opinion, territorial questions in the Balkans and in the Adriatic littoral had to be determined in accordance with racial lines, and Albania had to have its own seacoast from Montenegro to Greece.[43] Through Noli, Roosevelt sent a message to the Albanians:

> The independence of Albania must be restored at the next Peace Congress and put under a disinterested guarantee by the Allied Powers. I shall do anything in my power for the achievement of that result and for the recognition of the just claims of the ancient and brave Albanian race.[44]

For six months in the year 1919, the world's eyes were fixed on Paris,[45] as it saw the first determined effort by a Western leader, President Wilson, to impose a pattern of humanitarian idealism on world affairs.[46]

'The world', meaning the Great Powers that had won the war—not to mention the Central Powers, which had lost it— accepted Wilsonianism as the foundational discourse for a redesigned international system.[47] Wilson intended that the conference would be based on his Fourteen Points and the principle of national self-determination, but these 'new' ideals faced opposition from those who endorsed the secret treaties signed during the war, above all the Treaty of London, in which the Great Powers' interests remained protected. Despite the alleged 'new diplomacy', there would only be a limited role for the small states at the Peace Conference, and the Great Powers' representatives would make the key decisions.[48] Representatives, official and semi-official, delegations, and deputations came to Paris in throngs from every part of the earth to lay the claims of their respective nationalities before the 'high tribunal' of the world and await its decisions.[49] All the Albanian diaspora communities were represented in Paris. The Albanian delegation was officially received at Paris and the presentation of the Albanian case was made by Turhan Pasha, Mehmed Konica, and Dr. Mihal Turtulli. In the newly-formed government, the Nationalist Albanian Party held the majority of the seats for the first time in the history of the country.[50]

The official Albanian delegation was presided over by Turhan Pasha, a former premier of Albania and head of its provisional government. Mehmed Bej Konica was in Paris in a dual capacity: he served both as a member of the official delegation as well as the senior delegate of *Vatra*. Dr. Mihal Turtulli was another member of both delegations[51], and like Turtulli and Pasha, made a great contribution to the national cause. The fourth and fifth members were Luigj Bumçi and, Mit'hat Frashëri, and Father Gjergj Fishta was an expert adviser.[52] In addition to the official Albanian delegation, there were a number of semi-official ones representing the aspirations of several Albanian diaspora communities which had been founded over time as a result of historical circumstances

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in other lands. The first such Albanian community was that of the Albanian diaspora of Constantinople. On 3 January 1919, it convened to elect delegates to the Peace Conference, ultimately choosing Mit'hat Frashëri, Fuad Dibra, Male Shan Tepelena, Mr. Blinisht as well as Mr. Halil Pashë Gjirokastra as its representatives.[53]

All delegates at the Paris Peace Conference saw the restoration of Albania as their duty. They also recognized the need to publish books in support of the national cause.[54] A few days later, the Albanian delegation was reinforced with the arrival of Telford Erickson, an American missionary who had been unanimously elected as a *Vatra* delegate by the extraordinary Convention held in December 1918. These Albanian delegations had different political orientations, according to their personal beliefs regarding which state was the best suited to defend Albanian interests.[55] The diaspora community of Romania was represented at the Paris Peace Conference by Prince Albert Ghica, a descendant of the Albanian dynasty of the Ghicas, and Pandeli Jano Angjeli, president of the Albanian community of Bucharest and the former governor of the province of Koritza. The delegates of the territory of Koritza were Vangjel Turtulli, Dhimitri Mano, and Captain Selaheddin Bloshmi. A number of people representing minor Albanian societies in the United States were also present in Paris.[56]

In the extraordinary assembly held on 4 January 1919, *Vatra* approved a resolution which was made known to the U.S. government through a letter sent to Secretary of State Lansing. In it, an appeal was made to the United States to help with the preservation of Albanian independent statehood by placing American troops on all disputed territories where the Albanian population represented a majority.[57] From January to April 1919, *Vatra*'s representatives made efforts at the Peace Conference to secure the return to Albania of the territories that had been granted to neighboring states at the 1913 Treaty of London. They sent telegrams and memoranda to the Great Powers in which they demanded the return

of these territories,[58] and also sent a memorandum to Wilson which denounced the cruel persecution of the Albanian population of Peja at the hands of the Serbian army.[59] Since the beginning of its work, the Peace Conference had analyzed the requests of the Greek delegation, among which were claims over territory held by Albania. On 4 February 1919, the Council of Chairpersons of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the United States of America, Great Britain, France, and Italy, decided to appoint a commission to analyze these claims. The commission appointed a team headed by the French Jules Cambon, which worked from 12 February to 21 March 1919, meeting twelve times during this period.[60]

During that time, the Peace Conference was dealing with the 'Adriatic Question', which addressed the former territories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the region and was thus inextricably connected with the Albanian issue.[61] On 9 December 1919, Great Britain, the United States of America and France addressed a memorandum to Italy proposing a solution to the 'Adriatic Question'.[62] It recommended leaving Vlora, together with its hinterland, under Italian sovereignty.[63] It also proposed that

> Valona shall be retained by Italy, as provided for in the Treaty of London, and, in addition the mandate over Albania shall be given to Italy. In northern Albania, the boundaries shall be readjusted. Those districts of Albania which will thus go to Serb-Croat-Slovene State will enjoy a special régime as an autonomous province similar to that which the treaty with the Czechoslovak republic provides for its autonomous provinces. The southern boundary of Albania shall be the line which was proposed by the British and French delegations on the Commission on Greek Affairs. This leaves Greece Koritza and Argyrokastron.[64]

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In October 1919, several representatives of *Vatra*, Rasih Dino, Sotir Koleka, Mit'hat Frasheri, and Hilmi Këlcyra, denounced the Tittoni-Venizelos Agreement before the Peace Conference,[65] as efforts in the circles of *Vatra* intensified during this time. In September, Mehmed Bey Konica sent a letter to the American delegate William Buckler, in which he asked that Albania be governed temporarily by an international commission which would be composed of three Americans, two Italians, and two Albanians. After Erickson's efforts to persuade American political circles to accept this solution failed, *Vatra* asked for an independent Albania governed by an Italian Prince.[66] The memorandum of 9 December 1919, which gave Italy Vlora and a protectorate of Albania, was shocking to the political circles,[67] immediately activating *Vatra's* Albanian circles. A harsh reaction was issued by Noli, in a *Vatra* assembly, where he accused the American president of violating all the points of the peace program. Noli made an appeal to the US Senate not to approve the exchange of Fiume with Vlora.[68] Because of its appeal to the sensibilities of the American public opinion, *Vatra* had an undoubtable impact on the attitude the US government took towards the Albanian issue. Taking into consideration the Great Powers' attitude towards this issue, it is clear that both the national movement as well as the émigré community were actively promoting the Albanian cause in the European chancelleries at this time.[69] Other influential allies, such as Aubrey Herbert and Edith Durham, also played an important role in the struggle for Albanian independence, as they promoted the Albanian territorial integrity claims before the public.[70]

From 5 to 27 March 1919, Luigj Bumçi and Dr. Turtulli undertook intense lobbying in London, aimed at changing the attitudes of the Great Powers regarding the Albanian issue. To this purpose, they lobbied friendly allies of Albania in order to change the British government's stance. Bumçi and Turtulli met many influential British political figures while campaigning, including the Secretary General of the League of Nations Eric

Drummond, as well as Lloyd George's Secretary Filip Kerr and the British expert in Balkan affairs, M. Leaper. At the initiative of Aubrey Herbert, two meetings were arranged in a room of the Parliament, where participating Deputies and Lords discussed the Albanian issue. In these two meetings, Turtulli and Bumçi tried to use all the necessary arguments and their strongest reasoning to inform the British that Albania's neighbors did not have any right to ask for parts of its territory. Rather, Turtulli and Bumçi argued that, if the issue was to be treated fairly, they return what they seized according to the 1878 Treaty of Berlin and the 1913 Treaty of London, as they believed that these two treaties constituted irrefutable proofs of Albanian nationhood since 1878. The Treaty of Berlin had granted part of South Epirus, comprising the towns of Arta and Preveza, and the river Calamas, to Greece. Following forcible protest from Albania, the signatory powers were forced to revert their decision and draw the border at Arta. However, the Treaty of London once again granted this and even more territory to Greece.[71] Turtulli and Bumçi strongly contradicted the slanders of their neighboring states, who suggested that Albanians were divided by conflict and were not capable of governing themselves. They also showed that Albania had no religious problems, and that Muslims and Christians lived in total harmony.[72] Regarding the meeting with Robert Cecil and Eric Drummond, the report sent by the delegates on 30 March stated that

> Lord Cecil was clarified at length regarding our issue and we sent him some documents, he promised orally and in written form that he would do what he can to help the Albanian issue. We met with the Secretary-General of the League of Nations M. Eric Drummond who nowadays is in charge of almost all its work. We also informed him thoroughly on our issue and told him we do not accept any mandate, any turmoil in our affairs from Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia.[73] Looking at the attitudes of the Great Powers toward

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the Albanian issue, the only hope seemed to lie with the League of Nations and for this purpose Aubrey Herbert insisted in the League of Nations circles close to Philip Kerr, that Albanian borders should not be decided hastily in Paris, but left to the League of Nations to decide on different sectors where there were doubts. It is indubitable that the continued efforts of Mehmed Konica, Rasih Dino, and Aubrey Herbert had an effect on British diplomacy.[74]

Consequently, the main result of the Peace Conference, regarding the Albanian case, was the denunciation of the secret Treaty of London of 1915, and the lack of recognition from the United States of America until the Albanian case was resolved. At this time, movements against Italy began in Albania.[75] The celebration of Independence Day on 28 November 1919 was marked by a huge manifestation in Italian-held Vlora. In the manifestation, the local population strongly expressed its anger at the dealings of the Peace Conference, and at the politics of Italy, with the popular slogan "foreigners out of our country".[76]

Albania in the League of Nations

The political situation in Albania in 1919 was getting worse because the Peace Conference in Paris had not solved the Albanian issue. The only option for Albania remained a resolution of the League of Nations. Albania appealed to it for international recognition, restoration of its borders, their assignment and its status. At this time, mass turmoil ensued in the north of the country against the Italians, while the interim government in Durrës, which was prone to collaborate with them, lost the support of the population.[77]

In the meantime, the Greek press reported the Tittoni-Venizelos Agreement, which encouraged both sides (Italy and Greece) to support

each other's claims, which further increased Albanian discontent.[78] The Albanians, disappointed with the oscillations of European diplomacy regarding the solution to their problems, mobilized their political activity as soon as possible, assembling the National Congress of Lushnje. It was convened on 28 January 1920 and headed by Sulejman Delvina. Its main purpose was "the full independence of the country".[79] These two events, the Congress of Lushnje and the opposition to British-French-Italian pressures for the dismemberment of Albania, represented a historical turning point for the position of *Vatra* towards the United States. Disappointed by the lack of foreign support, *Vatra* started referring more and more to the domestic factor in Albania, focusing increasingly on independent political and military action in Albania to solve the national issue, because it was disappointed by the lack of foreign support it had received. Its disappointment with the western powers was expressed through the press, especially *Dielli*. It made an appeal for the organization of a national army, with 100,000-150,000 troops, supported by a domestic loan. However, it still did not exclude the possibility of ensuring political and financial support from a foreign country.[80]

At the request of Prime Minister Sulejman Delvina, *Vatra* sent volunteer troops to Albania which would serve in a civil guard. Sulejman Delvina's government focused its attention on the international reaffirmation of the decisions of 1913 on the recognition of Albania's independence and its borders. For this reason, in the autumn of 1920, it moved the center of its foreign policy activity to the League of Nations, which had just been created and was based in Geneva, Switzerland.[81] Undoubtedly, the League of Nations presented certain advantages compared to the Peace Conference. The conference was a body operating in the narrow circle of the Great Powers, outside the scrutiny of public opinion, while the League of Nations brought a new element to the international arena: it had to deal with problems relating to publicity.[82]

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Moreover, the League of Nations option also proved important because American politics was embarking on an isolationist course that put an end to Wilsonian 'internationalism', and would eventually keep America away from Europe until the Second World War.[83] On 19 October 1920, a month before the opening of the First Assembly of the League of Nations, Herbert wrote to Drummond, reminding him of the desire expressed by Bumçi in the name of the Albanian government to be admitted to the League of Nations. He reminded Drummond of a telegram sent by the Albanian government in November 1919, asking to be admitted as a member to the League and to be treated in the same way as other countries, mentioning as an example the case of Lithuania, which was admitted to the League.[84]

During this time, Herbert had a meeting with the British representative Fisher and the British politician Robert Cecil.[85] It was Herbert's luck that Cecil – one of his closest political associates – would attend the First Assembly of the League of Nations as the representative of South Africa. Upon arrival in Geneva, Cecil was chosen as chairman of the second sub-commission of the Fifth Assembly (in which the admission of new members to the League of Nations was discussed), and charged with the preliminary assessment of the requests for membership from Albania, Bulgaria, Austria, and Liechtenstein. Moreover, the representative of Albania in the League of Nations, Fan Noli, made an excellent defense of the Albanian case.[86] However, on 4 December 1920, the sub-commission voted against the admission of Albania, because the French delegate René Viviani and the British delegate Fisher argued that the League of Nations should not antedate the decisions of the allied Great Powers regarding the future of this country. Cecil promised Herbert that he would continue to exert pressure to reconsider Albania's membership.[87]

Meanwhile, the Prime Minster of Greece, Eleftherios Venizelos, an ally, had just lost its power, and on 5 December a plebiscite decided the rise to power of King Constantine I, which the Allies had dethroned three

years earlier because of his pro-German claims. His return to power urged Britain and France to reconsider their support for the territorial expansion of Greece.[88]

Consequently, on 17 December 1920, Albania was admitted as a member to the League of Nations with thirty-five votes in favor, seven abstentions, and no votes against.[89] It became the first state that joined this international organization without previously obtaining diplomatic recognition.[90] The admission to the League of Nations subsequently led to a decision on Albania's borders, at the Conference of Ambassadors in 1921, which was followed by the establishment of diplomatic relations. With its entrance into the League of Nations, Albania found extraordinary strength in its quality as a member and made an appeal to have an arbiter if necessary or to raise its voice in the court of military penalties. This was due to the fact that, since its admission to the League, it faced anxieties regarding potential invasions, as well as being confronted with the insecurity of diplomatic actions. Albania considered its admission to the League of Nations as a positive act of justice.[91]

Conclusion

Albania's admission to the League of Nations constituted a significant moment in Albania's history, as well as an important and complex part of the global history of the League of Nations. In the historiography, the process of state formation has to date always been portrayed as a product of domestic political forces. However, most of the important political figures who ruled Albania in the years 1920-1925 had been part of émigré societies. Albanian nationalism developed differently from that of its neighbors, due to both its origins in emigration, and its lack of religious homogeneity that could be found in the neighboring countries. It was 'natural' for the Albanian nationalists to seek unity in language,

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since religion, and indeed almost everything else in Albania, seemed divisive rather than unifying, as Eric Hobsbawm adduced in his work.[92] The émigré communities printed and disseminated the idea of 'Albanianism' first among themselves, and then among the citizens in Albania.[93] *Vatra* carried out a very important role in defense of the national cause from the end of the First World War until Albania's admission to the League of Nations. As Haris Silajdžić summarizes in his work,[94] *Vatra* developed its activity in three main directions. The first of these involved persuading the American delegation to the Paris Peace Conference of the righteousness of the Albanian demands, and lobbying European chancelleries with the same purpose. Secondly, *Vatra* aimed at a rejection of the Greek propaganda, which associated the Christian Orthodox religion of the South Albanian population with Greek nationality. Thirdly, through its delegates, *Vatra* organized numerous activities in order to revitalize Albanian political life. Following its practice of lobbying European chancelleries through its representatives and Albanian allies like Erickson or Herbert, *Vatra* managed to postpone the decision of Albania's recognition from the Peace Conference to the League of Nations, which was its greatest achievement in the service of the Albanian cause. This achievement brought the discussion of this issue to the League of Nations, whose workings were much more open to public scrutiny. Through its activity, *Vatra* contributed to a change in attitude of the Great Powers. Through its contacts with President Wilson and the memoranda it sent to him and the American Senate, *Vatra* managed to sensitize the American public opinion to the Albanian issue, also influencing President Wilson's attitude. It also gained the support of Great Britain, which subsequently helped with the membership of Albania in the League of Nations. This all indicates how *Vatra* constituted an essential factor in the history of the Albanian national movement.

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[9] Kristo Floqi was a lawyer, and one the main contributors of *Vatra*. During the years 1912-1913, he started his short-lived newspaper *Zëri i popullit* (Voice of the People). After the First World War Floqi edited the local newspaper *Agimi* (The Dawn) for the *Vllazënija* (Brotherhood) society in 1919. In December 1920 he became Minister of Education in Albania.

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The Agony of Historic Western Hungary and the Birth of Burgenland (1914-1921)

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Many know that one of the most important consequences of the First World War was the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Yet only few know that the two defeated allies – Austria and Hungary – had not only lost large territories of their own to the neighbouring successors states, but they were also engaged in serious border dispute with each other between 1918 and 1921. This desperate struggle may seem as if it came out of nowhere since the three historic counties that composed the Western periphery of Hungary did not really suffered from deep political or social conflicts before the war, at least not on the surface and comparing to other multi-ethnic regions of Central and Eastern Europe. If we picture the old Habsburg Empire as a jigsaw puzzle then the Western Hungarian counties should be imagined as those oddly shaped interlocking and mosaiced pieces that geographically as well as culturally connected the two halves of the empire. Although the long but narrow area along the Western border of the Kingdom of Hungary was dominantly German-speaking for centuries, both countries were under Habsburg rule under which questioning the historical borders would have been simply unreasonable. This radically changed around the turn-of-the century when modern nationalism broke through in public life and became a main driving force behind political aspirations. The disintegration of historic Western Hungary and birth of Burgenland were a very complicated process in which regard the significance of nationalism and its radicalization in the Great War cannot be underestimated.

Keywords: Austria; Hungary; Habsburg; Burgenland; First World War

Introduction

One of the most important consequences of the First World War was the collapse of the multi-ethnic conglomerate of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.[1] Yet only few remember that the two defeated allies, Austria and Hungary, had not only lost large territories of their own to the neighboring successors states, but they were also engaged in a serious border dispute with each other between 1918 and 1921. This desperate post-war struggle may seem as if it came out of nowhere. The three historic counties that made up the western periphery of the Kingdom of Hungary, i.e. Moson, Sopron, and Vas, did not really suffer from deep political or social conflicts before the Great War, at least not on the surface and not compared to other multi-ethnic regions in Central and Eastern Europe.

Recent research suggests it may have been the miseries endured during the war that destabilized society and aggravated the post-war political turmoil, escalating tensions across the otherwise peaceful western Hungarian landscape. As one contemporary expert on this topic points out in her dissertation project, the agony of historic Western Hungary and the birth of Burgenland were an extremely complicated process in which 'the chronology, historical events and occurrences alone hint at the interplay of the international and national politics throughout the whole process'.[2] Since the topic in general would require a more extensive elaboration, this paper focuses primarily on the regional aspects that enable us to better understand the reasons behind this specific territorial conflict.

'Happy years of peace'? – Western Hungary before 1914

'Western Hungary—such a part of the country does not exist and never did', a Moson County journalist quite rightfully claimed when despairing of the loss of his homeland to Austria in 1921.[3] Indeed, not only does the term 'Burgenland' sound ahistorical regarding events leading up to the early 1920s, but so to some extent does 'Western Hungary', which had at best a vague geographical meaning over the course of the centuries. This area, where the foothills of the Alps meet the plains and hills of the Carpathian Basin, has never been a unified administrative region but was historically composed of three counties and several self-governing towns. The western borders of the three counties were also a state border with Austria. However, since Austria and Hungary constituted a Dual Monarchy between 1867 and 1914, this should be considered rather a 'weak' state border compared to the 'hard' borders that usually separate two neighboring nation states.[4] From an external point of view, Western Hungary may have appeared not to be a border region in the era before the Great War but in fact it was. It is necessary to emphasize, however, that the three counties as well as the royal cities of Western Hungary had, for centuries, been in a frequent social, cultural and economic exchange with the neighboring Austrian lands and cities: Styria (Steiermark), Lower Austria (Niederösterreich) and with the imperial capital of Vienna (Wien).[5]

According to the 1910 census, the combined population of the three counties and their four cities was about 815,000 inhabitants.[6] More than half of them identified themselves as native Hungarian-speakers, 290,000 of them belonged to the German-speaking community and about 110,000 of them spoke a Slavic language (mostly Croatian or Slovene) as their mother tongue. In general, the closer the border, the more multi-ethnic the western Hungarian landscape was. In terms of religion, the absolute majority was Roman Catholic followed by a

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minority of Lutherans who were especially present in the German-speaking towns. As a result of mass immigration during the nineteenth century, significant Jewish communities existed across the region as well.[7] Despite their Germanophile attitude and the anti-Semitic tendencies shown occasionally by the ethnic Hungarian majority, they considered themselves not as an ethnic minority but as a religious subgroup within the Hungarian community. At the highest level of society were a number of wealthy Hungarian aristocratic families such as the famous Esterházy family who had held the hereditary office of Lord Lieutenant of the Sopron County since the seventeenth century.[8] Public life was dominated by the Hungarian-born middle and lower nobility, who held the important offices in the county's administration as well.[9] By far the largest social group across all three main ethnic groups was the peasantry, as the region's economy remained dominantly agricultural.

By the end of the long nineteenth century, new social groups (bourgeoisie and industrial workers) appeared on the scene as a result of the increasingly rapid industrialization and modernization that took place all over the country. Consequently, the region's society became considerably more diverse in terms of group identities, which, in the age of nationalism, sometimes led to political and social conflicts. However, it is difficult to determine whether and to what extent the side-effects of an otherwise integrative process of nation-state-building and modernization contributed to the disintegration of the society in Western Hungary in the decades prior to the First World War. Until now, only a limited amount of research has been done at the regional and local level on the question of the security of national minorities and whether a dramatization of security issues took place in Western Hungary. In my view, the complicated relationship between the regional administration and local identities, interconnected with the nationality question, should be understood as a key pre-war disintegrative force.

The term 'contested self-governance' summarizes this phenomena very well since it refers to the controversial transformation of Hungary's historic territorial administration at the end of the nineteenth century.[10] Hungary had been subdivided into counties (in historic term: municipalities) since the Middle Ages, which served as a refuge for the Hungarian nobility's corporative positions against the Habsburg administration. As the counties constituted an important arena for local political opinion-making for centuries, they played an integral role in the nobility's local and regional identity. However, when Hungary regained its sovereignty within the Habsburg Monarchy in 1867, the Hungarian elites were able to establish their own national parliament and government, and attempted to transform a pre-modern, multi-ethnic kingdom into a modern and unified nation state.[11] As a result of the reforms implemented step-by-step after 1870, the counties conceded an increasing number of legal and administrative responsibilities to the central government. In this new era, the counties were no longer really seen as self-governing and identity-forming territorial units but as integral elements of the national administration that conveyed the decisions of the government and parliament at the local level.[12]

Simultaneously, the Western-Hungarian elites traditionally had patriotic and pro-Habsburg sentiments, and thus supported the 1867 policies, including the centralization of the public administration. However, the transformation of the state was achieved by the old elites and they might have failed to establish a new regional identity that facilitated the integration of the non-Hungarian communities into the nation state. This phenomenon is even more noticeable in the case of the so-called 'free royal cities'. The country's new political structure changed the conditions not only for the counties, but also for those cities that had held town privileges for centuries. They were not part of the counties but now they lost most of their privileges, including the right to directly communicate with the government. In Western Hungary, three of the

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four towns that did have a self-governing tradition (i.e. Kőszeg/Güns, Kismarton/Eisenstadt and Ruszt/Rust) were incorporated into their respective counties in the 1870s. Only the region's most important city, Sopron/Ödenburg, was able to maintain some autonomy, though at a decreased level. As these were mostly German-speaking towns, their enforced incorporation into the counties (1876) was not just a matter of territorial administration but a question of nation-building. As Károly Mérey, the Lord Lieutenant of the four cities himself wrote in his resignation letter in 1874, he had to work under critical circumstances 'in those four German-minded, unpatriotic and wrongly educated towns'.[13]

One should be aware that, according to the nationality law of 1868, the society of Hungary was composed of several different nationalities (including 'Hungarian' itself) that had equal rights and liberties and together formed one single political nation, which was also to be called Hungarian.[14] In reality, however, the representatives of the ethnic minorities never really shared this vision of the Hungarian elites and desperately resisted the government's so-called 'Magyarization' efforts. In the counties of Moson, Sopron, and Vas, similarly to the nationwide situation, the ethnic Hungarians enjoyed only a relative majority over non-Hungarian minorities. Furthermore, Moson was the only one of the 63 counties where Germans enjoyed an absolute majority over other ethnic groups. The western border area was predominantly inhabited by German speakers, which caused the Hungarian authorities to see a potential national security issue in Pan-German nationalism and separatism.

These worries were not entirely unfounded, at least not after the turn of the century. In 1908, a Bohemia-born journalist of German origin, Josef Patry, wrote a political leaflet entitled *Westungarn zu Deutschösterreich*.[15] This should be considered one of the first signs of the subsequent Western Hungarian crisis. The leaflet was published by

the Vienna-based Pan-German journal *Alldeutsches Tageblatt* and the hundreds of copies were circulated among Austrian readers as well as the German-speaking inhabitants of Western Hungary. Patry's vision was indeed innovative as he invented 'Western Hungary' as a modern geopolitical term. According to the vision of the Austrian branch of the Pan-German ideology, German-Austria should be established on the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The ultimate goal of this new state-formation would be the eventual unification with Germany, but, prior to that, it aimed to incorporate all the German-speaking inhabitants of the Habsburg lands into one single political unit.[16] In terms of geography, that was obviously an impossible idea, since most of the ethnic German population in Hungary and Transylvania, as well as in Bohemia and Moravia, lived either thinly spread or very far from the core provinces of German-Austria. What they could easily do without much risk, however, was to speculate about the future border between Austria and Hungary. Patry envisioned an imminent collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy and advocated the complete redrawing of the political map of Central and Eastern Europe. In exchange for Western Hungary, the German nationalist in Austria would have offered the provinces of Dalmatia and Bosnia to Hungary, though they demanded not only the German-speaking border area but also a far larger territory between the River Rába/Raab and the Danube. Even though Patry ruled out using military means to resolve the border question, he urged the 200 German representatives of the Austrian Parliament to protect their compatriots in Western Hungary from the 'culturally inferior Hungarians'. He also invited the German-speaking intellectuals, university students and even tourists from both sides of the border to join their cause.

The leaflet triggered outrage in Hungary. The question of the western border was even raised in the Hungarian Parliament in Budapest on February 26, 1908, when Hugó Laehne, an MP from the Kőszeg/Güns

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district, addressed Prime Minister Sándor Wekerle.[17] Although Laehne himself was born in Sopron/Ödenburg and was of German origin, he was also a member of the Hungarian nationalist 'Party of Independence and '48', and strongly demanded the immediate elimination of Pan-German propaganda from Hungary: 'Not at the moment when this movement is producing results, but now, when it is still in its infancy, should this [movement] be eliminated. […] We must not let citizens of foreign states stir up emotions and question the territorial integrity of our country', Laehne told his fellow members of Parliament.[18]

In one of the biggest political dailies, a resident of Western Hungary reacted mockingly and furiously to the speculations about his homeland.[19] According to János Breit from Sopronkeresztúr/Deutschkreuz, the Hungarian authorities had to be aware of the Pan-German danger from Austria and nip the propaganda in the bud: 'We, Hungarians cannot do anything but draw the urgent conclusion that the twelfth hour has arrived.'[20] He pointed out that the Pan-German movement seemed to be showing anti-Habsburg tendencies; therefore he urged the Austrian prosecutor to carry out an investigation into Josef Patry's political activities. Indeed, as long as both Austria and Hungary were under Habsburg rule by historic right, there was no room for any kind of border dispute between the two sides. Furthermore, Western Hungary was traditionally the most royalist and pro-Habsburg regions of Hungary, which contributed to the difficulties regarding the incorporation of the region into the left-wing dominated Republic of Austria after the war.

In a few years' time the potential danger of Pan-German nationalism became part of everyday administration in Western Hungary. Just before the war, in April 1914, for instance, the Ministry of Interior Affairs instructed the Lord Lieutenant of Vas County to keep an eye on local peasant organizations as they might have connections with a Budapest-based Pan-German umbrella organization called *Deutscher Bauernbund*

aus den Ländern der Ungarischen Krone.[21] The Lord Lieutenant carried out a thorough investigation, receiving reports from the district administrators of Németújvár/Güssing and Szentgotthárd/St. Gotthard on the activities of an ethnic German citizen named Carl Wollinger. He was accused of using local savings bank branches to spread ideas of German nationalism among the border area population. According to the reports, as a result of Wollinger's activities, some villages had already started to demand the use of German language in local administration instead of the official state language. A few years later, the Hungarian elites would have been happy to grant this basic right in their desperate attempt to stop Western Hungary's disintegration.

Western Hungary as Hinterland of the Great War (1914-1918)

As we have seen, the Austria-Hungary border conflict between 1918 and 1921 did not come out of nowhere. Still, it would take much more to argue that the post-war conflict was deeply rooted in the pre-war political, social, economic and cultural developments of the region. What we have witnessed is the activity of a number of political adventurers or visionaries who might have had enough intellectual capacity to become the protagonists of a cause but certainly lacked the power and political influence to make it come true. Without a major turn that would radically change the political attitude of both the elites and the ordinary people, the idea of moving the Austria-Hungary border tens of kilometers eastwards would not have tempted a great audience. Recent research on East Central European political thought points out that 'one of the most unintended consequences' of the First World War was that it served as a 'laboratory for testing the radical doctrines', including Social

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Darwinism's vision of a zero-sum game, and of the effects of the turn of the century in real life and on real people.[22]

Source: M. Vares, *The Question of Western Hungary/Burgenland 1918-1923. A Territorial Question in the Context of National and International Policy* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Jyväskylä, 2008), 325.

Was it therefore the war and its consequences that made the Western Hungarian people's indifference towards nationalist appeals disappear within a short period of time? The academic concept of 'national indifference' suggests it probably was.[23] This concept has become one of the main issues in international research on nations and nationalism in recent times; it claims that the nationalist struggle in the Habsburg-ruled countries was not driven by a mass movement for the nation, but rather the opposite: indifference, ambivalence and opportunism of 'ordinary people' when dealing with issues of nationhood and with claims made by nationalists. The American sociologist Rogers Brubaker, a pioneer of the concept, argued that national identities are not the logical outcome of an already existing ethnic identity, nor is the nation a real group, but rather a practical category, an institutionalized form, and a contingent event.[24] Brubaker and his followers took the constructivist paradigm further to challenge Anthony Smith's ethno-symbolist position as well as Miroslav Hroch's phase theory of national movements and Michael Billig's analysis about the relentless spread of banal nationalism in modern society. Proponents of 'national indifference' insist there was no mass breakthrough of nationalism in the Habsburg lands before the First World War but that it was the general breakdown of society because of the war that created the conditions for the 'massification' of national movements.[25]

When the heir to the imperial (Austria) and royal (Hungary) thrones, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife were killed by Gavrilo Prinzip in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, nobody expected that a four-year-long world war would break out. Obviously, the governing elites of the Dual Monarchy had been aware of the threatening potential of an armed conflict, but the ordinary citizens were not yet in a hurry to sacrifice themselves for 'sacred war aims'.[26] Franz Ferdinand was certainly not a popular figure in Hungary, as his so-called 'Belvedere circle' had been openly advocating the structural overhaul of the Dual Monarchy for

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many years, first and foremost at the territorial expense of Hungary.[27] The famous proposal of the *Vereinigte Staaten von Groß-Österreich* (United States of Greater Austria), drafted by the Archduke's right hand man, the ethnic Romanian lawyer Aurel Popovici, in 1906, would have meant a Trianon-like disintegration of the Lands of the Holy Crown. The proposal has been discussed by historians, but only limited attention has been paid to the fact that it would have granted the predominantly German-speaking parts of Western Hungary, including large parts of Vas, the Sopron counties and the entire Moson county with the addition of the cities of Sopron/Ödenburg and Pozsony/Pressburg to German Austria, one of the 15 different federal states of the envisioned Greater Austria. With Franz Ferdinand's death, the proposal was taken off the agenda only to make an unexpected return in a somewhat different form four years later.

Since the Archduke was also to inherit the Hungarian throne, a period of nationwide mourning took place, with black flags hoisted on public buildings and entertainment events cancelled all over Hungary. The Minister of Interior Affairs informed the Lord Lieutenants of the counties about the tragic news via telegram.[28] On July 1, 1914, the Roman Catholic Bishop of *Szombathely* celebrated a mass in honor of the late royal couple. On the very same day, the Imperial Defense Minister informed the Hungarian government about the plans for a 'larger military exercise' in the Austria-Hungary border area, which of course never took place due to the outbreak of the war.[29] On July 2, the Assembly of Sopron County sent its condolences via telegram to the Viennese court.[30] In his speech to his fellow assembly members, Dr István Tálas drew a comparison between the deaths of Crown Prince Rudolf (1889) and Archduke Franz Ferdinand and emphasized Sopron County's close attachment to the latter, who in the past had been known as the colonel of the regiment of county hussars. The Assembly of Moson County also expressed its condolences to the royal family.[31]

The Great War broke out on July 28, 1914, when Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia.[32] Soon, the Dual Monarchy found itself in a very difficult two-front war as the Tsarist Russian army easily invaded Galicia and pushed in the direction of Kraków as well as into the northeastern counties of Hungary on the western side of the Carpathian Mountains. In May 1915, Italy also entered the war on the side of the Entente Powers, opening a third front in the southwest for the control of the Adriatic Sea and the Southern Alps. The following year in August, Romania joined the Entente and attacked Austria-Hungary from the southeast in the hope of the annexation of Transylvania and the Bánát region. Although with German assistance the Austro-Hungarian troops fought back and the Central Powers even invaded Bucharest, the Romanian conflict tied down significant military capacities for the rest of the war. As the initial illusion of a quickly concluded war completely shattered after a couple of months, it became increasingly obvious that those powers that produced more supplies and provided greater numbers of reinforcements in terms of manpower, weapons and food would have a better chance to win the war. In this regard, the Central Powers proved to be lagging behind the Entente, especially after the United States entered the war in 1917.[33]

Geographically, the region of Western Hungary was located quite far from all the war zones, yet it was destined to face the tragic consequences of becoming a hinterland of the war. The war posed an enormous challenge to the public administration. The local authorities—the counties as well as the towns—were forced to switch from peace to war mode as soon as possible. In the latter, there was no room for traditional forms of self-governance as everything had to be sacrificed for the sake of the war effort. Unlike elsewhere, in the predominantly German-speaking district of Kismarton/Eisenstadt, the district administrator was able to implement the transition more or less smoothly.[34] Lajos Wolf, who became known as the Vice-Lieutenant of Sopron County in the

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interwar period, established the local unit of the Red Cross, supported the left-behind poor families and organized a military hospital, among other things. He had to deliver the unpopular tasks as well, including the introduction of war loans and the management of local military mobilizations and requisition of food and equipment. In the course of time, these practices, as well as other wartime miseries, turned the local population against the authorities. In non-Hungarian regions public discontent typically took the form of anti-Hungarian sentiments. The hatred increased even more when local civil servants, whose salaries drastically lost value due to wartime inflation, were involved in corruption or abuse of power.[35] Listing the series of wartime difficulties, it is necessary to emphasize that almost every family—regardless of their ethnic background—lost at least one or two family members, typically fathers and sons, during the war. During the first four months of 1915 alone, the Austro-Hungarian army lost 800,000 soldiers—either killed or captured—in the battles against Russia for the East Carpathian and Galician territories.[36] Although the state censorship did the utmost to control publishing and the circulation of newspapers, bad news spread anyway.[37] In the village of Káld in Vas County, for example, a local doctor named Gyula Götzl from the nearby town of Jánosháza was accused of scaremongering. According to an investigation by the local district administrator, Götzl just could not stop talking publicly about tragic news from the front that contradicted the official military reports. The doctor unwillingly caused such a great panic and desperation among the women of the village that local authorities felt obliged to intervene.[38]

The unprecedented scale of human and material losses on the one hand demoralized the society of the hinterland, whilst on the other hand undermining the agricultural and industrial production. The lack of men on the farms and in the factories, together with the increasing military requisition of food, clothes, boots and other goods and equipment, massively deteriorated the quality of life across the country.[39] In spite of

contemporary and posterior Marxist arguments, the elites had been very much aware of the suffering of the poor and cared for their needs, as is mirrored, for example, in a confidential message by a cabinet member to the head of Vas County.[40] However, the deprivation of the many was going hand in hand with the enrichment of the few. Either as official or black-market suppliers of the army, some traders and landlords became so wealthy within a short period of time that it caused widespread public outrage. In many cases the villagers, angered by the magnates who lived far from their vast farmlands channeled their hate towards the local servants of the public administration. These locally evolved tensions escalated more and more into a strange combination of ethnic and class hatred, often as antisemitism and anti-Magyarism. The ethnic hatred spread like an epidemic because of the refugee crisis too. In 1915-1916, tens of thousands were forced to leave their homes behind in Galicia, in Northeastern Hungary and in Transylvania during the attack of the Russian and Romanian troops.[41] These refugees temporarily migrated to the hinterland regions, mostly to Budapest and Vienna but also to the countryside, including Western Hungary, and their arrival put an extra heavy burden on the local society.[42] As most of the refugees from Galicia were of either of Slavic or Jewish background, they faced a strange combination of generous support and ethnic discrimination from the side of the hinterland population. At the same time, similar "ethnic boxes" were created spontaneously on the front within the divisions of the otherwise heterogeneous Austro-Hungarian army. These processes in a previously functioning multi-ethnic society clearly foreshadowed the post-war hostilities between the different ethnic groups.

Since Austria-Hungary was at war with both Serbia and Russia, Slavic people in general, especially South-Slavs and/or those of Orthodox religion, were securitized from the very beginning of the war. Whether they were prisoners of war, citizens of foreign states in internment camps or even Austrian/Hungarian citizens, in the eyes of the authorities

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they all had the potential to stir up anti-war sentiments, undermine the government and betray the Dual Monarchy, desert the army, and possibly join the enemy. Spying on foreign agents and surveillance of suspicious figures and associations therefore became part of everyday life. In Western Hungary, the Croatian minority, which was spread rather thinly along the border, showed no sign of ethnic-based frustration, but the Slovenes formed a compact ethnic block in the southwestern corner of Vas County. Because of this Muraköz/Medžimurje micro-region, Vas County was considered one of those "southern" counties of Hungary that could be targeted by South-Slavic aspirations. For instance, in July 1915, the Ministry of Interior Affairs instructed the leadership of these counties to prevent the circulation of a leaflet by the "South-Slavic Student Association". The text of the leaflet harshly criticized Germans, Austrians and Hungarians over the alleged oppression of Slavic peoples who were now urged to join the war effort of the Entente Powers.[43] In contrast to the Pan-Slavic paranoia, the question of Pan-German nationalism was temporarily taken off the agenda during the war years in Hungary, which can be explained through the close military alliance with the German Empire.

As the killing continued on the front, the miseries of war hit the big cities even more, mostly in the form of food rationing, and the lack of coal and every kind of material that is indispensable for everyday life.[44] The food crisis was even worse in Vienna than in Budapest, which contributed to Austria's dependence on Western Hungary. Due to the geographical distance, the farmers, craftsmen and traders of Western Hungary, those of German origin in particular, used to sell their products on the Viennese markets long before the war. The increasing need for agricultural products in the imperial capital strengthened this economic bond even further. Until the end of the war, Austria and Hungary formed a customs union under Habsburg rule, which meant that there was no legal obstacle to Western Hungary's economic gravitation towards Vienna. During the

war, the legal trade was no longer able to meet the increasing demands, therefore an intensive cross-border smuggling activity evolved between Western Hungary and Vienna, which accelerated even more in the years of the border crisis (1918-1921). The Hungarian border police put a lot of effort into curbing the illegal export of food.[45] The prospect of the end of the war with the potential collapse of the Dual Monarchy hinted at the possibility of a hard border between Austria and Hungary. Such a future border would have not only isolated the starving city of Vienna from Western Hungarian agriculture but would also have harmed the economic interests of the border area population profiting from either legal or illegal food trade.

From the Republic of Heinzenland to the German Autonomy of Western Hungary

When it became obvious that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was losing the war, the days of the ancient regime were already numbered in Vienna as well as in Budapest. Although the borders of the Monarchy were still intact and the still existing Austro-Hungary army stood on the enemy's soil and not the opposite, the Dual Monarchy collapsed from the inside in the fall of 1918. A revolutionary wave swept through the Habsburg lands as the so-called national councils were established all over the regions of the former Empire.[46] In Cisleithania, Charles I – as Emperor of Austria – issued the Schönbrunn Proclamation on the day of the Armistice (November 11), in which he recognized the right of the Austrian people to decide over the form of the state. Two days later – as King Charles IV of Hungary – he also put his signature on a similar document known as the Eckartsau Proclamation, issued for the Lands of the Holy Crown (Transleithania). Charles relinquished his participation in the administration of both of his realms but did not abdicate from the two

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thrones, leaving the option for a future return to power open. On November 12, 1918, the Austrian National Council in Vienna declared Austria to be a democratic republic, which was to be part of the new German Republic.

Meanwhile in Budapest, the Hungarian National Council announced the independent Hungarian People's Republic under the leadership of Mihály Károlyi on November 16. The 'red count' and his leftist circles seized power as a result of the so-called Aster Revolution in Budapest on October 31, on the very same day that István Tisza, a symbolic figure of the old regime, was killed by unknown terrorists. In both countries, the new political elites introduced a new ideology linked with the promise of a better future after the misery of the war. Consequently, the 400-year bond between Austria and Hungary, embodied by the Habsburg dynasty, was finally broken. Both Republics pursued moderately left-wing and social-democrat social and economic policies on the one hand, and pro-Entente foreign policies on the other hand, while simultaneously promoting nationalist and anti-royalist sentiments.[47]

In addition, both countries faced similar challenges, including a catastrophic economic situation, social turmoil, a food and coal crisis and the uncontrolled return of tens of thousands of brutalized and demoralized soldiers from the front. Furthermore, over the coming weeks and months, Austria as well as Hungary lost enormous territories to the successor states of the Habsburg Monarchy. With the military intervention of the Entente Powers, Austria yielded South Tirol to Italy, ceded Bosnia, Dalmatia, Carniola and parts of Carinthia to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, relinquished Galicia to Poland and lost Bohemia and Moravia to the Czechs and Slovaks. At the same time, the Romanian army occupied Transylvania and Eastern Hungary, the Serbs annexed Southern Hungary and Croatia, while the Czech troops marched into Northern Hungary to establish the new state of Czechoslovakia. Millions

of German and Hungarian speakers became at once ethnic minority groups in their own homeland after the war. Moreover, both Austria and Hungary lost significant industrial and agricultural capacities that would have helped to overcome their economic crises.

The main difference between post-war Austria and Hungary was that, while the new Austrian state was able to survive its internal crisis under the leadership of the Social-Democrat chancellor, Karl Renner, in Hungary the Károlyi administration failed to live up to the expectations, paving the road for the radicalization of politics. As a result of a well-organized coup d'état in Budapest on March 21, 1919, the extreme left rose to power and established the Republic of Councils in Hungary. Following in the footsteps of Soviet Russia, the Hungarian Communists, led by Béla Kun, stirred up class hatred and implemented Bolshevik social and economic policies by exerting 'red terror' for 133 days. In order to create a corridor towards Russia, the Hungarian Red Army even launched military operations against the Czech and Romanian troops with much success against the former and less against the latter. One should be aware that, in this period, the domestic political situation in Vienna was also critical; the chance of an Austrian version of the Bolshevik revolution was a distinct possibility. However, it did not happen, and, as a result, Austria was able to negotiate the peace terms, at least to some extent, with the Entente Powers whose diplomats had been gathering in Paris since January 1919 to discuss the future borders of Europe. Although the Communist regime collapsed by the end of July, the political turmoil in Hungary ended only in November 1919 after right wing, counter-revolutionist groups under the leadership of Miklós Horthy rose to power and took revenge on the revolutionists in the form of 'white terror'.

In Western Hungary, the national councils were established in late October and the early days of November 1918. They were the local branches of the Hungarian National Council in Budapest and were ready

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to take over the public administration.[48] The members of these local councils came from either nationalist-independentist or left-wing, democratic backgrounds with a conventional interpretation of Hungarian history that the age-old marriage with Habsburg Austria was a fatal failure.[49] They had to realize soon that Austria would not let them just walk away after the disappearance of the Habsburgs. The government of German-Austria (*Staatsrat*) officially announced its claim on the German-inhabited territories of Moson, Sopron and Vas with the addition of the city of Pozsony/Pressburg/Bratislava on November 12, 1918. As Mari Vares points out, neither the formation of the Republic of Austria, nor the struggle for Western Hungary, can be interpreted without the context of Pan-German nationalism in the former Habsburg Monarchy.[50] The historic wish that all the Germans of the Habsburg Empire had the right to form their own state and to eventually join Germany also explains why the Austrian government defined the question of 'being a German' in accordance to Wilsonism and why they formally insisted on the idea that the new Austrian state territory was based on the voluntary union of German people. Although a delegation of ethnic German farmers from Western Hungary paid a visit to Vienna to request the annexation, the vast majority of the society of Western Hungary was yet to be convinced of the cause. In order to make it happen, the Austrian government established the so-called *Westungarische Kanzlei* (Western Hungary Bureau) in Vienna. This authority was responsible for the preparation of the annexation through an intensive propaganda campaign that aimed to speed up the historic region's disintegration.[51]

Over the course of the next weeks Austrian agents and agitators showed up in the borderland villages, distributing pro-Austria and anti-Hungary flyers among the German-speaking population. In early November, the locals of Nagymarton/Mattersburg chased the Hungarian public servants away and their children threw the textbooks to the floor in

school while chanting 'We do not want to learn Hungarian anymore'.[52] On November 17, a joint gathering was held by the border villages of Savanyúkút/Bad Sauerbrunn and Pecsenyéd/Pöttsching, where locals declared their intention to join Austria.[53] On December 2, Austrian officers visited the village of Szentmargitbánya/St. Margarethen, urging the local stone miners to start civil unrest in the nearby town of Ruszt/Rust.[54] Three days later, a truck transporting 300 rifles from the Lower Austrian city of Wiener Neustadt arrived in the border village of Lajtaújfalu/Neufeld an der Leitha, but the Hungarian police arrested the crew and confiscated the shipment. On December 5, a similar shipment reached the town of Nagymarton/Mattersburg, where the weapons were successfully distributed among pro-Austria locals who aimed to take control over the area surrounding the town.[55] The next day, also in Nagymarton/Mattersburg, a local Social Democrat, Hans Suchard, proclaimed the Republic of Heinzenland, a name referring to an ethnic-linguistic subgroup of Western Hungary Germans. This artificial ministate was brought to existence with the clear purpose to cut out a piece of the territory of Hungary and prepare its annexation to Austria. The following day, the Hungarian army deployed an armored train and a machine gun squad to the town, forcing the rebels to surrender without bloodshed. Although the interrogations at the police headquarters in Sopron/Ödenburg suggested otherwise, the Austrian government denied any role in these highly controversial events as well as any connection to the short-lived Republic of Heinzenland. Vienna tried to avoid an open conflict with Hungary even if good relations with the Eastern neighbor were not considered a top priority. The post-war Austrian foreign policy was much more focused on convincing the Entente diplomats to support the basic interests of the Republic, such as minimalizing territorial losses at its northern and southern borders, and to keep the option of a Pan-German unification open.[56]

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Meanwhile in Hungary, the territory of the one-time Kingdom was getting smaller day by day. The Károlyi-administration either did not want to or was just not able to organize substantive military resistance against the invasion of the Little Entente troops, while still feeding the illusion that a fair peace treaty could be reached by the Great Entente powers in Paris.[57] Oszkár Jászi, the Minister of Nationalities, attempted but failed to keep the Romanians, Serbs and Slovaks within the borders of Hungary by offering their leaders maximum autonomy. Jászi, who enjoyed a much better reputation as a scholar than a politician, even envisioned a Switzerland-like Danube Confederation that would mirror some ideas of the above-mentioned plan of the Belvedere circle on Great Austria (1906).[58] The prospects of ethnic autonomy, however, could have delayed the change of the historic border in the West as an influential group of Germans in Western Hungary, namely the German National Council, deemed an autonomous German region within Hungary a more persuasive option than annexation to Austria or a continuation of the traditional Hungarian rule.[59] On January 28, 1919, the Károlyi-administration passed the law 'on the practice of self-government of the German people of Hungary', recognizing the right of the German-speaking communities of Hungary to create 'autonomous self-governing zones' in areas where they formed the majority. Even though the Western Hungary border area constituted such a territory, the boundaries, structure, level of self-governance and its reconciliation with the existing public administration caused a series of local conflicts during the remaining two months of the ill-fated Republic.[60]

The issue of German autonomy in Western Hungary was not taken off the agenda during the time of the Communist dictatorship (19 March-1 August 1919) either. On the contrary, the Bolshevik leaders considered Western Hungary a bridge towards Austria, the country they hoped would become the next scene of the World Revolution. The so-called *Gaurat für Deutsch Westungarn* [Territory Council for German West

Hungary] in Sopron/Ödenburg was first held at the end of April 1919, establishing an autonomous ethnic German territory for the first time in the region's history. As of this time, the Austria-Hungary border area was seen as an autonomous body of the Republic of Councils in Hungary administrated by the German Regional Council in Sopron and the German Western Hungarian Regional People's Office. However, in many multiethnic towns and villages, German autonomy was introduced in parallel with the new Bolshevik system, while the remains of the traditional administration still existed. The multiple institutions once again led to a series of local conflicts, if not chaos. All in all, the Communist experiment massively contributed to the disintegration of historic Western Hungary. It not only detached a specific area from the territories of the Moson, Sopron and Vas counties, but, through Bolshevik policies, it also deterred the dominantly Catholic, conservative and rural society of Western Hungary from the parent state. Moreover, Vienna could rightfully argue in front of the Entente Powers that the region could only be protected from the Communist terror through its annexation to Austria.

From Saint-Germain to the Sopron Plebiscite

The fate of Austria was ultimately decided when the Treaty of Saint-Germain was signed on September 10, 1919.[61] After months of multilateral negotiations, the Entente Powers agreed with Vienna that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would be dissolved; therefore, Austria had to recognize the independence of the successor states, including Hungary. The former Cisleithanian Austria lost about 60 percent of its prewar territory, most of it already occupied by the Great and Little Entente armies. Furthermore, it was strictly forbidden for Austria to use the name 'German-Austria' and join Germany under any circumstances.

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The Treaty however awarded the western parts of the Moson, Sopron and Vas counties, including the city of Sopron/Ödenburg, to Austria, although this amounted to a somewhat smaller territory than expected: 4364 square kilometers with 350,000 inhabitants, including 250,000 German speakers. The Treaty of Saint-Germain also meant the Entente Powers rejected Prague's surrealistic idea of establishing a 'Slavic corridor' between Czechoslovakia and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom through the territory of Western Hungary.

The fate of Hungary was ultimately decided on June 4, 1920 in the form of the treaty of Trianon.[62] Due to the political chaos (Romanian invasion in Northern Transdanubia, counter-revolution and 'white terror' elsewhere, etc.), the new Hungarian regime in Budapest had only been consolidated in November 1919, months after the collapse of the Communist dictatorship. The Kingdom was restored without the return of the Habsburgs to the throne when Miklós Horthy, the leading figure of the counter-revolutionist movement, was elected regent on March 1, 1920. Although in the following months the Hungarian diplomats did their utmost to improve the peace terms, the Treaty of Trianon mirrored the current status quo: Hungary was sentenced to lose 71 percent of its prewar territory, including the western parts awarded to Austria by the Treaty of Saint-Germain. The difference between Western Hungary and the other territories was that, while most of the latter were *de facto* already lost at the end 1918, Western Hungary remained under some sort of Hungarian administration throughout the crisis years up until November 1921. On the one hand, Hungary was reluctant to evacuate the territory in the hope of a regional plebiscite or a turn in power relations; on the other hand, Austria lacked the military capacity to enforce the evacuation. Furthermore, after the fall of the 133-day Communist regime, the regional political forces in Western Hungary gravitated once again more towards counter-revolutionist Hungary rather than socialist Austria.

As the new Hungarian regime's rise to power began in August 1919, public administration in Western Hungary was reorganized through a new legal framework, the so-called Government Commission for Western Hungary. This authority was headquartered in Szombathely—the largest Hungarian-inhabited city of the region and the administrative center of Vas County—with the aim to reorganize and coordinate the administration of four western counties: Zala, Vas, Sopron and Moson. Under the leadership of the government commissioners Antal Sigray and József Cziráky, the remains of the territorial German autonomy were completely abolished, and Western Hungary was once again managed by the traditional county administration. However, due to the border dispute and the possibility of a future plebiscite, public servants were constantly reminded to pay special attention to the needs of the German-speaking citizens, including their right to use their mother tongue in local administration.[63] On February 18, 1920, the representatives of Western Hungary in the National Assembly sent their report to the Ministry of Nationalities, in which they called for an even more delicate approach to the German question in Western Hungary. They insisted that economic support and improved living standards would be the best way to earn the trust of the locals, instead of sending agitators from Budapest.[64] Meanwhile the question of the Croatian minority appeared on the agenda too. The Catholic priest of Pásztorháza/Stinatz/Stinjaki, Péter Jandresevits, who was known as the self-appointed commissioner of Western Hungary's Croatian community, started negotiations with both the county authorities and the central government. In exchange for the Croats' proven loyalty to Hungary, he demanded the extension of minority rights in public administration and education. Jandresevits also warned that the poor economic situation might speed up the region's disintegration.[65]

The fate of Western Hungary was still hanging in the balance. Over the course of 1920 and 1921, Austria and Hungary were engaged in

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continuous negotiations and embittered diplomatic competition for the disputed territory.[66] Austria demanded the Entente Powers to force Hungary to evacuate the area and also continued the underground propaganda campaign among the German-speaking border area population. At the same time, Hungary took advantage of the public administration to reverse the disintegration process and demanded the revision of the Austria-Hungary border in the respective peace treaties, or at least the possibility of holding a plebiscite in the disputed territories. Pál Teleki, the Hungarian Prime Minister, insisted on connecting the question of Western Hungary to the controversial issue of Baranya County in South Transdanubia, which, despite the provisions of the Treaty of Trianon, was still under Serb occupation. In order to mediate between the two sides, the Entente Powers deployed a so-called Inter-Allied Military Mission to Sopron/Ödenburg. This authority was also intended to oversee the evacuation process in order to prevent further escalation of the crisis. After several proposals for sharing the disputed territory, Hungary finally succeeded in reclaiming Baranya County on August 27, 1921 and in exchange Budapest agreed to evacuate Western Hungary on the very same day. According to the agreement, the Hungarian authorities were to hand over the territory to the Inter-Allied Military Mission first, which would pass it over to the arriving Austrian authorities.[67]

When a group of Austrian gendarmeries, public servants and civilians crossed the historic border and headed toward Sopron/Ödenburg on August 28, probably both sides thought the crisis was coming to an end. However, a group of local rebels unexpectedly opened fire in the village of Ágfalva/Agendorf nearby Sopron, forcing the Austrians to retreat. This incident was the beginning of the so-called Western-Hungarian Uprising that lasted until October 14. The few hundred rebels, who became known as the 'scrubby guard', engaged in months-long guerilla warfare across the region later called Burgenland. They were led by Pál Prónai, a former

officer of the Horthy army, who was infamous for his role in the 'white terror'. Among their ranks, we can find desperate locals as well as university students, former soldiers and political adventurers from other regions of the former Monarchy, even a group of Bosnian Muslims. Like one of the uprising's prominent figures, Viktor Mádersprach, many of the rebels felt they had had no opportunity to defend their respective home regions but now saw an opportunity to fight for Western Hungary.[68] The 'scrubby guard' not only successfully fought back the Austrian gendarmeries and custom officers attempting to occupy the region in several waves, but also cleared and secured the entire disputed territory to create an artificial ministate named the Banate of Leitha. The capital of this highly controversial state was Felsőőr/Oberwart, a predominantly Hungarian-speaking town in the south. They even issued their own postage stamps.[69] The clear purpose of the state that *de facto* existed between October 4 and November 5, 1921, was to prevent the annexation of the territory to Austria, even if it could not remain part of Hungary. Although Prónai was in frequent contact with Budapest and his rebels received unofficial and indirect support from Hungary, the Hungarian government was not able to control the uprising. In fact, many of the rebels claimed the Horthy regime simply let down Western Hungary with the evacuation of the region. At the same time, Hungary could argue vis-à-vis the Entente Powers that the Western Hungarian uprising proved that the people of the region had no intention to join Austria. In order to resolve the crisis, Italy volunteered to mediate between Austria and Hungary, inviting them to the negotiating table in Venice. According to the Venice Protocol signed on October 13, Hungary agreed to eliminate the Banate of Leitha, disarm the rebels, and fully evacuate the territory awarded to Austria by the Treaty of Saint-German. In exchange, Austria finally consented to hold a plebiscite in Sopron/Ödenburg and its surrounding villages.[70]

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The implementation of the Venice Protocol, however, suffered a delay due to an unexpected turn of events.[71] Charles, the former Emperor of Austria (under the name Charles I) and the former King of Hungary (as Charles IV), surprisingly returned to Western Hungary in his second attempt to retake at least one of his former thrones, i.e. the Hungarian one. While his first attempt during Easter 1921 was thwarted in a peaceful manner, the second so-called 'Royal coup d'état' in Hungary led to a more serious conflict. After he received the support of the legitimist groups in Western Hungary, many of them involved in the uprising, Charles' airplane landed near the village of Dénesfa. The King immediately visited Sopron/Ödenburg where he quickly established his alternative government and recruited a minor royalist army that marched on Budapest. As the Little Entente powers threatened Hungary with a military invasion in case of the restoration of the Habsburg rule, Horthy decided to stop Charles by any means necessary. The legitimists suffered a defeat by the pro-government forces in the battle of Budaörs on October 23, and Charles was placed under military custody in the Monastery of Tihany. Although he did not abdicate the throne, he was forced into exile in Madeira where he passed away few months later after contracting the Spanish flu. In order to avoid a Little Entente intervention, the Hungarian Parliament passed a law to dethrone the Habsburg dynasty whilst formally remaining a monarchy.

The former western Hungarian border area (nearly 4,000 square kilometers) was officially incorporated into Austria on December 5, 1921, followed by the establishment of Burgenland on January 1, 1922. However, in contrast to the original plan, it was not Sopron/Ödenburg that became the capital city of the new Austrian 'land' but the town of Eisenstadt/Kismarton, since the plebiscite in Sopron and in eight nearby villages proved to be in favor of Hungary. The vote was held between December 14 and 16, 1921, under the supervision of the Inter-Allied Mission. Both sides waged desperate campaigns with flyers, posters,

newspapers and demonstrations.[72] According to the 1920 census, about 50,000 people lived in the district of the plebiscite, of which 55 percent was German, 39 percent Hungarian, 5 percent Croatian and 1 percent of other ethnic background. In the city itself, Hungarians and Germans both made up nearly half of the population.[73] According to the plebiscite regulations, 26,879 citizens had the right to vote and 89.5 percent of them participated in the voting. After all, 15,334 voted for Hungary (65%), 8,227 for Austria (35%) and 502 votes were found invalid. In Sopron, 72 percent of the voters were in favor of Hungary, which meant that even many German-speaking citizens rejected the idea of joining Austria. In five of the eight villages, however, Austria won with an overwhelming majority. As a result of the plebiscite and in contrast to the Peace Treaties of Saint-Germain and Trianon, Hungary reclaimed 257 square kilometers of its former territory with a city of symbolic value and regional significance. Although the Austrian government questioned the legitimacy of the outcome and accused the Hungarian side of waging an unfair campaign and causing a series of irregularities such as transporting voters to Sopron, the Entente Powers confirmed the decision and put an end to the three-year-long border conflict between Austria and Hungary. The nationalist struggle, however, continued both in Budapest and in Vienna during the interwar period in the form of mutual accusations, irredentism, counter-irredentism and speculation about the future of Burgenland. For Hungarians, the historic Western territory remained one of the many 'heart-breaking and unjust' losses of the post-war peace treaties, whereas Sopron/Ödenburg had long been remembered in Austria as the lost heart of Burgenland ('das verlorene Herz des Burgenlandes').[74]

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Summary

The disintegration of historic Western Hungary and the birth of Burgenland were an extremely complicated historic process in which the significance of modern nationalism and its radicalization during the Great War cannot be underestimated. If we picture the old empire of Austria-Hungary as a jigsaw puzzle, then the Western Hungarian counties should be imagined as those oddly shaped, interlocking and mosaiced pieces that geographically as well as culturally connected the two halves of the empire. Although the long but narrow area along the western border of the Kingdom of Hungary was predominantly German speaking for centuries, both countries were under Habsburg rule under which questioning the historical borders would have simply been unreasonable.

This radically changed around the turn of the century when modern nationalism broke through in public life and became a main driving force behind political aspirations. The new nationalist elites of the nondominant ethnic groups engaged themselves in speculations on how to change the historic borders in accordance with real or imagined ethnolinguistic boundaries all over East and Central Europe. In the case of Western Hungary, these speculations took place either among the high elites (i.e. the Belvedere circle) or in the nationalist groups of the middle class, but could hardly reach the ordinary people who, in the beginning at least, responded with national indifference to the claims made by the protagonists of nationalism. This reluctance by the target audience slowly but surely disappeared during the First World War and the post-war chaos when the general breakdown of society created the conditions for the 'massification' of national movements. The misery of war and the series of local tensions escalated more and more in a strange combination of ethnic and class hatred. At the same time, the critical economic situation also contributed to the disintegration process as

crisis-stricken Vienna was in great need of the Western Hungarian agriculture.

After the collapse of the Dual Monarchy at the end of 1918, politics radically shifted to the left both in Budapest and Vienna, but it did not lose its nationalist character. On the contrary, the new, revolutionary leaderships entered the competition for the new borders after having helplessly witnessed the successor states claiming the former territory of their respective countries. However, it was socialist-led Austria and not short-lived Communist Hungary that was able to articulate its policies in accordance with the interests of the big powers and thus to secure the international acknowledgment of at least some of its territorial demands. Indeed, the decisive moment came when the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920) finally agreed to move the historic border between Austria and Hungary somewhat eastward. However, the exact location of the new border, and thus the fate of tens of thousands of Germans, Hungarians, and Croats, remained a matter of embittered dispute between the competing neighbors up until the end of 1921.

Endnotes

[1] This study was written within the framework of the DFG Collaborative Research Centre/Transregio 138 subproject at the Herder Institute in Marburg, Germany, entitled *Discourses on the Rights of Minorities and Majorities in East Central Europe in the 19th and 20th Century.* Learn more: https://www.herderinstitut.de/projekte/laufende-projekte/versicherheitlichung-und-diskurseueber-rechte-von-minderheiten-und-mehrheiten-in-ostmitteleuropa-im-19und-r More information on the collaborative research centre: https://www.sfb138.de

[2] M. Vares, *The Question of Western Hungary/Burgenland 1918-1923* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Jyväskylä, 2008), 12.

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[3] 'A nyugati határvidék sorsa (The Fate of the Western Border Territory)', in: *Mosonvármegye* XIX/2 (9/01/1921), 1.

[4] The ecclesiastical jurisdiction over some border villages was a matter of dispute between Austrian provinces and Hungary even in the late nineteenth century: F. Pál, 'A szombathelyi püspök joghatóságának kérdései 1867 és 1914 között (The questions of the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Szombathely between 1867 and 1914)', in: *Vasi Szemle*, LXIX/3 (2015), 335-341.

[5] G. Horváth, *Bécs vonzásában. Az agrárpiacosodás feltételrendszere Moson vármegyében a 19. század első felében (In the Attraction of Vienna. The Preconditions of the Agricultural Marketing in Moson County in the First Half of the 19th Century)* (Budapest 2013).

[6] *A Magyar Korona Országaiban az 1891. év elején végrehajtott népszámlálás eredményei*, I. rész: Általános népleírás *(Results of the early 1891 census in the Lands of the Hungarian Crown. Part I. General Description of the People),* (Budapest, 1893) [hereafter: Census 1891], 100-111.

[7] V. Heuberger, 'Zwischen Wien und Budapest: Der Einfluß der deutschen Sprache und Kultur auf das Westungarische Judentum', in: W. Kriegleder & A. Seidler (eds.), *Deutsche Sprache und Kultur, Literatur und Presse in Westungarn/Burgenland* (Bremen, 2004), 47-60.

[8] The family's historic attachment to Sopron County was mentioned several times at the inauguration ceremony of the new Lord Lieutenant Prince Pál Esterházy on October 27-28, 1872. See more: MNL [National Archives of Hungary] Győr-Moson-Sopron Megyei Levéltár, Soproni Levéltára, Sopron Vármegye Törvényhatósági Bizottsága Közgyűlési Iratai, IV/402/b/54, no. 405.

[9] Their political influence was ensured by the so-called virilist system. In the era of Dualism, half of the seats in county assemblies were reserved for the highest taxpayers. A list of the highest taxpayers in Sopron county on November 10, 1871: MNL Győr-Moson-Sopron Megyei Levéltár, Soproni Levéltára, Sopron Vármegye Főispánjának Iratai (1867-1871), IV/251/3, no. 118.

[10] A comprehensive analysis of Hungary's constitutional development in the nineteenth century: L. Péter, 'Die Verfassungsentwicklung in Ungarn', in: H. Rumpler & P. Urbanitsch (eds.), *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918. Band VII/1, Verfassung ind Parlamentarismus* (Vienna, 2000), 239-540.

[11] A more detailed summary of the attempt: T. Székely, 'A közigazgatás átalakításának programja. Modernizáció és nemzetállam-építés a dualizmus korában. (The Program for Transforming the Public Administration. Modernization and Nation-state-building in the Era of Dualism)', in: N. Csibi & Á. Schwarczwölder (eds.): *Modernizáció és nemzetáll'am-építés. Haza és/vagy haladás dilemmája a dualizmus kori Magyarországon. Kronosz Kiadó* (Pécs, 2018), 165-179.

[12] Several public figures of the era argued for a powerful and centralized nation state at the expense of the "medieval" autonomies. Read more: B. Grünwald, *Közigazgatásunk és a szabadság (Our public administration and the Liberty)* (Budapest, 1876) 78; G. Beksics, *Új korszak és politikai programja (A New Era and its Political Program)* (Budapest, 1889), 16-18.

[13] Lord-Lieutant Károly Mérey's resignation letter to Vilmos Tóth, Minister of Interior Affairs on 24th of January 1874: MNL Országos Levéltára, K148, 83. d, 1867.III., pp.19-20.

[14] L. Péter, 'Law of XLIV of 1868 "On the Equality of Nationality Rights" and the Language of Local Administration'*,* in: M. Lojkó (ed.), *Hungary's Long 19th century, Collected Studies by László Péter* (Leiden-Boston, 2012), 343-354.

[15] In 1918, when the author's unrealistic vision suddenly became a distinct possibility, he republished his thoughts as a book: J. Patry, *Westungarn zu Deutschösterreich* (Vienna, 2018).

[16] R. Saage, 'Die Deutsche Frage. Die Erste Republik im Spannungsfeld zwischen österreichischer und deutscher Identität', in: H. Konrad & W. Maderthaner eds.), *Das Werden der Wersten Republik… der Rest ist Österreich, Band I* (Vienna, 2008), 65-82.

[17] *Képviselőházi Napló (1906) XVI. kötet (Diary of the House of Representatives of the Hungarian Parliament called in 1906, Volume 16)*, 128-129.

[18] Ibid., 129.

[19] 'Nyugatmagyarországot a németeknek!' (Western Hungary to the Germans!), in: *Budapesti Hírlap* (22/02/1908), 5-6.

[20] Ibid., 6.

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[21] Letter from the Ministry of Interior Affairs to István Békássy, the Lord Lieutenant of Vas County, on 29th of March 1914. MNL Vas Megyei Levéltára, Főispáni Elnöki Iratok 1914, IV.401/a/7, res 51.

[22] B. Trencsenyi, M. Kopeček, L. Lisjak Gabrijelčič, M. Falina, M. Baár (eds.), *A History of Modern Political Thought in East Central Europe. Volume 1* (Oxford, 2016), 631.

[23] M. Van Ginderachteer & J. Fox (eds.), *National indifference and History of Nationalism in Modern Europe* (London-New York, 2019).

[24] R. Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe* (Cambridge, 1996), 13-22.

[25] T. Zahra, 'Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis', in: *Slavic Review* 69/1 (2010), 93-119.

[26] T. Hajdu, F. Pollmann, *A régi Magyarország utolsó háborúja 1914-1918 (The Last War of the Old Hungary 1914-1918)* (Budapest, 2014), 63.

[27] A. Popovici, *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Groß-Österreich. Politische Studien zur Lösung der nationalen Fragen und staatrechtlichen Krisen in ÖsterreichUngarn* (Leipzig, 1906).

[28] Minister of Interior Affairs János Sándor's telegram to István Békássy, the Lord Lieutenant of Vas County, on 29th of June 1914: MNL Vas Megyei Levéltára, Főispáni Elnöki Iratok, IV.401/a/7, Res. 80.

[29] Minister of Interior Affairs János Sándor's letter to István Békássy, the Lord Lieutenant of Vas County, on 7th of July 1914: MNL Vas Megyei Levéltára, Főispáni Elnöki Iratok, IV.401/a/7, Res. 86.

[30] The text of the mourning telegram was recorded in the protocol of the extraordinary assembly meeting of Sopron County on July 2, 1914: MNL GyőrMoson-Sopron Megyei Levéltár, Soproni Levéltára, Sopron Vármegye Törvényhatósági Bizottsága Közgyűlési Iratai, IV/402/b/59, 453.bgy. 12097/914.

[31] 'Vármegyénk közgyűlése' (Assembly of our County), in: *Mosonvármegye* XII/57 (12/07/1914), 1.

[32] On the military history of the Habsburg Monarchy in the Great War in general: R. Jeřábek, 'Militärisches Potential und Kriegsverlauf 1914-1918', in: H. Rumpler

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(ed.), *Die Habsburgmonarchie 1848-1918, Band XI, 1. Teilband* (Vienna, 2016), 209-283.

[33] On the breakdown of the Austro-Hungarian war machine: M. Rauchensteiner, J.Broukal, *Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende des Habsburgermonarchie in Aller Kürze* (Vienna, 2015), 191-230.

[34] T. Balázs, 'Gévay-Wolff Lajos Sopron Vármegyei Alispán (1920-1938) élete és munkássága (The life and work of Lajos Gévay-Wolff, Vice-Lieutenant of Sopron County (1920-1938))', in: *Arrabonna* 41 (2004), 191-192.

[35] Hajdu, Pollmann, *A régi Magyarország,* 252-257.

[36] 'Statistics of the First World War casualties of Austria-Hungary', in: H. Rumpler (ed.), *Die Habsburgmonarchie 1848-1918, Band XI, 2. Teilband, Weltkriegsstatistik Österreich-Ungarn 1914-1918* (Vienna, 2014), 161-182.

[37] Wartime instructions by István Békássy, the Lord Lieutenant of Vas County, to the editorial groups of local newspaper: MNL Vas Megyei Levéltára, Főispáni Elnöki Iratok, IV.401/a/7, Res.176.

[38] Report on the investigation into the Gyula Götzl case by the local authorities to István Békássy, the Lord Lieutenant of Vas County on 14th of September 1914: MNL Vas Megyei Levéltára, Főispáni Elnöki Iratok, IV.401/a/7, Res. 222.

[39] 'Élelmiszernyomorúság' (Food misery), in: *Mosonvármegye* XIII/33 (13/06/1915), 1; 'Drágaság (High prices)', in: *Mosonvármegye* XIV/22 (28/05/1916), 1.

[40] Minister of Interior Affairs János Sándor's letter to István Békássy, the Lord Lieutenant of Vas County, on 10th of September 1914: MNL Vas Megyei Levéltár, Főispáni Elnöki Iratok, IV.401/a/7, Res.244.

[41] 'Az erdélyi menekültek' (Refugees from Transylvania), in: *Mosonvármegye* XIV/41 (8/10/1916), 1.

[42] Government and county plans for the relocating of refugees on the territory of Vas County (9th of January 1915): MNL Vas Megyei Levéltár, Főispáni Elnöki Iratok, IV.401/a/7, Res.379.

[43] Government warning to the local authorities of propaganda by the South-

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Slavic Student Association that aimed to recruit a South-Slavic legion in Austria Hungary (29 January 1915): MNL Vas Megyei Levéltár, Főispáni Elnöki Iratok, IV.401/a/10, Res 548.

[44] Latest research results about the (post)war difficulties in Hungary: Z. Bódy (ed.), *Háborúból békébe: a magyar társadalom 1918 után, (From War to Peace. The Hungarian Society after 1918)* (Budapest, 2018).

[45] Letter by János Sándor, Minister of Interior Affairs, to all county leaders on the prevention of grain smuggling on 31st of October 1915: MNL Vas Megyei Levéltár, Főispáni Elnöki Iratok, IV.401/a/12, Res. 869.

[46] W. Maderthaner, 'Die eigenartige Größe der Beschränkung. Österreichs Revolution im mitteleuropäischen Spannungsfeld', in: H. Konrad & W. Maderthaner (eds.), *Das Werden der Wersten Republik… der Rest ist Österreich, Band I* (Vienna, 2008), 187-206.

[47] The Holy Crown of St. Stephen, for instance, was removed from the coat of arms of Hungary. 'A magyar címer és lobogó' (The Hungarian Coat-of-Arms and Flag), in: *Mosonvármegye* XVII/4 (26/1/1919), 1.

[48] Abstract of the protocol of the extraordinary county assembly meeting in Sopron County held on 18th of November 1918: MNL Győr-Moson-Sopron Megye Soproni Levéltára, Sopron Vármegye Törvényhatósági Bizottsága Közgyűlési Iratai, IV/402/b/59, nr.18043, November 27, 1918.

[49] 'Megalakult a vármegyei Nemzeti Tanács' (The National Council of the County has been established), in: *Sopronvármegye* (19/11/1918), 1-2; MNL Győr-Moson-Sopron Megye Soproni Levéltára, Sopron Vármegye Törvényhatósági Bizottsága Közgyűlési Iratai, IV/402/b/59, nr.18043, November 27, 1918.

[50] Vares, *The Question of Western Hungary/Burgenland,* 94-96.

[51] J. Botlik, *Nyugat-Magyarország sorsa 1918-1922* (Vasszilvágy, 2008), 24. (English translation: J. Botlik, *The Fate of Western Hungary 1918-1922* (Buffalo, NY, 2012)).

[52] 'Osztrák ügynökök szítják Nagymartonban az elszakadás gondolatát' (Austrian agents propagate separatism in Nagymarton), in: *Sopronvármegye* (19/11/1918), 3; MNL Győr-Moson-Sopron Megye Soproni Levéltára, Sopron Vármegye Törvényhatósági Bizottsága Közgyűlési Iratai, IV/402/b/59, nr.18043, November 27, 1918.

53 'A savanyúkúti hazaárulók' (The traitors of Savanyúkút), in: *Soproni Napló* (20/11/1918), 3; MNL Győr-Moson-Sopron Megye Soproni Levéltára, Sopron Vármegye Törvényhatósági Bizottsága Közgyűlési Iratai, IV/402/b/59, nr.18043, November 27, 1918.

54 Botlik, *Nyugat-Magyarország,* 25.

55 Ibid., 25-27.

56 E. Hanisch, 'Im Zeichen von Otto Bauer. Deutschösterreichs Außenpolitik in den Jahren 1918 and 1919' in: Helmut Konrad & W. Maderthaner (eds.), *Das Werden der Wersten Republik… der Rest ist Österreich, Band I* (Vienna, 2008), 207-222.

57 On Hungary's failure to organize military resistance in late 1918-early 1919: T. Révész, *Nem akartak katonát látni? (They did not want to see any soldiers?)* (Budapest, 2019).

58 O. Jászi*, Magyarország jövője és a Dunai Egyesült Államok (The Future of Hungary and the United States of the Danube Area)* (Budapest, 1918).

59 The autonomy vs. annexation dilemma of local Germans was discussed by both sides: G. Zsombor: *Westungarn. Zu Ungarn oder zu Österreich?* (Sopron/Ödenburg, 1919); R. von Pflaunder, *Die Zukunft der Deutschen in Westungarn* (Vienna, 1919).

60 The local journal of Moson County thoroughly discussed the issues around the German Autonomy: 'Mosonvármegye és a német kérdés' (Moson County and the German question), in: *Mosonvármegye* XVII/1 (5/1/1919), 1; 'A nyugatmagyarországi németség' (The Germans of Western Hungary), in: *Mosonvármegye* XVII/2 (12/1/1919), 1-2.; 'A német autonómia és a nemzeti tanács' (The German autonomy and the National Council), in: *Mosonvármegye* XVII/8 (23/02/1919), 1; 'A német autónómia' (The German autonomy), in: *Mosonvármegye* XVII/11 (16/3/1919), 1.

61 L. Mikoletzky, 'Saint Germain und Karl Renner. Eine Republik wird "diktiert"', in: H. Konrad & W. Maderthaner (eds.), *Das Werden der Wersten Republik… der Rest ist Österreich, Band I* (Vienna, 2008), 179-186.

62 For detailed analysis see: I. Romsics, *A trianoni békszerződés (The Peace Treaty of Trianon)* (Budapest, 2007).

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[63] Letter by Ödön Beniczky, Minister of Interior Affairs to József Cziráky, Government Commissioner for Vas County, on February 29, 1920: MNL Vas Megyei Levéltára, Főispáni elnöki iratok, IV.401/a/18, Res. 16.

[64] Opinion of the parliamentary representatives of Western Hungary on the internal situation in Western Hungary: MNL Vas Megyei Levéltára, Főispáni elnöki iratok, IV.401/a/18, 1920, 536/920.

[65] Letter by Péter Jandresevits, representative of Western-Hungarian Croats, to József Cziráky, Lord Lieutenant of Vas County, on November 16, 1920: MNL Vas Megyei Levéltára, Főispáni elnöki iratok, IV.401/a/19., Res. 23.

[66] Vares, *The Question of Western Hungary/Burgenland,* 208-211.

[67] Ibid.*,* 222-238.

[68] V. Madersprach's memoirs, published first as a series of newspaper articles in the late 1920s, were republished as a book in 2014: V. Madersprach, *Élményeim a nyugat-magyaországi szabadságharcból (My memories of the war for freedom in Western Hungary)* (Budapest, 2014), 9-16.

[69] U. Brand, *Die Zerschlagung Ungarns. Aus Westungarn wird das österreichische Burgenland* (2014), 4-10.

[70] Vares, *The Question of Western Hungary/Burgenland,* 247-250.

[71] Botlik, *Nyugat-Magyarország,* 285-295.

[72] B. Rásky, 'Vom Schärfen der Unschärfe. Die Grenze zwischen Österreich und Ungarn 1918-1924', in: H. Konrad & W. Maderthaner (eds.), *Das Werden der Wersten Republik… der Rest ist Österreich, Band I* (Vienna, 2008), 150-155.

[73] *Az 1920. évi népszámlálás, I. rész: A népesség főbb demográfiai adatai (The 1920 census, Part I: The main demographic data on the population)* (Budapest, 1923), 29.

[74] See more: P. Haslinger, *Der ungarische Revisionismus und das Burgenland 1922-1932* (Frankfurt, 1944).

Archival Review: The Welsh Political Archive at the National Library of Wales

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Llyfrgell Genedlaethol Cymru or The National Library of Wales (NLW) in Aberystwyth was established in 1909, to collect and provide access to the documentary history of the nation. It is a legal deposit library and is therefore entitled to receive a copy of all books, magazines, newspapers etc. as well as copies of e-publications published in the United Kingdom and Ireland. Published material is however only part of the NLW's remit, as holdings also include archives, manuscripts, maps, visual images and audio and audio-visual material.

The Welsh Political Archive (WPA) is a dedicated programme within the NLW, established in 1983, to collect, catalogue and promote archival material which reflects the political life of Wales. Organising and cataloguing archives is undertaken by staff in the NLW's Archives and Manuscripts Section. But as the political collections include tapes of radio and television programmes, photographs, works of art, electronic files and websites, the WPA works across departments within the NLW.

Collections

Many of the political archives the NLW holds are personal collections of well-known political figures (Members of Parliament, Lords, Members of the European Parliament and Members of the Senedd); the formal

records of a large number of political organisations – including the main political parties, campaign groups, referendum campaigns – and business and labour groups constitute another important part. The WPA has also created certain thematic collections such as collections of ephemera related to elections, specific campaigns, and referenda.

The NLW concentrates on nationally significant figures and organisations. Although the NLW does hold some legacy material of a local nature, since the establishment of a network of local record offices across Wales, such material can often be found in these offices.[1]

Public Records, created by government departments, agencies and the judiciary including those of the Welsh Government are kept at the National Archives in Kew. The records of the Senedd (Welsh Parliament, formerly known as the National Assembly for Wales/*Cynulliad Cenedlaethol Cymru*) are Parliamentary Records and are deposited at the NLW along with the archive of legislation passed by the Senedd.

The language of the NLW's catalogue is English, though in some cases collections are catalogued in Welsh or bi-lingually. The name of the organisation is usually given in its original language but in this article, I have provided an English version alongside the first instance of any organisation where the original title is not in English. In some cases, where there is no recognised English name, I have provided a close translation.

The Welsh national movement

The NLW is home to the archives of the Welsh Conservatives, Welsh Liberal Democrats, Welsh Labour and Plaid Cymru as well as the archives of a number of constituencies and branches. These all contain valuable material on the development of Wales as a political nation, debates around political devolution to Wales, national institutions and the political dimension and official attitudes to the Welsh language and wider Welsh culture.

The Plaid Cymru Archive is amongst the largest political archives held in the NLW. Plaid Cymru was established in 1925 and was initially known as *Plaid Genedlaethol Cymru* (Welsh National Party), but later changed its name to Plaid Cymru (Party of Wales). Three of its leading figures were jailed for arson after burning the Royal Air Force (RAF) Bombing School at Penyberth in 1936 in protest at the location of the facility in a Welsh-speaking community. The party won a historic by-election in Carmarthen in 1966 and had elected representatives at all levels since then.

The Plaid Cymru Archive includes the papers of the National Executive Committee, conferences, the National Council, various party sections, papers relating to referenda, elections, research and summer schools, as well as the archives of regional committees and local branches. It also contains a large amount of correspondence and campaign material. The NLW also hold the archives of the Hydro Group, which was established to oppose the socialist stance adopted by the party in the 1970s and those of *Chwith Genedlaethol* (National Left) which campaigned for socialism within the party.

In addition, the NLW also holds the papers of many prominent Plaid Cymru politicians including those of party leaders and presidents such as Saunders Lewis, Gwynfor Evans, Dafydd Elis-Thomas, Dafydd Wigley

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and Ieuan Wyn Jones as well as a number of its Members of Parliament (MPs), Members of the Senedd (MS – formerly Assembly Members (AMs)), and leading thinkers. These include the papers of Lewis Valentine, Cynog Dafis, Elfyn Llwyd, Simon Thomas, and Phil Williams.

The NLW's holdings also include papers from a number of prominent figures from other parties including Secretaries of State for Wales, MPs, AMs/MSs and Lords. In some cases, these are people who have campaigned for devolution to Wales or, campaigned vociferously against devolution to Wales and were fiercely opposed to the national movement.

Outside of the parliamentary parties, the NLW holds records of the 1979, 1997 and 2011 Welsh devolution referenda as well as the archives of the Parliament for Wales Campaign, the Council for Wales and Monmouthshire, *Undeb Cymru Fydd* (Young Wales Movement) and *Cymru Yfory* (Tomorrow Wales).

The Welsh language has long been a political issue. The campaigns for the Welsh language, including calls for a Welsh language television service, are well represented in the NLW with collections including the archives of *Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg*, *Urdd Gobaith Cymru Mudiad Ysgol Meithrin* (a voluntary group providing Welsh medium nursery schools), *Fforwm Iaith Genedlaethol* (National Language Forum), *Adfer* (a movement which worked to strengthen Welsh-speaking areas) and *Cefn* (a civil rights groups for Welsh speakers), as well as those of prominent individuals such as Saunders Lewis and Kate Roberts. The archive of *Ymddiriedolaeth Nant Gwrtheyrn*, an organisation established to transform an abandoned quarry village in north west Wales into a residential language centre is also held at the NLW.

The control of water resources has long been at the heart of Welsh politics, no more so than following the announcement of plans to flood

the village of Capel Celyn to supply water to the city of Liverpool. Several archives, including those of Plaid Cymru, Cymru Fydd, Ednyfed Hudson Davies and Dr Noelle Davies contain material on this topic.

There have been several instances where elements of the national movement in Wales have used violence in order to further their aims. Understandably there is very little in the way of official records of these organisations, but their activities feature in correspondence and other papers of politicians and political movements, as well as being recorded in the press and television programmes and in the Papurau Ty Cenedl Papers. Other organisations were involved in non-violent direct action coupled with electoral activity; an example is *Cymru Goch* and the NLW holds a small archive which gives a fascinating insight into the aims and operations of this organisation.

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One of the most important collections in the NLW is the collection of electoral and other political ephemera comprising election addresses, flyers, letters etc. from 1837 to the present. Although older holdings are patchy the collection since 1983 is extensive and covers European elections, general elections and by-elections to the UK Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales/Senedd Cymru.

As part of the work of collecting campaign ephemera, the NLW makes archival copies of the websites of the main parties, MPs, AMs/MSs, pressure groups and candidates several times a year, and more frequently at election time including internal party elections

Many archives relating to the primary Welsh language cultural festival, *Eisteddfod Genedlaethol Cymru* (National Eisteddfod of Wales) are also held in the NLW.

In addition to the archival collections, the development of the national movement in Wales is captured in paintings, photographs, and film. The Geoff Charles photograph collection contains coverage of elections, the flooding of Capel Celyn, protests by *Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg* and the activities of the Parliament for Wales Campaign from the 1930s to the 1970s. Much of this collection has been digitised and can be searched and viewed freely on the NLW's website. The NLW's Framed Works of Art collection also contains portraits of leading figures in the national movement such as Gwynfor Evans and Dafydd Wigley and the NLW holds a substantial collection of cartoons by the Welsh artist Mal Humphreys (Mumph) focussing on Welsh politics dating from the mid-1990s through the early years of devolution. Work is underway to digitise this collection.

There is a broad variety of material in the audio-visual and music collections. This ranges from folk songs with overtly nationalist messages by artists such as Dafydd Iwan, movies such as the 1992 anti-

war biopic *Hedd Wyn*, news, current affairs, and history programmes in both Welsh and English. The NLW holds the ITV Wales and the BBC Cymru Wales archives and is running a multi-million pound project to create a National Broadcast Archive for Wales[2] which will give access to a selection of programmes over the world wide web, with full access in Clip centres located in the NLW and at other locations across Wales. The NLW's off-air recordings of BBC Wales, ITV Wales and S4C's output are available to consult.

Other national movements

The national movement in Wales developed many connections with similar political, cultural and language movements in the other Celtic nations including Ireland, Brittany, Scotland, and Cornwall. Much of this material held at the NLW stems from correspondence between leading figures in the national movement in Wales and the other Celtic nations, co-operation between nationalist organisations and the establishment of pan-Celtic organisations.

The NLW holds the papers of the Breton nationalist Louis Feutren together with two fellow nationalists' papers he accumulated, Neven Henaff (Célestin Lainé) and Alan Heusaff. All three were prominent members of the Breton collaborationist force *Bezen Perrot* (Perrot Militia) formed in December 1943. The birth of the Irish Free State is chronicled in the Thomas Jones CH Papers amongst others.

The Plaid Cymru Archive contains material on Breton, Scottish and Cornish nationalism, arranged into various subject files and the NLW holds the archives related to the Celtic League and the European Bureau of Lesser Used Languages.

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Public services

Anyone is welcome to use the material in the NLW. The original material can be consulted in the reading rooms, open from Monday to Saturday, while much of the digitised material is available freely on the NLW's website. Visitors can register as a reader in advance or on the day of their visit.[3] Information on most of the archives is available by searching the collections at the online catalogue, but the staff is happy to offer help or answer search queries.

Guides to the major archives by theme and party can be found at www.library.wales/welshpoliticalarchive

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[3] Services at the NLW have been seriously affected by the Covid-19 pandemic and anyone planning to use the collections should check the NLW website at https://www.library.wales/

Archival Review: Tresoar, Frisian Historical and Literary Centre

JELLE KROL

In 1997, the land west of the River Lauwers in the Netherlands, formerly referred to by its Dutch name 'Friesland' was officially changed to 'Fryslân'. Tresoar is Fryslân's historical and literary centre. Sited on one of the three *terpen*, the man-made mounds on which Leeuwarden, Fryslân's capital, was built, Tresoar is at the foot of the *Oldehove*, the city's iconic leaning tower. It is housed in two late twentieth-century buildings connected by an overhead bridge. Founded in 2002, it is one of the few institutes in the Netherlands which is an official public body, as it has its basis in an act of law.[1] It is a library, an archive, and a literary museum but, while it stimulates research, it is not a research institute.

Tresoar is an amalgamation of three institutes which had functioned separately up to 2002, i.e. the State Archives in Fryslân, Fryslân's Provincial Library, and the Frisian Literary Museum and Documentation Centre. Tresoar's logo hints at this triple amalgamation, with the E in Tresoar reversed, so that it resembles a 3. The name itself means 'treasure' as well as 'a chest in which treasures are kept'.

The Frisian poet Jan Cornelis Pieters Salverda (1783-1836) uses this uncommon word with reference to the Frisian language in one of his poems:

Ja, Frieslân's teal iz 't djoer tresoor,	Yes, Fryslân's language is the precious treasure,
Waems schatten, meij ondoafbre gloar,	The jewels of which radiate joyfully with inextinguishable glory,
Europa's wijz' ijnn' eagen blierje;	In the eyes of Europe's wise men;[2]

These few lines epitomise the pride and glory of early nineteenth-century Frisian Romantic national consciousness, which provided the basis for the emergence of the Provincial (1839) and State (1886) Archives and the Provincial Library (founded in 1844 and open to the public in 1852). The Frisian Literary Museum and Documentation Centre was founded much later, in 1959, as the Frisian counterpart of the Dutch Literary Museum and Documentation Centre in The Hague (established in 1954), which collected, documented, and exhibited manuscripts and artefacts written in Dutch, but not in Frisian.

The awareness of Frisian nationality, already reflected in the seventeenth century in the works of Fryslân's most honoured poet, Gysbert Japicx (1603-1666), rapidly gained ground during the nineteenth century. Soon after the University of Franeker, Fryslân's sole university and the second oldest of the Netherlands (established 1584), had been closed by Napoleon in 1811, the *Friesch Genootschap van Geschied-, Oudheid- en Taalkunde* (The Frisian Historical, Archaeological and Philological Society) was founded. From its inception, in 1827, its medium was Dutch rather than Frisian, and its nineteenth-century balloted membership consisted mainly of learned men belonging to Fryslân's high society.

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After the State Athenaeum – the watered-down version of the Franeker University – also closed in Franeker in 1843, a few young men from varying walks of life propagated the use of Frisian and they established the *Selskip foar Fryske Tael en Skriftekennisse* (The Society for Frisian Language and Literature) in 1844. This society soon became popular among the Frisian-speaking middle classes. Both in Fryslân and beyond its borders, local branches of this were founded, each having its own study group, theatrical society and/or choir.

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, organisations and institutions in the Netherlands' society as a whole were segmented according to neutral and religious principles. This was reflected in how all those who advocated the use of Frisian became organised.

In 1908, the Protestants, who objected to frivolous Frisian plays and dancing after the staging of plays in public houses, founded the *Kristlik Frysk Selskip* (Christian Frisian Departure). They perceived the diversity of languages as a gift of God. In 1917 the Roman Catholics followed the Protestant example by creating a new organisation for themselves, the *Roomsk Frysk Boun* (Roman Catholic League), which stimulated, among other things, the translation of missals.

More radical in its ideas was the *Jongfryske Mienskip* (Young Frisian Fellowship), established in 1915. Its leader, Douwe Kalma (1896-1953) propagated revolutionary ideas, among them a more autonomous Fryslân.

The first part of the twentieth century can be seen as the heyday of these Frisian movement organisations, the archives of which are kept at Tresoar. They often contain several thousands of items of interest for the study of the Frisian national movement. The descriptions of the bulk of the items can readily be reached by consulting Tresoar's website:

https://www.tresoar.nl/Pages/Zoeken-in-de-collecties.aspx   or websites in which Tresoar participates, such as www.archieven.nl and www.worldcat.org.

Fedde Schurer makket romte!

De Filistinen oer dy, Simson!

After the Second World War the Frisian movement organisations vied less with one another and cooperated more or less reluctantly in the *Ried fan de Fryske Beweging* (The Council of the Frisian Movement). Moreover, the central government in The Hague and the provincial government in Leeuwarden had already made some concessions before the war. In 1937, for example, changes in the 1920 Dutch Primary Education Act permitted the teaching of 'a regional language' during Dutch lessons and in 1938 the *Fryske Akademy* (Frisian Academy), a research institute dealing mainly with Frisian history, language and culture, received a provincial subsidy.

Attitudes towards Frisian language and culture gradually changed in the post-Second World War years, especially after *Kneppelfreed*, when Dutch central government and the Provincial States of Fryslân developed policies which promoted the use of Frisian. *Kneppelfreed* (literally 'Baton Friday', after the batons that were used by the police) took place on November 16th, 1951. On this day two journalists, one of whom was the famous Frisian poet Fedde Schurer (1898-1968), had to appear in court in the Frisian capital. Both of them had written articles defending the use of Frisian in court and had denounced the attitude of the officer of justice, who was unwilling to understand Frisian. Their denunciations were regarded as slanderous and they were both found guilty.

After the trial, a riot broke out in the market-place in front of the Hall of Justice, during which the police used excessive force against the people who supported the pro-Frisian points of view of the two journalists. As a result of this riot more rights were granted to Frisian in the fields of justice and education during the 1950s, and Frisian became known as the Netherlands' second state language. Consequently, the riot is seen as a milestone in the emancipation of Frisian in the Netherlands.

In the citation from J. C. P. Salverda's poem, quoted above, the poet refers to the eyes of Europe, being directed towards the Frisian language. Frisian speakers, especially those interested in the language itself, have always been aware that during the Middle Ages Frisian used to be spoken in a far wider area, broadly the North Sea coastal region between the present-day Danish and Belgian borders. Apart from the modern province of Fryslân with approximately 350,000 speakers of Frisian, two other Frieslands can be found in Germany, in Ostfriesland and Nordfriesland where people generally consider themselves to be Frisians.

However, the Frisian language has survived in Germany in only a few pockets of land. In Saterland, an East-Frisian region that used to be

enclosed by bogs and marshes, Saterland Frisian is spoken by around 1,000 people. In the North-Frisian coastal strip southwest of the Danish-German border, varying North -Frisian dialects are being used by roughly 8,000 – 10,000 speakers.

The *Fryske Rie* (Frisian Council), established in 1956, promotes the organisation of cross-border exchanges and meetings in the fields of economics, education, (local) government, media, and agriculture. The contacts between West, East and North Frisians, stimulated by the various Frisian cultural societies ever since the nineteenth century, are reflected in the archives, letters and books collected by Tresoar.

To house the ever-growing archives (35,000 metres) and the increasing number of books (approximately 600,000) Tresoar opened a new depot and repository centre in 2016. This so-called *Kolleksjesintrum Fryslân* (Collections Centre Fryslân) represents a unique form of cooperation in Fryslân (http://www.kolleksjesintrum.nl/). It provides room for collections kept not only by Tresoar, but also by four other institutes: the *Frysk Lânboumuseum* (Frisian Agricultural Museum), the *Fries Museum* (Frisian Museum), *Natuurmuseum Fryslân* (Museum of Natural History in Fryslân), and the *Fries Scheepvaart Museum* (Frisian Maritime Museum).

Between 2014 and 2019 four million scans were made to put the Frisian archives on the digital map. Tresoar coordinated the initiative, which included scans of material kept by other Frisian institutes and museums. These are now readily accessible through the websites of the Tresoar and the various participating institutes and museums.

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State of Nationalism (SoN): Nationalism and Gender

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The belated application of gender analysis to nationalism studies is captured in an oft-quoted statement by Anne McClintock:

> Nationalism [is] radically constitutive of people's identities, through social contests that are [...] always gendered. But, if the invented nature of nationalism has found wide theoretical currency, explorations of the gendering of the national imaginary have been conspicuously paltry.[1]

Until the 1970s, nationalism studies were almost exclusively about men: male intellectuals and politicians who defined the nation for the public, and male revolutionaries or soldiers who attained and protected the nation, often claiming full political citizenship in return for their services. However, the fact of their gender and the connection between national and masculine identities was hardly acknowledged, much less interrogated until the 1980s. Ironically, seeing men *as men* was largely the result of asking where the women were. Mirroring the development of gender studies more broadly, the first steps toward an explicitly gendered understanding of nations and nationalism was an outgrowth of the interest in women's and sexuality studies created by the sexual revolution and the women's liberation movements of the 1960s and

1970s. Since the mid-1980s a growing recognition that the complexities of nationalism cannot be understood without an analysis of gender has been accompanied by an explosion of case studies from around the world. Nevertheless, much remains to be done in gendering the study of nations and in creating theoretical structures to organize new research in this area. The newness of the field, combined with the fact that most of the studies are of article- or chapter-length, makes it difficult to identify those that will have the greatest significance over the long-term. However, this review identifies a number of the most important contributions and examples of some of the newer trends emerging in this area of study.

One early and of ongoing line of research has been the gendering of national belonging – analyzing the ways in which male and female citizenship has been differently defined in terms of rights and responsibilities. An early problem tackled by women's historians was the relationship between women and the nation state, particularly in Western democracies. Historian Linda Kerber's seminal article, for example, demonstrated that the early American republic created a role for women that deviated from the way that European Enlightenment *philosophes* had configured female citizenship. This role, which she termed 'republican motherhood,' grew out of the politicizing experiences of women during the American Revolution, which gave women a stake in the creation and perpetuation of the new nation. It did not include political rights in the public sphere, but it did concede to them a type of domestic moral authority and education that would allow them to raise sons and encourage husbands to virtuously exercise their masculine duties to the state.[2] The concept of republican motherhood has since been extended to describe women's relationships to other European states, especially France.[3] The historical trajectory of female citizenship, however, differs in most formerly colonized democracies that granted woman suffrage at the same time as men: at the time of

national independence. Thus directly attached to independence movements, the interconnectedness of citizenship, nationalism and gender is perhaps even more apparent there than it is in the West.[4]

Sexed bodies have always been important to nationalist movements – especially as soldiering male and childbearing female bodies. One early work that treated this dyad was Anna Davin's *Imperialism and Motherhood*.[5] In it she showed how British doctors, medical officers, politicians and middle-class reformers in the early twentieth century responded to a perceived threat that the numbers and fitness of soldiers was becoming insufficient to maintain the empire. They offered a variety of prescriptions, including pronatalist and maternalist social policies, education of working-class mothers, and eugenic proposals. Karen Offen, Mary Louise Roberts, and Cornelie Usborne investigated similar fears of national decline attached to shrinking birthrates and twentieth-century wartime deaths in France and Germany.[6] This literature overlaps with another focused more specifically on eugenics, which is concerned with biologically purifying and improving nations from within as well as drawing 'racial' boundaries to protect them from 'aliens'. It was no coincidence that eugenics appeared the height of late nineteenth century western nationalism. However, it was truly an international movement that spread through much of the world.[7] Ranging anywhere from a fringe ideology to state policy, eugenic nation building is still in evidence in many societies today.[8]

Although producing more and 'fitter' soldiers and mothers may seem like an almost predictable concern for nationalist movements, George L. Mosse posited a less obvious link between nationalism and sexuality – that nationalism actually absorbed late nineteenth century challenges to European social norms like homosexuality, masturbation, and bohemian, nudist and youth movements, and channeled them into 'acceptable' demonstrations of patriotism like the male camaraderie of the world wars and nationalistic motherhood.[9] Mosse's work focused

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predominately on men and has been followed by an avalanche of studies showing how masculine identities are entwined with nationalist movements and wars in a wide variety of places and circumstances.[10] A more contemporary co-opting of sexual pluralities by nationalist projects is the phenomenon of homonationalism – a term coined by Jasbir K Puar in 2007 to describe racist strains of nationalism adopted by some circles within the gay right. This, she says, followed the rise of 'homonormativity' which included gay communities as (unequal) citizens into the body politic as defined against Islamic 'outsiders' to facilitate the war on terror.[11] Although rejected by most LGBTIQ movements, the phenomenon of homonationalism persists, as evidenced by the very visible support by some members of the gay community for U.S. President Donald Trump's nationalist and anti-immigrant rhetoric. Recent work on sexual orientation-asylum cases and the way that regulation of homosexuality in Africa and Islamic countries has been treated in the western press continue to draw on Puar's influential work.[12]

Two pioneering works on women and nationalism appeared in 1989. One was Cynthia Enloe's 1989 *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases*. In it she asserted that, although nationalism has 'typically […] sprung from masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation, and masculine hope,' nationalist movements cannot be understood apart from women's experiences.[13] Enloe argued that the calculus of nationalistic aggression – military, social, and economic – often overlooks women, who are enormously impacted by it. She showed how powerful national and transnational economic and political forces have constructed 'third world' women's labor 'cheap,' and how sexuality supports the international order through women's roles as tourists, diplomatic wives, and sex workers around foreign military bases.

The second important work on women and nationalism that appeared in 1989 was a volume of essays edited by Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Antias

entitled *Women-Nation-State* containing ten essays by anthropologists, sociologists, and historians, who attempted to systematically explore how nations and nationalism have been gendered concepts.[14] Setting the stage for the essays that follow, the editors located five major ways in which women participate in ethnic and national processes – as biological reproducers of members of ethnic collectives, as reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic/national groups, as participants in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and transmitters of its culture, as signifiers of ethnic/national differences, and as participants in national, economic, political and military struggles. These five categories are overlapping, and the authors did not claim that they were definitive. Indeed, Sylvia Walby added two missing categories – the gendered division of labor, and women's work in maintaining boundaries in social hierarchies and between different ethnic and national groups within the state.[15] Elaboration on these themes has since remained fertile ground for gendered studies of nationalism.

Rich scholarship surrounds the attempt to understand the meaning behind gendered national myths and the way that nations choose to represent themselves with symbols that are recognizably coded as either feminine or masculine. Lynn Hunt, for example, analyzed the familial imagery adopted by French revolutionaries constructing their nation as a brotherhood.[16] Such family imagery has proven both appealing and powerfully useful in nation-building projects. Lauenstein has illustrated, for example, how familial language is incorporated into national anthems in ways that reinforce social hierarchies, prescribe social roles, and reify social phenomena as biologically determined.[17] According to George Mosse, women are most often used as the national symbol, 'the guardian[s] of continuity and immutability of the nation, the embodiment of its respectability' which is to be guarded by the male hero/soldier figure.[18] Others have demonstrated that the nation as female may be figured either as a mother or as a lover.[19] But the soldier-

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heroes are not always male, and the gendering is not static and sometimes ambiguous.[20] Nationalists often use notions about ideal masculinity, femininity, and gender relations to claim their superiority over other groups, including patriarchal assertions that 'we treat women better than they do'.[21] Scholars have also shown how normative western ideals of masculinity and femininity have been invoked as putative justification for denying the fitness of colonized peoples for self-government as, for example, in Mrinalini Sinha's *Colonial masculinity: the 'manly Englishman' and the 'effeminate Bengali' in the late nineteenth century*.[22]

Women's role as reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic or national groups is likewise manifested in numerous ways. Women's penetrable bodies have been seen to represent the boundaries between groups. This may have a positive function as women (and, less often, men) leave their natal group to marry and thereby strengthen diplomatic relations or cement alliances between groups. However, out-marriage can also threaten the security of the group and it leaves the interloping individual vulnerable to suspicion of disloyalty by both sides when the two groups quarrel. Hence, more ethnic, religious, cultural, racial groups and nations espouse endogamous marriage and sexual practices.[23] Sexual mores are nearly always stricter against women having relations outside the group – which may introduce 'alien blood' into the nation – than they are with men. This is seen, for example, by the persistence of states defining citizenship according to the husband's nationality.[24]

Although their meanings vary to some extent by culture, wartime rapes and other sexual tortures committed by men against women represent a literal breach of national boundaries on the bodies of the victims. They also commonly include the intent to humiliate and emasculate enemy men who are unable to protect their property, family, and ethnic bloodlines. Speaking of systematic Serbian war rapes in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1990 and 1995, including organized rape

camps where women who survived were deliberately impregnated and then held until it was too late to abort their fetuses. Maria B. Olujic explains:

> In war individual bodies become metaphoric representatives of the social body [. . .]. War rapes reinforce the cultural notions of cleanliness and dirtiness associated with sexuality and ethnic affiliation. Through forced pregnancy resulting from rape, aggressors can 'purify the blood' of the attacked group by creating 'ethnically cleansed' babies belonging to the group of the invading fathers.[25]

Rape and sexualized violence against men during war, although less common, also assaults potent cultural self-definitions of masculinity, honor, shame, and kinship. At the same time, propaganda during both war and peace often focuses on the purported 'deviant' sexuality of enemy or 'other' nations. Wendy Bracewell, for example, claims that a pre-existing crisis of Serbian masculinity created by a stereotype of Albanian rapists contributed to the outbreak of the war in Yugoslavia and the sexualized violence that accompanied it.[26]

One of the most controversial issues in the gendered study of nationalism, first raised by scholars in the 1980s, concerns the relationship between nationalistic particularism and an international feminism that sees itself engaged in a universal struggle for women's emancipation and liberation. If, as Enloe first claimed in 1989, 'when any nationalist movement becomes militarized […] male privilege in the community is likely to become even more entrenched', why do many women participate, sometimes even in the most masculinist of projects as shown, for example, by Claudia Koonz in Nazi Germany?[27] Numerous studies have established key roles that women have played in nationalist warfare, including both sides of imperialist and revolutionary anti-colonial struggles. Scholars wrestle with the questions of whether some

women gain from national projects, and whether, or to what extent, women's participation in nationalist projects can be empowering. In other words, is a 'feminist nationalism' possible, as Ranjoo Herr claims it is?[28] The conclusion of the authors of studies on sixteen revolutions in Africa, Asia, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, the Middle East, and Latin America, for example, concur with Enloe in asserting that, although women's participation in violent national liberation and reform movements is critical, their interests are generally subordinated and their activities go unrewarded.[29] Another important collection of studies published in 1997 found more mixed results.[30] Women's motivations and experiences as active participants in nationalist movements is an ongoing subject of debate; it provides the focus of a number of studies in the 2018 collection of articles on gender and nationalism edited by Jon Mulholland.[31]

In many countries, women's presence in positions of political power has increased significantly, if slowly, over the last several decades. A 2005 Occasional Paper authored by Amrita Basu for the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development reported on the status of women in relation to political parties and social movements in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India. It asked what kinds of leadership roles women have played in those organizations and in elected office and what, if any, benefits have accrued to women individually or generally as a result of their participation. It noted that nationalist parties – most of which are ethnically and religiously based, were especially effective at mobilizing support through gendered appeals – especially through women's symbolic presence.[32] Updates on these countries and similar studies around the globe that examine how women in public and elective office might be affecting definitions of nation and national belonging would be welcome additions to the literature.

In 1995, sociologist Cynthia Cockburn began a research project to study how two cross-ethnic/national women's organizations were created and maintained by watching women interact within and between the

Women's Support Network in Belfast (an array of Catholic/Nationalist and Protestant/Unionist community organizations addressing women's needs) and the Medica Women's Association in Zenica (a medical and psychosocial project responding to the needs of Bosnian Muslim, Serb, and Croat women raped and traumatized by the 1992-95 war in Bosnia). She found that women in these groups could cooperate with each other while accepting varying attachments to nationalism in each other. However, all of the women who either did not reject nationalism outright, or actually identified themselves as nationalists, defined the term in an anti-essentialist, democratic, liberal and inclusive, way. Interestingly, many of these women claimed that theirs was a distinctively feminine type of nationalism that differed from men's.[33] More recently, Jill Vickers has begun a project of testing theoretical hypotheses about the possible outcomes of affiliations between feminist and nationalist movements against actual case studies. She finds change over time within countries as well as differences between them and concludes that there are some instances where women's affiliation with national projects has facilitated feminist goals, and warns of the dangers of relying on the Euro-centric biases of 'modernist (i.e. equality as opposed to difference-based) feminisms'.[34] These cautions are extended and theorized by Leela Ferrnandes' work on transnational feminism in the United States.[35] The project of understanding the relationship between feminism and nationalism is on-going, but seems to underscore the fact that both terms are historically and geographically contingent and diverse

This review is part of
The State of Nationalism (SoN), a comprehensive guide
to the study of nationalism.
As such it is also published on the SoN website,
where it is combined with an annotated bibliography
and where it will be regularly updated.

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State of Nationalism (SoN): Nation Branding

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Introduction

The practice of nation branding combines public interests and resources with corporate practices and commercial aims through the creation of campaigns intended to increase foreign investment and create a competitive international image. As an industry, nation branding took off in the late 1990s, to become a fast-growing, new specialist area for consultants. Practitioners in the industry believed that the branding process that had been so successfully used by corporations could also be applied to nations.[1] To them this was a logical progression from the reputation management of which these nations were already engaged. Nation branding goes beyond simply government propaganda or tourism promotion, but rather consists of a multitude of activities that form a comprehensive, top-down, government driven and funded initiative that appropriates corporate branding strategies to a nation. The practice of nation branding encompasses outward facing 'cosmetic' changes to logos, slogans, and associated tourism media, as well as investment initiatives, economic policy, and public planning. Nation branding can also be directed internally, as a part of a broader effort to create a sense of nationhood among the general public.

As an area of academic critique, concerns are often raised about the implications of nation branding. This literature addresses what it means to market a nation, and examines how this practice relates to

neoliberalism. It also questions whether nation branding is merely replicating older practices of cultural imperialism, and looks at its consequences for democratic governments. More recently, academic researchers have also investigated the role of the media in the production and circulation of branded content. However, this sort of academic scholarship on nation branding is marginal to the vast literature produced by practitioners in the field.

In 2011, Nadia Kaneva called for greater academic interest in nation branding and published a now highly-cited review article on nation branding. In that article, Kaneva (2011) observed that the majority of published literature on nation branding came from marketing, business, and international relations sources that unreflectively saw nation branding as a positive and essential practice for nations in order to compete internationally.[2] Kaneva's commonly cited definition of nation branding 'as a compendium of discourses and practices aimed at reconstituting nationhood through marketing and branding paradigms' demonstrates how the practice exists at the intersection of national identity and business.[3] Because nation branding is largely about marketing and branding, as well as an exercise in soft power, the literature has until very recently been dominated by praise from many practitioners in the field. For example, the leading *Journal of Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, which was tellingly founded by the nation branding practitioner Simon Anholt, tends to publish articles that are highly supportive of the industry, rather than question the wider implications of branding as an essential function of the nation.

The following sections will outline a selection of the major works in sociology, anthropology, international relations, and communication, which take a more critical approach to the implications of nation branding. This article aims to provide a general overview of scholarly literature in order to enable greater understanding of the increasing commercialisation of nations.

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Nation branding as an extension of late-capitalism

A key strand of academic research on nation branding approaches it as a part of a wider trend whereby nationalism has become increasingly commercialised. Researchers in this tradition note that nation branding involves nations using corporate branding practices in order to frame their communities in terms of their economic competitiveness: to sell the nation. The nation as a brand is 'an identity deliberately (re)defined according to the principle of competition and strategically (re)oriented toward the market'.[4] In this way, nation branding is both a consequence and a perpetuator of neoliberalism and free-market competition. This has led many critics of nationalism to see nation branding as an extension of a late capitalist era where the nation 'is thus increasingly realised as an economic function' and 'connected to ideological and economic changes on a global scale'.[5] Nation branding, from this perspective, is more than just branding, it is used to create 'identity, status, and recognition' in order to preserve 'territorial sovereignty', and to respond to 'emergent conditions of "late modernity"'.[6]

Wally Olins, a well-known consultant and supporter of nation branding, explains how we live in a time where everything is dominated by brands, and where everything must be marketable, commercial, and profitable, even nationalism.[7] While his work lacks a reflection on the wider impact of the dominance of branding, he provides a good example of how marketing nations as brands developed seamlessly within the advertising industry. Branding and identity are inherently interconnected, therefore branding national identity seemed highly logical, and also necessary for nations within an increasingly globalised economic world. Olins emphasises a brand's ability to evoke strong emotions. Brands 'have immense emotional content and inspire loyalty beyond reason'.[8] Both brands and nations can spur similar feelings of allegiance. For Olins branding nations is also a logical extension of the

public relations and identity communication that already exists within and between nations. However, the difference between the nation building and national representation that nations engaged in previously, is that nation branding's ultimate goal is creating a national image that is solely intended to enhance global economic competitiveness. Sue Curry Jansen argues that 'what distinguishes nation branding from these efforts is that the primary motivation, the raison d'être, of nation branding is commercial ambition'.[9]

Olins goes on to argue that nation branding is the new norm, and that every nation will be seen as a brand whether or not they intend to: 'every nation has an identity: they can either seek to manage it or it will manage them'.[10] Through the process of nation branding, however, practitioners argue that nations can improve their identity, making the nation more economically competitive and reducing global inequality. 'The promoters of nation branding market it as a powerful equaliser – a way that countries without the economic, military, or political clout of superpowers can compete in the global marketplace'.[11] However, against such bold claims, the reality of nation branding, as we will see in the next section, is that it reproduces inequalities. Practitioners also overstate the ability of nation branding to create any significant economic change. 'As symbolic commodities, nation brands do, in fact, yield profits for various beneficiaries – including media corporations, local and international brand consultants, and certain political and economic elites – but not necessarily for the nations they allegedly represent'.[12]

While nation branding does not necessarily increase economic gains, it is still a cause and consequence of a wider reframing of the nation within the neoliberal logic of economic competition. The literature on 'commercial nationalism' or 'consumer nationalism' offers a way to theorise the changing role of the nation in an era of neoliberalism and late-capitalism.[13] This research has argued that traditional theories of nationalism 'have not fully recognised the importance of markets,

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commerce, and consumption in the process of nation-building'.[14] Instead of becoming irrelevant with the increase of transnational institutions and supranational politics, 'nationalism, far from being weakened by the world-wide spread of capitalist economy, became one of its indispensable building blocks'.[15] In this context nationalism is characterised by a dual process whereby there is 'simultaneous nationalisation of the commercial and commercialisation of the national'.[16] In this way, nation branding acts as one of the main forces of commercial and consumer nationalism where the nation becomes more and more dependent on using commercial branding for public diplomacy, international recognition, and nation building.

For academics like Jansen and Christopher Browning, nation branding is more critically observed as part of this process of transformation, as society moves towards late-capitalism/postmodernity. In a world where 'governments are brands and corporations make public policy', Jansen, as well as Browning, see globalisation and 'late-modernity' as a central force in perpetuating the existence of nation branding.[17] In her article on 'designer nations', Jansen argues that nation branding has become a force of globalisation, in the sense that branding 'explains nations to the world'.[18] Nation branding is also simultaneously fighting against globalisation's post-national trend by re-establishing and branding the nation as a legitimate economic force in a modernising era.[19] However, the globalised 'late-modern' world that created the need for a fixed nation brand also requires flexibility of identity and the capacity to cope with constant change. Nation branding is 'in danger of ignoring the reflexivity central to late modernity, which arguably makes such strategies attractive in the first place'.[20]

Discussions of late capitalism often comment on the growing importance of the image. This focus on imagery is evident in the rise of visual branding that applies corporate branding aesthetics to national governments. While researching how former Yugoslav governments

portray themselves online, Zola Volcic argues the focus on appearance in branding the nation forms part of this 'time of postmodern neoliberalism in which the "image is everything"'.[21] In an article on Qatar's logo, Shannon Mattern argues that 'By branding the nation, we erase it and put in its place a multinational corporation'.[22] Within this visual representation of the nation 'what is branded is a simulacrum of a nation'. Mattern states that this sort of nation branding is not 'benign' instead it acts to actively turn the nation into a fetishised 'market-driven entity'.[23] More recently, Kaneva has also demonstrated how nation branding creates a simulated version of the nation that is not concerned with nation building but rather with creating an 'imagined community' defined in economic terms and for the economic benefit of private corporations and political elites.[24] Therefore the nation becomes constructed through nation branding, to quote Katja Valaskivi, 'in an attempt to redefine the social imaginary of the nation with means that appear compatible with the circumstances of "global competition" and cultural capitalism'.[25]

Nation branding and power

As seen previously in the discussion of Olins's work, industry often claims that nation branding is essential for countries seeking a foothold in the global arena. Ultimately its proponents argue that, in order to gain political and economic power, nations, especially small ones, must have a brand. 'In this view, nation branding is understood as an essential strategic tool as nations compete against each other in the global marketplace for scarce resources, such as tourists, investments, qualified workers, or political goodwill'.[26] Nation branding has, in this way, also been approached as a tool of political diplomacy and soft power. The difference between nation branding and other forms of political diplomacy lies 'in the means used to wield the power'.[27] As a form of

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political power that utilises marketing consultants, 'nation branding is a feature of the corporatisation of soft power'.[28] Therefore, research on nation branding often aims to expose the political and economic power imbalances at play in shaping the way the nation is branded.

Mellisa Aronczyk's book, *Branding the Nation: The business of National Identity*, provides a comprehensive study of both nation branding consultants and the national governments that hire them. Aronczyk shows how these brands are presented as more than a strategic means of generating capital. Rather, she argues that nation branding creates 'legitimacy and authority' in an international political field.[29] This new image of the country creates a positive global appearance that is intended not just to increase foreign investment and international trade, but also in such a way that this positive image can reverberate back to the nation forming a sense of national pride and belonging. These nation brands, though often outward-facing, do 'influence the social imaginary of a nation'.[30] However, this image is often a top-down construction where external consultants largely determine what aspects of the nation are valuable and marketable.

When the nation is branded, the country simultaneously undergoes a process of differentiation and normalisation.[31] The country's image is used in order to distinguish it in a competitive field and to convince investors, corporations, and tourists to choose it above other nations. At the same time, the country is positioned as being standard, safe, and stable – thereby normalising what makes the country valuable.[32] In this regard, nations will usually be branded as different but not 'too different', resulting in a lack of any significant variation among nation brands. Thus, often 'nations end up looking the same'.[33] This homogenisation of value makes diversity problematic and creates an unsustainable image of the nation.[34] However, this value is not determined by members of the nation, but is instead constructed with regards to international political influence and power.

Many economically smaller nations, and nations with a poor international image, are motivated to invest in expensive nation branding campaigns. This has largely been studied in countries of Eastern Europe, but there is also a growing interest in other areas, such as Latin America.[35] In order to redefine their nation after the fall of the Soviet Union, almost every Central and Eastern European nation has turned to nation branding experts for an international image makeover.[36] Despite the growth of nation branding and its seemingly vital importance to these Eastern European nations, most of this research gives a fairly bleak account of nation branding. Most Eastern European countries tend to have a long history of a 'top-down' approach to politics, with the result that it is the government of the day that ultimately decides the nation's brand.[37] This brings up debates about who has the right to brand the nation and make decisions of national identity construction. Nadia Kaneva shows how the top-down idea of nation branding is an instrumental approach that 'unapologetically espouses a form of "social engineering" that allows elites to manipulate national identities. It ignores relations of power and neglects the implications of nation branding for democracy'.[38] Additionally, many of these Eastern European countries attempting to join the EU have enlisted the help of Western European consultants. This opens up even more questions about whose right it is to brand the nation and the role of Western European narratives on the formation of national identity.

Dina Iordanova's research on the branding of the Romanian region of Transylvania brings up additional critiques of nation branding in smaller nations.[39] Since the 1990s, the Transylvanian government became aware of the profitability of capitalising on the Dracula imagery of Transylvania that was already established in the west. Referring to the process as 'self-exoticism', Iordanova shows that, while voluntary, 'in poorer nations where the domestic consumer market is not solvent cultural

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entrepreneurship is underpinned by decisions made on the basis of perceptions of Western (entertainment) market demand'.[40]

In the case of Latin America, Dunja Fehimović and Rebecca Ogden have argued that nation branding 'amplifies existing geopolitical inequalities'.[41] Nation branding builds on, commercialises, and profits off of the exotic representation of the 'Third World', reproducing distinctions between the modernised West and an underdeveloped Latin America. In his research on the Colombian branding campaign *Colombia es Pasión* (Colombia is Passion), Juan Sanín shows how the campaign succeeded in redefining the nation and became a proud national symbol. However, this representation of the nation was still a creation of the elite that reproduced Colombian and Latino stereotypes resulting in a superficial image of Colombia emptied of diversity 'in which the only ethnic and civic principle unifying diverse people into a national community is passion'.[42] Instead of offering a way to place the Latin American nations on an even playing field with those of the West, nation branding would create 'new economic, political, and cultural layers to historically-shaped inequalities, cementing the unbalanced power dynamics already present in the nineteenth century's world of nations'.[43]

Reflecting the arguments outlined above, Kaneva reiterates that in the academic research you 'repeatedly find in each nation-branding case study the subordination of public interests to market principles and the commercialized reproduction of dominant identities within branded narratives at the expense of marginalized groups'.[44] What Kaneva is arguing, however, is that this is not just a case of nation branding campaigns creating incorrect representations, but rather that it is through media circulations that these representations create a simulated reality of the nation. Therefore, nation branding is not about nation building for the greater good of the national community. Rather it is determined by international demand, directed at an outside consumer market, and profited upon by international private organisations and

political elites. 'In other words the simulation nation is also "imagined", but it is imagined primarily for the benefit of media audiences who are, by and large, located outside the nation'.[45]

Consultants have touted nation branding as a necessary step for nations, especially for smaller and poorer ones, to survive and compete in the global arena. As a result, nation branding is now widely considered to be a key task of national governments. Nations now must "sell" themselves in order to attract investment, tourism, funding, etc. But while they are advised to do this in order to gain political and economic power internationally, they are instead subject to existing global power dynamics, where larger western markets decide what is valuable. International political and economic power dynamics therefore dictate how nations should brand themselves, and which elements of the nation they must omit in order to be successful. From this perspective, the nation is imagined according to the values and the consumption of an international audience.

Nation branding and democratic values

We have seen that nation branding replicates global power dynamics and is based on top-down campaigns that largely exclude ordinary members of the nation from branding decisions. Aronczyk, however, provides an alternative vision of nation branding as an opportunity for the nation to engage in a public dialogue on who 'we' are and where 'we' want to go as a nation.[46] In this view, nation branding could be approached as an exercise in democratic nation building. However, as discussed, nation branding campaigns are ultimately not created with the wider national membership in mind. Even the *Colombia es Pasión* campaign, which did involve ordinary Colombians and succeeded in becoming a national symbol, was originally intended to be a merely

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temporary campaign, wherein decisions on national representation were determined by external consultants with an international audience in mind.[47] Similarly, in the case of Slovenia's 2007 branding campaign, which ostensibly placed the general public at the core of the rebranding exercise, it has been noted that it was 'purely promotional', and ultimately still produced a commercialised version of the nation for economic elites.[48] Nation branding campaigns therefore are not an exercise in democratic discussion of nation building but instead show how 'public national resources are transferred into private hands and governance is outsources to corporate experts'.[49] These nation branding campaigns are publicly funded representations of the nation for investors, tourists, and other interested parties outside of the nation. This is one of the reasons academic critique on nation branding has questioned the relationship of nation branding and democratic values.

Jansen uses Estonia as an example of nation branding intended to construct a more economically advantageous international image after the cold war.[50] For Jansen the problem of nation branding resides in the creation of a 'monologic, hierarchical, reductive form of communication that is intended to privilege one message, require all voices of authority to speak in unison, and marginalise and silence dissenting voices. The message itself is, by design, hyper-visible, but the decision making involved in arriving at it and the multiple agendas incorporated within it are neither legible nor visible in the classic liberal sense'.[51] For Jansen, nation branding is inherently narrow and normalising, as it simplifies a nation, privatises national identity, and turns identity into a commodity. Furthermore, the industry's lack of transparency and open involvement makes nation brands undemocratic constructions of the elites. This argument is reflected in Scotland the Brand, which argues that 'no monoculture project is possible'.[52] What the authors want to point out here is the impracticality and unfeasibility of creating a representation of a nation as one cohesive unit. Nations are not homogenous states and

any effort to represent them as such will unavoidably create an unequal power dynamic. 'All essentialist attempts to create mono-culture will inevitably build in power assumptions, and in this scheme of things gender will be skewed. The same will be true of race, religion, class or any other social dimension we examine'.[53]

Jansen argues that the practice of branding may work for corporations that want to create a succinct, reduced message and control the product image through constant regulation, supervision, and authoritarian control. However, in a democratic system of government, creating a consistent and controllable national image should not be a 'desirable national goal'.[54] Browning comes to a similar conclusion about nation branding arguing that while making national identity a commodity it presents this identity as narrow with no diversity creating 'bland marketable homogeneity' that is fixed. This lack of diversity and fluidity of identity comes at a 'cost to democratic pluralism' with 'the potential to produce disembodied artificial caricatures of self-identity that undermine it in the long run'.[55] Browning argues that 'branding promotes particular conceptions of good citizenship that can simultaneously enhance the sense of democratic deficit and elitism that often surrounds debates about national identity and purpose'.[56]

As previously discussed, for many scholars, nation branding is different than other ways of representing the national community because it is outward facing, predominantly externally influenced, and largely for commercial purposes.[57] It is a focus on representing the nation based on economic aims that Jansen believes is undemocratic, representing an overall 'drift toward privatisation of foreign policy'.[58] The nation is now being imagined differently and nation branding is proof of this: 'if previously the nation was constructed as a collective community in relation to political legitimacy and citizenship, it is today imagined as a competitive entity in a global economy'.[59] Browning argues that nation branding is at odds with the ideals of 'democratic pluralism'.[60] Mattern

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makes a similar claim stating that through nation branding the state 'marginalizes differences, masks inequalities, and promotes depoliticization. What is ultimately branded is a corporation-nation seeking to appeal to a clearly defined set of stakeholders'.[61] The criticisms of nation branding presented in this article, however, are highly shaped by the authors' background in the discipline of communication and media studies. What is still largely lacking are empirical studies on nation branding from nationalism scholars that take a deeper look at how nation branding relates to the democratic role and values of nations along with questioning the impact of nation branding on nationalism.

Simon Anholt, arguably one of the biggest names in nation brand consulting, has since removed himself from the nation branding business. In an interview with *The Guardian* he seemed to express regret about the way nation branding has commercialised nations.[62] He now focuses on the idea that for nations to have good international standing, they need to make real changes in governance and be good global actors. This means that instead of a slick corporate branding campaign, they need a government with local and global humanitarian policies, positive cultural contributions, democratic governance, etc. Anholt states that 'the upsetting thing about this lie called nation-branding, […] is that it encourages so many countries, who really can't afford it, to blow wicked amounts of money on futile propaganda programmes, and the only people who benefit are these beastly PR agencies'.[63] Yet, even though Anholt and others have begun to consider the negative impacts of nation branding, it is still a prominent industry with more and more nations branding and then rebranding themselves.

Nation branding continues to reproduce inequalities and international competition. Less economically developed nations employ the practice with the aim of increasing their competitive position. Larger nations continue to exploit their position by engaging in the activity without due

consideration of the impact it can have on other nations within the international arena. In essence, any nation that engages in nation branding 'is a nation that imagines itself as a product for consumption, rather than as a democratic community in which the government's task is to distribute public resources to create maximal well-being for the maximal amount of people'.[64] Nation branding does not build a national community for the good of the nation, it builds a national community that answers to the desires of international consumers. 'By spreading images and narratives that inspire a sense of shared identity and collective pride, nation-branding campaigns refashion Benedict Anderson's "imagined community" in line with neoliberal principles, reconfiguring citizenship, identity, and the public sphere in the process'.[65] Nation branding actively reimagines the nation through neoliberal logic and in doing so creates a nation distinct to that theorised by Anderson and other modernist theorists of nationalism. Now the question that academics must ask is not whether nation branding has any impact on the way the nation is constructed, defined, and imagined, but when 'the nation becomes analogous with corporations', and what sort of impact defining the nation this way has on the imagined political community.[66]

Endnotes

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[23] Ibid.

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[25] K. Valaskivi, 'A brand new future? Cool Japan and the social imaginary of the branded nation', in: *Japan Forum* 24/4 (2013), 500.

[26] Kaneva, 'Nation branding and commercial nationalism', 179.

[27] Castelló & Mihelj, 'Selling and consuming the nation', 560.

[28] P. Surowiec, *Nation branding, public relations and soft power: Corporatising Poland* (London, 2017), 3.

[29] Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation*, 16.

[30] Valaskivi, 'A brand new future?', 486.

[31] Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation.*

[32] Ibid.

[33] Valaskivi, 'A brand new future?', 500.

[34] Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation.*

[35] Fehimović & Ogden (eds.), *Branding Latin America*.

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[36] N. Kaneva (ed.), *Branding post-communist nations: Marketizing national identities in the 'new' Europe* (London, 2012).

[37] L. Kulcsár & Y.O. Yum, 'One nation, one brand? Nation branding and identity reconstruction in post-communist Hungary', in: N. Kaneva (ed.), *Branding post-communist nations: Marketizing national identities in the 'new' Europe* (London, 2012), 193-212.

[38] Kaneva, 'Nation branding: Towards an agenda for critical research', 121.

[39] D. Iordanova, 'Cashing in on Dracula: Eastern Europe's hard sell', in: *Framework* 48/1 (2007), 46-63.

[40] Ibid., 47.

[41] Fehimović & Ogden (eds.), *Branding Latin America*, 21.

[42] J. Sanín, 'Colombia was passion: Commercial nationalism and the reinvention of Colombianness', in: Z. Volcic & M. Andrejevic (eds.), *Commercial nationalism: Selling the nation and nationalizing the sell* (Basingstoke, 2017), 54.

[43] Fehimović & Ogden (eds.), *Branding Latin America*, 21.

[44] Kaneva, 'Simulation nations', 638.

[45] Ibid., 641.

[46] See Aronczyk, *Branding the Nation.*

[47] See Sanín, 'Colombia was passion'.

[48] Volcic & Andrejevic, 'Nation branding in the era of commercial nationalism', 609.

[49] Kaneva, 'Nation branding and commercial nationalism', 188.

[50] See Jansen, 'Designer nations'.

[51] Ibid., 134.

[52] McCrone et al., *Scotland – The Brand: The making of Scottish heritage* (Edinburgh, 1995), 69.

[53] Ibid., 70.

[54] Jansen, 'Designer nations', 122.

55 Browning, 'Nation branding, national self-esteem', 212.

56 Ibid., 196.

57 See Ståhlberg & Bolin, 'Having a soul or choosing a face?'; Castelló & Mihelj, 'Selling and consuming the nation'; Fehimović & Ogden (eds.), *Branding Latin America*.

58 Jansen, 'Designer nations', 124.

59 Ståhlberg & Bolin, 'Having a soul or choosing a face?', 275.

60 Browning, 'Nation branding, national self-esteem', 212.

61 Mattern, 'Font of the nation', 492.

62 S. Subramanian,' How to sell a country: The booming business of nation branding', in: *The Guardian* (7-11-2017).

63 Ibid.

64 Valaskivi, 'A brand new future?', 500.

65 Fehimović & Ogden (eds.), *Branding Latin America*, 8.

66 Valaskivi, 'A brand new future?', 490.

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Book Review

In May 1847, the American traveller S. Teackle Wallis arrived in Seville in the middle of a wave of protests against the rise in the price of grain. Two days after witnessing a violent riot in the tobacco factory, he attended a 'private ballet', in which 'a black-eyed, gypsy-looking girl, one of the cigarreras of the riot' featured prominently. Her dance reflected some of the fury that erupted two days previously. This scene, which excellently depicts some of the topics with which Spanish 'exoticism' is viewed by romantic travellers, is used by Sandie Holguín to introduce a subject as attractive as it is complex: the role of flamenco in the construction of Spanish national identity.

Both the title of the book – *Flamenco Nation* – and the illustration on the cover are provocative. At first glance, one could assume that this is a book that provides an external view of flamenco as a symbol of an exotic Spain that has attracted many travellers and tourists, but is not recognized by the Spanish themselves. Nothing, however, could be further from the truth. The author, a historian with a number of previous publications on Spain's contemporary history, among them the book *Creating Spaniards: Culture and National Identity in Republican Spain*

(University of Wisconsin Press, 2002), examines with depth and accuracy this complex subject.

The work stems from a question that precisely reflects the afore-mentioned conundrum: 'How did flamenco, castigated as a degenerate form of song and dance associated with both the Gypsies, a despised ethnic minority in Spain, and Andalusia, a region often derided as backward, become inexorably tied to Spain's national identity? Why did flamenco persist as a symbol of the nation when so many elites within Spain worked feverishly for nearly a century to excise it from the country?' (pp. 7-8). To answer these questions, Holguín carries out an extensive analysis that begins in the late eighteenth century and continues through to 1975. Her research is not focused on flamenco as a form of musical expression, although she does outline in chapter 1 the origin and evolution of the genre in its essential elements (*toque*, *cante* and *baile*), to initiate the reader who may be unfamiliar with the origins of flamenco. She instead approaches the subject from a holistic perspective, by placing 'the evolution of this performance within the larger Spanish and European historical, cultural, and political trends of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries' (p. 8). This is one of the successful aspects of the work, which goes beyond the traditional approaches in the study of flamenco, in favour of a transnational perspective, examining both the internal and external images of Spain in the construction of its national identity. In reference to the discussion on national identity, some statements by the author could be refuted, such as 'over the course of the nineteenth century, flamenco became reified as one of two major expressions of Spanish national identity – the other one being bullfighting'. However, her analysis of complex concepts such as nationalism, regionalism or national identity is exemplary.

María Nagore-Ferrer

Flamenco Nation is composed of three parts divided into seven chapters, preceded by a documented introduction and ended with a final coda, a glossary, notes, an extensive bibliography and a useful onomastic index. After the introduction, which gives a thorough historiographical review and sets out the main bases of the study, the first part, 'Setting the stage', is divided into two chapters. The first of which is an overview of the history of flamenco, its roots and how it evolved up until the early days of the Restoration (1875). The author makes a commendable effort of synthesis, founded on a great deal of interdisciplinary literature on the subject, even if this synthesis does result in some inaccuracies when it comes to defining the particularities that set flamenco apart from other pre-flamenco and Andalusian popular music forms. Chapter 2, 'The Perils of Flamenco in Restoration Spain, 1875-1923', explores the phenomenon of *antiflamenquismo* during the Restoration period (1875-1923) amongst three distinct elite groups, the Catholic Church and its conservative allies, left-leaning intellectuals and politicians, and the leaders of revolutionary workers' movements. This reaction coincides with the rise of flamenco as a popular spectacle, especially in the *cafés cantantes* of Madrid, Barcelona, and Seville. Here we see the full force of the contradiction interrogated at the outset of the book: while flamenco grew as a popular mass spectacle, the elites who considered themselves 'guardians of the Spanish national identity' rejected it.

The second part, 'Flamenco on the regional and international stage', examines the different perceptions of flamenco, widening the lens to incorporate both an international and regionalist points of view. Chapters 3 and 4 explore the cases of Catalonia and Andalusia respectively. The first describes the opposition by the emerging force of Catalan nationalism, that tries to counteract the influence of flamenco by promoting manifestations they considered their own, such as the

sardana or choral singing. Chapter 4 focuses on Andalusian regionalism through the figure of Blas Infante who is considered to be 'the father of the Andalusian nation', and his efforts to define flamenco as a worthy art form. Especially interesting is Chapter 5, which moves away from Spain to international exhibitions, examining how Spanish elites wanted to have their nation represented and how that projected national identity failed to live up to their expectations on the world stage. The chapter also cites the strives of various avant-garde artists, such as García Lorca, Manuel de Falla or Debussy, to elevate the status of flamenco to that of a veritable art.

The third part, 'Flamenco and the Franco regime', through the last two chapters, grapples with the Franco regime's ambivalence towards using flamenco as a principal marker of Spanish identity. Chapter 6 reveals that the regime, with the help of the Catholic Church and the leaders of the Spanish Falange, wanted to purify the Spanish culture in accordance with the principles of national-catholicism, enhancing the patriotic spirit through the activity of regional Spanish choirs and dance groups. It was a way of homogenising Spanish folklore, and establishing a new kind of national identity, one of 'unity in difference', and of suppressing the musical supremacy of flamenco. Finally, Chapter 7 looks at the way the Franco regime, in conjunction with a developing Spanish tourist industry, changed course yet again to promote flamenco in order to bolster tourism industry in Spain. This tactic once again perpetuated the same old stereotypes.

Holguín ends the book with a Coda that guides us back to the present, where the dynamics between globalization and regional autonomy have once again transformed contemporary flamenco practices.

María Nagore-Ferrer

Throughout the volume, the author's ability to rigorously, clearly and attractively present the topics is evident. She combines the handling of a large number of sources and references with anecdotes and illustrations, and grabs the reader's attention with phrases like this one that opens chapter 1: 'Contrariness gave birth to flamenco'. A clear didactic vocation is also apparent in the structure of the book itself, which includes summaries and recapitulations at the beginning of each section. But beyond the formal aspects, the book provides an interesting and necessary insight into the subject of flamenco, which is increasingly present in academic literature. In short, it is essential reading in better understanding the place of flamenco in contemporary Spain.

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Book Review

Maurice Pinard, *Nationalist Movements Explained.*
Comparisons from Canada, Belgium, Spain, and Switzerland.
London: Routledge, 2020, 202 pp, 11 illustrations.
ISBN 9780367271459

Maurice Pinard's *Nationalist Movements Explained* and the Perils of Comparative Research

For any scholar of social movements and, in particular, the Quebec independence movement, Maurice Pinard is a venerable authority. In the 1980s, his studies broke new ground and contributed decisively to identifying the determinants of nationalist mobilisation and the electoral support for pro-independence parties. While in his previous monograph Pinard condensed more than 30 years of research in a social-psychological theory focusing on motivational factors,[1] in this book, he expands his theoretical framework and tests it more systematically on a series of nationalist movements in Belgium, Canada and Spain. He also includes Switzerland as a counter-case in which cultural, linguistic and religious cleavages did not lead to the rise of strong sub-state nationalist movements (with the exception of the ephemeral campaign for the creation of the Jura canton in the 1970s).

There is much to commend in this study, especially in the first and third chapters, which outline comprehensively Pinards' model and offer an interesting summary of the existing literature on nationalist contentious action. It is impossible to do justice to Pinard's framework in this short

review, but, in essence, he singles out two clusters of determinants of nationalist mobilization: socio-psychological and structural. Structural determinants are not only embodied by long-term processes such as modernisation, urbanisation, industrialisation, secularisation, state-making and war, as well as cultural segmentation, but also by more volatile factors such as political opportunities. Structural determinants somehow set the ground for the socio-psychological factors that explain, at the micro-level, the drive for engaging in nationalist mobilisation felt by the active members of nationalist movements. It is this set of socio-psychological factors which, according to Pinard, accounts best for 'the emergence and development of the national question' (p. 5). Pinard especially emphasises motivational factors, notably: (a) felt grievances, that is, perceived deprivation to which people attach feelings of discontent or injustice; b) collective incentives; and, often neglected, c) expectancy of success.[2]   To these motivational factors, Pinard adds framing processes, beliefs and values.

While some would criticize Pinard's theoretical insights for not being sufficiently parsimonious, they simply reflect the complexity of nationalist mobilisation, which is heavily influenced by contextual elements making the varying combinations of factors outlined by Pinard a richer explanatory matrix than many other theoretical models in the current literature. In addition, Pinard should also be commended for showing how some of the determinants he explores can have opposite effects on nationalist mobilisation depending on the interaction with other factors. For instance, extreme economic disparities may act as formidable sources of the discontent required to nourish felt grievances, but they can also constitute insuperable hurdles in the process of mobilisation of resources that any nationalist movement needs in order to grow and proliferate.

However, the book also has major limitations, two in particular. The first relates to the empirical evidence marshalled to support some of the

claims made by the author. In Chapter Five, Pinard argues that nationalist mobilisation in the cases analysed has followed a pattern in line with the so-called 'cycle of protest' perspective and, more precisely, with the evolution of levels of private materialist and post-materialist values among US college freshmen between 1966 and 2013 (Figure 4.1 in the book). Pinard concludes that 'there are striking concordances between, on the one hand, the cycles of increases in personal materialism among college freshmen and of decreases in their self-fulfilment values and, on the other hand, the decline cycles of support for the nationalist parties which we have been considering' (p. 129). More precisely, 'the decline in support of a meaningful philosophy of life accompanied the decline in the cycle of protest movements of that period, suggesting that the first could have been a factor in the second' (p. 116). There are three problems with this argument. First, it is highly questionable to assume that trends in private values among US freshmen can be used as a measure for value changes in other countries. Second, some of the data challenge his conclusions. In the case of Quebec, electoral support for the *Parti québecois* (PQ) increased consistently from 1970 to 1981 coinciding almost perfectly with declining levels of private self-fulfilment values and increasing levels of private materialism. The same occurred in Catalonia, between 1980 and 1984, when *Convergencia i Unio* (CiU) rose to the position of dominant party in the region. In Belgium, the data roughly fit Pinard's claim, but only if one accepts the very questionable idea that the *Vlaams Belang* (VB) can be excluded from the picture simply because it is an anti-immigration party, as Pinard does. This leads to the third problem. Pinard tends to take into account only one (dominant) party in most of the regions under study. This is problematic because, had he considered the total sum of votes of the two major nationalist parties in Flanders (*Volksunie* and VB until 2001; *Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie*, N-VA, and VB after 2001) and Catalonia (CiU and *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*, ERC), he would have found very different electoral trends from those he reports.

Emmanuel Dalle Mulle

The second limitation of the book pertains to the comparative dimension of the study. Comparative research is a thankless job. Those who venture into it have to confront the extremely time-consuming task of getting acquainted with the very complex contexts of several cases, while accepting at the outset that they will never know these as well as scholars that specialise exclusively in such cases. Hence, they will always expose themselves to criticism that their case studies are not accurate enough. That said, one cannot help feeling that, apart from the parts on Quebec, this book could have displayed a better command of the context of each case. There are indeed a number of factual inaccuracies throughout the volume. Some do not really affect the overall argument, but others are more problematic. At the end of Chapter Five, for example, Pinard concludes that organisational tensions are likely to arise within successful ethno-regionalist parties thus causing their decline. He says 'strong nationalist ideologies easily produce internal tensions and competition, and in particular the emergence of new parties on their left, such as *Quebec Solidaire* in Quebec, the N-VA in Flanders, the ERC and *Candidatura d'Unitat Popular* in Catalonia'. Now, ERC was founded in 1931 and is one of the oldest parties of current Spanish politics. The N-VA is indeed a relatively new party, founded in 2001, but it stands clearly to the right of the disappeared VU.

To conclude, Pinard's book will certainly be useful to whoever wants to engage with his sophisticated theoretical insights and to those who aim at getting familiarised with the existing literature on nationalist contestation. However, readers should consider with a degree of scepticism some of the conclusion he draws.

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Endnotes

[1] See M. Pinard, *Motivational Dimensions in Social Movements and Contentious Collective Action* (Montreal, 2011).

[2] In a 1986 article written with Richard Hamilton, Pinard appropriately quoted Leon Trotsky arguing that if grievances were sufficient to explain mass protest, 'the masses would always be in revolt'. M. Pinard and R. Hamilton, 'Motivational Dimensions in the Quebec Independence Movement: A Test of a New Model', in: *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change,* 9 (1986), 258.

Book Review

Christian Karner, *Nationalism Revisited: Austrian Social Closure from Romanticism to the Digital Age.* New York: Berghahn books, 2019, 308 pp,
ISBN 978-1-78920-452-0

The book analyses the history of the nation and nationalism in Austria since the late eighteenth century. This is at once an ambitious goal – and the author states at the beginning that this is an ambitious book – and one that might not matter much except to scholars of a small country in Central Europe. However, Karner has digested a broad body of scholarly literature on the Austrian Republic and the Habsburg Monarchy and he needs just 220 pages for a well-structured overview that covers a long period of time. For anyone looking for reliable information on nationalising political discourse in Austria this is a good deal. It potentially makes the book useful for future comparative studies.

Karner starts out from autobiographical reminiscences that reveal him as someone whose position enables him to speak about the Austrian we-group from the inside. They also show what makes belonging to this national we-group problematic because at the base of the Austrian nation – and really any nation – are processes of selective memory, exclusions, and naturalization. Following a chronological order, the book traces the crystallizations of nationalizing discourse in Austria, a notion whose meaning involved shifting boundaries and geographies. Chapter 1 sketches an intellectual history of romantic ideas about nationhood in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It discusses texts from

Herder, Fichte, and Schlegel and asks how the concepts that formed a romantic ideoscape spread to Habsburg Central Europe.

Chapter 2 turns to the intense nationalizing dynamics of the last decades of the long nineteenth century, when nationalists sought to make grammars of assimilation and apostasy relevant in the sphere of the everyday and thereby erase sites of national indifference. His account of how nationalising dynamics played out in the Habsburg Monarchy is attuned to a perspective that has mainly been articulated by historians from the US since the 1990s. Pieter Judson distilled it into an influential monograph about the Habsburg Empire, which was published in 2016.[1] In this view nationalism does not appear as an all-pervasive force that doomed the Empire, which is portrayed in a relatively benign light (maybe it should not surprise that a 'liberal Empire' does not seem a bad idea to scholars from the US). This strand of literature reserves more scepticism for the nation-states that were founded in 1918. Indeed, it is in the ensuing decades that in Austria the exclusionary logic of social closure reached new heights and culminated in genocidal war and the Holocaust (Chapter 3).

Whereas in the 1920s the Austrian Republic failed to acquire all features of a nation state, in its second run after 1945 and under more favourable conditions it mastered the task of nation building (Chapter 4). Selective memory of the recent past and a selective Austrian particularism played a huge role in this process. Seeking to distance Austria from Germany and from the responsibility of Nazi atrocities went together with tacit pan-German assumptions. In an increasingly wealthy and politically stable country nationalism became banal. However, on occasion it turned 'hot' as for example when the Slovene minority in the southern province of Carinthia demanded language rights and met the open hostility of 'German-Carinthians'.

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In Chapters 5 to 7 the author deals with the period from the late 1980s to the present. Relying on a broad corpus of sources it is here that his analysis comes into its own. Taking a long view on the history of Austrian social closure pays off in enabling perceptive remarks on recent phenomena. Karner for instance discusses current tendencies of social protectionism as a 'palimpsestic recycling' of an opposition between ethnonational 'rootedness' and cosmopolitanism (p.197). He also points out that on the one hand the 2016 presidential elections in Austria formed part of a global dynamic that pitted democratic liberalism against right-wing populism. (In the Austrian case liberalism eked out a victory, but one that was soon erased by elections for the national parliament.) On the other hand the 2016 elections saw the re-emergence of a rural-urban divide that in the interwar era had pitched social democrats against the Christian Social political right (p.204). This of course also had its parallels in other democracies.

It is worth placing Karner's work, albeit briefly, in the history of scholarship on the Austrian nation. The ambition of his book clearly differs from Ernst Bruckmüller's *Nation Österreich*, first published in 1984, which posited increasing identification with the small Austrian Republic as the happy end of a complicated history.[2] Contributing to the construction of this version of an Austrian nation was the avowed or implicit commitment that drove works on Austrian history of the long post-war era since the 1950s. It lost some of its urgency since the 1980s when an ever-larger part of the population had been born into the political, economic, and cultural context of a small wealthy nation-state. On the one hand this allowed for a critical reassessment of the role of Austrians in the Nazi period, while on the other hand it opened up a discursive space for a somewhat relaxed investigation into the more benign myths that had propped up the Austrian nation in her post-1945-form.[3] It also integrated Austrian society into the globalizing dynamics of

the 1990s and early 2000s, which among many other things increased international academic mobility.

Karner is professor of sociology in Lincoln, UK. From an Austrian perspective he lives abroad. His book will also mostly have non-Austrian readers. So it may be small wonder that he is not concerned with shoring up Austrian national identity, even less so as his book was written at a moment when processes of right-wing-renationalization had come into full swing. Although Karner wants to contribute to a democratic polity – in this respect not at all different from Bruckmüller in the 1980s – the academic, political, and economic context has markedly changed. This leads to a quite different stance vis-à-vis the Austrian nation. Not only does Karner fully embrace a constructivist theory of nationalism, which has long become the dominant approach in nationalism studies, he also applies it without reserve to the underpinnings of post-1945 Austria.

Karner brings a clearly defined theoretical and methodological focus to the task of revisiting nationalism. This greatly enhances the value of his book. At its theoretical core is the Neo-Weberian concept of social closure. Thereby the author moves away from writing a history of the Austrian nation as if it were a thing in the world that can be loved or hated but exists in the same way as the physical space that the Austrian state treats as its territory. Karner's interest lies instead with showing how social boundaries were drawn on the base of a national deixis. A nation is not an essence but a form of creating communal relationships: it allows to distinguish between those who belong and those who do not.

As a methodological approach Karner opted for an eclectic mix of tools taken from Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which in Ruth Wodak's brand had already been applied to the analysis of national identities in contemporary Austria.[4] CDA claims to approach discourse as embedded in social practices. Even more than that it wants to show discourse as a form of social practice itself. However, CDA has been criticized for falling

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conspicuously short in this respect.[5] This would also be my principal critique of an otherwise interesting book. There are many ways to overcome the limitations of CDA: by systematically relating utterances to the social, economic, collective and biographical constellations against which they acquire their particular meaning; by doing a multifaceted microhistory (the author quotes Jeremy King's work on Budweis/Budejovice, which is an impressive example); by paying serious attention to how institutional and organizational networks interact with discursive actions. It would also pay off going beyond a focus on political discourse that is typical for the CDA-lens and instead take a close look at economic aspects of nationhood.

As I am myself a historian, this might be my particular *déformation professionelle*, but I am convinced that in order to come to full fruition the approach that Karner outlines in his introduction would need a source analysis that goes considerably beyond an assemblage of published texts. This would also allow to discuss in which ways and how far nationalism entered the realm of the everyday, of associational and educational practices, of production and consumption. Karner refers to 'banal nationalism' mostly as the opposite of 'hot', politically explicit and more fanatic forms of nationalism. This does not capture the complexity of nationalism as a 'whole way of life', to paraphrase Raymond Williams's famous definition of culture. Including everyday nationalism would give a fuller view of Austrian social closure and it would come closer to the book's declared goal of having nationalism 'emerge from research, rather than being presupposed or even predetermined by it' (p.215).

In spite of this critique, it is important not to overlook the merits of Karner's work. It proposes a conceptual framework that structures a concise history of nationalism in Austria. As is inevitably the case, such an account leaves open many questions, but this just calls for further

empirical research in order to deepen our understanding of nationalism as a means of social closure.

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Endnotes

[1] P. M. Judson, *The Habsburg Empire: A New History* (Cambridge, MA, 2016). It does not figure in Karner's bibliography but the author has made intensive use of Judson's earlier publications.

[2] There is an edition in English: E. Bruckmüller, *The Austrian Nation: Cultural Consciousness and Socio-political processes* (Riverside, 2000)3.

[3] Karner does not much relate to this research: S. Breuss, K. Liebhart & A. Pribersky, *Inszenierungen: Stichwörter zu Österreich* (2. ed. Vienna, 1995); E. Brix, E. Bruckmüller & H. Stekl, (eds.), *Memoria Austriae,* 3 vol. (Vienna, 2004–05).

[4] R. Wodak, R. de Cillia, M. Reisigl & K. Liebhart, *The Discursive Construction of National Identity* (Edinburgh, 1999).

[5] For example R. Breeze, 'Critical Discourse Analysis and its Critics', in: *Pragmatics* 21/4 (2011), 493–525.

Book Review

Note on the book review published in SNM 5 (2020): Barbara Loyer on Ludger Mees, *The Basque Contention. Ethnicity, Politics, Violence*, Routledge, London / New York, 2020, p. 232-240.

This is not a reply to the arguments expressed by Barbara Loyer in her review. Though not sharing many of them, I accept them as academically legitimate points of view. However, for reasons only the author knows, the review contains some errors and statements that do not correspond to reality. In order to prevent readers who have not read the book from being misguided, here are some clarifying remarks:

1. According to Loyer, on p. 4 of the book 'Mees states "I have myself been traumatized by ETA's cruelty and by the cynicism of some its defenders, and I have grown admirative of the force of a number of its opponents – some of which have become my friends"' (p. 233). The reality is that this statement does not appear on p. 4 of the book, nor on any other of the following or previous pages. Apparently, it has been invented.

2. According to Loyer, Mees is 'subliminally' setting 'nationalism as a natural evidence that simply emerges from this territory, and not the product of a very efficient politics' (p. 238). The reality is that, besides highlighting the crucial importance of the 'invention and popularization of national apparatus (...) and different festivities', the analysis of early Basque nationalism concludes placing emphasis precisely on the constructive elements of nationalist politics: 'The mobilization of Basque

nationalists required their prior emotionalization, which was facilitated through the movement's organizational design as a community of believers, the symbolic transmission of political messages and the celebration of the nation through festivities and monuments' (p. 59).

3. According to Loyer, 'the books that bring a contradictory perspective on his implicit thesis, that the nationalist ideology is in essence democratic, are not mentioned'. Besides the fact that no such generalizing statement about the 'democratic essence' of nationalism can be found on any of the pages of the book, a second observation must be made. Juan Pablo Fusi and Antonio Rivera, listed by Loyer as among the authors who have been alleged victims of such a selective and partisan bibliographical approach (p. 237), are in fact cited throughout the book on several occasions. Indeed, Fusi's pioneering study on labor politics in the Basque Country is quoted on p. 49, endnote 44 and on p. 82, note 3. Different publications by Rivera are quoted on p. 26, notes 25, 26 and 28; on p. 85, note 37; on p. 141, note 6, and on p. 265, note 12 and 15.

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