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Introduction

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In the absence of live sporting events in recent months, people have turned their gaze to the past, as attested by the popularity of *The Last Dance*, the documentary narrating the career of the basketball player Michael Jordan and his team, the Chicago Bulls, during the 1990s. Unsurprisingly, sports podcasts, TV shows, and websites were once again flooded with the most illustrious question concerning sports and its history: why do certain teams succeed and establish themselves as an immemorial dynasty (like the Bulls), and others – though so similar – fail?

While the question will forever remain unanswered (hence its appeal), we can assess certain patterns that help to set the stage for possible success. One of these is the continuous effort to learn, expand, and improve to make sure that the fundamentals are as sound as possible, inducing further growth and improvements. The Chicago Bulls did not stumble into greatness: it took years of effort and gradual improvement in order to ultimately establish themselves as one of the greatest teams in the history of basketball and sports in general.

In the last year, *Studies on National Movements* has been emulating this tenet, hoping to improve the foundations of the journal. As a result, the journal is now able to present to its readers two new sections which, we hope, will continue to grow and flourish in the following years. In addition to its continuing heuristic section, edited in interaction with the international review *State of Nationalism* – and in this volume includes

contributions on nationalism and social class, and nationalism and collective trauma – this journal now includes a section devoted to book reviews. We encourage readers that, if they are interested in reviewing books on nationalism and corresponding themes, they consider contacting us and helping us to further expand the section and the journal.

The second section corresponds with NISE's objective to devote attention to intermediary structures and form a bridge between archival institutions and researchers across Europe. In this new archival section, the journal wants to grant archival institutions a platform to present their institution, collections, and research projects to a wider audience. In this way, the journal hopes to facilitate further cooperation between different regions and institutions and make it easier to conduct comparative and transnational research on a plethora of cases. In this volume, two institutions present themselves and their collections: the Herder Institute and the Institute of Cornish Studies. We hope that these initial contributions can spark a further development of the section, making it a key pillar of the journal's future.

In addition to the novel sections, there are two extra announcements. First of all, *Studies on National Movements* will henceforth appear twice a year, in June and December. Secondly, a physical edition of the volume will become available via printing on demand, and we will keep everyone informed on the ongoing process. Please do not hesitate to contact us for further information, and we will post all the necessary information as quickly as possible.

This volume – the result of the NISE annual conference in Warsaw in 2019 – is focused on the relation between (sub)nationalism and diversity, with its focal point the year 1919. 1919, to return to our sports example, constituted to some degree a political 'last dance', as old institutions – most notably the different empires in Central and Eastern

Europe – had ceased to exist following the end of the First World War, and new states were formed.

One of the questions that gained prominence following the end of the war was the issue of minority rights. Although empires and states dealt with ethnic minorities and related inequalities long before 1919, minority rights became urgent issues of (international) concern in the formation of new states after the First World War. The contributions in this volume illustrate the multitude of questions that surround the complexity of minority rights, ranging from the history of the legal precedents that came to underpin the Minority Treaties after the First World War, to specific cases in Central and Eastern Europe that highlight how the practical conversion of the principle of self-determination could result in heightened political and social tensions in the postwar world. The contributions in this volume underpin the complexity of the relation between diversity, minority rights, and nationalism before and after 1919, and it is without a doubt that these valid analyses can induce further research to enhance our grasp of the subject. This research subject, unlike the 1990s Chicago Bulls, has thus not yet performed its last dance.

The 'Dogma of the Independence of Nations': Nationality as the Basis of the 1919 International Legal Order

FRANCESCA ZANTEDESCHI

Gerda Henkel Stiftung/USC Research Group HISPONA

In 1851, in his famous lecture *Della nazionalità come fondamento del diritto delle genti*, the Italian jurist Pasquale Stanislao Mancini (1817-1888) formulated the so-called 'dogma of the Independence of Nations' – a fundamental principle of the political ideologies of the *Risorgimento*. In it, he defined nationality as 'a natural society of individuals' based on 'unity of territory, origins, habits and language, and conformed to a commonality of life and social conscience.' Although he is well known among scholars of international law, Mancini is far less known among historians. Yet his 'dogma of the independence of nations' proved to be fundamental during the 1919 Peace Treaties, when the rights of nationality became the criterion redesigning the map of Europe – nationality being officially attached to the promise of self-determination by President Woodrow Wilson.

This article intends to present the principle of nationality advocated by Mancini and how it became the basis of relations between states in international law in the second half of the nineteenth century. It also aims to analyse how the principle of nationality was transposed, formulated and interpreted in the 1919 Peace Treaties to support the rights of national minorities.

Keywords: Nationality, Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, 1919 Peace Treaties, national self-determination, Woodrow Wilson

Introduction

In 1916, in his work on *Le Principe des Nationalités. Ses Origines historiques*, the French historian and economist Henri Hauser attributed the causes of the First World War to the Principle of Nationality, highlighting its ambiguities and intrinsic contradictions.[1] Contrary to the Italian jurist Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, who first had advocated that nationality – and not the state – was the rational basis of the Law of Nations and had latched the foundations of his conception of nationality to territory, race and language, Hauser contested that these elements alone were sufficient to define it, asserting that the essence of nationality rather lay in 'collective consciousness'. He also argued that, once the war was over, it would have been complicated to reconstruct Europe according to the principle of nationalities, given that this concept remained difficult to apply in practice. Not only because very often there was no precise correspondence between a given nationality and a defined geographical area but, above all, because it would have been difficult 'to determine exactly, among the human groupings, those who have the right to the title of nation.'[2] Moreover, Hauser asserted that the plebiscite instrument – which had worked during the process of the Italian unification – would have no value if organised either under the control of a vanquished state 'in a country of which a considerable part of the population of origin has been expelled or forced to emigrate', or, finally, in a country 'on which the conquering state would have poured a considerable fraction of its own countrymen.'[3]

Hauser's predictions proved to be right both as regards to the practice of plebiscites, which would be used to decide on territorial or sovereignty issues, as to the difficulties of employing a principle that was based on an idea which was as abstract as it was inapplicable, i.e. nationality. In fact, during the 1919 Peace Treaties, the rights of nationality became the criterion with which the map of Europe would be reshaped – nationality

being officially linked to the promise of self-determination by then US President Woodrow Wilson.

This article aims to retrace the history of the principle of self-determination by focusing mainly on the 'principle of nationality', as formulated by Pasquale Stanislao Mancini (1817-1888) in the second half of the nineteenth century. Indeed, it was thanks to him that the principle of nationality became the fulcrum of the relations among states in international law, while the notion of 'nation' acquired centrality in the domain of domestic law. Accordingly, Mancini's ideas will be placed in the Italian context of that period which was characterised by the search for political unity. At the same time considerable effort was devoted to establishing an international congress of jurists which would resolve the most poignant international law issues. Finally, this article will consider the common assumptions shared by Mancini and Woodrow Wilson concerning nationality in order to analyse how the principle of nationality was transposed, formulated and interpreted in the 1919 Peace Treaties to support the rights of national minorities.

Historical notes on the term 'nationality'

As the German jurist Kay Hailbronner rightly pointed out, 'nationality in a historic perspective is a somewhat new phenomenon.' It expresses the membership of a nation and, in its more modern sense, is defined by 'a common history, culture, ethnicity and common political convictions or value', whereas in the nineteenth century, a predominant element in nationality was 'a "right to exclude others", and to defend the territory of the national from external aggression.' Yet, there is 'no generally recognised concept of nationality as the expression of membership of a political community.'[4]

The French historian Gérard Noiriel has also stressed the ambiguity of *nationalité* in his excursus on the French uses of the term in the nineteenth century. As such, it can refer both to 'subjective' (i.e. 'nationality as a "feeling of belonging" to a group of individuals, themselves defined by a set of cultural characteristics') and 'objective' (i.e. 'nationality as a legally codified belonging') criteria.[5] In 1923, the French writer and journalist René Johannet, author of *Le principe des nationalités* (1918), referred to these criteria as a 'concrete political-ethnographic meaning' ('Nationality means a human group forming or appropriate to the formation of a national state'), and an 'abstract legal meaning' ('the legal bond between a man and a State, expressed by the term *indigénat*'). Moreover, he added a third, more ancient meaning, which could be expressed as 'existence nationale, amour-propre national, nationalisme déplacé, excès de nationalisme, etc.'[6]

There are indeed many difficulties when it comes to clearly defining the term and its meaning(s). *Nationalité* is not only a polysemic term, as illustrated by Gérard Noiriel's emphasis on the difficulties one encounters when translating the term into German or English.[7] Its meaning has also modified over time under the sway of socio-political changes that have resulted in the discourse on the nation being repeatedly reorganised in order to adapt it to new domestic and international political contexts and ideas. According to the historical reconstruction proffered by Noiriel, the term *nationalité* – which is derived from the term 'nation' – appeared only recently, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and was first adopted by Madame de Staël, in *Corinne et l'Italie*, published in 1807.[8] However, it was definitively consecrated by the translation, in 1825, of the work of Friedrich Jahn, *Deutsche Volksthum* (1810), in French. The translation of the title *Recherches sur la nationalité; l'esprit des peuples allemands et les institutions en harmonie avec leurs mœurs et leur caractère*, testifies to the difficulties of conveying a concept – that of *Volk* – whose meaning

was predominantly cultural and simultaneously referred to the nation and the people.[9]

Noiriel explained how the term, once introduced into the French lexicon – and contrary to what happened in the German language – veered progressively towards a clear differentiation between its political and anthropological definitions. In France, the term encountered mixed fortunes, and was not used at all by historians during the Restoration, yet it was increasingly adopted from the July Monarchy (1830) onwards, including by those writers who had ignored it a few years earlier. At that time, the term embodied a 'spiritual force' and had no political meaning. However, towards the final years of the July Monarchy, the term nationality began to be used increasingly for political purposes, while the debate around it shifted from the domestic to the international arena. After the Second Empire had ordained the *principe des nationalité*s – the term is preferably declined in the plural – 'an essential instrument of its external policy', at the end of the century the *question de nationalité* was again 'a priority problem in internal politics.' Consecrated by its renewed use in the singular, the term nationality now designated both an individual and a collective character.[10]

But let's return to René Joahnnet's book for a moment. Undoubtedly, it was a propitious time for the publication of a book entitled *Le principe des nationalités* (1918). As Johannet explained in the introduction to the second edition in 1923:

> Que les paix, conclues à Versailles, à Neuilly, à Sevres, à Saint-Germain, à Trianon, soient, en principe, à travers les imperfections et les hyprocrisies, des paix nationalitaires, il serait difficile de le nier. Partout où les diplomates sont intervenus après les soldats, ils ont choisi ostensiblement pour guide – non pas pour guide

> unique, non peut-être pour guide véritable, – mais pour guide principal, le nationalitarisme. C'est la première fois dans l'histoire du monde qu'une idée, (ou ce qu'on appelle de ce nom depuis environ un siècle) de cette nature, avec des prétentions à l'objectivisme, se soit imposée de la sorte au cours d'un règlement d'une pareille envergure.[11]

Interestingly, Johannet forged the neologism *nationalitarisme* to denote a policy based on the principle of nationalities, referring in particular to the policy pursued during the Peace Treaties (which he defined as 'une paix nationalitaire') which aimed at aligning new political borders with *nationalitaires* borders, restoring 'sunken nations' to the present day. Furthermore, in his voluminous work, which received an award from the *Académie française*, he depicted the idea of nationality as 'an intriguing combination of constructivist and essentialist thought.'[12] In Johannet's thinking, the 'principle of nationalities' required the State and the Nation to converge and draw its borders according to race or preferably nationalities ('d'après les races ou plutôt les nationalités'), and where there is a nation, there must also be a State. And yet, a few lines later, he had to admit that 'the darkest part of the principle of nationalities, is precisely the nationality.'[13]

So what exactly constituted nationality? Johannet acknowledged that the first definition of nationality was given by Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, who laid down an accurate, coherent definition of the term which no longer had literary or historical nature but was on the contrary political and legal. However, Johannet also stressed how Mancini's nationality actually did not apply to reality, since it was an ideal, or even 'an intellectual category in search of an incarnation, – let us say, an Italian category, a political weapon in the hands of the still enslaved but already threatening *Italianità*.'[14]

Nationality in Mancini's thinking

Born on March 17, 1817 in Castel Baronia (Avellino), in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, during the 1840s, Mancini was one of the protagonists of the liberal movement in Naples, fighting for the freedom of press and trade, and the reform of the prison system. Appointed in 1847 as substitute professor of Natural Law at the University of Naples, he was elected to the parliament in 1848. The heavy repression that followed the brief constitutional period forced him to flee to Turin in September 1849 where he continued to be an active propagandist for national unity. In 1850, he was appointed to the Commission to review civil and criminal legislation. The following year, he was appointed Professor of the Chair of Public and Private International law, and Maritime law, and became an adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for diplomatic affairs and diplomatic litigation in 1857.

From 1859-1860, Mancini played an important role in the process of legislative and administrative unification. After his election to the Parliament of Piedmont–Sardinia in 1860, he was sent to join the council presiding over the territory of his former homeland – which had recently been conquered by the Italian patriot Giuseppe Garibaldi – the following year. There, he revoked religious orders, renounced the concordat with the papacy and proclaimed the state's right to church property. Returning to Turin, he served as Minister of Justice (1876–78) and as acting Minister of Public Worship in 1878. In 1881, he became Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was responsible for the Italian accession to the alliance treaty with Germany and Austria-Hungary (the Triple Alliance of 1882). In 1885, he resigned after failing to obtain a majority from the Chamber in favour of the colonial policy he had embarked upon with the occupation of Assab. He died in Naples on December 26, 1888.

During his exile in Turin, and in addition to holding important positions in consultative and ministerial bodies, Mancini held the Chair of Public and Private International law, and Maritime law. He began teaching his courses on 22 January 1851 with the famous prolusion on *Nationality as the foundation of the Law of the Peoples*,[15] for which he is principally renowned in Italy and abroad, in particular amongst jurists and scholars of international law.

For Mancini, nationality consisted of a complex combination of natural and historical elements common to a people:

> 1) Territory: each nationality is assigned the natural boundaries of its territory (mountains, seas, etc.). The diversity of regions and temperatures affects sensitivity, trends, active forces, and needs, etc., of the people. The nature of the country and its agriculture determine the way of life and the direction of national development.
>
> 2) Race: is the expression of an identity of origin and blood. Among individuals, there is an evident plurality of races with more or less distinct characters. Despite the melding they have undergone and that has engendered the birth of new races, some characteristics persist and are transmitted in races, thus forming the national spirit. Analogy of feelings and tendencies represents a more persistent bond between individuals of the same lineage compared to those who are foreign to it.
>
> 3) Language: is the strongest bond of national unity. The great number of existing languages denotes the providential destination of human society to consist of many distinct nationalities, each with its own life and its own being. The languages of peoples cause less uncertainty than the traits and forms of the body, since the genius and

> intellectual state of a nation are revealed in them. The unity of language is the expression of the unity of a Nation's moral nature and creates its dominant ideas. It is these elements that engender the others, i.e. religious beliefs, customs, laws and institutions.[16]

However, as Mancini explains, they are all 'inert' elements that acquire a vital spirit thanks to the 'consciousness of nationality', i.e. 'the awareness that nationality acquires of itself, and that makes it capable of forming itself internally and manifesting itself externally.'

Since nationality is 'the natural society of individuals', stemming from the unity of territory, origins, customs and language, conformed to a commonality of life and social consciousness, it follows that the Nation – and not the State – represents the elementary unit in the genesis of international rights. Moreover, the State embodies the principle of nationality, which is a necessary prerequisite for its very existence.

Since many nations coexist on Earth, the principle of Nationality implies the equal inviolability and protection of all nations. The respect and independence of each Nationality is a just and effective guarantee of the rights of the people. Hence, the principle of Nationality is the foundation stone of the Rights of the People. The supreme aim of the Right of the Peoples is Giambattista Vicos' 'Humanity of the Nations', i.e. the celebration of humanity and its civil progress in the free, harmonious and complete development of nationalities.[17]

Predictably, Mancini's prolusion had a major impact, causing protests from Austria and the Bourbons,[18] whilst simultaneously providing the legal and political doctrinal basis for the Italian Risorgimento. As Luigi Nuzzo explains, 'the political and legal projects of *nation* and *state building* were defined around the principle of nationality and both

presupposed a strong voluntary component.' In this sense, the convergence between the 'narration of the Italian nation' was founded precisely on the principle of nationality and the importance attributed to its legal meaning in the process of national unification.[19] It was brought about by Giuseppe Mazzini despite the fact that he had been ignored by the internationalist jurists of his time, especially because of the political centrality he ascribed to the 'people'.

According to Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872), allegedly 'the chief inspirer and leading political agitator of the Italian Risorgimento',[20] Italy had a twofold mission: on the one hand the abolition of the Papacy, in the name of 'the replacement of the dogma of human *fall* and *redemption* with a more timely belief in Progress.'[21] On the other hand, the development of the principle of Nationality 'as the supreme foundation of international relations and as a guarantee of future peace.' The idea of Nationality, he explained, was 'the soul of a new Era':

> Almost all the wars fought in Europe between the last years of the first Napoleonic Empire and our present time originated from that principle. Quite often those wars were provoked by peoples that aimed to achieve their own *nationality* or wanted to protect it from the assaults of others. On other occasions, war was promoted by monarchs who wanted to preventively gain control over and undermine a *nationalist* uprising that they foresaw as inevitable.
>
> Today, several peoples in Europe are called on by providential tendencies to strengthen their internal bonds so that they can live their normal life, and freely and spontaneously fulfil their role on the continent. However, those peoples are for the most part split up and divided. The servants of others, they have been subjugated by states with a different *goal*. They have been violently separated

> from other branches of the same family; and this makes them weak and uncertain in their movements and in the expression of their legitimate aspirations [...].
>
> Different *Nations* represent the diversity of human abilities. They are thus called on to reach their common *goal* by *associating*; not by becoming confounded with or submerged into others. Each nation forever retains the right to fashion its own life, for only those who are self-determining and affirm their own *individuality* can fruitfully associate [...]. Free *nationhood*, or universal national self-determination, is the sole guarantee against the despotic rule of a single people over several others, just as *individual liberty* is the sole guarantee against the despotic subjection of human beings.[22]

The consequences of the centrality of the nation in the internationalist legal discourse were important. In his *Lineamenti del vecchio e del nuovo diritto delle genti. Prelezione del corso accademico dell'anno 1852*, Mancini recalls the regulatory principles of international law so as to highlight that Nations and not States were the source of international rights and duties – constituting a 'natural and necessary subject', not an 'artificial and arbitrary' one. According to him, such a change would have had profound consequences, by enshrining in particular:

> 1) The 'inalienable and inviolable' right of every nation to establish itself freely, preserving its independence if it owns it, or claiming it if it is enslaved or oppressed.
>
> 2) Free trade and free navigation.

> 3) Reduction of the role of the treaties stipulated by the rulers to the detriment of the 'inalienable and essential rights of nationalities', in particular those that sanction the divisions of nations or, on the contrary, unite them through 'monstrous marriages'.
>
> 4) Recourse to international arbitration, capable of resolving international disputes peacefully, instead of war, 'a savage and senseless means of redressing injustices.' In this way, peace would become the 'natural, legitimate and perpetual state among peoples.'
>
> 5) Renewal of private international law in the name of 'mutual respect for the right Laws of other nations' and recognition of the civil rights of foreigners.[23]

In mid-nineteenth century Italy, the idea of the state withdrew from that of the nation. But in 1872, when the Italian liberation process was over, even though the principle of nationality was still the fundamental principle on which to build the science of international law, States formally returned to being 'subjects capable of law-making' alongside nationalities, humanity, and protagonists 'of the society of peoples.' In particular, the State became a legal entity where certain constituent elements of nationality were lacking, or where there was no formal character capable of distinguishing the State and the Nation. In this regard, Mancini identified two types of State: those that were the result of force or built on consensus, 'an aggregate of provinces and territories belonging to different nationalities'; and nation-states, which were 'the creation of nature' and, for that very reason, immutable and eternal.[24]

In 1874, after welcoming the capitulation of the Empire and the political Papacy which had opposed the establishment of the 'Right of the People' for centuries, Mancini invoked the need to undertake a reform and codification of international law, a reform made more urgent by the

intensification of international relations following the development of the means of transport and international trade.

> The equality and independence of states, the rule that they should not intervene in the internal disputes of other nations, the competence of the national will to determine the government and constitution of each state, the freedom of international communications and commerce, the horror of war and the duty to make it ever rarer and more difficult, and to limit calamities and disasters, the faith of public treaties, the respect and inviolability of the ambassadors, the cooperation in common with all those world institutions that produce security and increase international relations, are by now fundamental maxims of definitive income, even if not written, in today's practice of the Right of the Gentiles, nor would any Government dare to contravene them openly without fear of being banned from civilization.[25]

The reform and codification of international law was also urgently needed because of the American Civil War (1861-1865) and the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) which had put an end to the many years of peace. In fact, Mancini's acclaim did not consist in ideologically elevating nations to the status of subjects of international law, but by developing a coherent legal form for a concept that would shake up and then arbitrate the history of Europe for decades to come: that of nationality.[26]

Towards an international understanding of the "Right of the Peoples": the establishment of the *Institut de Droit International*

As the Italian jurist and politician Augusto Pierantoni emphasised, the University of Turin had not only welcomed Mancini, but also other exiles, and was 'the most elected sanctuary of national science.' Among them, the Italian philosopher and statesman, Terenzio Mamiani Della Rovere (1799-1885), stands out for his 'Italianness and eloquence'.[27] Born in Pesaro, a collaborator of the *Antologia*, a literary and scientific journal founded by Giampietro Vieusseux in Florence in January 1821, Mamiani took an active part in the uprisings of 1831 as a result of which he was forced to flee to Paris. He was Minister of the Papal Government in 1848 and member of the Constituent Assembly in 1849. Opposed to the Roman Republic, he moved to Turin where he founded the *Società nazionale per la confederazione italiana* (National Association for the Italian Confederation), together with Vincenzo Gioberti.[28]He was Minister of Education (1860), member of parliament and senator (1864), and held a Chair of Philosophy of History at the University of Turin.

It was in France that Mamiani began to distance himself from Mazzini and his programme which he considered as 'temerarious and utopian', but also contrary to the real interests of the various Italian princes and alien to the historical, cultural and economic traditions of the country. Mamiani opposed Mazzini's strongly unitary ideal with a federal programme which, according to the former, was more appropriate to the civil and economic history of the peninsula and more feasible because less conflicting.[29]

Most important for the purposes of this article is that Mamiani shaped another idea of nationality and attempted to establish it scientifically.[30] According to Pierantoni, the main difference between Mancini and

Miamiani's respective systems was that the former considered the nation, and not the state, as the basis of the international law, whereas the latter 'persisted' in basing it on the state. And he reported a letter in which Mamiani explained:

> I strongly doubt that it is possible to base people's rights on the abstract principle of nationality; and we must also add the common conscience as it is taught and defined by our illustrious friend Professor Mancini. As for me, I think that nature, by creating nations, predisposes and sets people to compose one state and one homeland of those nations. But because ultimately the homeland results from the tenacious and unshakable will of certain families, villages or provinces to live together in the most intimate civil conjunction that is granted to men, it follows that the state and the homeland are not legally constituted by the natural facts of certain commonality of race, language, customs, etc.; but by the firm, deliberate and spontaneous will of men or we mean, by a rational and moral fact, which may sometimes exist in the nation as the Swiss, the Alsatians, the Corsicans, or may exist outside the nation but with a narrower and more separate border, as happened in Germany. [...] In practice, therefore, we will say that a state and a homeland almost always arise where nature constituted a nation; but in theory the *First* of the Law of the Peoples is to be found in the autonomous congregations that were independent and wish to remain so, as I tried to define and demonstrate in my volume *D'un nuovo Diritto Europeo* and in the other writing *Dell'ottima congregazione umana* which came to light in 1856 and however long before Stuart Mill's juridical writings that reproduce more or less several of my opinions on the subject.[31]

Both Mancini and Pierantoni were among the founders of the *Institut de Droit International*, who met from 8 to 11 September 1873 in the 'Salle de l'Arsenal' in the town hall in Ghent. According to its articles of association, adopted on 10 September, the *Institut de Droit International* was (and still is) 'an exclusively learned society, without any official nature.' Its aim was to promote the advancement of international law, 'striving to become the organ of the legal conscience of the civilised world' (Art. 1, 1); 'lending its co-operation in any serious endeavour for the gradual and progressive codification of international law' (Art. 1, 3); 'seeking official endorsement of the principles recognised as in harmony with the needs of modern societies' (Art. 1, 4); 'contributing, within the limits of its competence, either to the maintenance of peace, or to the observance of the laws of war' (Art. 1, 5).[32]

As was stated in an article published in the first issue of the *Annuaire de l'Institut de droit internationa*l (1877), it is surprising that, in a century characterised by the presence of numerous associations

> there has not been any association for the study of peoples' rights or, as we prefer to say today, international law for a long time. However, this delay is quite comprehensible if we consider the relative neglect in which the science of people's law was growing on the one hand, compared to other legal disciplines until recently; on the other hand, the essentially cosmopolitan nature of this science and the need to galvanize its followers in all countries, [and unite them notwithstanding differences in language and habits], overcoming political divisions and national prejudices, crossing distances, finally surmounting many material difficulties.[33]

The purpose of the *Institut de Droit International* was to serve as a body not for governments but 'for the legal opinion of the civilised world on the subject of international law.'[34]Being independent from all

governments, it aspired to become a supranational moral authority for them, whose authority they be bound to only if they considered it appropriate. Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns (1835-1902), one of the founders and secretary-general of the *Institut*, explained that, despite the vicissitudes of politics, there was a movement towards the regularisation of international relations, 'namely, towards the transformation of the *de facto* society that exists between nations and a true society governed by law.' This movement had been manifested in two ways until then, i.e. through diplomatic action and individual scientific action. The time had come to take collective scientific action to overcome the obstacles to the aspirations of these 'two major factors of international law.' For diplomacy, the main obstacle was represented by the 'at least apparent conflicts between the particular political interests of peoples, subjects of law, and the collective interest of society between nations.' Individual scientific action was hampered by the lack of any binding moral authority in isolated works, regardless of their scientific value or that of their author. As regards the nature of the *Institut*'s work, one of its primary tasks would be to study the principles of international law. As Rolin-Jaequemyns explains, the codification of international law propounded by some was in fact seriously opposed by others because of disagreement over some of the most basic principles of international law, including for example: 'What is a State? What is a nation? Theory of non-intervention. Rules of neutrality. Theories of obligations, binding force of treaties, etc.'

The creation of the *Institut de Droit International* was therefore a response to the need, first raised by Mancini, but also by others besides him, to regulate international law in a period in which nationality had been placed 'at the heart of modern law.'[35]

And yet, as we have seen, there was no unanimity about the idea of nationality which was ambiguous and refractory to any kind of clear and unequivocal definition.

The indeterminacy of the idea of nationality – and of nation – was compounded, in those same years, by the definition of nation furnished by Ernest Renan. In his famous 1882 conference, leaning more towards the principle of nationality outlined by Mamiani than the one by Mancini, Renan refused to count race, language and territory among the foundations of nationality. For him, common history and memory and, above all, a willingness to belong to it were the constituent elements of a nation. Thus, the possession of a common heritage and the desire to live together, 'la volonté de continuer à faire valoir l'héritage qu'on a reçu indivis.'[36] It is interesting to note, taking up the observations made by Gérard Noiriel in this regard, how Renan added an 'assimilationist' element to the previous definitions of nation/nationality. In fact, as Rogers Brubaker has also pointed out in his famous book on the French and German concepts of nationality and citizenship, the 'French notion' of the nation ('à la française') has two main characteristics: it is centred on the State and is 'assimilationist'. It essentially represented a specific aspect of the French political and cultural geography, i.e. the progressive formation of the nation-state around a single political and cultural centre. This was also the consequence of an idea of nationhood elaborated *de facto* by a broad bourgeois stratum as part of the willingness to reform an already existing nation-state. It gave rise to a series of 'assimilationist' political and cultural measures – such as, for example, the policy of linguistic assimilation – aimed at creating a national community based on a political awareness of belonging to the same State.[37]

No doubt, the period was favourable to the discussions on this subject. Not only the unification wars of Germany and Italy, and the Franco-

Prussian war, but also the rapid development of means of transport and the intensification of economic relations, with the large demographic movements that it engendered, had placed the question of nationality at the centre of the debate, as it was now closely connected to the need to control the movement of individuals.

Yet to the extent that the use of the principle of nationality in resolving issues related to the resolution of (inter)national conflicts is concerned, its definition and effective applicability would still have generated endless discussions. Bearing testimony to that period, the German jurist Franz von Holtzendorff observed that the cases of Italy and Germany could not be considered as 'evidence' of the general applicability of the principle of nationality. International law still had a long way to go, especially with regard to Eastern Europe, 'where fragments of various nationalities' cohabited with each other, almost always 'animated by hostile feelings, but too weak to be able to form and live in independent states.'[38]

From the principle of nationality to national self-determination

The idea that the creation of a state corresponds to the achievement of the full individuality of a national people – since the nation-state represented 'the culmination of individual self-determination and of the sovereignty of the people' – seemed to triumph at the end of the First World War when new states were forged from the ashes of the old empires.[39] The 'nation-state principle', as Peter Alter defined it, implies that there should be 'perfect congruence between political and ethno-cultural unity', and it is precisely this principle that seemingly guided decisions at the time of the Peace Treaties, thus redrawing the political

map of Europe. However, as has been profusely emphasised by the subsequent historiography, the States born at the end of the war turned out to be as heterogeneous and multinational as the Empires – the 'oppressors of peoples' – they replaced.[40] This was simply due to the actual distribution of people which effectively prevented the newly founded states from being homogeneous from an ethno-cultural point of view.

The observation that the principle of the nation-state lived an 'illusory triumph' is the result of the great work of 'historiographic cleaning' that normally occurs with the passing of time. However, it was above all the events that followed the Peace Treaties, in particular the rise of Hitler and the outbreak of the Second World War which radically questioned the results of the Paris Peace Conference and contributed to raising the issue of whether what has been improperly coined 'the Versailles settlement' was destined to fail or not. Very different answers were given: while some hailed it as 'the triumph of democracy, national self-determination, justice, the rule of law and security against militarism', others denigrated it as 'the triumph of cynicism, calculated vengeance, economic unrealism and oppression of national minorities.'[41] The systematic violation of the principle of national self-determination became the specific object of condemnation.[42] According to Yael Tamir's argument – who adopts a different expression for the classic distinction between 'ethnic' and 'civic' nation – historically divergent interpretations of the right to national self-determination originated from the two different notions of 'cultural nation' and 'democratic nation'. Therefore, while the cultural version of the nation understands national self-determination as the right of the members of a nation 'to preserve their distinct existence, and to manage communal life in accordance with their particular life', the democratic version of the nation – defined as 'the group of individuals living under the same rule'

– intended self-determination as 'the right of individuals to participate in governing their lives.'[43]

And yet during and after WWI, great turmoil seems to have enveloped these two notions, which, as it turns out, were not as clearly distinct as presupposed. Indeed, the origins of this conceptual confusion can be traced back to the idealisation of the figure of the American President Woodrow Wilson and his famous 'fourteen points' speech. This idealisation was based on an unequivocally erroneous interpretation of the term 'self-determination' which – as we will see in the next few lines – in the Wilsonian formula corresponded to self-government, and therefore should be interpreted as a form of fully democratic government and the need to lead 'primitive peoples' to the state in which they would be able to self-govern.

The term 'self-determination' had never appeared in Wilson's statements prior to delivering his speech known as the 'Four Point address', on 11 February 1918.[44] In the coming settlement, he said, 'national aspirations must be respected', and people may be 'dominated and governed only by their own consent.'[45] And yet, Robert Lansing, Wilson's own secretary of state, noted that the term self-determination was essentially equivalent, in Wilson's usage, to the time-honored liberal principle of consent of the governed. In fact, as Erez Manela has explained, by invoking the principle of self-determination – a term which Wilson borrowed from the language of the Bolsheviks – he 'incorporated the new term into his ideological war lexicon, adopting this phrase as his own and assimilating it into the program for the post-war international order.' In this way, self-determination replaced previous references to the consensus of the governed. It was a substitution – Manela explains – that aspired to neutralise Bolshevik criticism of Allied war objectives by adopting their language, but which did not change, in essence, Wilson's

view that 'self-determination' was simply synonymous with 'self-government' and the importance of 'government with consensus'.

The arguments propounding the right to self-determination and the closely related concept of collective security, advanced by the US President, represent the essence of the ideology of Wilsonianism. As Wilson stated on May 27, 1916 while advocating the idea of a post-war League of Nations, not only does

> every people ha[ve] a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live […] the small states of the world [also] have a right to enjoy the same integrity that great and powerful nations expect and insist upon. And […] the world has a right to be free from every disturbance of its peace that has its origins in aggression and disregard of the right of peoples and nations.[46]

As Thomas Musgrave pointed out, Wilson's ideas about self-determination initially reflected the Western European understanding of self-determination, according to which 'those within a certain state should have the right to determine their own government […]. By "self-government", he meant the right of a population to choose its own form of government; this right was ongoing and was therefore synonymous with democratic government.'[47]

Wilson, whose notion of nationality was shaped by American experience, understood the principle of national self-determination from the perspective of historicism. In his view, the national consciousness of a people was determined more by historical factors and civic affinities than by ethno-cultural elements. Consequently, language and race lose the primordial role they had in ethnic nationalism to become only two of the many elements that define a nation. Accordingly, the growth of the

national idea coincides with the people's conscious development of the national experience and life as well as of a distinctive historical consciousness. It follows that not all peoples who claim the right to self-government already constitute a nation – in other words, that not all the nations are endowed with the 'historical qualities' of nationality. As Lansing later wrote, the principle of self-determination clearly did not apply to 'races, peoples, or communities whose state of barbarism or ignorance deprive them of the capacity to choose intelligently their political affiliations.'[48]

Furthermore, during the 1919 Peace Treaties, other factors intervened to influence the application of Wilsonian principles, particularly the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in November 1917. Once in power, the Bolsheviks – who during the Provisional Government had been manifestly sensitive to the issue of national minorities, going so far as to advocate the right of secession for those peoples requesting – immediately inaugurated a new policy towards the nationalities of the overthrown Tsarist empire through a series of initiatives aimed at consecrating the principle of self-determination. In the 'Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia', adopted on November 15, 1917, they guaranteed

> the equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia; the right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination, even to the point of separation and the formation of an independent state; the abolition of any and all national and national-religious privileges and disabilities; the free development of national minorities and ethnographic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia.[49]

As proof of their goodwill, they immediately recognised the independence of Finland. The recognition of the right to self-determination contributed significantly to making the Bolsheviks popular among non-Russian peoples, prompting them to provide support during the civil war that followed the October Revolution.

During the peace negotiations, therefore, the 'Bolshevik spectrum', besides constituting a reason of solidarity between the Allies – who were unanimously prepared to use any means to impede any further propagation of the Russian 'infection' – was repeatedly brandished as a weapon and presented as the threat of redrawing the territorial map of the defeated countries so that a safety belt (*cordon sanitaire*) could be created to contain the Revolution. In this context, the principle of self-determination was used to justify the creation of independent states following the capitulation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, as well as to legitimise important territorial concessions to Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia while substantial economic and military energies were diverted into the fight against Bolshevism.[50]

In conclusion, the weakness of Wilson's international programme, due to the generic and often contradictory nature of many of its points, could also be explained by its absolute lack of logical unity, a factor that facilitated its manipulation at the Paris Peace Conference by 'inscribing many nationalistic war acquisitions in the final resolution.'[51] As Allen Lynch points out, the problem was that – due to his US political education and experience – Wilson's idea of nationality came down to a community of language, which is why he thought that attachment to state and attachment to nation must be concurrent. Hence, from his perspective, to argue that the principles of nationality and self-determination should coincide was merely perceived as a stepping-stone.[52]

Accordingly, during WWI, the principle of self-determination was embodied with linguistic, cultural and racial elements. Since the terms of peace and stability in the postwar period were aligned to the establishment of sovereign political entities, these had to be as homogeneous as possible from an ethnic point of view. As an observer of that time remarked:

> Depuis la guerre, le principe des nationalités semble avoir conquis de nouvelles faveurs. Ce n'est pas qu'on ait pris la peine d'en donner une démonstration théorique. Comme en bien d'autres domaines non seulement le bon public, mais ceux mêmes qui ont eu le redoutable honneur de tenir en leurs mains les destinées du monde, ont accueilli, sans trop y réfléchir, des formules séduisantes peut-être par leur apparente simplicité, mais qui n'avaient d'autre mérite que de bien servir leurs dessins.[53]

Conclusion

Alan Sharp pointedly remarked that 'the injection of nationality into the concept of self-government created the hybrid of self-determination and this produced a series of complex and complicated problems for the peacemakers to disentangle; not least because Wilson never entirely committed himself to the principle that nationality should be the sole determining factor in the drawing up of new frontiers in the Peace Settlement.'[54]

Among the unexpected consequences of the resolutions adopted by the Peace Treaties in Europe – which used the principles of nationality and self-determination interchangeably – there were at least two that would have serious repercussions for years to come. First of all, the lack of a

genuine concurrence between the 'national idea' advocated by its official proponents and the actual self-identification advocated by the people concerned, as numerous plebiscites organised in 1918 demonstrated.[55] Second, the geographical deflagration of nationalist and regionalist movements which meant that, whilst the principle of self-determination had been highly valued until then by 'liberating and unifying' national movements at the expense of multinational or supranational States, from 1919 onwards it became a source of legitimacy for separatist movements.[56]

And it is perhaps in this sense that the differences between the principle of nationality advocated by Mancini and the principle of national self-determination, as applied in the Peace Treaties of 1919, became more evident. Whilst Mancini's nationality principle identified a process of expansion and progress through the creation of a nation that would lead to a future universal society, Wilsonian self-determination endorsed the return to particularism. This drained nationalism of the very content of liberation and unification that had characterised liberal nationalism during the nineteenth century.

Endnote

[1] This paper is part of a research project funded by the Gerda Henkel Stiftung entitled *From the trenches to regionalist militancy. Regionalism as a form of dissent in the immediate aftermath of World War I* [AZ 50/F/17].

[2] H. Hauser, *Le principe des nationalités. Ses origines historiques* (Paris, 1916), 8-10.

[3] Hauser, *Le principe des nationalités,* 28-29.

[4] K. Hailbronner, 'Nationality in public international law and European law', in: R. Bauböck, E. Ersbøll, K. Groenendijk, & H. Waldrauch (eds.), *Acquisition and*

Loss of Nationality. Policies and Trends in 15 European States. Vol.1: Comparative Analyses (Amsterdam, 2006), 35. On the "changing parameters" of nationality, see also K. Henrard, 'The Shifting Parameters of Nationality', in: *Netherlands International Law Review*, 65 (2018), 269-297.

[5] G. Noiriel, 'Socio-histoire d'un concept. Les usages du mot "nationalité" au XIXe siècle', in: *Genèses*, 20 (1995), 5.

[6] R. Johannet, *Le principe des nationalités* (Paris, 1923), 3. René Johannet (1884-1972) was a major figure of integral nationalism, close to Chares Maurras and the *Action française*. He contributed to the *Revue universelle* (1920-1944) and *Candide*, a weekly magazine created by Jacques Bainville in 1924. Both journals were an expression of Maurrasian ideas. See E. Weber, *L'Action française* (Paris, 1985 [1962]), 550-551.

[7] The French term *nationalité* can be translated into English as 'nationhood' (which has a political meaning), 'nationality' (with a ethno-graphic meaning), and "citizenship" (which is a legal or juristic concept).

[8] 'Je pouvais donc me croire destinée à des avantages particuliers, par la réunion des circonstances rares qui m'avaient donné une double éducation, et si je puis m'exprimer ainsi, deux nationalités différentes.' De Staël, *Corinne et l'Italie* (London, 1807), 395. Quoted in Noiriel, 'Socio-histoire d'un concept', 7.

[9] P. Lauret, the translator of the book, explains his choice of translating Volchstum into *nationalité* in this way: 'Le mot nationalité, employé dans le titre de ce livre, choquera peut-être les oreilles des puristes et ne satisfera pas ceux qui veulent par le titre seul connaître tout un ouvrage. Je n'ai pas su trouver un meilleur mot dans notre langue et qui ait été employé dans le même sens. J'ai été forcé à quelques autres néologismes pour rendre certains mots que le génie de la langue allemande permettait à notre auteur de fabriquer de toute pièce.' Quoted in Noiriel, 'Socio-histoire d'un concept', 8.

[10] Noiriel, 'Socio-histoire d'un concept', 13-18.

[11] Johannet, *Le principe des nationalités*, VII.

[12] G. Sluga, *The Nation, Psychology, and International Politics, 1870-1919* (Basingstoke, 2006), 55.

[13] Johannet, *Le principe des nationalités*, 7.

[14] '[U]ne catégorie intellectuelle à la recherché d'une incarnation, – disons-le, une catégorie italienne, une arme politique aux mains de l'*italianità* encore asservie mais déjà menaçante.' To convince his readers, Johannet cites the fact that Austria tried to ban his courts and the King of Naples confiscated his property. Johannet, *Le principe des nationalités*, 8.

[15] 'In mezzo ad un popolo che per la causa del riscatto nazionale immensi sacrifizii con magnanima virtù sostenne, nel sacro ed ospitale asilo della libertà e del sapere Italiano, nella città che sola tra le prostrate sorelle della Penisola estolle maestosa l'invitto suo capo, la Scienza alla quale è commesso propugnare il domma della Indipendenza delle Nazioni, anzi che vedersi tuttavia confusa con altre nello insegnamento quasi secondaria disciplina, ben meritava più esteso e distinto dominio, anche a rischio di cangiare in un'oscura voce, com'è la mia, la parola sapiente e feconda che doveva farsene l'interprete' [tr.: In the midst of a people who, for the cause of national redemption, sustained immense sacrifices with magnanimous virtue, in the sacred and hospitable asylum of freedom and Italian knowledge, in the city that alone, among the prostrate sisters of the Peninsula, raised its invincible majestic head, the Science to which it is committed to advocate *the dogma of the Independence of Nations*, instead of seeing itself however confused with others in the teaching almost secondary discipline, well deserved more extensive and distinct dominion, even at the risk of changing in an obscure voice, as is my own, the wise and fruitful word that should be made by the interpreter]. P.S. Mancini, *Della Nazionalità come fondamento de diritto delle genti* (Turin, 1851), 7-8. My italics. Mancini refers here to Amedeo Melegari (1805-1881), professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Turin. Melegari was one of the founders of the Giovine Italia and, after moving to Switzerland, one of the five Italian representatives who signed the 'Berne Pact', that is the founding act of the Giovine Europa, on 15 April 1834. Melegari gradually moved away from Mazzini's ideas, until he assumed liberal-democratic and constitutional positions.

[16] Mancini, *Della Nazionalità come fondamento,* 30-32.

[17] Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) was a Neapolitan philosopher. He was the author of *Scienza nuova* (The New Science, 1725-1744), in which he proposed a new methodology for history, a scheme of how it develops, and a reformulation of the providential theory. According to Vico, there are three historical stages, through which all nations are destined to pass: 'the age of the gods' (i.e. of the primitive religious myths); 'the age of heroes' (or of the lordly dominion), and

'the age of men', characterised by the appearance of philosophical thought and legislative codifications.

[18] During his exile in Turin, Mancini contributed to demolishing the image of the Bourbons of Naples by publishing *Relazioni di magistrati e pubblicisti italiani sopra le quistioni legali e costituzionali della causa per gli avvenimenti del 15 maggio 1848 a Napoli*. See G. Massari, *Atti e documenti del processo di lesa maestà per gli avvenimenti del 15 maggio 1848 in Napoli* (Turin, 1851), 179-247);http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/pasquale-stanislao mancini_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/

[19] L. Nuzzo, 'Da Mazzini a Mancini: il principio di nazionalità tra politica e diritto', in: *Giornale di storia costituzionale*, 14 (2007), 162.

[20] See S. Recchia & N. Urbinati (eds.), *A Cosmopolitanism of Nations: Giuseppe Mazzini's Writings on Democracy, Nation Building, and International Relations* (Princeton, 2009).

[21] A Genoan propagandist and revolutionary, he was the founder of the secret revolutionary society Young Italy (1832) and Young Europe (1834). The political association Giovine Europa (Young Europe) had a public program, but the names of its members were secret. It was founded in Bern by Mazzini and 16 other Italian, German and Polish political refugees. The association was dissolved following Mazzini's ban from Switzerland (1836).

[22] G. Mazzini, 'Principles of International Politics (1871)', in: S. Recchia & N. Urbinati (eds.), *A Cosmopolitanism of Nations: Giuseppe Mazzini's Writings on Democracy, Nation Building, and International Relations* (Princeton, 2009), 232-233. The original text follows: 'Le guerre combattute in Europa dagli ultimi anni del primo Impero fino a noi originarono quasi tutte da quel principio: suscitate da popoli rivolti a conquistarsi nazionalità o a proteggerla dagli assalti altrui o promosse da monarchie tendenti a impadronirsi di moti nazionali antiveduti inevitabili e sviarli dal segno. I popoli chiamati da tendenze provvidenziali a conglomerarsi per vivere di vita normale e compire liberamente e spontanei un ufficio in Europa sono oggi, i più, smembrati, divisi, servi d'altrui, aggiogati a chi ha fine diverso, separate per opera di violenza da rami della stessa famiglia, deboli quindi e inceppati nei loro moti, nelle loro legittime aspirazioni […]. Le Nazioni rappresentano le diverse facoltà umane chiamate a raggiungere associate, non confuse e sommerse l'una nell'altra, il fine comune e hanno eterno

il diritto di vivere di vita propria: non s'associa chi non vive e non comincia dall'affermare la propria individualità […]. Le Nazioni sono l'unico argine al dispotismo d'un popolo come la libertà degli individui al dispotismo d'un uomo.' G. Mazzini, "Politica internazionale", in: *La Roma del Popolo*, 4, 5, 6, (1871).

[23] P.S. Mancini, *Prelezioni con un Saggio sul Machiavelli* (Naples, 1873), 67-92.

[24] Mancini, *Prelezioni con un Saggio sul Machiavelli*, 163-220. As Luigi Nuzzo explains, Mancini's State 'had become a virtuous State which, through the principle of nationality, had succeeded both in resolving internal political and social conflicts [...], but also the often conflicting relationship between the state/society and state/population, by identifying the nation with the state. The Italian State was national because it was a creation of nature, and it was necessary and eternal because it was natural.' Nuzzo, 'Da Mazzini a Mancini', 16.

[25] 'L'eguaglianza e l'indipendenza degli Stati, la regola che non debbano intervenire nelle interne contese delle altre Nazioni, la competenza della volontà nazionale a determinare il governo e la costituzione di ogni Stato, la libertà delle comunicazioni e dei commerci internazionali, l'orrore della guerra ed il dovere di renderla sempre più rara e difficile, e di limitare le calamità e i disastri, la fede de' pubblici trattati, il rispetto e l'inviolabilità delle ambascerie, la cooperazione in comune a tutte quelle istituzioni mondiali che producano sicurezza ed incremento alle relazioni internazionali, sono ormai massime fondamentali entrate definitivamente, benché non scritte, nella pratica odierna del Diritto delle Genti, né alcun Governo oserebbe contravvenire ad esse apertamente senza temere di esser posto al bando della civiltà.' P.S. Mancini, *Della vocazione del nostro secolo per la riforma e la codificazione del diritto delle genti e per l'ordinamento di una giustizia internazionale. Discorso per la inaugurazione degli studi nella R. Università di Roma pronunziato nel 2 novembre 1874* (Rome, 1874), 39.

[26] http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/pasquale-stanislao-mancini_(Dizionario-Biografico)

[27] A. Pierantoni, *Storia degli studi di diritto internazionale in Italia* (Modena, 1869), 155.

[28] Vincenzo Gioberti (1801-1852) was an Italian philosopher and politician. A priest from 1825 onwards, affiliated with the Giovine Italia, he fled to France in 1833. Having distanced himself from Mazzini, he wrote *Del primato politico e*

morale degli italiani (1843) proposing a confederation of states under the leadership of the papacy (neo-Guelfism) as an alternative to the unitary republic. He was Prime Minister of the Savoy Kingdom (1848-1849). After the defeat of Novara, he retired to voluntary exile in France.

[29] For the same reasons, Antonio Brancati explains, 'he also rejected the conspiracy-revolutionary strategy and entrusted the still dawning aspirations of the National Risorgimento, above all, to the open ethical-political education of the 'plebs', based not only on the values of freedom and autonomy of the country, but also on a specific programme of economic and social emancipation of the minute people.' A. Brancati, "Mamiani Della Rovere, Terenzio", in: *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, 68 (2007). http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/mamiani-della-rovere-terenzio_%28Dizionario-Biografico%29/

[30] See T. Mamiani Della Rovere, *D'un nuovo diritto europeo* (Turin, 1860). The book was published several times in Italy and immediately translated into French and English; Brancati, "Mamiani Della Rovere".

[31] 'Io dubito forte che si possa fondar bene il giure delle genti sull'astratto principio di nazionalità; e si aggiunga pure la coscienza comune quale la insegna e la definisce l'illustre amico nostro professore Mancini. […] Quanto a me io penso che la natura col creare le nazioni predispone ed apparecchia la genti a comporre di quelle un solo stato e una sola patria. Ma perché da ultimo la patria risulta dalla volontà tenace e incrollabile di certe famiglie, borghi o provincie di vivere insieme nella congiunzione civile più intima che agli uomini sia conceduta, ne segue che lo stato e la patria non sono giuridicamente costituite dai fatti naturali di certa comunanza di stirpe, lingua, consuetudini ecc; ma sì dal volere fermo, deliberato e spontaneo degli uomini o vogliamo dire, da un fatto razionale e morale, che può talvolta sussistere nella nazione siccome agli Svizzeri, agli Alsaziani, ai Corsi; ovvero può sussistere fuori della nazione ma con più ristretto e separato confine, come insino è accaduto in Germania. […] In pratica, adunque diremo che quasi sempre sorge uno stato e una patria laddove natura costituì una nazione; ma in teorica il Primo del giure delle genti è da collocarsi nelle congregazioni autonome che fossero indipendenti e vogliono rimanere tali, secondo che mi sono ajutato a definire e provare in quel mio volume D'un nuovo Diritto Europeo e nell'altro scritto dell'ottima Congregazione umana venuto a luce insino dal mille ottocentocinquantasei e

però molto prima delle stampe giuridiche di Stuart Mill che riproducono a un di presso parecchie mie opinion in proposito.' A. Pierantoni, *Storia degli studi di diritto internazionale in Italia*, 169-171.

[32] *Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international* (1877), 1.

[33] "Notice historique sur l'Institut de droit international, sa foundation et sa première session. Gand 1873, Genève 1874.' As specified, this note is in part a reproduction of an article by Alphonse Rivier, published in *Bibliothèque universelle et Revue Suisse* (1874), 11 and onwards.

[34] G. Rolin-Jaequemyns, 'De la nécessité d'organiser une institution scientifique permanente pour favoriser l'étude et les progress du droit international', in: *Revue de droit international et de législation comparée*, V (1873), 463 and onwards.

[35] Cogordan defined nationality as 'le lien qui unit l'individu à l'État, c'est-à-dire au groupe social suprême et indépendant", and nation as "un groupe d'individus unis par la similitude des goûts, des usages, des intérêts, des sympathies, si bien qu'il règne entre eux une cohésion intime, une puissante solidarité qui leur fait souhaiter de vivre sous les mêmes lois, et de marcher ensemble aux mêmes destinées. L'identité de la race et de la langue et plus encore le souvenir d'un long passé commun contribuent grandement à créer une telle union, qui, lorsqu'elle existe, confère une sorte de droit naturel à former un État. Ainsi comprise, la nationalité est indépendante des divisions factices que les guerres et les traits ont pu tracer sur la carte du monde. Et le principe des nationalités, qui est si souvent invoqués de nos jours, a précisément pour but de faire coïncider les frontières des États avec celle de nations. Il a pris une si haute importance et jouit d'une telle popularité que les États sont obligés de l'invoquer, même lorsqu'ils le respectent les moins.' G. Cogordan, *La nationalité au point de vue des rapports internationaux* (Paris, 1890), 4-5.

[36] E. Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?* (Paris, 1882), 26.

[37] The French – so called 'voluntaristic' – notion of the nation, is part of a constructivist (or artificialist) perspective, in the sense that it is built on 'the union of wills in a free association, based on adherence to the principles of the social contract.' Nationality would not therefore be a 'natural determination', but would be defined 'by an act of voluntary adherence to the democratic community or to the social contract', which is a matter of free choice (Renaut

1991, 33-34). The *nation-contrat* is usually contrasted with the *nation-génie*, which is closely linked to the idea of the collective soul and is also known as the 'German' notion of the nation. The German nation, which is centred on the *Volk*, is therefore 'differentialist' because thought under the idea of difference. R. Brubaker, *Citoyenneté et nationalité en France et en Allemagne* (Paris, 1997), 23, 26-29.

[38] Fr. von Holtzendorff, 'Le principe des nationalités et la littérature italienne du droit des gens, à propos de l'ouvrage de M. Auguste Pierantoni: *Storia degli studi del diritto internazionale in Italia* (Modena 1869)', in: *Revue de droit international et de legislation compare*, II (1870), 106.

[39] P. Alter, *Nationalism* (London, 1989), 92.

[40] According to E.J. Hobsbawm, 'the main change was that States were now on average rather smaller and the "oppressed peoples" within them were now called "oppressed minorities".' E. Hobsbawm, *Nations and nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge, 2000), 133.

[41] I.J. Lederer (ed.), *The Versailles Settlement. Was It Foredoomed to Failure?* (Boston, 1965), vii. Furthermore, whereas the liberal public opinion of Western Europe considered the aspirations of the micro-nationalities in Central and Eastern Europe as 'a revolt of democracy against tyranny', among the Powers the inalienable right of a people to self-determination didn't have unanimity, both for their reluctance to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign State, and for the presence, in three of them, of dissatisfied national minorities.

[42] See W.R. Keylor, 'The Principle of National Self-Determination as a Factor in the Creation of Postwar Frontiers in Europe, 1919 and 1945', in C. Baechler & C. Fink (eds.), *L'établissement des frontières en Europe après les deux guerres mondiales* (Frankfurt, 1996), 37-54.

[43] Y. Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism* (Princeton, 1993), 69.

[44] Neither was it present in his well-known 'Fourteen Points' address, pronounced a month earlier, in which he supported the "autonomous development" of peoples of the Austrian and Ottoman Empires. It was therefore in the 'Four Points' speech that he first publicly articulated the phrase 'self-determination'.

[45] E. Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment. Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford, 2007), 41.

[46] L.E. Ambrosius, *Wilsonianism. Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations* (New York, 2002), 21.

[47] T.D. Musgrave, *Self-Determination and National Minorities* (Oxford, 1997), 22.

[48] Quoted in Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*, 24.

[49] https://www.marxists.org/history/ussr/government/1917/11/02.htm

[50] The manipulation of the principle of self-determination for the achievement of precise political-strategic goals was recognised also by Winston S. Churchill himself, who admitted that while this principle 'had preserved Germany as the greatest united branch of the European family was finally fatal to the Empire of Habsburg.' W. Churchill, 'The World Crisis: The Territorial Settlement of 1919-1920', in: Lederer (ed.), *The Versailles Settlement*, 78-85.

[51] H. Holborn, 'World War, World Settlement and the Aftermath', in: Lederer (ed.), *The Versailles Settlement*, 1-17.

[52] A. Lynch, 'Woodrow Wilson and the Principle of "National Self-Determination": A Recondideration', in: *Review of International Studies*, 28 (2002), 423-424.

[53] These lines were written by the Belgian Catholic priest, Pierre Harmignie, who was executed by the Germans, together with others, as reprisal measurement, in Courcelles, on 18 August 1944. See P. Harmignie, 'Note sur le principe des nationalités', in: *Revue néo-scolastique de philosophie*, 9 (1926), 23.

[54] A. Sharp A., 'The genie that would not go back into the bottle: national self-determination and the legacy of the First World War and the Peace Settlement', in: S. Dunn & T.G. Fraser (eds.), *Europe and Ethnicity. World War I and Contemporary Ethnic Conflict* (London & New York, 1996), 13. See also Lynch, 'Woodrow Wilson and the Principle of "National Self-Determination".

[55] Hobsbawm, *Nations and nationalism,* 134.

[56] The emergence of the 'micro-nationalities' that Wilsonism provoked would be used by what Guy Hermet has called 'careerist nationalists' – obscure activists who saw in the territorial and political recomposition of Central and Eastern Europe and in the achievement of independence for their country, an unhoped-

for opportunity to gain access to positions of prestige in the administration or in any other entity at the national level. G. Hermet, *Histoire des nations et du nationalisme en Europe* (Paris, 1996), 192-195; Hobsbawm, *Nations and nationalism,* 138-139.

Historicising the Normative Boundaries of Diversity: The Minority Treaties of 1919 in a *Longue Durée* Perspective

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The article accounts for the specific form a certain legal and, indeed, normative understanding of diversity informed the so-called Minority Treaties of 1919 by historicising the evolution of certain interlocking discourses over the remit of 'rights', as well as the identity of their holders. It seeks to account for why certain groups (national minorities) rather than others were singled out for protection and why the rights they were given took the form they did (cultural and linguistic) by positioning them in the context of broader debates within which they were embedded. I thus argue against reading the Minority Treaties from a 'presentist' perspective that not only retrojects a certain teleological narrative that tends to read them along the familiar lines of 'progress', but bears the danger of naturalising certain categories – such as 'the nation', 'the nation-state', or 'nationalism' – in light of their *subsequent* prominence, which consequently acquires a certain air of inevitability. To do so, the article first discusses normative conceptions of 'diversity' in a *longue durée* perspective, arguing for the emergence and contestation of hybrid and combined models of managing 'difference' during the long 19th century, prompted by the opposing tractions of efforts at homogenisation and hierarchisation. Second, it places the Minority Treaties in their immediate 1919 context, arguing that the form they took was significantly influenced also by contingent and extraneous contemporary factors, such as the expansion of the franchise after World War I or the sustained attempts to contain socialist revolutionary activity. The paper illustrates these developments by making specific reference to the situation of the Jewish minorities in Central and Eastern Europe as a case study.

Keywords: Nationalism, imperialism, minorities, diversity, Eastern Europe

Introduction

The legal codification of 'rights', however conceived, is necessarily arbitrary, just like any attempt to standardise and codify the inherent diversity of society is bound to be. While the task of legal experts and political philosophers is to argue over such arbitrariness from the perspective of its correspondence or incongruity to either practical considerations regarding consistency or ideal notions of 'fairness', it is the job of the historian to account for its specific evolution by placing it in its proper historical context. As such, the present article aims to account for the specific form a legal and, indeed, normative understanding of (certain forms of) diversity informed the so-called Minority Treaties of 1919 by historicising the evolution of certain interlocking discourses over the remit of 'rights', as well as the identity of their holders. In doing so, it seeks not only to account for why certain groups (national minorities) rather than others were singled out for protection and why the rights they were given took the form they did (cultural and linguistic), but also to position them in the context of broader debates within which they were firmly embedded. Examples of such debates span the entire range of what Holly Case has recently called 'the age of questions' – which included, just in the title of her work, *The Eastern, Social, Woman, American, Jewish, Polish, Bullion, Tuberculosis, and Many Other Questions*. The age's defining feature, in addition to the proliferation of such 'structuring ideas about society, politics, and states […] influencing the range of actions considered possible and desirable', was that such questions were at once 'highly contentious and competitive' and raised simultaneously, or 'bundled together'.[1]

A century after the sea-change of 1919, the Minority Treaties are mostly viewed looking backwards, as precursors or antecedents. Authors who hail Versailles – 'the Wilsonian moment' – and the League of Nations as the apogee of liberalism,[2] and those who lament their abysmal failure to

provide international security or protect the minorities they were designed to protect[3] are united in reading the treaties from a footing in the twenty-first century that is informed by contemporary human rights and minority protection regimes.[4] My argument here is that such a 'presentist' perspective[5] not only retrojects a certain teleological narrative that tends to read them along the familiar lines of 'progress', but bears the danger of 'naturalising' certain categories – such as 'the nation', 'the nation-state', or 'nationalism' – in light of their *subsequent* prominence, consequently acquiring a certain air of 'inevitability'. In contrast, I argue that such prominence was far from certain even as the architects of the peace sat down to give precedence to a (partial and very narrowly defined, yet posing as 'universal') idea of national 'self-determination' as the primary organising principle of international relations. This becomes even more tenuous when we turn to the nineteenth century, where the contest, interplay, and overlap between nation and empire as the dominant forms of political organisation by no means pointed to a decisive 'winner'. As such, my article places normative conceptions of 'diversity' in a *longue durée* perspective, arguing for the emergence and contestation of hybrid and combined models of managing 'difference' during this period, prompted by the opposing tractions of efforts at homogenisation and hierarchisation. Furthermore, it places the Minority Treaties in their immediate 1919 context, arguing that the form they took was significantly influenced not only by the long-term history of discourses balancing rights and notions of sovereignty, but also by contingent and extraneous contemporary factors, such as the expansion of the franchise after World War I or the sustained attempts to contain socialist revolutionary activity. Finally, on the basis of this double historical context that acts as its overarching framework, my article will turn to the unintended consequences of the 'politics of difference' designed in Paris in 1919 and their impact on the turn toward an authoritarian, right-wing form of nationalism during the interwar period, making specific reference to the situation of the Jewish

minorities in Central and Eastern Europe as a case study. With the understanding that the very broad scope my presentation seeks to cover in the space of a short article will necessarily render it schematic, even skeletal, I believe the value of historicising 'questions' related to normative definitions of alterity holds not only historical, but also political potential, pointing to the many 'roads not taken, the ideals that were not realized',[6] which hold within them the promise of change.

Strangers, Subjects, and Citizens – Recognising Difference in the Long Nineteenth Century

Seeking to trace the roots of the legal and normative conceptualisations of diversity in 1919 brings us to two related and interlocking discourses prominent among the 'questions' that marked the nineteenth century: the 'rights of man' associated with the revolutionary era; and 'humanitarianism' and its associated practice, 'humanitarian intervention'.[7] While the two are frequently conflated in interpretations that see them as 'precursors' of the contemporary 'human rights' regime,[8] the terminological confusion[9] masks a radically different scope. While the former were pursued as political projects that coalesced around liberal nationalism and were mostly concerned with defining the boundaries of the body politic, the latter (mostly) targeted and sought to improve the fortune of humans in faraway lands. The first involved co-members of an 'imagined community',[10] increasingly but not yet exclusively national, citizens, 'us'; the other was geared at strangers, 'slaves, sinners [and] savages',[11] 'them'. While both these notions were marked by the tension between the individual and the collective, the universal and the particular,[12] politically they could be at loggerheads, with the former associated with the revolutionary nation and the latter with the counter-revolutionary empire. And while nations promoted notions of popular sovereignty, empires sought to contain them and

increasingly found in 'humanitarianism' the legitimation for external intervention.[13]

That these were competing idea(l)s is a given, according to the all-too-familiar story of the nation-empire dichotomy and the former's liberation struggle from the latter. They were also espoused by different groups, with liberals calling for the accomplishment of the universal within a sovereign national community with the corresponding rights, and conservatives, especially Catholic, reclaiming the legacy of the 'universal church' for a notion of 'collective humanity' they shared with some unlikely allies in their anti-liberal ethos, including romantic socialists.[14] However, painting the picture of a mere dichotomy between nation and empire as competing forms of statal organisation blinds us to their pervasive and complex imbrication throughout the nineteenth century. First off, the immediate thing to consider is that the 'model nations' of the nineteenth century, of which France was the most prominent, were simultaneously vast and expanding colonial empires. As such, processes of national homogenisation in the metropolis ran parallel to the colonial hierarchisation of subject populations predicated on notions of civilizational superiority, with liberalism equally informing both.[15] The German unification process was undertaken not just in the name of cultural nationalism but also under the aegis of empire, just as unified Italy came to exhibit imperial ambitions of its own.[16] Meanwhile the Eastern land empires that had long been ignored by the vast literature on imperialism and colonialism were at this time engaged in nationalising projects of their own, from the nation-building efforts in the Romanov Empire after the Crimean War, through the separate paths taken by the Austrian and Hungarian parts of the Dual Monarchy after the 1867 *Ausgleich*, to the 'messy process of experimentation aimed at holding together, and indeed nationalizing, the far-flung [Ottoman] empire.'[17] As Stefan Berger and Alexei Miller argue, 'whether we think of sea-based empires in the west or contiguous empires in Central and

Eastern Europe, imperial imaginations had been vital for state formation and continued to be the dominant imaginations during the nineteenth century.'[18]

Second, the national and imperial imaginations of the nineteenth century and the attending notions of 'rights' shared multiple common origins, including their mutual genealogy in the Enlightenment. The nineteenth century was a 'progressive age', and 'if there was a word that ruled the age of questions, it was *emancipation*'.[19] Whether this translated into the gradual emancipation of social groups (women, peasants, workers) within national or imperial boundaries, of 'oppressed nations' from their imperial overlords (as in the Greek, Italian, or Polish 'questions'), or of slaves everywhere (as with the anti-slave trade and anti-slavery abolitionist campaigns that are widely regarded as the first cases of transnational humanitarian intervention),[20] the commitment to improvement bore with it moralising tones that were characteristic of the age. On the side of empire, they translated into notions of 'civilising mission' which provided the much-needed moral legitimation for colonial expansion in the name of future improvement rather than historical origins in conquest.[21] The futural orientation of such arguments legitimated domination in the present in the name of future emancipation and was deployed globally in the well-known idea of 'stages of development', with its attendant notions of the alleged 'immaturity' of colonial subjects and their ensuing 'need' for tutelage.[22] In an argument familiar at least ever since Edward Said's *Orientalism*, if

> Enlightenment universalism […] asserted the unity and fundamental equality of all humankind and its uniform capacity for civilization […] in practice, it constructed knowledge about non-Western cultures that insisted how different from, and therefore inferior to, the West they were; the knowledge acquired in this manner, tainted by the unequal power relation it inscribed, actually created the very 'Orient,' or 'Africa,' or 'Asia' that it

> purportedly only reflected. It was *this liberal production, and constant re-production, of difference*, rather than outright force or even naked greed, that enabled colonial hegemony in the modern era.[23]

Moreover, the global deployment of this production of difference was meant to some extent to mask the heterogeneity of the core, the persistence of 'internal peripheries' (e.g. of peasants yet to be made into Frenchmen) in its midst.[24]

The latter aspect points both to the abovementioned entanglement of nation-building processes and imperial expansion characteristic of nineteenth-century 'nationalizing empires', and to a third aspect accounting for this entanglement. This resided in a nexus of simultaneous structural transformations that fundamentally altered the material conditions of modernity: the global penetration of capitalism,[25] the technological revolution in media, travel and communication,[26] and, most importantly for the present argument albeit informed by both previous elements, the processes of standardisation that it set in motion, including the establishment of a universal time regime.[27] The synchronicity resulting from these processes was central both to modern nationalism, as Benedict Anderson has shown, and to what Sebastian Conrad has termed 'the globalization of the imagination'.[28] Thus, the homogenisation associated with the 'first great wave of globalization before 1914' reinforced similar tendencies playing out on the national level, and for similar reasons,[29] just as the imperial production of difference translated into patterns of inclusion and exclusion that were enacted both globally and within national polities. Standardisation and centralisation were characteristic during this period not just of 'modern' nation-states but also of (allegedly 'backward') empires, as Pieter Judson's superb history from below of the Habsburg Empire shows, just as colonial racial hierarchies could be mirrored in Vienna's linguistic policies resulting in an 'emerging and unintended hierarchy of languages

and by extension, as could be argued, of the people who spoke them.'[30] As such, the processes of standardisation and codification that Ernest Gellner identified as essential to modern nationalism appear more pertinently understood along the lines of James Scott's account of modern *states* and their attempts to render their populations 'legible'.[31] In multi-linguistic, multi-confessional and multi-ethnic polities such as the Habsburg Empire, the terms of such classification, in all their arbitrariness, became crucial political factors in determining the boundaries of future 'nationalities', themselves staking a claim to their own nation-states.[32]

The 'Eastern Question' was central to the intersection of several of the aspects briefly touched upon earlier pertaining to the delineation of 'difference' in nineteenth-century Europe. Notions of civic and political rights, humanitarian intervention, sovereignty, the 'standard of civilization',[33] the many 'national questions' it encompassed, the interplay between nations and empires, doubled by geopolitical considerations and commercial interests, all met in what was one of the 'aggregates that encompassed a variety of the aforementioned "smaller" emancipatory questions'[34] and perhaps the most important one for the present argument. Jews as a group also stood at the heart of such debates. Discussions of their status proceeded from and in all directions mentioned above, ranging from interventions in the name of humanity, through religious rights – with the role played by religion constituting a marked absence from most narratives of nineteenth-century 'rights' discourses, as well as from a lot of the literature on nationalism and empire[35] – and issues of citizenship, to their existence as a nation or their ambiguous status in the overseas colonies.

In a setting where processes of inclusion and exclusion proceeded simultaneously on national, imperial, and global scales, the position of Jews as 'citizens who combined spectacular success with irredeemable tribal foreignness'[36] was constantly negotiated, 'oscillating between that

of the prime candidates for assimilation to their radical exclusion on the basis of categories as rigid as those employed to identify "racial difference".'[37] The tension between the universal and the particular entailed in the 'Jewish question', whose paradox was famously explored by Marx in the homonymous 1843 essay,[38] thus threw into light both the global entanglement of nation-state-empire and its multifarious articulations in different spaces. Following Yuri Slezkine, we can see Jews as 'model moderns', 'the nation' as a secular rendering of Jewish 'chosenness', and modernity as 'the Jewish age' – albeit in a global framework of similar diaspora groups, whereby Jews are rendered paradigmatic merely by virtue of modernity's origins in Europe.[39] Tracing the 'Jewish question' all the way to colonial India and its displacement in the minoritisation of Muslims by Hindus, we can alternatively follow its identification by Amir Mufti 'as an early, and *exemplary*, instance of the crisis of minority that has accompanied the development of liberal-secular state and society in numerous contexts around the world.'[40] What emerged in this crisis was 'a set of paradigmatic narratives, conceptual frameworks, motifs, and formal relationships concerned with the very question of minority existence, which are then disseminated globally in the emergence, under colonial and semicolonial conditions, of the forms of modern social, political, and cultural life.'[41] We can then read these conceptual frameworks, with Dorian Bell, as the production of 'racial scalarity', where liberal imperial notions of 'stages of development' dovetailed with the distinct but mutually reinforcing economic scales (e.g. the national, the imperial, the global) entailed by the global deployment of capitalism during the late nineteenth century. Along these lines, Jews appear as 'a privileged figure of scalarity', as 'in their presumed racial liminality – classified somewhere between Occident and Orient, Europe and Africa, white and black – Jews perhaps offered a suitably elastic device for mediating between domestic and imperial varieties of difference.'[42]

This liminality or in-betweenness is acutely visible in Eastern Europe, where it holds a mirror to the self-perceptions of nation-building anti-Semites regarding their own positionality in the international order and the European colonial project. On the one hand, in emphases on their 'backwardness' and associations with 'Orientals', they performed the function of colonised non-White groups in reinforcing a sense of the 'Europeanness', 'whiteness', and modernity of East European elites. On the other, for nationalists engaged in struggles for independence from East European empires, Jews' occasional loyalties to the imperial crown were turned into accusations of their acting as agents of the 'colonisers', a feature complete with self-victimisations that compared the fate of, for example, Romanians, to that of colonial Algeria, or, at the very least, the 'white colony' of Ireland.[43] 'Caught in the crossfire of the attempts to reproduce Western Europe's colonising thrust and the fear of seeing it applied to themselves, Jews (and other select internal "others") could be portrayed alternatively by peripheral nationalising states as *standing for* both: as "backward" populations to be colonised and agents of colonisers aiming to subvert and undermine national aspirations.'[44]

Turning from process to agency and from the external constructions of 'Jewishness' by anti-Semites and philo-Semites alike to Jewish interventions on behalf of their coreligionists, their nuanced articulation in diverse spaces points to the multiple possibilities open to conceptualising alterity in the nineteenth century and responding to it in the framework of the intersecting discourses of 'rights' mentioned above. One example are the religious controversies surrounding the so-called 'Damascus Affair' of 1840 and the 'Mortara Affair' of 1858, both involving not modern, secular anti-Semitism, but 'perennial' issues (blood libel and forced conversion, respectively) in Jewish-Christian relations.[45] As Jonathan Frankel has argued, the international Jewish solidarity that emerged in the wake of these crises led to the crystallisation of processes of nationalisation that eventually culminated

in the development of Zionism following another crisis, the pogroms of 1881-1882 in the Russian Empire.[46] According to Abigail Green, this provides the 'global religious context' necessary for understanding 'the relationship between international Jewish solidarity and the pre-history of Jewish nationalism.'[47] Instead of an opposition between religion and nationalism as the bases for identification, or the latter's supplanting of the former, this example reveals their mutually reinforcing entanglement, as well as the interlocking of the national and international.

The Jewish interventions on behalf of their coreligionists in Romania for example mutated from humanitarian outrage over the drowning of four Jews expelled by the Romanian authorities at Galaţi in 1867[48] to a call for civil and political rights in the campaign led by the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* (AIU) and Gershon von Bleichröder before the 1878 Congress of Berlin, as a condition for international recognition of Romania's independence.[49] This example shows the entanglement of the otherwise distinct strands of humanitarian intervention and citizenship rights mentioned above, as well as the apparent motion from one toward the other. However, that such a mutation was a preferred option only in certain contexts is shown by a comparison of the interventions related to the 'question of Jewish minority rights' in Romania (as addressed at the Congress of Belin in 1878) and Morocco (as addressed at the Conference of Madrid in 1880).[50] The Jewish advocacy efforts diverged widely, despite the fact that the Jewish community in Morocco was much longer-standing, dating back to the Spanish expulsion of the fifteenth century and earlier still, compared to Romania, where the majority of the Jews were first or second generation Ashkenazi migrants to the principality of Moldova.[51] As such, while in Romania they aimed at coercing the government to accept Jews as 'natives with full citizenship rights', in Morocco they sought 'to preserve Jews from the disadvantages of local citizenship by maintaining the pre-modern system of consular

protection.'[52] The notable discrepancy of these policy preferences, as they occurred more or less simultaneously and as a result of advocacy by the same groups, not only demonstrated the nuanced grasp of the diversity of forms the protection of minority rights could take, but also flew in the face of the evidence that 'the overwhelming majority of Jews had far deeper roots in Muslim Morocco than they had in Christian Romania, where many had immigrated within living memory'. Consequently, such choices are 'highly revealing of the very different positions Morocco and Romania occupied internationally.'[53] Ultimately, they revealed the pervasiveness of the notions, consistent with liberal imperialism, of 'stages of development', whereby a Christian European periphery was seen as having the potential – albeit with Western tutelage – for meeting a higher civilisational standard than a Muslim non-European state. Moreover, they are also indicative of the transformation occurring at the end of the nineteenth century from a universalist language of progress and moral improvement to racially-inspired beliefs in the immutable 'inferiority' of certain cultures as a legitimation for the European colonial project.[54]

A further example confirming such a reading is that of the so-called 'Crémieux decree' of 1870, named after Adolphe Crémieux, founder of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle*, at the time acting in his capacity as Justice Minister in France during the Franco-Prussian War. The decree conferred citizenship to the 35,000 Jews in French Algeria, with the result that 'the category of indigènes became split along ethno-religious lines: Jews were made citizens, and Islam became the singular impediment for those who were not.'[55] Unlike the previous case comparing the diverging interventions on behalf of the Jewish minorities in Romania and Morocco, this is an instance that shows the politics of difference at work in distinguishing between indigenous populations within the same colonial polity with regard to their relative 'value' to the metropolitan elite, and their perceived potential for being 'civilised'.

Furthermore, the Crémieux decree did not only engender a wave of antisemitism in both metropolitan France and French Algeria, underpinned by different rationales – the former translating into Édouard Drumont's Arabophile denunciation of the decree as an act of treason in a time of war, contrasted with the valiant contribution of the Arabs to the French war effort, the latter into the far right 'Latinist' movement in Algeria which held it responsible for blurring 'the hierarchy of colonizers and colonized that underpinned the imperial enterprise' while considering the indigenous population of Algeria as primitive and barbaric irrespective of religion.[56] It also 'provoked a definitive "rupture" between Jews and Muslims in Algeria' that some authors link to the roots of the Muslim anti-Semitism still visible in France today.[57]

Even this brief excursus into issues related to the 'Jewish question' in different nineteenth-century contexts shows the diversity of modalities of addressing it, from humanitarian intervention to enfranchisement, sensitive to local contexts as well as the specific interests of imperial powers. The space these diverse but certainly related (at the very least by the fact that the agents intervening on behalf of the Jews formed a well-identifiable distinct group involved in all these cases) stories share, however, was a well-defined one, by and large corresponding to the 'Eastern Question' and its fringes. This shows not only its 'centrality […] for understanding the history of humanitarian intervention', as Davide Rodogno has argued,[58] but also how it acted as a nexus for the articulation of discourses centred on a common humanity, geared at the protection of 'strangers', with those seeking to define the boundaries of the – national and imperial – body politic. The status of the Jews in Romania after 1878, as subjects but not citizens, with none of the benefits and many of the obligations associated with citizenship, complete with an individual naturalisation law that opened a door to 'deserving' or 'useful' Jews, finds an interesting parallel further afield,

beyond the borders of the 'Eastern Question', in the similar status of the indigenous subjects in the French West African Federation, where such a law was proposed in 1907 and passed in 1912 by the Dakar administration.[59] Not only are such similarities in two otherwise patently different situations indicative of the general tension between the universalising claims of liberalism and its attendant hierarchies, but the two individual paths to naturalisation bore striking resemblances in their emphasis, in addition to 'moral rectitude', on property and 'good financial standing', as well as in their exclusion of women from their remit.[60] Moreover, by situating the Jewish minorities in Eastern Europe within or at the periphery of land empires in a common framework with overseas colonial subjects, it becomes apparent that these hierarchies, often read exclusively as racial, could be at once more and less than just that, drawing as they did on historical patterns of exclusion on grounds of religion, gender, or class. In turn, as Alice Conklin notes, the project of the French republicans to forge 'a new African humanity – one cast as much in their own moral image as marked by indelible difference' had its parallels, both ideational and logistic, in the Freycinet plan of 'building railroads throughout rural France in a conscious attempt to integrate another group of "savages," its own peasants, into both the marketplace and the nation.'[61]

To conclude, for all their dissimilarities, 'nation' and 'empire' and the corresponding '-building' processes proceeded in tandem during the long nineteenth century. While they produced and managed 'difference' in ways that varied across space and time, they certainly drew on each other, the liberal ideology that underpinned both, the dynamics of global capitalism, and the forms of social control characteristic of the modern state and its population politics.[62] Rather than a dichotomy between empire and nation or a teleological narrative that sees the (allegedly more 'modern') nation replace the (less modern) empire gradually over the course of the nineteenth century, it seems more productive to focus

on their coexistence, and acknowledge that 'there was and is no single path from empire to nation – or the other way around […] and both empires and nation-states could be transformed into something more like the other.'[63] The internal homogeneity that nationalism proclaimed failed to materialise, and hierarchies of minority (or minoritized) groups remained prominent. However, such differentiated recognition of difference allowed for a certain degree of flexibility, where in many cases, as shown above, the boundaries of the polity and the attendant 'rights' were not yet rigid, and constantly negotiated. Jane Burbank's argument for the nineteenth-century Russian Empire, that 'inclusion and difference were not antagonists but partners in the habitus of empire based on differentiated rights'[64] would thus seem a fitting summary of a century where 'empire, and not yet the nation-state, remained the dominant form of territorial organisation globally.'[65]

Making the Nation Normative: Self-Determination, Minority Rights, and the 'Wilsonian Moment'

The two interlocking but distinct strands of conceptualising rights over the long nineteenth century were fused into a joint normative framing of difference at the Paris Peace Conference. On the face of it, what Erez Manela has termed the 'Wilsonian moment' 'launched the transformation of the norms and standards of international relations that established the self-determining nation-state as the only legitimate political form throughout the globe.'[66] The normative emphasis on national sovereignty, interpretable as a culmination of the nineteenth-century emancipatory drive geared at citizenship rights, conferred it an internationally recognised status as *the model* for international relations and was rendered more meaningful domestically by a significant expansion of the franchise that however stopped short in most cases from recognising women as equals in this respect. The principle of self-

determination had its complement, and apparent limit, in the formalisation of minority rights, granting recognition to *national* communities that, for various reasons, were not seen as meeting the necessary prerequisites of statehood or were separated from their kin-state as a result of the most comprehensive redrawing of borders undertaken in history. Encompassing both within its remit, the League of Nations was established as an international organisation meant to act at once as a guarantor of the international order based on self-determination and of the protection of minorities within state borders.[67] With members such as 'Abyssinia, Siam, Iran and Turkey', the League was 'already something with a very different global reach to the old European conference.'[68]

Prompted as they were by the collapse or defeat of the Central and Eastern European empires (Austro-Hungarian, German, Ottoman, and Russian), the geographical scope of the newly formalised 'rights' was limited however for the most part to the area they covered. As such, recognition of the nation-state and of national minorities continued to be circumvented by empire, the prerogatives of the victorious ones remaining largely untouched. Although empires' 'alibis' became more sophisticated out of necessity, especially due to Wilson's opposition to an annexationist peace and to colonialism more generally, rendering 'imperialism' a bad word even among the prime imperialists, the British,[69] the ensuing tension was mostly solved through cosmetic adjustments, such as the mandates system which 'granted administrative control but not formal sovereignty to [the] victors, on the understanding that […] "the well-being and development of [those territories'] peoples form a sacred trust of civilization".'[70] In fact, the prominent nineteenth-century notion of the 'standard of civilisation' was as prominent a factor in shaping the post-war peace settlement as the 'messianic Wilsonian liberalism'[71] and it was their combination rather than the latter which rendered the Versailles Treaty a legal innovation in

international law. The imperial hierarchies it entailed were clearly visible in the mandates system, with its distinction between type A, B, and C mandates, where the latter two were according to Jan Smuts 'inhabited by barbarians, who not only cannot possibly govern themselves but to whom it would be impracticable to apply any ideas of political self-determination in the European sense.'[72] This echoed the Social Darwinist notions of the late nineteenth century, as expressed for example in James Lorimer's division of humanity 'into three zones or spheres – civilized humanity, barbarous humanity, and savage humanity.'[73]

Once more, the discrepancy in the treatment of the vestiges of the 'Eastern Question' in Eastern Europe and the Middle East through the two distinct prominent 'legal innovations of the League, […] its mandates and minorities regimes'[74] reveals the endurance of the civilisational hierarchies that were briefly addressed in the previous section in the comparison of the Jewish interventions in Romania and Morocco. This is also well illustrated by the case of a petition from Western Samoa discussed by Susan Pedersen: 'bearing the signatures of 7982 Samoan taxpayers (out of a total native tax-paying population estimated at 8500 adult men)', it clearly demonstrated political agency and capacity for self-government, a transition to which was the stated purpose of the mandates system.[75] Despite this, the petition was dismissed according to the familiar paternalism that projected immaturity and incapacity unto subjects who were meant to be protected only insofar as their claims did not challenge the system's 'assumptions of racial and civilisational difference' meant 'to legitimize the perpetuation of imperial (that is, alien and non-consensual) rule in a Wilsonian age.'[76] This helps explain why, seen through the lens of a non-European, peripheral perspective, the Paris Peace Conference 'appears as a tragedy of a different sort, as the leading peacemakers, Wilson foremost among them, failed to offer the populations of the non-European world the place in international

society that Wilson's wartime speeches had implied that they deserved. At the Wilsonian moment, Egyptians, Indians, Chinese, Koreans, and others glimpsed the promised land of self-determination, but enter into it they could not.'[77]

Placing some non-European territories beyond the pale of a narrowly-defined, European notion of 'civilisation' was doubled by the secondary status of both those new states where the principle of self-determination did apply, and of minority groups in the international legal order. As such, while Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Romania, Greece, Turkey, Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary had to acquiesce to minority protection, Finland was exempt, as were 'The Big Four', Belgium, Denmark, and, most notably, defeated Germany.[78] That the 'minority states' as they occasionally came to be called scoffed at their second-rank status – with Poles celebrating the end of 'international servitude' by lighting bonfires throughout the country when Poland left the League in September 1934[79] – should come as no surprise, insofar as the Minority Treaties marked their alleged need for tutelage on the path to 'civilisation'. Similarly, 'many German communities in the new states of Eastern Europe, long accustomed to a dominant social position, were wont to bristle at the designation "minority", which to them carried the stench of marginality.'[80] As for the Ukrainians, Ruthenians, and Belarusians, their unheard claims for self-determination and their status as 'minorities' seemed to sanction what appeared in their eyes as unfairly-drawn borders. Reflecting as they did 'some mix of strategic calculation, ethnic considerations, and victors' bounties', those borders were bound to appear arbitrary and unfair to some, although 'no demarcation line could have unscrambled the ethnic mix of Eastern Europe'[81] – especially, I would add, since the respective 'ethnic mix' was as much the product of defining 'minorities' and 'majorities' in an area characterised by a

significant degree of national indifference and fluidity as it was the cause of such definitional efforts.[82]

Moreover, beyond the disappointment of some groups or states, as Natasha Wheatley shows, the very category of 'minority', as that of mandated populations, was inherently marginal in legal terms: 'most jurists argued that to the extent that they possessed international personality (if they did at all), this personality was limited or qualified in significant ways.'[83] As new subjects of international law, they were 'fringe dwellers', 'straddling the line between legal visibility and invisibility, between international agency and its absence', likened to 'human embryos, slaves, and silhouetted specters […], linguistically birthed into damaged and disenfranchised bodies that signposted their secondary status. The implied opposite of these images – the normal, enfranchised, seemingly unmetaphorical legal person against which these deficiencies were visible – was the state.'[84] If the very existence of minority rights conjured up the old juridical debate of whether the locus of sovereignty was the nation or the nation-state, the specifics of the procedure for minority petitions clearly answered it by pointing toward the latter. Consequently, the status of the individuals and communities enjoying this hybrid legal personality could be seen, in the words of the interwar jurist Alfred Verdross, as 'similar to those people in a state who are subjects […] without political rights.'[85] The formulation recalls two of the examples provided earlier, the status of the Jews in Romania after 1878 and that of the native population in the French West African Federation, allowing us to trace its *longue durée* roots in similar hybrid forms developed in domestic contexts in the course of the long nineteenth century and putting a dent on interpretations that emphasise the 'modernist', 'experimental', or 'avant-garde' nature of interwar international law.[86]

Protecting Jews, Preserving Hierarchies, Containing Revolution – The Liberal Response to the Socialist Challenge

As was the case during the nineteenth century, the 'Jewish question' loomed large on the agenda of the Committee on New States that met in Paris in 1919 to draft the Minority Treaties. Both the immediate 'daily reports of violent pogroms in Poland' and the legacy of 'the failure of the 1878 protections in Romania' were invoked as grounds for urgently addressing the protection of the Jewish minorities, of which the one in Poland emerged as 'the paradigmatic' one.[87] As a paradigmatic minority group for whom being part of a multi-national, multi-lingual, and multi-confessional empire was much more convenient, 'from a Jewish point of view', as Mark Levene argues, 'the fragmentation of the empires, even the former tsarist Russian empire, in favour of a series of nation-states thus aroused not so much enthusiasm as sheer horror.'[88] While positions on the form such protections and rights should take varied between the different Jewish lobby groups – from the Zionism of the French *Comité des Délégations Juives* (CDJ) and the American Jewish Committee (AJC) to the assimilationist stance of the Joint Foreign Committee (JFC) of British Jews and the AIU – it is indisputable that their commitment and access to the inner sanctum of the peace conference rendered them highly influential. 'There were so many Jews in the delegations at Versailles that even Lithuania tried to include Jews in its delegation to maximise its influence.'[89] In turn, this helped fuel antisemitic sentiment in the 'new states', appearing as it did to confirm conspiratorial accounts of a concerted Jewish action dictating the terms of the peace agreement.

However, as Liliana Riga and James Kennedy note, the importance of the Jews went beyond their 'elite influence […] because of their perceived association with Bolshevism.'[90] This was certainly a new development in the dynamic of the 'Jewish Question': previously perceived exclusively as

victims in need of protection, their association with the socialist Revolution had rendered them 'dangerous'. This association led to the emergence of the 'Judeo-Bolshevism' myth in Central and Eastern Europe in 1918-1920, antedating its 'mainstreaming' in the 1930s as a result of Nazi propaganda. It harped both on previous notions linking Jews to left-wing revolutionary activity and drew on the contemporary experience of the turmoil of the Russian Civil War and the 1919 revolutions in Central Europe, from Hungary to Germany.[91] As Dan Diner and Jonathan Frankel pointed out, 'the images of Leon Trotsky standing at the head of the Red Army, and of the Jewish Chekist in leather jacket with a Mauser pistol carrying out mass liquidations, conjured up an existential threat of demonic proportions.'[92] While certainly lacking the conspiratorial elements characteristic of the myth of 'Judeo-Bolshevism' – which both drew on the already existing *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* and helped to popularise them (with 1920 marking a boom in the text's global spread) – the association, not only of Jews but of national minorities generally with the Bolshevik Revolution is well-documented, and its 'class universalism' was, according to Liliana Riga, prompted in part by 'particular imperial experiences of (socio)ethnic exclusion.'[93] As a result, 'ethnic Russians were a significant minority, but Jews, Latvians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, Poles, and others comprised nearly two-thirds of the revolutionary elite.'[94]

On the one hand, Riga's account, seeing the emergence of class universalism as the consequence of the nation- and empire-building processes at work in the nineteenth-century Tsarist Empire and their attendant hierarchisations, illustrates once more the importance of *longue durée* perspectives for understanding the structuring of difference, even for the avowed enemies of 'nationalism'. On the other hand, it explains why Wilson – and many other architects of the Versailles peace and its minority protection regime – thought that 'the Bolshevist movement had been led by the Jews' and that this was 'partly

due to the fact that they had been largely treated as outlaws.'[95] In the context of the fear of the spread of Bolshevism and especially of the establishment of a bridge between revolutionary Russia and Germany, the attempts of the Western Allies to prevent any ties between the two prominent outcasts of the post-war international order ranged from direct intervention in the Russian Civil War to the well-known policy of *cordon sanitaire* whose two pillars were Romania and Poland, 'the "Thermopylae of Western civilization," as an article in the French press put it in the spring of 1919.'[96] If this resulted in a redrawing of borders that favoured both large states (Czechoslovakia or Poland, over potential divisions that would have seen Slovaks, Ukrainians or Belarusians enjoy their own 'right' to self-determination) and 'white nations' over 'red' ones (Romania over Hungary in the drawing of a border highly favourable to the former as a prize for its intervention against the Soviet Republic of Béla Kun), it also translated into a minority regime that sought to make Jews (and other minorities) loyal to their new states by granting them protection.[97] Consequently, the 'Jewish Question', always transnational, also acquired a geopolitical dimension at Versailles. In turn, the myth of 'Judeo-Bolshevism' not only performed an important external function in post-1918 nation-building processes in Central and Eastern Europe, helping to carry over former suspicions of the Russian imperial agenda to the Soviet Union, but was also pivotal internally for 'delegitimating working-class socialist activism in an age of mass politics and universal (male) suffrage […], displacing class antagonisms and offering national alternatives for working-class mobilisation to international workers' solidarity.'[98]

As such, the specific form the minority rights designed at Versailles took can also be accounted for by seeing them in light of liberalism's opposition to socialist notions of self-determination. Both antedating Wilson's 'Fourteen Points' and much more radical in scope in their inclusion of a call for 'the unconditional and immediate liberation of the

colonies without compensation',[99] the socialist language of self-determination had however far less traction in 1919 even among colonial intellectuals, its foremost beneficiaries, let alone in Central and Eastern Europe. The explanation for this is to be found in the vast power differential between the United States, on the one hand, which 'was a leading world power whose intervention in the war had appeared to tip the scales in favor of the Allies', and 'the Bolsheviks, on the other hand, [who] were struggling for control of a land that was devastated by the war and were engaged in a brutal civil war whose outcome was far from certain.'[100] However, as the opening story of Erez Manela's *The Wilsonian Moment* – featuring 'Nguyen Tat Thanh, a twenty-eight-year-old kitchen assistant from French Indochina' who came to Paris in 1919 petitioning Wilson and seeking a personal audience with him, only to be disappointed, turning subsequently to Lenin as his inspiration, and becoming known to the world by the name of Ho Chi Minh – shows, the disillusionment of non-Europeans seeking independence from colonial empires with the Versailles peace was later translated into the popularity of Soviet socialism among anti-colonial movements 'after the collapse of the Wilsonian moment and the stabilization of the Soviet state.'[101]

Whether or not we choose to follow Arno Mayer's account of the post-war 'new diplomacy' as a result of the clash between Wilson and Lenin,[102] it is clear that the challenge socialism posed to the liberal order in 1919 was salient, at least in its *perception* as such. As shown above, the spectre its revolutionary potential invoked significantly influenced not only the reorganisation of space on the territory of the collapsed empires, but also acted as a catalyst for the establishment of a system of minority protection in an attempt to prevent minorities' 'defection' to Bolshevism. This factor further contributed to the minority rights' statist bias – they could consequently appear as 'directed more to protecting the states against their minorities than the minorities against oppression by the

state.'[103] The challenge posed by socialism also shaped the form these rights took: limited to cultural recognition, to linguistic, religious, or cultural rights, in no way did they address economic inequalities or long-term, intergenerational cases of social exclusion, even while 'culture' or 'ethnicity' often overlapped with class and status for many of the populations falling under their remit. As Riga and Kennedy emphasise, 'without access to labor markets, advanced education, and professional and bureaucratic hierarchies, cultural rights could not convert into social access. Yet these were the social locations where nationalising states did most of the excluding.'[104] This was true for the 'ethnic reversals' they discuss, which entailed rapid loss of status for former imperial elites in the new nationalising states, as it was for groups that had long been marginalised in societies (one need only think of the Roma, who did not even register as a 'minority' at this time) and whose very socio-economic exclusion translated into an absence of cultural representation. By eliding any economic considerations, the focus on 'national' or 'cultural' markers of difference artificially excised the 'national question' from the nexus of 'questions' with which it was inextricably bound, rendering it at once more salient than all others and more removed from the social realities it purported to reflect.

Conclusion

The story of the normative inscription and selective production of difference at Versailles was shaped by its circumstances, some of which were (or appeared as) immediate, urgent, and novel, while others demonstrated long-term continuities with earlier patterns of negotiating alterity in the long nineteenth century. The prioritising of certain categories over others had less to do with what minority groups 'did or did not demand for themselves' and more with 'the international arena in which those demands were made. The key issue in Paris, in other

words, was *context* not *content*.'[105] It was the multiple contexts of the 1919 politics of difference that this article has concerned itself with, projected in their intersections and incomplete overlaps over a *longue durée* that, even if it perhaps only serves to complicate matters rather than 'settle' them, hopefully opens up a space not only for questioning its failures and trying to account for them, but also for imagining alternatives. Starting from the premise of the period's many 'questions' and their entanglements, the narrative also aimed at accounting for the receding into the background of some of them (the 'social question', the 'woman question') and the privileging of a disentangled 'national question', which was to have fateful consequences.

If in the different treatment of the territories that came under its consideration (e.g. the mandates system vs. minority rights) the Paris Peace reflected the global hierarchies it eventually came to preserve, the diversity of forms of dealing with difference was replaced by a 'simple' binary scheme of majority-minority within the 'new states' where the Minority Treaties applied. This not only had the effect of reifying identities which cut across national lines, or combined national identifications with other factors (linguistic, confessional, territorial), but also of reinforcing the opposition between the groups as a result of the enforcement of a clear-cut dichotomy. This binary structure was complete with an implicit hierarchy whereby the majority group appeared as the primary repository of national rights, with minorities placed in a 'tolerated' position, while the selective applications of the respective provisions to certain states – where they constituted a 'badge of the new states' secondary status'[106] – but not others both reflected earlier notions of the 'standard of civilisation' and reinforced them. Given that their 'underlying premise was that assimilation into the civilized life of the nation was possible and desirable',[107] as well as the statist bias visible in the petition procedure, one can argue that they delivered a picture familiar already from the debates on Jewish emancipation during

the French Revolution, opening up the mutually exclusive possibilities of emancipation and assimilation as individuals or a tolerated existence as a distinct group. Meanwhile, the interstitial status of minority groups in international law, akin to subjects without full political rights, reproduced on an international level earlier provisions deployed on a national scale (e.g. Jews in Romania after 1878, colonial subjects in the French West African Federation after 1912).

The 'minority states' found compensation for their subaltern status in the international order in the affirmation of their majority status within their own borders, reproducing the normative logic of hierarchy that determined their own position internationally. With the state constituting the ultimate measure of sovereignty, prevailing legally over both sub-state groups and the supra-national League, as well as with an expansion of the franchise that rendered it more pliable to popular pressure, the legal framework developed at Versailles thus helped set the stage for the more radical form of nationalism characteristic of the interwar period. Replacing the more nuanced (if hierarchical) and fluid imperial notions of difference with a neat normative distinction between majority and minorities, this framework facilitated ever stronger associations of the state with the titular nations, translating in turn into the *denationalisation* of minority groups, their symbolic exclusion from a homogeneously imagined nation. And if 'ethnic nationalism as practiced in Warsaw or Bucharest had limited scope for assimilation', 'racial nationalism of the kind that spread across Central and Eastern Europe in the 1930s allowed none.'[108] Adding to this context the prevalent anti-communism of the interwar period, especially in the area under consideration here, as well as the ever more pronounced association of the Jews with it, especially after Hitler's coming to power, this helps explain the revolution from the right that swept the region in the 1930s, with catastrophic consequences for the Jews of Europe. Always at the centre of debates about rights, their content, scope, and

limits, that sought to prevent their victimisation, Jews (and other minority groups) would ultimately become the main victims of the consequences of a system purposely designed for their protection.

The starting and end points of this narrative, i.e. the early nineteenth century and the Paris Peace Conference, also hint toward an interesting commonality. If humanitarian interventions associated with the former arose from the 'conservative venues of the old Concert of Europe's diplomacy',[109] and if 'it was really after the defeat of Napoleon that the concept of a European civilization became fundamental to new understandings of international order and new techniques of international rule',[110] the anti-Bolshevik impetus of the Versailles Peace and its minority provisions provide a twentieth-century counterpart. With liberalism the revolutionary force to be contained in 1815 and the conservative force containing its revolutionary challenger of 1919, what these otherwise very distinct moments appear to share then is a profoundly conservative, counter-revolutionary logic. Within this logic, a universal humanity could be invoked to exorcise the spectre of national revolutions, just as, later, national self-determination could be propped as a bulwark against a socialist universalism that had grown roots in its very cracks, in the complex articulations of nation and empire with 'difference'.

Without making any claims for the relevance of this account to contemporary human rights and minority protection regimes, it should become clear that historicising their evolution in their proper contexts allows a different vantage point than the one provided by presentist assumptions and the story of 'progress' they tend to retroject. Long-term continuities appear as important as ruptures, watersheds that are held to inaugurate novel forms of conceptualising alterity. Along these lines, more remains to be said about the eventual failure of the interwar system of minority rights and the suspicions of it (according to the notion that 'every protected minority will ultimately find its Henlein'[111]) that led

to the establishment of a human rights regime whose scope was broader only insofar as its content was thinner, more abstract, and more difficult to enforce. More can be said from this *longue durée* perspective also for the return of minority protection after the end of the Cold War, designed for an area that insistently recalls the 'Eastern Question' and with a statist bias reminiscent of the one that had plagued the League of Nations in the interwar period. While such issues remain beyond the scope of this article, it might hopefully provide a platform inspiring studies of the complex and fluid articulations of 'diversity', across time and space and at the meeting points of global processes and local geographies of difference, to consider the endurance of echoes of their origins in the 'rights' discourses of the nineteenth century and their attendant hierarchies: colonial, racist, hegemonic.

Endnotes

[1] H. Case, *The Age of Questions: Or, A First Attempt at an Aggregate History of the Eastern, Social, Woman, American, Jewish, Polish, Bullion, Tuberculosis, and Many Other Questions over the Nineteenth Century, and Beyond* (Princeton NJ, 2018), xv, 4, 6.

[2] J. Jackson Preece, *National Minorities and the European Nation-States System* (Oxford, 1998).

[3] C. Fink, *Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878-1938* (Cambridge, 2004).

[4] See e.g. M. Barnett, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca NJ, 2011); S. Stuurman, *The Invention of Humanity: Equality and Cultural Difference in World History* (Cambridge MA, 2017).

[5] These "presentist assumptions" when dealing with such subjects of high contemporary political relevance are also noted by Abigail Green in her review article on nineteenth century humanitarianism. See A. Green, 'Humanitarianism

in Nineteenth-Century Context: Religious, Gendered, National', in: *The Historical Journal* 57/4 (2014), 1157-1175.

[6] J. Leerssen, *National Thought in Europe: A Cultural History*, Amsterdam 2006, 18.

[7] See S. Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge MA, 2012), especially 11-43.

[8] Barnett, *Empire of Humanity*, 57-94.

[9] In French and German, the eighteenth-century terms 'droits de l'homme' and 'Menschenrechte' remain applicable to contemporary human rights. See A. Green, 'Humanitarianism in Nineteenth-Century Context', 1161.

[10] B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, 1983).

[11] Barnett, *Empire of Humanity*, 57-75.

[12] As Samuel Moyn notes, the emblematic figure of the Risorgimento, Giuseppe Mazzini, had emblazoned "Liberty, Equality, Humanity" on one side of the banner of Young Italy, and "Unity, Independence" on the other side. Of the two, the latter took precedence, as Mazzini proclaimed that "the epoch of individuality is concluded" and outside of the nation-state "you have no name, token voice, nor rights, no admission to the fellowship of the peoples. You are the bastards of Humanity". Moyn, *The Last Utopia*, 29; Y. Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism* (Princeton NJ, 1993), 124.

[13] Barnett, *Empire of Humanity*, 49-94; D. Rodogno, *Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815-1914: The Emergence of a European Concept and International Practice* (Princeton NJ, 2012).

[14] The similarities between two otherwise very different groups, Catholic conservatives and romantic socialists, and the degree to which the latter were indebted to the "universal community posited by Christianity" was noted by the liberal opponents of both. N. Andrews, 'The Romantic Socialist Origins of Humanitarianism', in: *Modern Intellectual History* (2019), 13, 17-22.

[15] J. Pitts, *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France* (Princeton NJ, 2009).

[16] See e.g. S. Conrad and J. Osterhammel (eds.), *Das Kaiserreich transnational. Deutschland in der Welt 1871-1914* (Göttingen, 2014); N. Labanca, *Oltremare: La storia dell'espansione coloniale italiana* (Bologna, 2002), especially 15-56.

[17] D. Moon, 'Peasants into Russian Citizens? A Comparative Perspective', in: *Revolutionary Russia* 9/1 (1996) 43-81; P. Judson, *The Habsburg Empire: A New History* (Cambridge MA, 2016); H. Eissenstat, 'Modernization, Imperial Nationalism, and the Ethnicization of Confessional Identity in the Late Ottoman Empire', in: A. Miller and S. Berger (eds.), *Nationalizing Empires* (Budapest, 2015), 429.

[18] S. Berger and A. Miller, 'Building Nations in and with Empires – A Reassessment', in *Nationalizing Empires*, 2.

[19] Case, *The Age of Questions*, 72.

[20] L.C. Jennings, *French Antislavery: The Movement for the Abolition of Slavery in France, 1802–1848* (Cambridge, 2000); C.L. Brown, *Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism* (Chapel Hill, 2006); H.T. David, 'Transnational Advocacy in the Eighteenth Century: Transatlantic Activism and the Anti-Slavery Movement', in: *Global Networks* 7/3 (2007), 367-382.

[21] K. Matena, 'The Crisis of Liberal Imperialism', in: D. Bell (ed.), *Victorian Visions of Global Order* (Cambridge, 2007), 113-135; K. Matena, *Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism* (Princeton NJ, 2010). Of course, notions of 'civilising mission' helped legitimate unspeakable violence – as the French jurist Charles Salomon who read it as "pure hypocrisy that sought only the advancement of commerce" put it in his 1889 book on the subject, "no word is more vague and has permitted the commission of more crimes than that of civilization". Cited in M. Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-1960* (Cambridge, 2004), 106.

[22] J. Fabian, *Time and the Other. How Anthropology Makes its Object* (New York, 1983).

[23] A. Conklin, 'Colonialism and Human Rights, A Contradiction in Terms? The Case of France and West Africa, 1895-1914', in: *American Historical Review* 103/2 (1998), 422 (emphasis added).

[24] H. Harootunian, 'Remembering the Historical Present', in: *Critical Enquiry* 33/3 (2007), 471-494; E. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914* (London, 1977).

[25] T. Haskell, 'Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensibility, Part 1', in: *American Historical Review* 90/2 (1985), 339-361; 'Capitalism and the Origins of the Humanitarian Sensibility, Part 2', in: *American Historical Review* 90/3 (1985), 547-566.

[26] The importance of print capitalism for the emergence of nationalism is emphasised by Benedict Anderson, in his landmark *Imagined Communities*. For an argument about the importance of the novel and new media technologies in the development of a humanitarian sensibility, see L. Hunt, *Inventing Human Rights* (New York, 2007).

[27] S. Conrad, '"Nothing is the Way it should be": Global Transformations of the Time Regime in the Nineteenth Century', in: *Modern Intellectual History* 14/1 (2017), 1-28. See also J. Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung der Welt: Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Munich, 2009).

[28] Conrad, '"Nothing is the Way it should be"', 9.

[29] J. Osterhammel, 'Nationalism and Globalization', in: J. Breuilly (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism* (Oxford, 2013), 705. See also E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford, 1983).

[30] Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 88.

[31] J. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven CT, 1998).

[32] R. Stergar and T. Scheer, 'Ethnic Boxes: The Unintended Consequences of Habsburg Bureaucratic Classification', in: *Nationalities Papers* 46/4 (2018), 575-591 (especially 579-584).

[33] See G.W. Gong, The Standard of 'Civilization', in: *International Society* (Oxford, 1984) for the classic account on this topic.

[34] Case, *The Age of Questions*, 79.

[35] A. Green, 'Nationalism and the "Jewish International": Religious Internationalism in Europe and the Middle East c. 1840-c. 1880', in: *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 50/2 (2008), 535-558.

[36] Y. Slezkine, *The Jewish Century* (Princeton NJ, 2004), 12.

[37] R. Cârstocea and É. Kovács, 'The Centre Does Not Hold: Antisemitisms in the Peripheries between the Imperial, the Colonial and the National', in: R. Cârstocea and É. Kovács (eds.), *Modern Antisemitisms in the Peripheries: Europe and its Colonies, 1880-1945* (Vienna, 2019), 34.

[38] K. Marx, 'On the Jewish Question', in: R.C. Tucker (ed.), *The Marx-Engels Reader* (New York, 1978), 26-52.

[39] In Slezkine's interpretation Jews are seen as part of a broader category of "Mercurians" or "service nomads" to be found across the globe, "permanent strangers" among the sedentary, agrarian societies in the midst of which they resided, "performing tasks that the natives were unable or unwilling to perform". If they eventually came to epitomise 'Mercurianism' everywhere, it was because they were the foremost such group in Europe. As such, modernity as "the Age of Universal Mercurianism became Jewish because it began in Europe". Slezkine, *The Jewish Century*, 11, 14, 47. See also A.D. Smith, *Chosen Peoples* (Oxford, 2003).

[40] A. Mufti, *Enlightenment in the Colony: The Jewish Question and the Crisis of Postcolonial Culture* (Princeton NJ, 2007), 7.

[41] Ibid, 2.

[42] D. Bell, *Globalizing Race: Antisemitism and Empire in French and European Culture* (Evanston IL, 2018), 28.

[43] A. Sorescu, *Visions of Agency: Imagining Individual and Collective Action in Nineteenth-Century Romania* (PhD Dissertation, London 2018), 188-189.

[44] Cârstocea and Kovács, 'The Centre Does Not Hold', 34.

[45] Green, 'Nationalism and the "Jewish International"', 540-541.

[46] J. Frankel, *The Damascus Affair: 'Ritual Murder,' Politics, and the Jews in 1840* (Cambridge, 1997), 2-5.

[47] Green, 'Nationalism and the "Jewish International"', 541.

[48] S. Johnson, *Pogroms, Peasants, Jews: Britain and Eastern Europe's 'Jewish Question,' 1867-1925* (Basingstoke, 2011), 16-23.

[49] R. Cârstocea, 'Uneasy Twins? The Entangled Histories of Jewish Emancipation and Anti-Semitism in Romania and Hungary, 1866-1913', in: *Slovo* 21/2 (2009), 64-85.

[50] A. Green, 'The Limits of Intervention: Coercive Diplomacy and the Jewish Question in the Nineteenth Century', in: *The International History Review* 36/3 (2014), 473.

[51] With the exception of a small Sephardic community in Wallachia.

[52] Green, 'The Limits of Intervention', 483.

[53] Ibid.

[54] K. Mantena, *Alibis of Empire.*

[55] J. Katz, 'An Imperial Entanglement: Anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and Colonialism', in: *American Historical Review* 123/4 (2018), 1201. See also L. Blévis, 'Les avatars de la citoyenneté en Algérie coloniale ou les paradoxes d'une catégorisation', in: *Droit et société* 2/48 (2001), 557-580.

[56] Katz, 'An Imperial Entanglement', 1197-1198. See also L.M. Leff, *Sacred Bonds of Solidarity: The Rise of Jewish Internationalism in Nineteenth-Century France* (Stanford, 2006), 207-228; J. Schreier, *Arabs of the Jewish Faith: The Civilizing Mission in Colonial Algeria* (New Brunswick NJ, 2010).

[57] See Bell, *Globalizing Race*, 14.

[58] Rodogno, *Against Massacre*, 17.

[59] C. Iordachi, 'The Unyielding Boundaries of Citizenship: The Emancipation of "Non-Citizens" in Romania, 1866–1918', in: *European Review of History* 8/2 (2001), 157-186; W.A. Oldson, *A Providential Anti-Semitism: Nationalism and Polity in Nineteenth Century Romania* (Philadelphia, 1991); Conklin, 'Colonialism and Human Rights', 434-442.

[60] Conklin, 'Colonialism and Human Rights', 434-435.

[61] Ibid, 430, 432. See Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, 209-211, 471-496.

[62] S. Conrad, 'Rethinking German Colonialism in a Global Age', in: *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 41/4 (2013), 553-558. Conrad refers to Ann Laura Stoler and Carole McGranahan's identification of colonial practices at work also in metropolitan contexts (as evident in the use of the terms *colonie* and *colon* for institutions as diverse as penal colonies – be they metropolitan or overseas – orphanages, state institutions for paupers, agricultural colonies of education, etc.) and their general focus on the practices of empire as 'imperial formations'. See A.L. Stoler, C. McGranahan and P.C. Purdue (eds.), *Imperial Formations* (Santa Fe NM, 2007).

[63] J. Burbank and F. Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton NJ, 2010), 9.

[64] J. Burbank, 'The Rights of Difference: Law and Citizenship in the Russian Empire', in: Stoler et al. (eds.), *Imperial Formations*, 78.

[65] J. Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung*, 615.

[66] E. Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford, 2007), 5.

[67] For a history of the Paris Peace Conference, see M. MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World* (New York, 2002).

[68] M. Mazower, 'An International Civilization? Empire, Internationalism and the Crisis of the Mid-Twentieth Century', in: *International Affairs* 82/3 (2006), 559.

[69] Mazower quotes a conversation between Arthur Balfour and Robert Cecil in December 1918 where the French and Italians are pejoratively identified as 'imperialists'. Ibid.

[70] S. Pedersen, 'Back to the League of Nations', in: *American Historical Review* 112/4 (2007), 1103.

[71] Mazower, 'An International Civilization?', 559.

[72] Cited in A.W. Brian Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention* (Oxford, 2001), 146. Type A mandates comprised the Ottoman Middle East, type B mandates most of German Africa, and type C mandates the former German colonies in the Pacific, as well as South West Africa. Pedersen, 'Back to the League of Nations', 1103.

[73] Gong, 'The Standard of 'Civilization', 49.

[74] N. Wheatley, 'New Subjects in International Law and Order', in: G. Sluga and P. Clavin (eds.), *Internationalisms: A Twentieth-Century History* (Cambridge, 2017), 267.

[75] S. Pedersen, 'Samoa on the World Stage: Petitions and Peoples before the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations', in: *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 40/2 (2012), 231.

[76] Ibid, 253.

[77] Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*, 225.

[78] H. Rosting, 'Protection of Minorities by the League of Nations', in: *The American Journal of International Law* 17/4 (1923), 647-648; J. Preece, *National Minorities*, 73-74; C. Fink, 'The Paris Peace Conference and the Question of Minority Rights', in: *Peace and Change* 21/3 (1996), 280-281. Although Finland was together with Sweden party to the Åland Islands Agreement of 1921, hailed as one of the few successes of the interwar system of minority protection, this "was not a condition of Finland's admission to the League of Nations and does not appear in the treaty series of the League of Nations but only in the Council minutes of 27 June 1921". J. Jackson-Preece, 'Minority Rights in Europe: From Westphalia to Helsinki', in: *Review of International Studies* 23/1 (1997), 83.

[79] Fink, 'The Paris Peace Conference', 284.

[80] Wheatley, 'New Subjects', 282.

[81] Pedersen, 'Back to the League of Nations', 1099.

[82] See e.g. J. Bjork, *Neither German nor Pole: Catholicism and National Indifference in a Central European Borderland* (Ann Arbor MI, 2008); T. Zahra, 'Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis', in: *Slavic Review* 69/1 (2010), 93-119.

[83] N. Wheatley, 'Spectral Legal Personality in Interwar International Law: On New Ways of Not Being a State', in: *Law and History Review* 35/3 (2017), 756.

[84] Ibid, 756, 765.

[85] Cited in Ibid, 781 (emphasis added).

[86] See N. Berman, '"But the Alternative Is Despair": European Nationalism and the Modernist Renewal of International Law', in: *Harvard Law Review* 106/8 (1993), 1792-1903.

[87] L. Riga and J. Kennedy, 'Tolerant Majorities, Loyal Minorities and "Ethnic Reversals": Constructing Minority Rights at Versailles 1919', in: *Nations and Nationalism* 15/3 (2009), 470-471.

[88] M. Levene, 'Nationalism and Its Alternatives in the International Arena: The Jewish Question at Paris, 1919', in: *Journal of Contemporary History* 28/3 (1993), 516.

[89] Ibid, 513-514, 521-522. Riga and Kennedy, 'Tolerant Majorities', 469.

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[92] D. Diner and J. Frankel, 'Jews and Communism. The Utopian Temptation', in: J. Frankel (ed.), *Dark Times, Dire Decisions. Jews and Communism* (Oxford, 2004), 5.

[93] L. Riga, 'The Ethnic Roots of Class Universalism. Rethinking the "Russian" Revolutionary Elite', in: *American Journal of Sociology* 114/3 (2008), 650; L. Riga, *The Bolsheviks and the Russian Empire* (Cambridge, 2012).

[94] Ibid, 4.

[95] Lloyd George, cited in Riga and Kennedy, 'Tolerant Majorities', 474.

[96] D. Diner, *Cataclysms. A History of the Twentieth Century from Europe's Edge* (Madison WI, 2008), 68.

[97] Ibid, 64-76. Riga and Kennedy, 'Tolerant Majorities', 474-476.

[98] Cârstocea and Kovács, 'The Centre Does Not Hold', 39-40.

[99] V.I. Lenin, *Marxism and Nationalism* (Melbourne, 2002 [1916]), 140.

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[101] Ibid, 3-4, 7.

[102] A.J. Mayer, *Wilson vs. Lenin: Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918* (Cleveland OH, 1964).

[103] A. Cobban, *The Nation State and National Self-Determination* (New York, 1970), 88.

[104] Riga and Kennedy, 'Tolerant Majorities', 478. This is further proven by the fact that "appeals to the League in the interwar years were not cultural, but economic". Ibid.

[105] Levene, 'Nationalism and its Alternatives', 514.

[106] Mazower, 'An International Civilization', 560.

[107] M. Mazower, 'Minorities and the League of Nations in Interwar Europe', in: *Daedalus* 126/2 (1997), 53.

[108] Mazower, 'Minorities', 54.

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[110] Mazower, 'An International Civilization', 554.

[111] I. Claude, *National Minorities: An International Problem* (Cambridge MA, 1955), 57.

National Frameworks: Reflections on the Construction of National Interests and Political Agendas in Interwar Europe

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This article explores the relationship that exists between ideology and political interest and applies it to the study of the international system that arose in Europe after the First World War. Following Alexander Wendt's approach to identity as a socializing process, we have underscored the extent to which the principles of the Versailles system affected its member's identities and goals. Because these assumptions derived from the national narratives that had become widespread in Europe during the previous decades, the new international framework became decisively modelled in accord to nationalist ideas. In turn, this meant that member states were socialised within an environment in which nationalist claims and interests could be perceived as legitimate. By depicting nations as the product of narrative practices, this research tries to shed light on the ways in which the institutionalised logic of national discourse influenced international developments after 1920. To do so, a general examination of some political instability issues in interwar Europe will be provided so as to analyse the degree to which nationalist assumptions shaped them. Finally, we argue that this framework had enormous consequences not just for minority and border populations which became increasingly regarded as factors of instability, but also for the broader objective of the Versailles system of maintaining a specific balance of power in Europe.

Keywords: National identity; Narration; International institutions; National minorities; International legitimacy.

Introduction

It is common for historians, sociologists, and other scholars to face a problematic question when they must consider the motives behind the behaviour of political actors. The matter, particularly apparent when we analyse nationalism as a political doctrine, is that of the instrumentalization of ideological claims.

The issue can be briefly summarised. Political analysts and academic researchers alike tend to differentiate ideological or propagandistic claims from other sets of considerations – such as economic, ideological, or geo-strategic factors – which we may describe as *realpolitik*. Behind this difference lies an assumption that portrays ideology and propaganda as being merely disguised and embellished forms that conceal *realpolitikal* motivations. This distinction, in turn, has strong implications for the study of political phenomena. If we, as researchers, acknowledge that these *realpolitikal* motives encompass the deepest level of explanatory factors for the behaviour of a given actor, why should we bother analysing those claims whose purpose is solely to conceal or make them more acceptable?

In the case of nationalism, the consequences of this question have been overwhelming. Many of the most famous studies on nationalism as an ideology – e.g. those of Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, or John Breuilly – have tended to dismiss nationalist texts as rhetorical propaganda and look for the deepest roots of the ideas of national identity elsewhere.[1] As Ernest Gellner himself summarised, they thought that 'we shall not learn too much about nationalism from the study of its own prophets.'[2]

Some researchers, particularly the ethno-symbolic current led by Anthony D. Smith, have tried to provide a counterbalance by showing that the contents of national identity can't be created out of thin air and

have been historically based on previously existent ideas of communal belonging.[3] At the same time, authors such as Benedict Anderson and Prasenjit Duara have paid strong attention to how the particular way of imagining the nation has shaped the resultant national identities.[4] Despite these efforts, however, strong modernist positions such as Hobsbawm's, Gellner's, or Breuilly's still find widespread support.

This identification of 'nationalist discourse' as a tool – a means towards an end –, at least from a 'modernist' theoretical standpoint, has brought the problematic tension between propaganda and *realpolitik* to the front. Scholars have thus been presented with two options: either they have accepted the essentialist positions defended by nationalist discourse (for example, by uncritically acknowledging the idea that national communities possess certain 'rights') and considered them sufficiently self-explanatory;[5] or they have argued that *realpolitikal* motivations are the only ones that ultimately matter, without explaining why nationalist claims were adduced by these actors to begin with. In this article I defend that both positions are heavily flawed, and that the solution to this contradiction must come from the removal of such extreme divisions between propaganda and *realpolitik*.

It is particularly important to pay attention to this discussion if we want to study the years that followed the First World War. This period has traditionally been described as one in which nationalist ideologies shaped the internal and external agendas of several European states. For instance, and especially in the case of Germany, the activities of these states have been described as attempts to revoke or alter the unfavourable terms that resulted from the signing of the peace in 1919.[6] This article will try to present a different approach, i.e. that the international norms of the moment, embodied most notably in the postwar peace treaties and in the League of Nations, allowed these

national claims to achieve legitimacy, and permitted the development of the nationalist agendas which, ultimately, would weaken the structural integrity of the whole system.

But what was the process by which these nationalist claims came to be seen as legitimate on the international stage? It is the objective of this article to answer this question. It will be argued that nationalist discourse heavily affected the Versailles system, and a brief summary of the nature and core assumptions of this national framework will be outlined. Then, evidence of the presence of these core assumptions will be provided by analysing some fundamental documents of the international society of interwar Europe, and I will explore the influence that national discourse had in the post-1919 system. Finally, the consequences of this impact will be analysed. To do so, an overall examination of some political instability issues in interwar Europe will be provided to make clear to what degree nationalist assumptions were responsible for them. The review will conclude with a series of reflections on the consequences that the influence of nationalist discourse in the Versailles system had for border populations and national minorities.

National narrative assumptions

Nations can be described as the result of particular narratives of identity and descent. As such, they are not particularly dissimilar from other products of narratives such as religions, *ethnies* (to use Anthony D. Smith's germane term), races, clans, and (arguably) any other community beyond the most basic familiar ties.[7] If we accept that different kinds of narrative produce different kinds of communities, the important fact is, then, to ascertain what makes national narratives unique amongst them.

When we analyse these narratives, especially those that have such global extension as the national idea, it is fundamental to focus first on distinguishing their constituents. Nations cannot be imagined in whatever shape, and this is evidenced by the fact that we can easily recognise various phenomena, in different locations and periods, as particular manifestations of nationalist ideas. In fact, nations are built around a few particular and unchanging notions – which we will term 'core national assumptions' – which, when combined, produce a pattern that frames the way in which a community can be conceived. Apart from these core national assumptions, there exist other 'variable elements', which fill this textual skeleton and relate it to particular temporal, geographical, or social coordinates. In the case of religious narratives, for example, faith (understood broadly as an unfalsifiable belief) constitutes one of its core assumptions, whereas the belief in the resurrection of the souls, on the contrary, would be a 'variable' element which connects the general notion of faith only to particular periods, locations, and cultural and social environments. In short, core national assumptions provide the unchanging structure of national narratives, while variable elements complete and provide content to this textual template.[8]

In the case of national narratives, eight core assumptions have been isolated as producers of this textual pattern. We have termed these notions unity, community, continuity, sovereignty, purity, historical subjecthood, representation, and international global spatiality. Although it is not the objective of this article to provide an exhaustive description of each of these elements, a brief summary of them is necessary.[9]

The concept of **unity** establishes that nations exist and that they are homogeneous, natural communities that possess a unique, distinct character. They allegedly share a powerful common bond (which can be

imagined as a blood connection, or as a language link, or as any other one) and also unified interests, goals, and preferences.[10] The idea of **community** defends that a nation is always made up of an ample number of individuals, and that important events are those which are caused by or affect this large group. By the notion of **continuity**, it is possible to imagine nations as 'communities not just of the living but of the living in continuity with the dead and the yet unborn';[11] that is, as communities which remain fundamentally unaltered over time and space, in spite of changing circumstances. The assumption of **sovereignty** establishes that nations possess inherent political rights. One of those is the right to (a certain degree of) self- government, and, as a result, that the nation-state is the political expression of the national community. The idea of national **purity** portrays nations as self-contained communities, which need no external input to develop themselves. Therefore, it designates the influence of one nation upon another (be it political, linguistic, social, artistic, or of any other kind) as an expression of power and as a force that must be resisted. The term **historical subjecthood** embodies the notion that any particular element in a national narrative must be selected, explained, and evaluated from the standpoint of the national community, and that national history portrays the evolution of this group towards its ultimate fulfilment (often, but not uniquely, national self-government). To achieve this goal, nations can be **represented** by individuals or institutions, or, in other words, are capable of embodying their needs and interests in historical actors that advance their natural evolution.[12] Finally, nations must exist in a world of formally equal nations which in turn possess all the assumptions and rights mentioned above, each established in its own territory and within a definite set of borders. This idea has been termed **international global spatiality**. These eight elements, when combined, produce the basic template of national narratives, i.e. the textual structure that distinguishes them from other kind of narratives.

Although they may seem a bit abstract, these assumptions have direct consequences for the international system of post-1919 Europe. After being developed and popularised in the decades prior to the First World War, national narratives (and their core assumptions) were capable of influencing the norms that ruled the international society of the period. As a result, they inherited the ideological framework of national narratives, as well as their own intrinsic contradictions. Eventually, this influence would have enormous consequences both for the existent national minorities in the newly created countries as well as for the Versailles system at large.

Two documents, produced in the later stages of the war and around the time the Treaty of Versailles was being discussed, provide evidence of this assertion. The *Declaration of Independence of the Czechoslovak Nation* (October 1918) and the *Declaration of Irish Independence* (January 1919) are, due to their very nature, texts with an international vocation, written to be accepted by audiences both internal and external to the national group. In this way, both documents provide valuable insight on the kind of arguments that national communities were expected to provide in order to be considered entitled to independent statehood in the late 1910s.

The aforementioned narrative structure can certainly be observed in the case of the *Declaration of Independence of the Czechoslovak Nation*, published on 18 October 1918 by the Provisional Government based in Paris:[13]

> We [the Provisional Government] do this [declaration] because of our belief that no people should be forced to live under a sovereignty which they do not recognize, and because of our knowledge and firm conviction that our nation cannot freely develop in a Hapsburg (*sic)* mock-federation, which is only a new

> form of the denationalizing oppression under which we have suffered for the past three hundred years.[14]

This portrayal of the Czechoslovak nation is heavily indebted to the core national assumptions exposed above. To begin with, it is stated that the Czechoslovak nation possesses the right to choose its sovereigns. This right is extended, then, to every other people, thus seemingly referencing an international system of formally equal nations.

Habsburg rule is consequently presented as opposed to the natural right of the Czechoslovak nation, and the lack of legitimacy of the dynasty is evidenced, in the eyes of the Provisional Government, by three arguments. First, Habsburg rule is not legitimate because it is not recognised by the nation itself, which, as defined by the core national assumptions, is a politically sovereign community. Secondly, the Habsburgs are unfit to govern the Czechoslovaks because their leadership constitutes a hindrance to the 'free development' of the nation, defined as an evolving community towards completion. As the role of the dynasty in Czechoslovak national history has not been to push it towards advancement, but exactly the opposite, it cannot be thought of as a representative of the national community. Finally, as 'denationalizing' monarchs, the Habsburg 'oppress' the Czechoslovaks and threaten their existence as a people. These three claims, which aim at presenting Habsburg rule as non-legitimate, had their roots in the core assumptions of national narratives.

It is possible to find additional support to defend the claim for Czechoslovak statehood further into the text. For example, the notion of national continuity lies at the foundation of the identification between a political institution which had existed in the seventh century and the new Czechoslovak nation-state. Moreover, it is under the light of this argument that the reunification of Bohemia and Slovakia as part of the

same national body is advocated.[15] This project is presented as a 'right', and thus it is offered as a universally valid argument by which any nation has the prerogative to create a nation-state that encompasses all its nationals.

The notion of a global international space as a natural way of imagining the world served the Provisional Government not only to defend Czechoslovak independence, but also to present Habsburg unfitness to rule:

> We cannot and will not continue to live under the rule, direct or indirect, of the violators of Belgium, France, and Serbia […]. We will not remain a part of a State which has no justification for existence, and which, refusing to accept the fundamental principles of modern-world organization, remains only an artificial and immoral political structure, hindering every movement toward democratic and social progress. The Hapsburg *(sic)* dynasty (…) is a perpetual menace to the peace of the world, and we deem it our duty toward humanity and civilization to aid in bringing about its downfall and destruction.[16]

The violation of the sovereignty of other peoples by the dynasty is exposed in this excerpt as a valid argument for demanding independence. Once again, Czechoslovakia is not presented as a one-of-a-kind entity, but as a member of a community of nations with each possessing a claim to equal rights and goals. This idea is reiterated by emphasising the Habsburg state as an 'artificial' political structure (in opposition to the 'natural' Czechoslovak nation) and by depicting it as a threat to the international system. The conclusion to be extracted from all this is, in the eyes of the Provisional Government, evident: whereas the Habsburg dynasty has no 'justification for existence', a new Czechoslovak nation-state would possess all the necessary legitimacy from the

perspective of national narrative assumptions.

A similar logic of argumentation can be found in the 1919 *Declaration of Irish Independence*. Just at the start of the text we encounter the following heading: 'Whereas the Irish people is by right a free people…'[17] As in the case of the previous document, the natural existence of national communities and the recognition of their inherent rights is underscored. Following this assertion, the lack of legitimacy of the British government is brought to the front, the main argument for this being its opposition to the 'declared will of the people'. In the face of this situation, national independence is portrayed as the only way of promoting 'the common weal' and of constituting 'a national polity based upon the people's will.' The Declaration concludes with an interesting remark:

> Now, therefore, we, the elected Representatives of the ancient Irish people in National Parliament assembled, do, in the name of the Irish Nation, ratify the establishment of the Irish Republic and pledge ourselves and our people to make this declaration effective by every means at our command.[18]

Once again, this fragment allows us to observe ideas influenced by the core assumptions of national narratives. Whereas the 'representatives' of the nation claim 'sovereignty' in the name of the 'people', the British rule is referred to as an 'occupation' and an 'usurpation'. The continuity existent between the present and the past of the Irish nation, a fundamental ingredient of any national narrative, is emphasised through the use of the adjective 'ancient'. This continuous experience – embodied in a particular understanding of the communal past as the defence of Irish independence and as a permanent series of struggles against English rule – provides Irish nationalists with the ultimate legitimising argument. Irish national rights, even during the long years of 'foreign' invasion, had been safeguarded and maintained, and could therefore still

supply the necessary foundations for an Irish nation-state.

The influence of national narratives on the Versailles system

National narratives were ubiquitous by 1919, and as we have seen in the cases of the Czechoslovak and Irish declarations of independence, notions stemming from them were considered convincing enough so as to be used to legitimise the creation of these two states. This should not surprise us: a declaration of independence is certainly the kind of text in which one would expect to find a national narrative. Nonetheless, they were far from an exception. Once the war concluded, the treaties and norms that shaped the peace and the international society of interwar Europe were also deeply influenced by the same logic that originated from the core assumptions of national narratives.

As a matter of example, let us observe how these notions manifested themselves in the Treaty of Versailles and in the proposals for a new international society that this text contained. The Covenant of the League of Nations, for instance, was founded on the idea that every member would be equal, sovereign, and independent, a remark specifically stated in Article 10 of the document.[19] However, a few articles later, in Article 22, it can be found that not every people would be capable of exercising these rights, given that some of them are not 'yet able to stand by themselves.' At first glance, there seems to exist a contradiction between these two claims, but, from the standpoint of the core national assumptions, they actually make perfect sense.

We have explained that one of the constituents of national narratives presented national history as a developmental account. Progress in this

development was produced via the historical agency of remarked individuals or institutions who, allegedly, represented national rights and interests.[20] The climax of these national histories, however, required achieving total national self-consciousness and abandoning the need of this kind of personal representation. As every nation was on the path towards this goal, it was possible to think of the relative position of each one of them in comparison to the others. According to this comparative perspective, some peoples had been historically capable of exercising and defending their national rights, whereas others had not been, and, therefore, had renounced any national claim and were rightfully conquered or controlled by others.[21]

By keeping this notion in mind, the seeming contradiction between a system of independent, sovereign states, and the text of Article 22 can be alleviated. The core national assumption of an international system of formally equal nations is not necessarily at odds with a hierarchy of human groups. In this regard, the Treaty already makes an attempt at this, by dividing them into two categories: the (nationally) conscious, and the un-conscious. This division has enormous consequences, of course, if we take into account the imperialist idea, also present in the Covenant, by which the latter group had to be 'entrusted to advanced nations' to assist in their development.[22] However, we should not consider it solely as a concession to imperialist powers, but as a result – unfortunate, of course, for the subjected populations – of the application of national narrative assumptions to the norms of the new international society.

The rest of the Treaty of Versailles is also deeply influenced by ideas of national belonging and identity which had been popularised in the previous decades. For instance, a great deal of effort was directed at creating homogenous, cohesive political entities in Europe. The roots of this determination rested on the idea that fostering a community of culture and interest was the best way to avoid instability: exactly what

national narratives had been advocating with their claims of producing states that coincided with peoples united by a national 'essence' or 'race'. In this manner, the Treaty embraced the same logic that had been at work in the *Declaration of Independence of the Czechoslovak Nation*, when the Provisional Government condemned the Habsburgs. If peace had to be maintained, instability had to be reduced to a minimum; for this to happen, every 'artificial' barrier ought to be erased and new, more natural borders should be placed instead. A non-national state, comprised of a myriad of different peoples, was not just ill-fitted for the modern world of nations; it was, from the ideological standpoint of the new international system, a threat to global peace.

This belief in the benefits of national unity and homogeneity manifested itself many times in the various peace treaties, as, for instance, in the case of the border territories between Germany and Belgium. Article 34 of the Versailles Treaty established that 'Germany renounces in favour of Belgium all rights and title over the territory of the *Kreise* of Eupen and of Malmédy.' Following this formal declaration, the inhabitants of the region had a period of six months to 'record in writing a desire to see the whole or part of it to remain under German sovereignty.' If that would occur, a Commission would be appointed by the League of Nations to solve the situation. Finally, once the border was ultimately settled, German nationals would have to abandon the (now) Belgian territories or renounce their German nationality altogether.[23]

This pattern, repeated in many other contexts throughout the peace treaties, was a tool to solve the problems that derived from dual claims of sovereignty. Populations were thus given a chance to decide which nation they were part of, and once they had done so, they were forced to unite with their fellow nationals. The basic assumption that guided this process was that homogeneous, national communities were, by default,

less unstable than heterogeneous and 'artificial' multi-national empires; as such, it represented another way in which the core national assumptions affected the ideological framework of the negotiators in Versailles.

Very telling in this regard is the beginning of Section V of the Treaty, in which the situation of Alsace-Lorraine is described and the arguments for the restitution of these territories to France is provided:

> The High Contracting Parties, recognising the moral obligation to redress the wrong done by Germany in 1871 both to the rights of France and to the wishes of the population of Alsace and Lorraine, which were separated from their country in spite of the solemn protest of their representatives at the Assembly of Bordeaux, agree upon the following Articles:…[24]

As in the case of the declarations of independence of Czechoslovakia and Ireland, this excerpt presents the particular arguments by which the international action of restitution was considered legitimate. Therefore, it provides a valuable source for studying the foundations upon which legitimacy and acceptance rested on the international society of 1919. Considered under this light, it is striking to assess the evident similarity that exists between the arguments introduced in the Treaty and those apparent in the Czechoslovak and Irish documents, and also that many of these shared features have clear connections with the core assumptions of national narratives.

The first reason that supports the restitution refers to the rights of France over the territory. As we have mentioned, the notion of national rights is dependent on the assumption that nations are natural communities with historical interests and agency exercised through representatives. These natural rights, as a result, are conceived as an essential feature of the nation that take priority over any other claim, even that of military

conquest or effective political control. Secondly, and according to the treaty, Germany did not possess any right over Alsace or Lorraine because it had not taken into account the wishes of their population. As a result, the consent of the people – i.e. the expression of national sovereignty – had not been considered, and thus another one of the foundations of these communities according to national narratives had been violated. The third argument maintained that Alsace and Lorraine, as territories which pertained to the French nation, had been 'separated' from the rest of their co-nationals. Given that the delegates in Versailles imagined multi-national entities as unstable, they, consequently, agreed with the notion that pictured national unity as a legitimate claim that was desirable for international peace and development. The final argument adduced mentions the protests against German rule conducted by the representatives of the two territories at the Assembly at Bordeaux. This event, in the eyes of the authors of the treaty, proved that these populations (via the action of their representatives) were not inactive in the face of German occupation, and had not lost, as a result of having accepted 'foreign' rule, their right to national self-determination.

These four arguments were, according to the treaty, of such a convincing nature, that it was a 'moral obligation to redress the wrong done by Germany.' The emphasis on this ethical nature served to firmly establish the core national assumptions as fundamental constituents of the set of rules of the new international society, while at the same time their use was naturalised as an effective argument in case of necessity.[25]

The treaties of Saint-Germain and Trianon, with Austria and Hungary respectively, also match the proposed thesis that national assumptions had a profound influence over the international norms of interwar Europe. Specifically, both documents included some assurance that the parts involved would 'protect the interests of inhabitants (…) who differ

from the majority of the population in race, language, or religion', and even contain a section which regulated the 'Protection of Minorities'.[26] Prior to the war, national communities had tended to be narratively constructed by paying attention to alleged racial belonging, linguistic difference, or religious identity. The fact that these three elements are referred to in the treaties suggests that the delegates at Saint-Germain and Trianon were deeply reliant on these notions when they posed the question of minorities in the new states. If that was the case, the idea that these groups needed 'protection' stemmed, ultimately, from the aforementioned understanding by which national unity and homogeneity were the only long-lasting guarantors of internal and external peace.

But, even if they were profoundly influenced by the core national assumptions, the postwar peace treaties had two major flaws when considered from the perspective of national narratives. The first one is evidenced in the cases of Hungary and, especially, Austria. The signatories, as we have mentioned, seem to have been deeply inspired by the direct implications that national unity had for world peace, but they were, at the same time, seriously worried about the position of postwar Germany. Whereas the right of self-determination had been widely granted to disputed territories in order to foster national unity and homogeneity, this right was not recognised for Austria and Hungary, according to Article 88 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain and Article 73 of the Treaty of Trianon, respectively.[27] These clauses contradict the ideological foundations which the rest of the resolutions had been observing and indicate how these frameworks were broken at times in favour of *realpolitikal* considerations.

The same critique can be made to the second flaw: the situation of nationalities in Eastern Europe. Whereas national unification and homogeneity were intensely pursued as a policy for the disputed western

territories of Germany and Austria, the case of their eastern borders was different. The newly created states of Eastern Europe (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) had very mixed populations in national terms; at the same time, however, the Versailles system intended them to function as a barrier against any expansionist ambition by Germany or Russia.[28] Consequently, the existence of national minorities in these countries was taken as a lesser evil and it was regulated accordingly in the aforementioned sections of the Saint-Germain and Trianon treaties.[29] In short, national assumptions present elsewhere were not applied in these cases in favour of *realpolitikal* motives.[30]

The previous examples have illustrated how the core concepts of national narratives made their way into the ordering of the international society in postwar Europe. However, it remains to be explained how this framework affected the interests and identities displayed by the leaders of the European states during the interwar period. For this purpose, we will follow Alexander Wendt's theory about international socialization processes.[31] According to Wendt,

> An institution is a relatively stable set or "structure" of identities and interests. Such structures are often codified in formal rules and norms, but these have motivational force only in virtue of actors' socialization to and participation in collective knowledge. Institutions are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors' ideas about how the world works. (...) On this view, institutionalization is a process of internalizing new identities and interests, not something occurring outside them and affecting only behaviour; socialization is a cognitive process, not just a behavioural one.[32]

Wendt's underlying idea is that an institution – such as the international

society of the interwar period – demands of its members a process of identification with its core assumptions in order to operate.[33] This process of internalizing a new identity is socially constructed and implies gradual phases of identification, as Shogo Suzuki has explained for the cases of nineteenth-century China and Japan.[34] The process of internalising the new set of societal ideas has strong implications for the identity of any actor. First, because identity, as Wendt asserts, is 'an inherently social definition of the author grounded in the theories which actors collectively hold about themselves and one another.'[35] Thus, identity and socialization are but two sides of the same phenomenon: the more an actor accepts the norms and rules of a certain institution, the more likely he is to frame and evaluate himself (and others) in terms of that same set of values. Wendt also describes interests as being based on identities, and even suggests that there cannot exist any interest detached from the socialization process. In summary, this means that the norms ruling interactions in the international society can ultimately shape both the identities and the goals of its members, thus contradicting the extreme theoretical division between propaganda and *realpolitik*.

Wendt's ideas have profound implications for the Versailles system. As we have seen, the norms and rules established in Versailles, Saint-Germain and Trianon – as well as the arguments claimed in the Czechoslovak and Irish Declarations of Independence – present us an international society in which assumptions that ultimately derived from national narratives were considered legitimate. As a result, the identities of member states were also shaped by these same assumptions via a process of socialization under the society's norms. Finally, these identities produced new interests and ambitions because, as we have observed, the international system of Versailles had some major flaws even from the standpoint of the principles of national narratives. Thus, even though the objective of the system was not to foster nationalism, its tacit acceptance of the foundations of national narrative meant, in fact,

that nationalist identities and interests could be validly employed by its member states.[36] In this regard it is possible to describe the Versailles system as a 'nationalist' one.

National agendas and border populations in the Versailles system

The consequences of these societal identities in the interwar period were enormous and widespread. As such, they are impossible to analyse in all their complexity in a study like this one. Nonetheless, an overall examination of them can be made by paying attention to certain examples, allowing us to get a slight glimpse of the ways in which instability concerns were affected by national identities.

First, the period was marked by the development of nationally framed agendas within the newly created states of Eastern Europe. The leaders of these countries, like the representatives of the victors in Versailles, shared the idea that unified, nationally homogeneous countries were more naturally stable. As a result, they tried to develop convincing national narratives to integrate the inhabitants that lived within their borders. However, despite their efforts to push these discourses, they were usually challenged by previous narratives of national belonging defended by groups who saw themselves not adequately represented in the new states.

In Czechoslovakia, for example, national unity became a problem soon after the declaration of independence. Official Czechoslovakism defended that the Czech and Slovaks were two 'tribes' of the same nation, although the Slovaks were thought to be the less developed among them.[37] Despite this formal coherence, the Slovak population of the

country failed to integrate in equal terms with the Czech community because the institutional, political and economic control was held by Prague.[38] Moreover, Czechoslovakian ideology was fundamentally based on Czech history and identity that usually confronted long-held visions which were fundamental for the traditional historical interpretation of the Slovaks.[39] This situation ultimately produced a climate of disappointment among the Slovaks, who increasingly came to see the new state as a foreign occupation by the Czechs.[40]

It is interesting to note that this resentment was framed on national terms, and not, for instance, as a class struggle between an agrarian population and urban bourgeoisie; in this sense, Czechoslovakia was never an undisputed, unified national reality.[41] The fact that the perception of Czech national supremacy was derived from their previous situation within the Habsburg Empire did not alleviate the tension. Pre-existing national narratives of Slovak nationhood were fostered and the new state found itself ill-fitted to fight them back with their own Czechoslovak discourse.[42] As a result, the Czechoslovakian situation became increasingly problematic, if national assumptions present in the international society of the moment were to be applied. And that is even the case if we do not consider the German population of the Sudetenland or the Magyars, who had been the object of reclamation by Germany and Hungary respectively and had even less public representation than the Slovaks.[43]

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croat and Slovenes – later known as Yugoslavia – suffered from a similar problem that, once again, resulted in a national framing of the situation. Officially, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, the Yugoslav nation was imagined as composed by three 'tribes': the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes.[44] However, the practical monopoly of top cabinet posts, banking institutions and political officialdom by the Serbs led to the alienation of other communities such

as the Croats, who saw their position neglected by the government in Belgrade. Partly, the reason for this was the centralizing political tradition of the Serbs, which was opposed by the more decentralizing positions defended by the Croats and other non-Serb communities.[45] Some stability issues of the postwar period, such as a rebellion of peasants in Croatia, were thereafter framed as a resistance effort made by the Croatian nation against foreign occupation and abuse.[46] This narrative, alongside the inability of the Serbian government to manage the situation, helped the Croatian Peasant Party to gain ample support in the whole region, both in the cities and in the rural areas.[47] The party's core demands were territorial autonomy for Croatia within Yugoslavia and a formal recognition of Croatian nationhood, which would occur in 1939.[48] However, the most immediate result of Croatian involvement in Yugoslav political institutions was King Alexander's dictatorship, proclaimed in January 1929, which aimed at the creation of a united Yugoslav national identity.[49] These developments, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, produced a climate of instability that damaged the security of the international system of Versailles in Central and Eastern Europe.

If producing unified nation-states was a problematic issue for new member states such as Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia or Poland, the case of Germany offers an invaluable insight on the way international interests became framed by national assumptions. As the most prominent defeated power of the war, sanctions on Germany had been harsh and abundant. Among these, territorial losses affected the self-consideration of the German cabinets and public opinion the most. As a result, both the Weimar Republic, first, and the Nazi government, later, searched for ways to recover territories inhabited by German 'nationals'.[50] Interestingly enough, public opinion in countries such as Britain tended to see at least some of these intents as rightful.[51] From their perspective,

Nazi intents to control the Rhineland, for instance, seemed reasonable, and this made it difficult for the members of the League of Nations to condemn the occupation as strongly as the Versailles Treaty compelled them to.[52] The Nazi government invoked the internationally sanctioned principle of self-determination, and, from the point of view of many Europeans, this made perfect sense.

The situation repeated itself with the *Anschluss*. As mentioned above, the Treaty of Saint-Germain explicitly prohibited Germany and Austria from merging without the permission of the League of Nations. This measure had been conceived as a caveat against a possible strengthening of the defeated Germany. As such, it was connected with *realpolitikal* considerations of the balance of power and collective security. Nonetheless, it had little ideological support and contradicted the principles of national unity and sovereignty established in other international norms. Hitler exploited this fact, as Austrians could be considered German by every indicator considered valid at the moment (i.e. culture, language, or 'racial' descent). Consequently, Hitler's claims appeared to be legitimate and reasonable, and as such they proved difficult to oppose by London and Paris, the main guarantors of the 1919 *status quo*. Therefore, once again, international consent was not asked for, but for a second time the negative consequences for Germany proved to be almost non-existent.

The Czechoslovak dismemberment, however, was totally different. A population susceptible of being considered German mainly inhabited the Sudetenland. This area had been trusted to Czechoslovakia in order to weaken Germany and grant a strong military defence to Bohemia.[53] As in the case of Austria, Germany could claim some rights over the population of these lands by means of an appellation to national assumptions present in the norms of the international system, specifically national unity, independence and representation. And so it did.

After an interview with Hitler, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain urged the areas in which German 'nationals' were a majority to be annexed to Germany.[54] Similarly, Hungary and Poland took advantage of the situation and pushed their own claims over territories inhabited by their 'nationals'. The creation of a Slovak country was, in fact, a strict application of the principle of self-determination. In short, up to this moment, despite the obvious preoccupations for its imperialistic policies in France and the United Kingdom, Germany had just been playing its cards within the (nationally influenced) rules of the Versailles system.

All alarms were raised, however, when Germany invaded what remained of Czechoslovakia and renamed it as the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939. The shock of the Czechoslovak dismemberment was not only due to Germany's explicit violation of the sovereignty of another member state, but also because this country could not be identified as German by any means. In this case, unlike as in the instances of Austria or the Sudetenland, Germany played outside the nationally inspired norms of self-determination, independence and sovereignty and, as a consequence, this had strong implications for the societal identity of Germany as perceived by other actors of the system. Considerations stemming from non-national backgrounds, such as *Lebensraum* or geo-strategic assumptions, were adduced by Hitler's government to justify its behaviour. The appeal to this new set of norms deeply affected state identities across Europe and set in motion a series of pacts and alliances which would lead to a second global conflict after the invasion of Poland.

An overall examination of the consequences of national framing during the interwar period would not be complete without a mention of border populations. As has been shown above, assumptions deriving from the

core concepts of national narratives made their way into the norms of the Versailles international system. However, national narratives had been developed with great success in various areas of Europe for a long time, particularly from the 1880s onwards.[55] This meant that the new states produced in Versailles had, within them, long-established alternative national narratives that could effectively challenge these new discourses of nationhood. This was the case, as we have seen, in countries such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. In some instances, previous national identities disappeared and gave way to the new unifying narratives; in others, such as in the Slovak or Croat examples, they resulted in instability, because, as national narratives, they also encompassed the core assumptions of national independence, sovereignty and representation.

The Versailles system proved itself useless for alleviating the tension between these opposing forces. On the one hand, the system, especially in Eastern Europe, had tried to create the conditions for a long-lasting peace based on a set of states that could contain German aspirations. Stability was a central necessity for these new entities, and as such the system stressed the importance for these governments to create national unifying narratives. This was the case because the norms of the international society deeply assumed that nationally homogeneous countries were more stable. On the other hand, this need for strong entities challenged another one of the ideological foundations of the whole Versailles system: that of national self- determination. In some cases, such as Czechoslovakia, intents by the new governments to push national unifying narratives were perceived by other communities as attempts to underrepresent them.[56] As a result, previous regional narratives were recovered or new ones were developed as alternatives to the centralizing efforts of the newly created states.[57] In the end, this meant that the Versailles system could not easily label these challenges as illegitimate because, although they eroded its strategic interests, they

stemmed from the same ideological standpoint as its very regulating norms.

This framing of the problem of border minorities makes it easier to understand the fragile nature of the whole system. The dual intentions of preserving the balance of power on the continent and to ground its political articulation in more 'natural' borders proved to be incompatible. This was because the balance of power required adaptation to circumstances and contextual decision-making from its members, whereas national communities originated from essentialist concepts that stemmed from national narrative assumptions. The agreement reached at Versailles matched (although not completely) the necessities of the victorious international powers at that particular moment, when Germany was defeated and its capacities were checked.[58] However, once the situation changed, the ideological framework they had used to legitimate the new map of Europe turned against them, as they saw how the newly created states were riven by both internal and external national rivalry. Intents of maintaining the postwar *status quo*, such as France's occupation of the Ruhr area in 1923, met with diplomatic criticism because they seemed to contradict the ideological foundations of the international society. Consequently, essentialist arguments extended and faced each other under the complacency of the system, which lacked the tools to keep them at bay.

Border populations suffered the most from this situation. They were framed as instability factors that had to be dealt with and, as such, attracted the attention of both internal and external actors. Internally, they were usually the focus of educational efforts which tried to assimilate them to match the national narratives endorsed by the government of the country. That was the case, for instance, of the Slovak community and Czechoslovak policies regarding language, which actually meant erasing

Slovak varieties in favour of Czech ones.[59] Externally, many of these communities were allegedly part of existing nations, and as such foreign states claimed rights over them.[60] This was exploited extensively by Nazi Germany in relation to the German territories in the Rhineland, Austria, and the Sudetenland, but it is important to remember that the Versailles Treaty had considered a 'moral obligation' to restore Alsace and Lorraine to French sovereignty using the same kind of argument. Once the basic set of norms that ruled the interwar international society was internalized by its members, it became their national goal to return these populations to the motherland. This strong pressure produced a climate of competition between opposing national narratives in which non-essentialist arguments soon lost their appeal.

Conclusion

This article has tried to provide a new perspective on the relation between ideology and political interest. Considering propaganda and *realpolitik* to be limited explanatory concepts to deal with international systems, a different framework has been suggested. In this regard, Alexander Wendt's approach to identity as a socializing process has allowed us to evidence the ways in which the core assumptions of the Versailles system affected its members' identities and goals, and has ultimately led us to a series of conclusions.

First, the Versailles system was influenced from its conception by a set of guiding notions that stemmed from national narratives. These assumptions – unity, community, continuity, global international spatiality, historical subjecthood, sovereignty, purity, and representation – were all present in documents such as the *Czechoslovak* and *Irish Declarations of Independence* and in the Treaties of Versailles, Saint-Germain, and Trianon. These national narratives had been

developing in Europe during the previous decades and by 1919 they were accepted to shape the positions of the negotiating parties in the immediate postwar period.

Secondly, these assumptions in turn affected the identity of member states and framed their internal and external interests. The principle of national unity pressed the newly created states to push national narratives of common belonging, which in turn had to compete with regionally or ethnically established alternatives. This turned out to be a major instability issue when populations claimed by foreign states were at stake, as has been evidenced in the case of the territories claimed by Nazi Germany.

Thirdly, border populations and national minorities were increasingly perceived as factors of instability during this period. The principle of national unity required homogeneous populations in the belief that they were more stable, but this contradicted the mixed reality of the newly created states, such as Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia. The treaties of Saint-Germain and Trianon had tried to address this problem by devoting one section to the ways in which these minorities should be dealt with. However, regional conflicts started to appear right from the start, and they were increasingly framed in national, essentialist terms. Ultimately, it meant that the Wilsonian ideal of self-determination did not help in de-escalating the tension between these competing national narratives.

Finally, this article has evidenced that the Versailles system had tried to achieve two goals with its reconfiguration of the political situation of Europe. Both these aims – the maintenance of the postwar *status quo* and the creation of nationally defined state borders – proved to be, in the end, incompatible. This was because the preservation of the balance of power demanded a high degree of adaptation to circumstances and contextual

decision-making from the system, whereas, on the other hand, national narratives, from which spatial determinations stemmed, were essentialist and fundamentally established by default. The resulting situation profoundly limited the ability of those members who tried to maintain the post-1919 *status quo* to defend their claims, as highlighted in the case of France's invasion of the Ruhr area or Germany's policy of recovering its lost territory. This, in turn, meant that the system became more and more unstable as time went on and as international circumstances moved further away from the postwar situation.

However, the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia by the Nazi government in 1938-1939 allowed the *status quo* defenders, especially the United Kingdom and France, to present their strategic interests as legitimate claims. The new Protectorate of Bohemia was not German according to any accepted criteria, such as language or racial belonging. As such, the ideological foundation of its rule by German authorities was totally different from that adduced to legitimate its control of Austria or the Sudetenland. It was this apparent incoherence that allowed the members of the Versailles system to condemn Germany's actions as imperialistic and to prepare the set of alliances that were fundamental at the advent of the Second World War.

Endnotes

[1] These three authors are usually referred to as members of the 'modernist' school, which considers nations and nationalism to be by-products of modern, industrial societies. An overview of their respective approaches can be found in the following works: E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford, 1983); E. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge, 1992); J. Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Manchester, 1993).

[2] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 124-125.

[3] Ethno-symbolist authors believe, in the words of Anthony D. Smith, that cultural elements 'are as much part of social reality as any material or organisational factors' and, therefore, that the study of the symbols, rituals, myths, traditions and memories of national groups is fundamental to understand national identity. For an introduction to the ethno-symbolist approach, see A. Smith, *Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach* (London-New York, 2009).

[4] B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. (London- New York, 2006); P. Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning narratives of modern China* (Chicago-London, 1995). For a brief summary of the debate between the modernists and their critics, see S. Gunn, *History and Cultural Theory* (London-New York, 2011), 136-138.

[5] This position has been explicitly criticised by Prasenjit Duara regarding historical practice and how it helps in the replication of national identity. As he put it, 'our own practice of History shows us that what endures through most of the changes in fashion of historical subjects of inquiry is the silent space of reference: the nation'. Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*, 27.

[6] P.A. Martínez, 'La Paz ilusoria: la seguridad colectiva en los años veinte, 1923-1933', in: J.C. Pereira (ed.), *Historia de las relaciones internacionales contemporáneas* (Barcelona, 2001), 307-320; M. Eiroa, 'La crisis de la seguridad colectiva y los virajes hacia la guerra. La política exterior del III Reich, 1933-1939', in: J.C. Pereira (ed.), *Historia de las relaciones internacionales,* 345-357.

[7] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 6. For a definition of the term *ethnie*, see Smith, *Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism*, 27.

[8] Mario Carretero and Floor van Alphen have paid attention to these patterns, which they call 'master narratives' for the case of nationalist histories. M. Carretero & F. van Alphen, 'History, Collective Memories, or National Memories? How the Representation of the Past Is Framed by Master Narratives' in: B. Wagoner (ed.), *Handbook of Culture and Memory* (Oxford, 2017), 283-304.

[9] Most of these notions are based, in one way or another, in the works of many researchers on nationalism. Concepts such as 'sovereignty', 'community', or 'purity' are already present in Ernest Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism*, and

they are widespread in studies about the topic. The ideas of 'historical subjecthood', 'continuity', and 'international global spatiality' owe a lot to authors such as Benedict Anderson, Prasenjit Duara, or Xiaobing Tang. X. Tang, *Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity: The Historical Thinking of Liang Qichao* (Stanford, 1996).

[10] As the historian Frank Dikötter summarised, 'Nationalism, in its broadest sense, endows the members of a national population variously referred to as a nation, people, nationality, or even "race" with an identity which is thought to be unique and distinct from other population groups. A nation, however defined, is thus thought to be a relatively homogeneous entity with shared characteristics which transcend internal divisions of class, status, and region.' F. Dikötter, 'Culture, "Race" and Nation: The Formation of National Identity in Twentieth Century China', in: *Journal of International Affairs*, 49/2 (1996), 590.

[11] G. Cubitt, (ed.), *Imagining Nations* (Manchester, 1998), 8.

[12] The concept of narrative 'representation', although based on the works of Anderson, Duara, and Tang, is also indebted to the narrative theory and researchers such as Paul Ricoeur, Mario Carretero and Floor van Alphen, and Monika Fludernik. For a brief overview of these ideas, see M. Fludernik, *An Introduction to Narratology* (London-New York, 2006).

[13] *Declaration of Independence of the Czechoslovak Nation by its Provisional Government* (New York, 1918). This translation was printed for the Czechoslovak Arts Club of New York City and it can be accessed online on <https://archive.org/details/declarationofind00czec/page/n6> [accessed 14/01/2020].

[14] *Declaration of Independence of the Czechoslovak Nation by its Provisional Government*, 3.

[15] *Declaration of Independence of the Czechoslovak Nation by its Provisional Government*, 4. For further information on the ideological basis of the union of the Czech and Slovak nations, see E. Bakke, 'The Making of Czechoslovakism in the First Czechoslovak Republic', in: M. S. Wessel (ed.), *Loyalitäten in der Tschechoslowakischen Republik 1918–1938. Politische, nationale und kulturelle Zugehörigkeiten* (Munich, 2004), 23.

[16] *Declaration of Independence of the Czechoslovak Nation by its Provisional Government*, 5.

[17] *The Declaration of Irish Independence* (Dublin, 1919), 2. <https://digitalcollections.tcd.ie/home/index.php?DRIS_ID=SamuelsBox2pt14_306> [accessed 14/01/2020]. This sentence serves both as a preface and as a way of organising the text, by means of an enumeration of the arguments 'whereas' Ireland should be independent. For this reason, the sentence has no definite conclusion. It has been considered more convenient to reproduce the original source faithfully in spite of this grammatical inaccuracy.

[18] *The Declaration of Irish Independence*, 2.

[19] *Treaty of Peace with Germany* (Treaty of Versailles) (Paris, 1919), 51. <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000002-0043.pdf> [accessed 14/01/2020].

[20] Tang, *Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity*, 80-81.

[21] The cases of Czechoslovak and Irish Declarations of Independence show the extent to which a continuous resistance against 'foreign rule' was perceived as a *conditio sine qua non* for national recognition.

[22] *Treaty of Peace with Germany*, 56.

[23] Ibid., 63-64

[24] Ibid., 77.

[25] The naturalisation of national ideas, both within states and internationally, has been convincingly described by authors such as Michael Billig. See M. Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London, 1995).

[26] As seen in articles 51, 57 and 60 of the *Treaty of Peace between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Austria* (St.Germain-en-Laye, 1919), transcription in <http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/other/dfat/treaties/1920/3.html> [accessed 14/01/2020]. Also, articles 44 and 47 of the *Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary and Protocol and Declaration* (Trianon, 1920), transcription in <http://www.hungarianhistory.com/lib/trianon/trianon.pdf> [accessed 27/12/2019].

[27] These two articles prevented Austria and Hungary from taking part in any policy which would compromise their independent statehood. This clause

meant that these two countries could not, without permission by the Council of the League of Nations, unite with each other or, in the case of Austria, with neighbouring Germany.

[28] A. Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism & the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia & the Middle East, 1914- 1923* (London-New York, 2001), 156.

[29] J.L.N. Hernández, 'La articulación del sistema internacional de Versalles. La sociedad de Naciones, 1919-1923', in: J.C. Pereira (ed.), *Historia de las relaciones internacionales contemporáneas,* 288.

[30] Hernández, 'La articulación del *si*stema internacional de Versalles', 294.

[31] A. Wendt, 'Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics', in: *International Organization*, 46/2 (1992), 391–425.

[32] Wendt, 'Anarchy', 399.

[33] The concept of 'institution' used here follows Christian Reus-Smit's definition: a 'stable sets of norms, rules, and principles that serve two functions in shaping social relations: (…) constitute actors as knowledgeable social agents, and (…) regulate behaviour'. C. Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State: culture, social identity, and institutional rationality in international relations* (New Jersey, 1999), 12-13. In the case of international society, the deeper level of institutional norms is defined by 'constitutional structures', 'coherent ensembles of intersubjective beliefs, principles, and norms that perform two functions in ordering international societies: they define what constitutes a legitimate actor, entitled to all the rights and privileges of statehood; and they define the basic parameters of rightful state action'. Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State*, 30.

[34] S. Suzuki, *Civilization and Empire: China and Japan's Encounter with European International Society* (London-New York, 2009).

[35] Wendt, 'Anarchy', 398.

[36] In this regard, Oliver Zimmer concluded that 'the view that distinctive cultural communities possess a legitimate claim to national self-determination (…) must almost inevitably lead to the politicisation of ethnicity'. O. Zimmer, *Nationalism in Europe, 1890-1940* (Hampshire-New York, 2003), 50.

[37] Bakke, 'The Making of Czechoslovakism', 23.

[38] Zimmer, *Nationalism in Europe*, 70.

[39] Bakke, 'The Making of Czechoslovakism', 35.

[40] Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism & the Fall of Empires*, 203: 'In the eyes of Father Andrej Hlinka's clerical-conservative, Slovak Populist Party – which maintained a plurality of Slovak votes in parliamentary elections from the mid-1920s on – the prospect of self-determination in an autonomous republic had given way to virtual colonization by the Czechs.'

[41] As Oliver Zimmer put it: 'If minorities refused to assimilate, or sometimes even if they wished to retain their cultural identity, this was seen as a sign of disloyalty and a threat to the territorial integrity of the state.' Zimmer, *Nationalism in Europe*, 60-61.

[42] Bakke, 'The Making of Czechoslovakism', 35-36.

[43] Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism & the Fall of Empires*, 203.

[44] D. Djokić, 'Nationalism, Myth and Reinterpretation of History: The Neglected Case of Interwar Yugoslavia', in: *European History Quarterly*, 42/71 (2012), 76.

[45] Djokić, 'Nationalism, Myth and Reinterpretation of History', 80. Oliver Zimmer has also argued that in the new states of Eastern Europe the numerically dominant groups tended to identify with a more hegemonic kind of nationalism, instead of favouring federalist approaches. This may have led to a conception by these dominant groups of national minorities as threatening for the survival of the nation-state and, as a result, they encouraged political action. Zimmer, *Nationalism in Europe*, 60-61.

[46] Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism & the Fall of Empires*, 205.

[47] Ibid., 206.

[48] Djokić, 'Nationalism, Myth and Reinterpretation of History', 80.

[49] Ibid., 85.

[50] The apparent failure of the Weimar Republic in this regard decisively affected its legitimacy in the eyes of many Germans. See Zimmer, *Nationalism in Europe*, 103.

[51] 'Extract from Cabinet Conclusions' 18(36), 11 March 1936 (FO 371/19892)': 'Moreover, many people, perhaps most people, were saying openly that they did not see why the Germans should not re-occupy the Rhineland.'<http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resources/german-occupation/source-3/> [accessed 14/01/2020]. This is a fragment of the Minutes of the British cabinet meetings of 1936, and as such provides an interesting insight on the perception that ruling elites in this country had about the situation that led to the Second World War.

[52] Eiroa, 'La crisis de la seguridad colectiva', 351.

[53] Ibid., 353.

[54] Ibid., 354. Richard James Overy has defended that popular fear to air bombing also acted as a brake on British and French reaction to German aggression. The position defended by Chamberlain is, however, totally in line with the established rules of international behaviour. R.J. Overy, *The Inter-War Crisis 1919-1939* (Harlow, 1994), 90.

[55] Some researchers have argued that national narratives had existed long before this date; see, for example, L. Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nations 1707-1837* (New Haven, 1992). However, I do not consider these narratives of common identity as national since they lack certain core elements mentioned above, usually the existence of a system of formally equal nations or the idea of national sovereignty. Nonetheless, elements from these previous discourses were adopted by national narratives during their consolidation process from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards. This granted a sense of continuity that linked various discourses of identity and belonging.

[56] Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism & the Fall of Empires*, 203.

[57] Zimmer, *Nationalism in Europe*, 70.

[58] Richard James Overy asserts that Britain and France were regarded, during this period, as 'satiated' states, 'anxious to defend the *status quo* from which they so clearly profited'. Overy, *The Inter-war Crisis*, 77.

[59] I. Deák, *Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848–1918* (New York, 1990), 208–209. Linguistic assimilation seems to have been the result of formal equality between the two varieties, and

not of an intended effort to wipe out Slovak language. Other factors related to the economic and institutional situation of the country seem to have transformed this *laissez-faire* into a threat for the Slovak language in Slovakia. However, the Czechoslovak government proved reluctant to change these language regulations even when faced with these consequences. Bakke, 'The Making of Czechoslovakism', 38-39.

[60] Zimmer, *Nationalism in Europe*, 62: 'This nationalist programme of supporting co-ethnics living outside the home territory enjoyed wide public support in the defeated states as such minorities were regarded as the living symbol and bridgeheads of revisionist claims.'

The Politics of Diversity in Disputed Border Regions during Times of Uncertainty: Upper Silesia, Teschen Silesia, and Orava (1918-19)

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Based on a discussion of the argument that there might be tensions between interwoven processes of nationalization and democratization we address the following question: Do divisions – regarding ethnic, culture as well as gender, religion and social class – hinder governance and coherent decision making in an uncertain time of transition to democracy? In our article we focus on the politics of the workers', farmers' and soldiers' councils after the "Great War" 1918/19 in the multinational border regions of Upper Silesia, Teschen Silesia, and Orava. We conclude that keeping law and order as well as improving the supply situation was the councils' main task. Even though and in spite of the prevalent phenomenon of national indifference in the regions, the question of national orientation and therefore the belonging of a region to Germany, Poland or Czechoslovakia overshadowed the councils' policy making. Still, they had a considerable ability to reconciliate differing political interests between the national camps in the regions.

Keywords: democratization, nationalization, politics of diversity, transition

Introduction and Research Questions

All political transitions are characterized by uncertainty – regarding the polity, the politics, and the policies.[1] They head from a given political regime towards an 'uncertain "something else"'. This 'something' can be democracy, any form of autocracy or 'simply confusion, that is, the rotation in power of successive governments which fail to provide any enduring or predictable solution to the problem of institutionalizing political power.'[2]

The transitional period is essentially coined by the discussion on the new rules of the political game by the main political actors as well as how different groups of the society deal with each other. The autumn of 1918 was the beginning of such a transitional period of uncertainty. Dynastic empires collapsed and from their ruins new self-proclaimed nation states and/or democracies emerged all over Europe. There has been much scholarly debate on the relationship of nation and democracy,[3] the processes of 'nationalization',[4] and nation-building and democratization.[5] The years 1918-19 are a good starting point to look at the relationship between the intertwined processes of politics of nationalization and democratization in a time of transition, which pose very specific conditions of a 'double transformation'.[6]

One question lies at the intersection of the challenges of building a democracy and a nation state: Who belongs to the nation and/or the demos and who does not? This article will focus on disputed border regions between the newly established democratic nation states of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Germany, and their complex social, national and religious composition in the years 1918-19. Especially in border regions the belonging to ethnically defined groups is in a state of flux, depending on the social and political situation. 'Border zones are characteristic for being the site of competing national movements' struggle on a territory and its population.'[7]

In many border zones after World War I the specific question had to be answered: Which nation and democracy do the population and the territory belong to? Our three regions are key examples of 'national indifference'[8] with its jumble of linguistic, religious and ethnic loyalties.[9] We analyse if, during the transitional period, the population in the three regions remained ambivalent, flexible or indifferent towards the idea of the nation or if a shift in a growing self-categorization along 'national' lines is observable in light of the diversity issues and border disputes. Democracy is usually associated with a diversity agenda, while political nationalism is often associated with an anti-diversity agenda. How are the challenges of diversity handled in the conflicting processes of democratization and nationalization? Our focus lies on the issues of 'nation', religion, gender and social class.

Important voices in the scholarly debate on the transformation process since 1989 argue that 'identity-based divisions', particularly nationalism, endanger democratization.[10] Sherrill Stroschein claimed in her seminal work on ethnic conflict, coexistence and democratization in post-communist Eastern European states that 'ethnic or religious divisions in society can hinder governance and decision making in even long-standing democracies.'[11]

Jack Snyder maintained that the initial phases of democratization are particularly prone to national conflicts. Feeling threatened by change, elites might thwart the move towards democracy by stimulating ethnic and nationalist conflicts.[12] Snyder further outlined how democracy allows parties to appeal directly to the people and use nationalism to curtail the power of liberal institutions like the judiciary. In a 'nationalist' environment a free press might, in his opinion, whip up ethnic conflict and nationalism. Michael Mann went so far as to claim that ethnic cleansing is an inherent 'dark side' of stalled democratization.[13]

The argument that there is a conflict between nation-building and democratization was often brought forward by referring to the interwar period. In their seminal work on political transitions Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan pointed out: 'One could historically analyze how, in a number of cases, the priority given to nation-building in the state contributed to democratic instability, crisis, and sometimes demise in later decades of the state itself. Of the eight new nation states formed in Europe after World War I, only three – Finland, Czechoslovakia and Ireland – were stable democracies.'[14]

Based on this we bring forward the more specific question we address in our article: Do divisions – regarding ethnic, culture as well as gender, religion and social class – hinder governance and coherent decision making in a time of transition to democracy?

While in the previous literature on the border regions of Upper Silesia, Teschen Silesia and Orava usually 'master narratives' from one national side were told, we take the multiple national perspectives from all those involved national angles into account. The allowance for multiple perspectives adds up to a neutral, exhaustive, and complex narrative of the discussions on the new political rules and the politics of diversity in these regions.

In our article we focus on the politics of the workers'-, farmers'- and soldiers' councils. These councils were the temporary institutions via which the new rules of the political game and the politics of diversity were negotiated in the regions discussed.[15] They appeared all over Europe in the last weeks of the Great War, from Trieste to Kiel and from Barcelona to Kraków.[16]

However, not all power rested in the councils. Hence, we also take into account how leading social and political groups not represented in the councils positioned themselves in the struggle for new rules of the political game and the politics of diversity. Our analysis is based on a vast

number of documents from archives in Germany, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, written in Czech, German, Hungarian, Polish and Slovak.[17] Moreover, for the transitional period we have systematically investigated a number of newspapers of the three regions reflecting the main political, religious and national orientations in the regions.[18]

Upper Silesia

Upper Silesia was one of the most important industrial centres of the German Empire because it contained large coal reserves. As wages and education standards remained low until the beginning of the twentieth century,[19] a strong labour movement and trade unions developed. According to the last imperial population census from 1910 around two million people lived in Upper Silesia, which makes it the largest of our research areas. 53% of the population declared to speak 'Polish', which mostly meant the local uncodified Upper Silesian dialect *Schlonsakisch*. 40% declared to speak German and only 2,3 % named Czech.[20] These numbers should not be taken for granted, especially because bilingualism was a widespread phenomenon in that region. Furthermore, the usage of language was strongly connected to the social situation – many Upper Silesians used a different language at home, at work or in church.[21] In national terms the region's population was 'neither German nor Pole',[22] but rather identified with the common Roman-Catholic faith. Over 90% of the population was Catholic. The province did have experience with democratic voting: they elected delegates to the German Reichstag since 1871 and the Prussian Landtag since 1855.[23] During the anti-Catholic Kulturkampf (1871-1878) the *Deutsche Zentrumpartei/Zentrum* [Centre Party] became the strongest party in the region, due to its struggle for regional and religious autonomy.[24] It comes as no surprise that the Catholic *Zentrum* was the most influential party in Upper Silesia.[25] In the

1912 Reichstag elections twelve members for the Reichstag were elected in Upper Silesia. *Zentrum* gained seven delegates (58,33 %).

While on the national level the Polish Party collaborated with *Zentrum*, the situation was different in Upper Silesia. In this region the Polish party, led by Wojciech Korfanty, was based on a strict opposition to German political and economic domination of Upper Silesia. In some important cases however – like the autonomy of the church – the Polish Party cooperated with the dominant *Zentrum* party. In 1912 it won four seats (33,3%).[26] The remaining seat was won by the right-wing *Deutschkonservative Partei* [German Conservative Party]. The two political camps which gained the most votes in the elections of 1912 on the national level, the (right- and left-wing) Liberals (added share of 25,9%) and the Social Democrats (SPD) (34,8%) did not gain a single seat in Upper Silesia.

The Polish faction in the German Reichstag with its four members from Upper Silesia – Paul Brandys, Paul Dombek, Paul Pospiech, and Adalbert Sosinski – disbanded after Korfanty's speech on October 25, 1918 in which he demanded the connection of Upper Silesia, Wielkopolska [Greater Poland] and Danzig to the new Polish state. Korfanty and others by that time were already active in the *Naczelna Rada Ludowa* [NRL, Supreme People's Council] which was founded in Posen/Poznań in 1916. In November 1918, the NRL had 80 members. Its largest regional division, 27, came from Upper Silesia. The three main protagonists representing the region were Korfanty, Józef Rymer and Kazimierz Czapla. The NRL was politically close to the *Narodowa Demokracja* [National Democracy] of Roman Dmowski and had a nationalist agenda.[27]

Zentrum meanwhile was in a state of shock and reconstruction. The process of reorganisation in the region was led by the Roman-Catholic priest Carl Ulitzka and the lawyer Joseph Bitta.[28] Members of *Zentrum* like Ewald Latacz founded the *Bund der Oberschlesier/Związek*

Górnoślązaków [Union of Upper Silesians] and demanded extensive autonomy rights for Upper Silesia. The movement claimed to represent a distinct 'Silesian identity', but it split up in the beginning of 1919 because its leading members could not agree if Upper Silesia should form an alliance with Germany or Poland.[29]

Shortly after the events of 9 November 1918 in Berlin and the declaration of the new democratic German Republic, a workers' council was founded in Breslau, the capital of the Silesian province. It was composed of members of the former city council, from a 'mosaic of different political parties'[30] under the leadership of the *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* [SPD, Social Democratic Party of Germany]. The first councils in Upper Silesia formed between 10-13 November in the main industrial towns: Kattowice, Hindenburg, Ratibor and Gleiwitz. Their founders and leading members had been trade-union activists and members of the SPD. The workers'- and soldiers' councils were confirmed by public acclamations.[31] In Kattowice, hundreds of workers and soldiers who had recently returned from the war, assembled in the *Reichshalle* to confirm the leader of the town's trade union Heinrich Löffler (SPD) as the council's chairman. He proclaimed the beginning of a universal 'democratization in state and administration.'[32]

In other cases, like the Upper Silesian administrative centre of Oppeln, the new councils where created by members of the town administration.[33] The influence of the labour movement was weaker outside of the industrial zone. All in all, the councils' constitution varied widely. The question of national loyalty gained notable impact. The workers' council in Pless for example was influenced by the Polish national movement and rejected any representatives of the SPD.[34] In the border-town of Leubschütz it was completely different: Officers of the local regiment formed a national council with the goal to prevent the appearance of any 'revolutionary' institutions influenced by Poles or Czechs.[35]

During the first few weeks, the council movement and the German administration in Upper Silesia quarrelled over executive powers. In Oppeln, the *Regierungspräsident*[36] Walther von Miquel suspected the councils to be influenced by Jewish-Bolshevik conspirators. He stated that a person called 'Tannenbaum' telegraphed orders directly from Moscow to the councils in the industrial zone.[37] These rumours about Bolshevik influence, often connotated with anti-Semitic narratives, faded out quickly.

The workers'- and soldiers' councils mistrusted the magistrates and demanded the immediate transfer of power.[38] Similar confrontations appeared all over the industrial zone. Main council protagonists like Löffler and the members[39] of the central council for Silesia in Breslau tried to negotiate between the councils and magistrates. Both sides wanted to prevent further economic disaster and improve the living standards in the region. This was also their strategy to ease the emerging national tensions. Löffler was convinced that higher wages and less working hours would increase Polish-speaking workers' trust in the German administration.[40] In most cases this 'diplomatic approach' worked, and in the industrial towns a modus vivendi was found between the two political forces: The administration usually kept working as before, but the councils got the right to control the decision-making process without the possibility to make decisions on their own.[41]

During the first weeks some of the workers'- and soldiers' councils in Upper Silesia offered new possibilities to negotiate on national conflicts and to handle diversity in the region. In Gleiwitz, Beuthen[42] and Rybnik[43] the councils included German and Polish members. Workers, regardless of their 'national' loyalty, had the common goal to improve their living conditions by raising wages and reducing working hours. Polish as well as German workers had strong reservations against the established administration and the mostly German factory owners. However, the compromise between the old and new order, between the leading council

members and the magistrates threatened this collaboration between workers. In a closed meeting of the workers' council in Kattowice on 6 December 1918, Löffler revealed that for him the cooperation with the Poles was a strategic necessity. He feared to lose the region or parts of it to the emerging Polish state and propagated to offer them more cultural and religious autonomy to prevent that.[44] He even suggested to use military force against Polish political activists and to establish a secret cooperation with the former conservative German elites. However, this suggestion was strongly opposed by other members of the councils like Max Liechtenstein from the *Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* [USPD, Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany], who was afraid of losing credibility among the workers.[45]

The leader of the *Polska Partia Socjalistyczna* [PPS, Polish Socialist Party] Józef Biniszkiewicz rejected any offers for mixed German-Polish councils. He wanted to establish homogenously Polish councils and strongly supported the unification of Upper Silesia with the new Polish state. However, like Liechtenstein on the German side he opposed the use of force against German political activists.[46] Under these circumstances, a long-term cooperation between Polish and German council members was not possible. The national indifferent workers of the region were forced by both sides to make a choice which side they supported.

Löffler looked for support from the Jewish communities in the region for the German workers' and soldiers' councils. Therefore, he cooperated with Georg Gothein. Originally a mining engineer and member of the German Reichstag from 1901 to 1918, Gothein was one of the co-founders of the *Deutsche Demokratische Partei* [DDP, German Democratic Party] in 1918-19. In 1919, he became a member of Philipp Scheidemann's (SPD) government as a Minister of the Treasury. He came from a mixed Jewish-Protestant family and became one of the region's best-known activists of universal liberalism and against the rising antisemitism.[47]

The Jews of the region were highly assimilated into the region's German community regarding language and culture. Gothein agreed to organize public gatherings of the Jewish communities in support of the German councils, but he also feared possible retaliation and attacks by Polish anti-Semites. He also strongly dismissed any cooperation with the former conservative elites due to their antisemitic views.[48]

For women the workers' councils were the first opportunity to gain political influence. The leading members of the workers'- and soldiers' councils in Upper Silesia all agreed on the importance of women's support. For example, all main political actors in the council of Gleiwitz agreed to appoint a woman as member of the executive committee. This idea was not only supported by the council's chairman Roman Becker (SPD), but as well by the conservative mayor (since 1916) of Gleiwitz, Georg Miethe.[49] In the minds of the leading activists the topic of gender was strongly connected with the struggle of the German and Polish side for predominance in the region. The leading council members feared that women could be easily manipulated by Polish agitators. Löffler even stated that the Upper Silesian women are 'more Polish than the men'[50] and emphasized the urgency to mobilize them for the German council movement. He suggested to reach out to the university of Breslau to find Polish-speaking women with loyalty to the German case.[51] A woman named Maruszik was actually elected into the executive committee of the workers' council in Gleiwitz, but as far as we can tell from the sources, she never had a real impact on the political decisions.[52]

The most important meeting that discussed the question of national loyalty in the region took place in Gleiwitz on 22 November 1918. Leading members of the German council movement in Upper Silesia, the region's administration, and the government in Berlin came together to discuss the *Polenfrage* [Polish question]. The representative of the temporary German government, the *Rat der Volksbeauftragten* [Council of the People's Deputies] was Hugo Haase (USPD). He strongly rejected

the politics of the German administration in Upper Silesia and criticised Walther von Miquel as an emblem of an anachronistic political order. Similar to Löffler, Haase refused any changes to the German-Polish border, but demanded better living conditions, language autonomy and political representation for the Polish-speaking Upper Silesians. Only such measures could preserve Upper Silesia as part of Germany in his view. His aim was to form common German-Polish councils to overcome the national fractures of the region. He also proposed a clear-cut separation of state and church which could help to ease the national tensions.[53] In reaction to Haase's speech, Józef Rymer, a close associate of Wojciech Korfanty and leader of the *Zjednoczenie Zawodowe Polskie* [ZZP, Polish Professional Union], confirmed that the Poles needed stronger democratic representation, but dismissed the offer of bi-national workers' councils.[54] Both were members for the region of Upper Silesia in the *Naczelna Rada Ludowa* [Supreme People's Council] in Posen, which aimed to integrate Upper Silesia into the new Polish state.

Another important meeting took place about a month later at the town hall of Breslau on 30 December 1918. The most prominent representatives of the council movement in Upper Silesia and the two leading figures of the new Prussian government (formed on November 12) were present: Otto Landsberg (SPD), member of the *Rat der Volksbeauftragten,* and Paul Hirsch (SPD), prime minister of Prussia and Minister of the Interior. They discussed how to deal with the autonomist movement, the *Bund der Oberschlesier/Związek Górnoślązaków* – which they viewed as a 'serious danger'[55] – and rejected any plans of Upper Silesian autonomy, fearing that this would weaken the German influence in the region. To fight the autonomists, they promoted the so called *Breslauer Beschlüsse* [Breslau Resolutions]. According to them the strengthening of the Roman-Catholic church was crucial, which stood in stark contrast to Haase's idea of a separation between state and church. The resolutions supported the usage of Polish language in schools, the administration and the holy mass. As a first measure they agreed to

appoint the *Zentrum* politician Joseph Bitta, a member of the Prussian parliament, as the new *Regierungspräsident* because of his knowledge of the Polish language and his strong connection with the Roman-Catholic church. Bitta was commissioned to implement the *Breslauer Beschlüsse* in the region.[56] Since German Social Democrats denounced the autonomists and any idea of self-government in Upper Silesia as a possible weakening of the region and entailing a stronger influence from Poland or Czechoslovakia,[57] they accepted *Zentrum's* dominance in the region.

The SPD gained momentum and became the second most powerful party in Upper Silesia during the 1919 elections to the Weimar National Assembly: *Zentrum* sent 8 delegates (48,2 %) and the SPD 5 delegates (32,7%). The former Polish Party vanished since its delegates supported Wojciech Korfanty, who wanted the immediate political union between Upper Silesia and the new Polish state. The four former Polish Reichstag delegates became members of the Polish legislative *Sejm* after the elections on 26 January 1919, but were not elected, since it was impossible to vote for the Polish parliament in Upper Silesia.

Teschen Silesia

Teschen Silesia belonged to the Austrian part of the Habsburg Empire. Since the late nineteenth century regional representatives of socialists, national-conservatives and the peasants' party had representatives in the imperial parliament, the Reichsrat in Vienna. In the year 1900, 75,7% of the region's inhabitants were Roman-Catholics, 21,5% Lutheran and 2,5% Jewish.[58] Mining (especially in the coal fields around Karviná/Karwin) was an important part of the region's economy. However, the region's capital Teschen was dominated by administration and trade. According to the 1910 census, the inhabitants of Teschen

Silesia declared to speak Polish (54,8 %), Czech (27,1%) and German (18 %).

When the new Emperor Karl I published his manifesto *To My faithful Austrian peoples!* on 16 October 1918 he promised more regional and national autonomy to his loyal subjects and suggested to establish national councils to formulate reform programs. In Teschen Silesia an institution called 'Czech national council' already existed since 1904. It was formed as a local division of the Czech national movement in Prague and was accepted by the imperial administration of the Habsburg state as a committee of local experts for 'Czech matters', helping to prepare the official census of 1910. On 29 October 1918 – one day after the declaration of independence of Czechoslovakia – the Czechs remodelled the council as a broad coalition of parties which wanted the region to be part of the new Czechoslovak nation state. This *Zemský Národní výbor pro Slezsko* [Provincial National Committee for Silesia] was led by local Czech-oriented elites like the Czech lawyer and social democrat Zikmund Witt, who was a member of the Vienna parliament since 1911 and of Jewish faith. Józef Kożdoń's regionalist *Schlesische Volkspartei/Śląska Partia Ludowa* [Silesian People's Party], founded in 1909, strongly emphasized the region's historical and cultural autonomy and was mostly headed by German-speaking Protestants. Nevertheless, they also used Polish in their publications.[59] The party demanded a recognition of Silesia as a separate state under the protection of the League of Nations, and not only an autonomous status for the region.

The Czech council was challenged by the regional Polish representatives, who were mostly elected members of the Reichsrat in Vienna or the regional Austrian Silesian Assembly in Troppau/Opava. The Polish *Rada Narodowa Księstwa Cieszyńskiego* [National Council of the Dutchy of Cieszyn], formed on October 19, acted as an institution that represented the Polish political interests in matters of national self-determination. It was led by Józef Londzin, a Roman-Catholic priest, member of the Vienna

parliament and leader of the *Związkek Śląskich Katolików* [ZSK, Union of Silesian Catholics]. On October 30, the Polish national council seized power in the district of Teschen and the north-western districts of Bielsko (Czech: Bílsko; German: Bielitz) and Fryštát (German: Freistadt). This bloodless coup was carried out by soldiers of Polish origin from the regional garrison.[60]

As both national councils claimed the region for themselves, a confrontation seemed unavoidable. The occupation of the strategically important train station in the border town of Bohumín (German: Oderberg; Polish: Bogumin) by Polish troops in early November could easily have sparked violent clashes. However, the Polish and Czech regional councils were able to de-escalate the situation. They agreed on a provisional demarcation line until an international peace conference had decided on the future of the region. Only the regionalist movement denounced the legitimacy of both national councils, as they criticised the lack of democratic elections and designated the councils as 'self-proclaimed'.[61]

Ironically, the first free elections in Poland led to the dissolution of the mentioned compromise between the Polish and Czech national councils. Warsaw declared that Teschen Silesia would take part in the elections to the legislative *Sejm* on 26 January 1919, despite the lack of international recognition of the borders and a Polish administration all over Teschen Silesia. The Czech government felt this decision to be a provocation and sent troops to the region. A brief border war started on January 23, which ended after seven days due to the intervention of the international coalition. The national councils transformed into a temporary local government, which struggled with its legitimacy.[62]

In Teschen Silesia national councils tried to attract major parts of the regional population but struggled with the phenomenon of national indifference. Supporters of the regionalist movement, led by Józef

Kożdoń, took an in-between position as mainly Protestant, anti-Polish, German-speaking, but 'Schlonsak' [Silesian] as national affiliation. To integrate them into a Czechoslovak or Polish nation-state project turned out to be a difficult task, as the example of Kożdoń himself shows. At first the Polish side offered him the membership in their national council, but Kożdoń refused, which is why the Polish national council accused him of betrayal.[63] He was arrested on 30 November 1918 and imprisoned for four weeks in Kraków. After his release, he stayed in Czechoslovakia and got elected as the mayor of Czech Teschen.

Another question of diversity in the region was the integration of the inhabitants who declared to be German. In Teschen Silesia, the Polish National council tried to persuade the German minority to support them against the Czechs. They offered the Germans cultural autonomy and allowed them to keep their own administrators in towns like Bielitz, where the Germans constituted a majority.[64]

The compromise with the Germans proved to be an obstacle for the work of the Polish national council. Its leaders promised the large German estate owners the control over their lands as long as they supported them against the Czechs – a clear breach of the statements made to the regional workers. Especially the German-speaking Larisch-Mönnich family, the largest estate owners in the region, was supported by the Polish council.[65] However, the Czechs also offered political and cultural autonomy to the Germans. The local German newspaper *Teschener Volksbote* for example, which was printed in Ostrava, sided with the Czechs and criticized the Polish national council because it was never elected by the local population.[66] Therefore, the German movement of the region was split between Polish and Czechoslovakian loyalists.

Women played an important role in the Polish national council, namely Zofia Kirkor-Kiedroniowa, a sister of Stanisław and Władysław Grabski. She led the regional women's league before 1918 and was a member of

the conservative National Democrats. She was one of three female members (out of 30) of the council. Her function was not only to mobilise regional women to support the national council, but also work on the highly disputed population census of the region.[67] The council members however did not reach a common political agreement for the future position of women: Socialists like Dorota Kłuszyńska, who was also a member of the council, wanted to push women's rights further by giving them full emancipation.[68] In contrast, the conservatives did not oppose giving voting rights to women, but still stated that a woman's job was to be a mother and household keeper. Even Kirkor-Kiedroniowa, an educated and politically active women, strongly opposed ideas of further emancipation.

Orava

Before 1918, Orava (Hungarian: Árva) belonged to the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Empire, i.e. the Kingdom of Hungary. It had hardly any industry, except forest industry. Its economy was dominated by subsistence agriculture. In the whole kingdom of Hungary mass political parties were absent. Due to the restrictions on the suffrage system, which was based on wealth and education, only around 6% of the population could cast their ballot in the elections for the parliament in Budapest. In Orava, where poverty and low educational levels were common, the percentage of voters was even smaller. As a result, the region's deputies and administrative officials were members of the Hungarian-speaking elite who did not represent the local population. In the northern part of Orava, close to the Galician border, most people spoke a regional Slavonic dialect, i.e. 'Góral', which was close to Polish but not codified and often differed in each village of the rugged mountain landscape. Since the end of the nineteenth century Poles and Slovaks tried to claim the population as their own. Especially Polish ethnographers, linguists and historians

from Kraków and the Tatra Museum in Zakopane travelled to the area and organized student field trips. Their examinations constituted a combination of ethnographic research, attempts of nation-building and tourism.[69] However, despite these efforts most of the population remained indifferent regarding nationality. The population was overwhelmingly Roman-Catholic and strongly identified themselves with their religious determination and local community.[70] Those local elites with a certain level of education (higher than elementary school and up to university graduates) who preserved and promoted a Slavic identity – be it Polish, Góral or Slovak – were present as well. Before 1918, individuals like the attorney and Slovak poet Pavol Országh Hviezdoslav from the Orava capital Dolný Kubín or Ferdynand Machay, a priest and Polish national activist from Jabłonka, were prominent actors for a Slavic national identity on a regional level. However, as Machay confessed in his memories *Moja droga do Polski: Pamiętnik* [My Road to Poland: Memories], he knew Hungarian much better than Polish, because he benefitted from a school and university system, which was Hungarian-grounded, while Polish schools did not exist in Orava.[71]

On 28 October 1918 the Aster Revolution – starting in Budapest – ended the monarchy in the Carpathian Basin. It served as the preliminary event for the foundation of national councils. In the so-called 'Martin Declaration'[72] of October 30, Slovak national activists proclaimed the creation of a Czecho-Slovak nation-state, subsequently leading to unstable administrative structures because the proclamation itself challenged the Hungarian presence in Slovakia. Additionally, returning soldiers and groups of the local population started to loot Jewish shops and attack Hungarian officials.[73] They blamed them for the precarious living conditions in the last weeks of the First World War and used antisemitic stereotypes to justify their actions.[74] The Hungarian administration, police and military failed to bring back order in the region. To restore law and order starting from November 3 onwards, national councils as well as national guards were founded in bigger cities

like the aforementioned Dolný Kubín and Jabłonka, but also in about a dozen smaller towns and villages.[75]

Actors like Hviezdoslav and Machay founded and led the local national councils and managed the process of political transition in Orava. To legitimize themselves, they used their pre-war reputation as regionally well-known Slavic activists. National councils were composed of local inhabitants who described themselves as Slovak or Polish, which simultaneously implied the exclusion of Hungarians and Jews from political power. The newspaper *Naša Orava* [Our Orava] – published by the Slovak national council in the region's capital Dolný Kubín – openly justified this violent re-configuration of the power structures as a reaction to an asserted 'Hungarian-Jewish rule' during the imperial period.[76]

These acts of violence as well as the dissolution of the Hungarian state's presence as an organizing factor in matters of governance and security set the main task for the new councils: regaining peace and order in Orava. The first action of the leading Polish council in the Upper Orava region in Jabłonka was to call Polish troops for help to bring back order to the region, to stop the anti-Jewish and Hungarian violence and to improve the food supply chain for the local population.[77] Neither in the Slovak councils, nor in their Polish equivalences were there any local or regional voting processes and none of the members had ever been elected to be the region's deputy before. Instead, they were installed in local meetings by public acclaim.

To execute the political transition from Hungarian to Czechoslovak rule, the Slovak council in Dolný Kubín negotiated a pragmatic agreement with the Hungarian *Župan* [the administrator of Orava county], Juraj/György Bulla. Bulla recognized the council as representative of the Slovak side and stayed in charge until the appointment of a new Czechoslovak Župan

on December 16, the local lawyer and pre-war national activist Vladimir Pivko.[78]

Bulla stood for a local elite of Slavic origin who remained loyal towards the Hungarian state until and sometimes even during the Czechoslovak period. In a predominantly nationally indifferent region, where family names did not necessarily represent national affiliations, it is difficult to grasp reliable data on those former Hungarian state officials who, after 1918, became loyal Czechoslovak citizens in order to keep their position in the state's administration. Bulla was certainly one of them. After he negotiated the agreement with the Slovak national council, he reported the events to Budapest and offered his resignation as *Župan*, which the new revolutionary government refused.[79] So he continued to run the local administration in cooperation with the new Czechoslovak representatives from the national council. Like Bulla, at least 30 members of the former Hungarian administration could keep their position in the Orava administration in early 1919.[80] They had Slavic, Hungarian and German (maybe Jewish) family names and had to declare that they remained loyal to Czechoslovakia and its laws.[81]

Especially for the Slavic majority of Orava the year 1918 turned out to be a breakthrough for political participation. The Hungarian suffrage system was designed to keep the poor and mostly uneducated Slovak peasants away from power. The council movement offered these underprivileged groups new forms of participation and put the improvement of the Slovak education system on the political agenda. Women were absent in the councils but participated in the local national movements, for example as authors in newspapers.[82] However, they first appeared in political functions as members of the Plebiscite Commission established in late 1919 after the end of the council movement. In this respect, Hviezdoslav served as a reliable representative of Slovak cultural and educational interests, since he was a known poet and translator, and a nation-wide respected representative of Orava in the Czechoslovak Revolutionary

National Assembly in Prague. An influential group for the Slovak as well as for the Polish council movement were Catholic priests, as for instance the already mentioned Machay from Jabłonka. He was in close contact with the Polish national activists at the Tatra Museum in Zakopane and accompanied the Polish soldiers in November 1918 when they occupied the northern part of Orava. His role was to convince the local population of their 'Polishness' and promise an improvement of the terribly depleted food reserves. Machay followed a double strategy: He tried to integrate the national indifferent population into the Polish council and national movement, which should simultaneously include more democratic rights, as the new Polish State provided universal suffrage. However, Machay could not convince the Orava inhabitants to be Poles since the Polish troops failed to improve the living conditions.

Comparative Conclusion

Polish, German, and Czechoslovak politicians in the transitional period competed hard to pull the people in Upper Silesia, Teschen, and Orava over in their 'national' camps with the aim that the people and the territory would belong to their 'nation'. The politics of diversity in these border regions after World War I was dominated from the start by the question to which nation the people and therefore the territory should belong.

During the transitional period of uncertainty, the main political task was to maintain law and order, include 'the people' into the upcoming democratization processes, and attract and integrate them into the councils' favoured nation-state projects. To achieve these goals councils developed different strategies to attract and integrate certain parts of the local and regional population. One reason for the differences was that the preconditions of democratization differed from region to region from the start. While Upper Silesia and Teschen Silesia benefited from previous

experiences with parliamentarism, a diverse political party system and the labour movement, Orava lacked such experiences. While negotiations between members of the members of the former elites still heading the administration and members of the councils went on more or less smoothly in Upper- and Teschen Silesia, violent clashes in Orava led to the exclusion of former elites from power – i.e. Hungarians and Jews.

While in Upper Silesia and Teschen Silesia the inclusion of women in the councils was a declared political goal, integrating women was not a main task in Orava and female actors did not appear at all in the council movement. Nevertheless, it must be stated that female members in councils were also rare in Upper Silesia and Teschen Silesia and only very few women, like Kirkor-Kiedroniowa and Kłuszyńska, did play a significant role in their councils.

Attempts of cooperation between councils of differing national or social orientation were rarely longstanding initiatives. While initial successful compromises were negotiated, mistrust steadily grew among national camps. Conflicting policies at the national level in Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland led to rivalry between councils in the regions.

This observation brings us to our main question, i.e. if ethnicity, culture as well as gender, religion and social class diversity hindered governance and coherent decision-making in a time of transition to democracy. In the borderlands of Upper Silesia, Teschen Silesia and Orava, the councils on the local and regional level had a much higher ability to reconciliate differing political interests between the national camps in the region, as regionally negotiated demarcation lines or pragmatic cooperation between certain national councils in matters of security demonstrated. The double transformation in Orava could be carried out relatively quickly (from November till mid-December 1918), until a new Czechoslovak government and regional *Župan* could be installed, while the period of uncertainty lasted several months longer in the other two

regions. We argue that this difference occurred from the fact that the Slovak national councils in Orava cooperated with the former Hungarian administration and the Polish councils in the northern territory. Instead of continuing political struggles from imperial times within nation, class or simply party conflicts, they focused on regaining stability. In Upper Silesia and Teschen Silesia on the contrary, the democratic traditions of a diverse political party system as well as labour movements hindered coherent decision-making. Differing political concepts had to be negotiated at length, which led to further national, social, gender and class conflicts. In spite of the prevalent phenomenon of national indifference in the regions, the question of national orientation and therefore the belonging of a region to Germany, Poland or Czechoslovakia became the most widely discussed issue in the councils instead of improving social conditions for 'the people'.

Endnotes

[1] A. Schedler, 'Taking Uncertainty Seriously: The Blurred Boundaries of Democratic Transition and Consolidation', in: *Democratization* 8/4 (2001), 1-22.

[2] G. O'Donnell, P. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore, 1986), 3.

[3] See e.g. the discussions in A. Lecours, L. Moreno (eds.), Nationalism and Democracy: Dichotomies, Complementarities, Oppositions (London, 2010); M. Plattner, L. Diamond (eds.), Nationalism, Ethnic conflict, and Democracy (Baltimore, 1994); R. Máiz, F. Requejo (eds.), *Democracy, Nationalism, and Multiculturalism* (London, 2006). For theoretical works on the topic see e.g. M. Keating, *Plurinational Democracy. Stateless Nations in a Post-sovereignty Era* (Oxford, 2004); O. Cassif, *On Nationalism and Democracy. A Marxist Examination* (London, 2006). For case studies see e.g. M. A. Jubulis, Nationalism and Democratic Transition: The Politics of Citizenship and Language in Post-Soviet Latvia, Lanham 2001; E. Harris, *Nationalism and Democratisation: Politics of Slovakia and Slovenia* (London, 2002).

[4] R. Brubaker, '*Nationalizing states in the Old "New Europe" – And The New',* in: *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 19/2 (1996) 411-437.

[5] See e.g. J. Snyder, F*rom Voting to Violence. Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York 2000).

[6] See H. Hein-Kircher/S. Kailitz, '"Double transformations". Nation Formation and Democratization in Interwar East Central Europe', in: *Nationalities Papers. The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, 46/5 (2018), 745-758.

[7] M. Klatt, 'Mobilization in crisis, Demobilization in Peace: Protagonists of Competing National Movements in Border Regions', in: *Studies on National Movements* 4 (2019) 1.

[8] T. Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls. National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900-1948* (Ithaca, 2008); Zahra, 'Imagined Noncommunities. National Indifference as a Category of Analysis', in: *Slavic Review* 69/1 (2010), 93-119.

[9] See e.g. J. Bjork, *Neither German nor Pole. Catholicism and National Indifference in a Central European Borderland* (Ann Arbor, 2008); T. Kamusella, J. Bjork, T. Wilson & A. Novikov (eds.), *Creating Nationality in Central Europe, 1880-1950 Modernity, Violence and (Be)Longing in Upper Silesia* (London/New York, 2016); P. Polak-Springer, *Recovered territory. A German-Polish Conflict over Land and Culture, 1919-1989* (New York, 2018); B. Karch, *Nationalism on the Margins. Silesians Between Germany and Poland, 1848-1945* (Cambridge, MA 2010).

[10] T. Carothers, 'How Democracies Emerge: The "Sequencing" Fallacy', in: *Journal of Democracy*, 18/1 (2007), 24.

[11] S. Stroschein, *Ethnic Struggle, Coexistence, and Democratization in Eastern Europe* (Cambridge, 2012), 1.

[12] See Snyder, *From Voting to Violence*.

[13] M. Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy. Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (Cambridge, 2005).

[14] See J. Linz, A. Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe* (Baltimore, 1996), 24.

[15] These institutions of political transition show interesting similarities to the round tables as institutions of political transition in Eastern Europe in the period

1989-1991. For a discussion on the nature, importance and role of round table talks in Eastern Europe see H. Welsh, 'Political Transition Processes in Central and Eastern Europe', in: *Comparative Politics* 26 (1994), 379-394.

[16] There is still much scholarly dispute about the nature of these political institutions. The research of the 1960s and 1970s focused mostly on the 'revolutionary' tendencies of the councils and their position as a 'third way' between parliamentary democracies and Marxist-Leninist party dictatorships. M. Gohlke, *Die Räte in der Revolution von 1918/19 in Magdeburg, Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg* (Oldenburg 1999), 5.

[17] Opole Archiwum Państwowe [Opole, State Archive] (APO); Wrocław, Archiwum Państwowe [Wrocław, State Archive] (APW); Warszawa, Archiwum Akt Nowych [Warszawa Archive of New Files] (AAN); Spytkowice, Archiwum Narodowe w Krakowie – Ekspozytura w Spytkowicach [Spytkowice, National Archive in Kraków – Spytkowice Branch] (ANK-S); Bytča, Štátný archiv [Bytča, State Archive] (ŠaB); Budapest, Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár – Országos Levéltára [Hungarian National Archive – Country Archive (MNL – OL); Bonn, Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie.

[18] We have analysed in our project the followings newspapers. From Upper Silesia: *Der Bund*/*Der Oberschlesier*/*Głos ludu Slaskiego*/*Górnoślązak*/*Katolik*/*Kuryer Śląski*/*Nowiny*/*Oberschlesische Grenz-Zeitung*/*Oberschlesischer Wanderer*/*Oberschlesischer Kurier*/*Ostdeutsche Morgenpost*. From Teschen Silesia: *Dziennik Cieszyński*/*Teschner Volksbote*/*Duch Času*/*Obrana Slezska*. From Orava: *Echo Tatrzańskie*/*Národnie noviny*/*Naša Orava*/*Gazeta Podhalańska*/*Slovenský Denník*.

[19] M. Alexander, 'Oberschlesien im 20. Jahrhundert. Eine mißverstandene Region', in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 30/3 (2004), 465-489.

[20] S. Rosenbaum (ed.), *Górny Slask i Górnoslazacy. Wokól problemów regionu i jego mieszkanców w XIX i XX wieku* (Katowice/Gliwice 2014); Rosenbaum, 'Górny Śląsk na zakręcie. Konflikty narodowe i społeczne na pruskim Górnym Śląsku w latach 1918–1919', in: *Biuletyn Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej* 11-12 (2008), 48-56.

[21] A. Michalczyk, *Heimat, Kirche und Nation. Deutsche und polnische Nationalisierungsprozesse im geteilten Oberschlesien (1922-1939)* (Cologne, 2010), 8.

[22] Bjork, *Neither German nor Pole*, 21-37.

[23] The voting rights of the Prussian Landtag were highly restricted and dependent on tax income. M. Anderson, *Practicing Democracy: Elections and Political Culture in Imperial Germany* (Princeton, 2000), 62-76.

[24] Alexander, 'Oberschlesien im 20. Jahrhundert'.

[25] Michalczyk, *Heimat, Kirche und Nation*, p. 20-23.

[26] This was by far the strongest result of the Polish Party in any region of the Reich in the 1912 elections.

[27] A. Mikołajew, 'Podkomisariat naczelnej rady ludowej dla Śląska wy Bytomiu', in: *Studia Śląskie* 33 (1978), 273-306

[28] Bitta was a member of the Prussian Parliament from 1910 to 1918. In 1919-20 he was a member of the Weimar National Assembly, the constitutional convention and de facto parliament of Germany. G. Hitze, *Carl Ulitzka (1873-1953). Oberschlesien zwischen den Weltkriegen* (Düsseldorf, 2002), 188-190.

[29] G. Doose, *Die separatistische Bewegung in Oberschlesien nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg (1918-1922)* (Wiesbaden, 1987), 17-19.

[30] W. Lesiuk, *Rady Robotnicze Żołnierskie Chłopskie i Ludowe w Rejencji Opolskiej w Latach 1918-1919* (Opole, 1973), 85.

[31] The sources do not mention how an acclamation was measured. We suggest that it was most likely by a show of hands.

[32] See 'Arbeiter- und Soldatenrat in Kattowitz [Workers' and Soldiers' Council in Kattowitz]', in: *Oberschlesischer Wanderer* (OSW), 261 (12/11/1918), 3.

[33] Lesiuk, *Rady Robotnicze Żołnierskie Chłopskie i Ludowe w Rejencji Opolskiej w Latach*, 87.

[34] Opole Archiwum Państwowe [Opole, State Archive] (APO), Rejencja Opolska, Revolution 1918, 259 [43] district administrator of Pless, telegram to Von Miquel, 14/11/1918.

[35] APO, Rejencja Opolska, Revolution 1918, 259 [115] district administrator of Leubschütz, telegram to Von Miquel, 15/11/1918.

[36] Highest administrative position in the German government districts.

[37] Wrocław, Archiwum Państwowe [Wrocław, State Archive] (APW), CRL 82_178_81 Oberschlesische Fragen [23] Central councils meeting minutes, 21/11/1918.

[38] For example in Hindenburg. See APO, Rejencja Opolska, Revolution 1918, 259 [65] district administrator of Hindenburg, telegram to Von Miquel, 11/11/1918.

[39] Influential members have been Paul Löbe (SPD), Kurt Prescher (Zentrum magistrate), Hugo Rawitsch (factory owner), Heinrich Brückner (labor union)

[40] 'Protokoll der gemeinschaftlichen Sitzung von Magistrat und Stadtverordneten [Protocol of the Meeting of the magistrate and Town Representatives]', in: *Kattowitzer Stadtblatt* (KSB), 95 (27/11/1918), 1.

[41] APO, Rejencja Opolska, Revolution 1918, 259 [159] Letter from Von Miquel to all district administrators in Upper Silesia, 16/11/1918.

[42] APW, Centralna Rada Ludowa, 82_178_81_Oberschlesische Fragen [24] Central councils meeting minutes, 21/11/1918.

[43] APO, Rejencja Opolska_259_Revolution 1918 [179] Letter from the Prussian ministry of interior to Von Miquel, 20/12/1918.

[44] APW, Centralna Rada Ludowa, 82_178_84: Oberschlesien Zentrale Kattowitz [2-4] Workers- and soldiers council in Kattowitz, meeting minutes from 6/12/1918.

[45] Ibid.

[46] APO, Rejencja Opolska_259_Revolution 1918 [331] Declaration of the secretary of the polish workers union Józef Biniszkiewicz about the Poles and the Upper Silesian question, 18/11/1918.

[47] A. Kramp, *Georg Gothein (1857-1940). Aufstieg und Niedergang des deutschen Linksliberalismus* (Düsseldorf, 2017), 532-535.

[48] APW, Centralna Rada Ludowa, 82_178_81_Oberschlesische Fragen [69-70] Central councils meeting minutes, 11/12/1918.

[49] 'Vom Arbeiterrat [About the workers council]', in: *Oberschlesischer Wanderer* (OSW), 264 (15/11/1918), 2.

[50] APW, Centralna Rada Ludowa, 82_178_84: Oberschlesien Zentrale Kattowitz [5] Workers' and soldiers' council in Kattowitz, meeting minutes 6/12/1918.

[51] Ibid.

[52] 'Vom Arbeiterrat', 2.

[53] 'Oberschlesien und die Polengefahr [Upper Silesia and the Polish Danger]', in: *Sohrauer Stadtblatt (SoSB)* 95 (27/11/1918), 1.

[54] 'Rząd a sprawa polska [The government and the Polish question]' in: *Górnoślązak*, 273 (26/11/1918), 1.

[55] GeStaArchPrKB, Berlin_ HA_I_Rep77_Tit. 1373a_Nr.12b. Short overview of the council's work to keep Upper Silesia as part of Germany. Report to the interior ministry 15/12/1919 [28].

[56] GeStaArchPrKB, Berlin_ HA_I_Rep77_Tit. 1373a_Nr.12b. Political guidelines concerning Upper Silesia on 30. December 1918. Report to the interior ministry on 15/12/1919 [32-33].

[57] See Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie, Bonn. NL Hörsing: Oberschlesien 1919_14. Letter from the central workers council in Breslau to the German department of state, 19/3/1919.

[58] G. Studnicki, *Śląsk Cieszyński : obrazy przeszłości a tożsamość miejsc i ludzi* (Katowice, 2015), 92.

[59] D. Jerczyński, J. Tomaszewski (eds.), *Józef Kożdoń (1873-1949) przywódca Śląskiej Partii Ludowej, a kwestia narodowości śląskiej na Śląsku Cieszyńskim i Opawskim w XIX i XX w.* (Zabrze, 2011).

[60] B. Cybulski, *Rada Narodowa Księstwa Cieszyńskiego (1918-1920). Studium historyczno-prawne* (Opole, 1980), 18-24.

[61] 'Rada Narodowa dla Księstwa Cieszyńskiego [National councils for the Duchy of Teschen]', in: *Ślązak* 43 (26/10/1918), 5.

[62] See Warszawa, Archiwum Akt Nowych [Warszawa Archive of New Files] (AAN), Ambasada RP w Paryżu_104_49_Korespondencja Śląsk Cieszyński [4] Telegram from the Polish national council in Teschen to the polish Council of Ministers, 12/07/1919.

[63] Z. Kirkor-Kiedroniowa, *Wspomnienia. Tom II: Ziemia mojego męża* (Krakow, 1988), 314.

[64] Cybulski, *Rada Narodowa Księstwa Cieszyńskiego,* 45.

[65] I. Panic, *Śląsk Cieszyński w latach 1918–1945* (Cieszyn, 2015), 28.

[66] A rertrospect view from 1920 about the founding of the national council: 'Darf sich die Rada Narodowa als Repräsentant des gesamten Volkes bezeichnen?', in: *Teschener Volksbote* 24 (28/01/1920), 4.

[67] Kirkor-Kiedroniowa, *Wspomnienia. Tom II: Ziemia mojego męża*, 322.

[68] D. Kłuszyńska, *Dlaczego kobiety walczą o prawa polityczne* (Krakow, 1912).

[69] T. Trajdos, 'Śląsk wobec Spiszu, Orawy i Czadeckiego w okresie międzywojennym', in: *Dzieje Najnowsze* 45/1 (2013), 35-46.

[70] P. Matula, 'Úloha cirkvi v zápase o národnú identitu obyvateľstva severného Spiša a Oravy v rokoch 1918-1939', in: *Nezkatalogizovaný záznam* 10 (2007), 4; Trajdos, 'Śląsk wobec Spiszu', 35-46.

[71] F. Machay, *Moja droga do Polski. "Pamiętnik"* (Krakow, 1992).

[72] The Declaration was named after a city south-west of Orava.

[73] See AAN, 2/3/0. 202_Kancelaria Cywilna Naczelnika Państwa w Warszawie, (16/11/18) [1].

[74] During the Czechoslovak state-building anti-Jewish violence was not limited to remote Orava villages, but occurred in many areas. M. Frankl, M. Szabó, *Budování státu bez antisemitismu? Násilí, diskurz loajality a vznik Československa* (Prague 2016); M. Szabó, *"Von Worten zu Taten". Die slowakische Nationalbewegung und der Antisemitismus 1875 - 1922* (Berlin, 2014).

[75] M. Mrekaj, 'Prevrat na Orave', in: M. Weinbergerová, M. Martinický (eds.), *Historické výročia v roku 2018* (Bratislava, 2018), 70-84.

[76] *Naša Orava*, 1 (23.11.1918), 2-4; *Naša Orava*, 4 (21/12/1918), 2.

[77] See Spytkowice, Archiwum Narodowe w Krakowie – Ekspozytura w Spytkowicach [Spytkowice, National Archive in Kraków – Spytkowice Branch] (ANK-S), 29_3185_1-2_Polska Komisja Likwidacyjna Spisza i Orawy, (01/11/1918) (2).

[78] *Naša Orava*, 5 (21/12/1918), 5; *Slovenský župan oravský* [Slovak Orava Župan], 7.

[79] Budapest, Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár – Országos Levéltára [Hungarian National Archive – Country Archive (MNL – OL), Polgári kori kormányhatósági levéltárak, Miniszterelnökségi Levéltár, Miniszterelnökség, Minisztertanácsi

jegyzőkönyvek 1867-1944 (K 27), Proceedings Council of Ministers, 11/11/1918, (3).

[80] Bytča, Štátný archiv [Bytča, State Archive] (ŠaB), Fond Oravský župa II, inv. č. 1734, č. 239, List of adopted state officials in the Orava, 11/01/1919.

[81] ŠaB, Fond Oravský župa II, inv. č. 1734, č. 2, Declaration form for Czechoslovak state officials, no date.

[82] One of the very few examples would be in Echo Tatrzańskie, a journal from Zakopane in Galicia, or Gazeta Podhalańska from Nowy Targ (both located in former Galicia, so on the territory of Poland), where Polish national activists also tried to include the Orava into the mental map of a future Polish national state. For example: H. Stanowska: 'O wychowaniu narodowem [About national education]', in: *Gazeta Podhalańska*, 41 (12.10.1919), 3-4.

A Forgotten Minority: The Return of the *Auslandsdeutsche* to Germany in 1919-20

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This article examines the expulsion of Germans abroad (*Auslandsdeutsche*) from Allied countries and colonial empires in the aftermath of the First World War, and their somewhat negative reception in Weimar Germany in 1919-20. It does so against the background of what it identifies as a re-territorialisation of German national identity, beginning during the war itself and leading to an abrupt reversal of previous trends towards the inclusion of Germans abroad within broader transnational notions of Germanness (*Deutschtum*), rights to citizenship and aspirations to world power status. Re-territorialisation was not born out of the logic of de-territorialisation and *Weltpolitik* in any dialectical sense, however. Rather, its causes were largely circumstantial: the outbreak of global war in 1914, the worldwide economic and naval blockade of Imperial Germany, and its final defeat in 1918. Nonetheless, its implications were substantial, particularly for the way in which minority German groups living beyond Germany's new borders were constructed in official and non-official discourses in the period after 1919-20.

Keywords: Auslandsdeutsche, citizenship, de-territorialisation, Germans abroad, re-territorialisation

Introduction

'Coming home' was a common experience for combatants and civilians from all belligerent nations at the end of the First World War. It was also a process fraught with conflicting emotions, political tensions and unresolved traumas, not least in those countries on the losing side.[1] In Germany, the chairman of the newly-created Council of People's Commissars and Reich President in waiting, Friedrich Ebert, famously welcomed back the 'undefeated' troops from the battlefields of the western front in a speech in Berlin on 10 December 1918.[2] Various narratives connecting patriotic (male) sacrifice and national identity were constructed and communicated, leading to a 'fragmented' war memory and a failure to demobilise completely, at least in the cultural and political sense.[3] As Benjamin Ziemann has shown, in the 1920s a plethora of republican as well as right-wing veterans groups competed with each other to define the war experience and give it meaning in an ever-changing, post-war, but hardly peace-like present.[4]

In nationalist discourse and ritualised forms of protest, much was also heard in the 1920s and beyond about the *Rückwanderer* or ethnic German returnees from the East, and about the German-speaking minorities who remained in interwar Poland.[5] These were the post-war successors to the tens of thousands of Russian Germans who had already begun 'returning' to the Reich from the 1880s onwards.[6] However, instead of escaping late Tsarist Russification policies, they were now fleeing the violence of the Russian civil war and the repressiveness of the Bolshevik and White regimes. The ethnic German refugees from the East were subject to intensive reintegration efforts, while the Germans who stayed put in Poland or in other successor states of the Habsburg monarchy after 1919-20 not only had strong support from the Reich, but received certain formal legal protections under the post-war Minority Treaties, including 'political, linguistic [and] religious rights'.[7] So too, at

least in theory, did the colonial settlers (*Kolonialdeutsche*) in Germany's largest pre-war colonial territory, German South West Africa, now administered by South Africa under a League of Nations mandate.[8] While Germany lost all of its overseas colonies under the Treaty of Versailles, the continued presence of German colonial settlers in South West Africa, alongside efforts by the German Colonial Society and other pressure groups, allowed for the retention of an association between 'whiteness' and 'Germanness' into the 1920s and beyond.[9] So too did the many myths and legends that were built up around the 'heroic' exploits of General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, who commanded German forces in East Africa during the war, successfully evading much larger British, French, Belgian and Portuguese colonial armies and refusing to surrender until 25 November 1918. When he and his troops finally returned to Berlin on 2 March 1919, they were permitted a 'victory parade' through the Brandenburg Gate and were fêted by officials of the new republican government.[10]

However, one group of 'home-comers' who have so far received little scholarly attention were the *Auslandsdeutsche*, the 'Germans living abroad' who were expelled from western Allied countries and non-German colonial territories all over the world in the period 1919-20. This was a distinct but very diverse body of people, representing all those who had continued to hold German nationality and citizenship in spite of their, or their parents' or grandparents', emigration to foreign countries. Their legal status, which offered them certain consular protections before 1914, also ensured that they automatically became 'enemy aliens' once their 'host' countries had entered into formal hostilities with the Central Powers. During and immediately after the First World War, most of these overseas ex-patriate communities faced a mixture of internment, expropriation, commercial boycotts and, finally, forced migration. In 1919-20, many of the tens of thousands of Germans still living, or held captive in, Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal or Allied

territories outside Europe had little choice but to 'come home', even if some of them had been born abroad and had never seen the 'fatherland'.[11] The war had destroyed their lives and businesses and left them facing profoundly uncertain futures. In spite of this, they were not recognised, either in international or German domestic law, as a minority with specific claims or interests, or even as a disadvantaged group in need of long-term state support (or tax concessions). Unlike the ethnic Germans of Russian nationality, or the *Kolonialdeutsche*, they were soon forgotten, with successive Weimar governments showing little interest in their fate.

This article will treat the *Auslandsdeutsche* not as one homogenous group, but as a heterogeneous body of people in early Weimar Germany who were collectively labelled as a special interest group by various support organisations that had been set up to help them, even if they were not treated as such by German officialdom. As far as the Reich and the individual German states were concerned, such persons were German citizens in a legal sense. Indeed, the Reich citizenship law of 1913, a revision of the 1870 law, contained clauses designed to enable them to retain their legal ties and civic obligations to Germany, even if they had taken on a second nationality, that of their new 'host' country.[12] However, they were not regarded as 'war victims'. If anything, they were branded as outsiders whose life stories and experiences might disrupt conventional republican *and* anti-republican narratives of the war. This official attitude was met at first with incomprehension and then with outrage on the part of the *Auslandsdeutsche* whose expectations of 'home-coming' were markedly different to the actual reception that they received. As they were forced to recognise, the end of the war had brought with it not only a redrawing of borders in Europe and the loss of formal German colonies overseas, but a 'larger global shift' in Germany's power position as the world in general pivoted awkwardly between a still colonial present and a post-colonial future.[13]

One way of conceptualising this phenomenon is to see it as a moment of re-territorialisation and de-transnationalisation of German national identity. The term 're-territorialisation' is *not* understood here in the same way as the French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, who seek to destabilise the very concept of 'territoriality' by deploying the dialectical argument that an 'organism that is deterritorialized in relation to the exterior *necessarily* reterritorializes on its internal milieus.'[14] Rather, it is used to denote a more contingent, open-ended process whereby the pre-1914 tendency in Imperial Germany to give 'greater weight to descent at the expense of territory as a constitutive principle of citizenship' (Rogers Brubaker) was put into sudden, unexpected reverse.[15] Indeed, in a significant revision of Brubaker's thesis, I will argue that the original intentions behind the 1913 Reich citizenship law were very quickly overtaken by events. From 1914, the existence, status and future expectations of the *Auslandsdeutsche* were shaped not by ideas of 'common descent' but by the new national and imperial borders in and beyond Europe, and by the reconceptualisation of ethnic and cultural 'difference' which accompanied the global upheaval of war. Those returning from overseas in 1919 via Rotterdam, Hamburg, Switzerland or Alsace were often detained, for varying lengths of time, in special reception camps or *Heimkehrlager*.[16] Especially if they had spent long periods of time abroad, their loyalty to the Reich, their attachment to Germany as a (now 'dismembered') territorial entity, and their ability to (re-) integrate were subject to doubt. Various advocate groups, based in Düsseldorf and Berlin, sought to help them find employment, to secure compensation from public funds for loss of confiscated property overseas, and/or to prepare them for re-emigration as and when new post-war opportunities might arise. However, such hopes were dashed by the peace settlement and its global as well as domestic economic consequences. By the end of 1919 relations between the *Auslandsdeutsche* and the new German state had become very poor,

with the former blaming the latter for failing to address their needs as an uprooted minority requiring special help and protection.

In what follows, we will first look at the position of the *Auslandsdeutsche* in the German Empire before 1914, and their treatment at the hands of the enemy during the First World War. This will be followed by an overview of the expulsion measures enacted in Allied countries in 1919-20, and the policies developed by the German authorities at Reich and state level to accommodate the 'home-comers' (*Heimkehrer*) while denying them any privileged position vis-à-vis domestic war victims and returning veterans from the war in Europe. A third section will examine the response of advocate groups and the gradual breakdown of relations with German officialdom. Finally, the conclusion will offer some broader reflections on the link between (imagined) non-European spaces, the 're-territorialisation' of nationalism and the political/cultural construction of 'minorities' in Europe in the immediate post-war years.

The *Auslandsdeutsche* before 1914 and their experiences during the First World War

Outward migration from German-speaking Central and East-Central Europe was already a fact of life prior to the nineteenth century. Beginning with the dawn of the early modern period, or rather the first Age of Discovery from the late fifteenth century, David Blackbourn mentions the numerous, albeit often anonymous 'German travellers, sojourners, merchants, missionaries, priests, scholars, mining engineers [and] settlers' who 'moved… within empires marked out by others – the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch [and] British.'[17] The example of the German farmers attracted by Catherine the Great to colonise the Volga region of Tsarist Russia in the mid-1760s also springs to mind,[18] as does the case of the German trading houses that settled in many of the leading

European ports, such as London, Amsterdam, Bordeaux and Cádiz, from the seventeenth century onwards.[19] However, it was only really in the decades after the Napoleonic wars, and more particularly from the 1850s, that the notion of 'Germans abroad' (*Auslandsdeutsche*) as a distinct, transnational category of Germans began to take shape.[20] A number of 'pull' factors aided this process, including cheaper travel made possible by improvements in maritime transport and the coming of the telegraph and the railways, as did various 'push factors', such as economic down-turns, famines and/or political unrest at home.[21]

Between 1816 and 1914 some 5.5 million Germans left their homelands in Central Europe for the United States. Others put down roots all over the world, with sizeable German communities in Britain, Belgium and France and throughout the British, French, Belgian, Portuguese and former Spanish Empires. The peak periods for emigration came in the years 1846 to 1857 and again from 1864 to 1873, accounting for one million each. Between 1880 and 1893 a further 1.8 million Germans left the territory of the Kaiserreich for pastures new,[22] but thereafter the emigration figures fell dramatically as the German economy grew stronger in the wake of rapid industrialisation. In fact, in the last decade of the nineteenth century, and the first decade of the twentieth, there was a much bigger *internal* migration of Germans from the countryside to the cities, as well as immigration of foreign seasonal workers, particularly from (Russian) Poland, Italy, Habsburg Austria and the Netherlands.[23] Indeed, the number of cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants in Germany increased from twenty-six in 1890 to thirty-three in 1900 and forty-eight by 1910, while the overall population rose from forty million in 1872 to fifty-six million in 1900 and sixty-seven million in 1913.[24]

Before 1914, many cultural pessimists in Germany saw the new industrial cities as cesspools of crime and degeneracy, as incubators of the 'poison of commerce and materialism' and even as a foreign or 'alien' presence on German soil.[25] Leading figures in the establishment and

among the imperial ruling class were also concerned about the continuing rise in support for the Social Democrats (SPD), combining this with a horror of strikes and a broader 'fear of a recrudescence of the revolutionary events of the year 1848.'[26] In marked contrast, as Stefan Manz has noted, the hundreds of thousands of *Auslandsdeutsche* living in Africa, Asia, North and South America, and Australasia were regarded in Berlin, positively if a little optimistically, as 'outposts of "Germanness" abroad'. Between them they were held to enjoy a variety of 'persisting bonds' to the Kaiserreich – cultural, economic, religious – which 'had to be preserved for their own and the fatherland's benefits.'[27] In other words – and contrary to the claims of Rainer Münz and Rainer Ohliger – 'political-territorial questions' were not especially important as a driver of official interest in the question of the *Auslandsdeutsche* after 1880.[28] Instead, the perceived threat posed by 'national indifference' among some German overseas emigrants, and even worse, of socialist or anarchist predilections among others, generated growing calls for sustained, government-backed, transnational activism. In order for this activism to succeed, it was believed, it had to sell a particular version of patriotic, conservative, Protestant *Deutschtum* while also taking into account the diversity of emigrant experiences, and the varied degrees of integration with native cultures and host societies to be found in different parts of the world. This in turn implied a certain, albeit hardly uncontested, 'de-territorialisation' of German identity. 'Germanness' was no longer confined to a particular territory (or territories, if one includes German overseas colonies acquired in the 1880s and 1890s). Rather it was also constructed and maintained via extra-territorial, global networks of like-minded patriots mobilised in support of German *Weltpolitik*.[29]

Communities of German migrants living overseas were thus styled, nationally and transnationally, as 'cultural markers' of the new German Empire and its aspirations to imperial greatness on a par with Britain

and the United States.[30] This was certainly the aim of the General German School Association (*Allgemeiner Deutscher Schulverein*), founded in 1881 and renamed the Association for Germans Abroad (*Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland*, VDA) in 1908.[31] On the one hand, overseas Germans were now claimed for overtly racist and imperialist agendas, with 'Germanness' clearly associated with 'whiteness' and European 'civilising missions' in the colonial context. Yet it also signified that such agendas would themselves have to become more diverse and worldly, and more open to understanding and engaging with global and transnational processes.[32] As Bradley D. Naranch has shown, the concept of 'overseas Germans' first emerged in the 1850s and 1860s as a way of keeping the 'liberal "spirit of 1848"' alive, a spirit which combined hopes for German unity with respect for regional diversity and religious and political pluralism.[33] Even as liberalism began to fade at home in the wake of Bismarck's 'unification from above' from the 1870s onwards, big business saw patriotic 'German emigrants… [as] potential consumers of Germany's industrial products', and argued for closer ties with them, both now and in an imagined future when Germany had become a more dominant player in world commerce and trade.[34]

Far from being merely the passive product of 'armchair metropolitan fantasy' among nationalists at home, the more committed *Auslandsdeutsche* were also active participants in the construction of their own transnational diasporic communities in the years 1871 to 1914 – whether as language teachers, Christian missionaries or members of navy leagues and other nationalist associations.[35] Some of the most vociferous exponents of *Deutschtum* abroad were in fact naturalised citizens of the 'host' society, but this did not necessarily prevent them from trying to forge or maintain links with their home country, including the cultivation of proud memories of wartime (1864-71) or peacetime (1871-1914) military service in the German army.[36] After the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, Berlin made sustained

efforts to call patriotic *Auslandsdeutsche* back home to serve the fatherland in its current hour of need. Quite a few reservists did try to make the journey to Germany; some were captured by the British *en route* and interned, a cause of much controversy, especially when they were taken from neutral ships docked in British ports or intercepted on the high seas. But others completed the journey successfully and either joined the German armed forces fighting on the western or eastern fronts or enlisted in the Imperial Navy.[37]

For information on the well-being of those left behind in enemy countries, the Imperial Government relied on the help of the *Zentral-Auskunftsstelle für Auswanderer*, a body originally set up by the German Colonial Society around the turn of the century but in 1902 brought under the direct administrative and political control of the Reich Chancellery in Berlin and used to support Germans living in places beyond German colonies too.[38] In response to an enquiry from the German Red Cross's Central Information Bureau in early November 1914, the *Zentral-Auskunftsstelle* set out what it understood to be its new role in wartime while making clear that it still reported directly to the office of the Reich Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg:

> …[our organisation] is responsible for making official enquiries about the fate of all Germans who are not serving in the army or navy but who are currently stranded in enemy countries, or who can reasonably be assumed to find themselves trapped there. This means Great Britain, France, Russia, Serbia, Montenegro and Japan, as well as Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and [other] British and French colonies. On the other hand, we cannot make official enquiries concerning Reich citizens in neutral countries.[39]

As other countries joined the Allied side, beginning with Italy in 1915 and Portugal in 1916, and ending with Siam, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Haiti and Honduras in 1918, the *Zentral-Auskunftsstelle* expanded the

geographical reach of its activities.[40] This came on top of the work done firstly by different branches of the German Red Cross, and through them, the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva, in respect of Germans (and their families) who were actually interned as civilian or military prisoners of war in enemy states;[41] and secondly by a body set up by the Reich Office of Interior in September 1914 to monitor alleged abuses against German civilians, the *Reichskommission zur Erörterung von Gewalttätigkeiten gegen deutsche Zivilpersonen in Feindesland* (Reich Commission for the discussion of acts of violence committed against German civilians on enemy territory).[42]

But in reality there was very little that the German government could do for *Auslandsdeutsche* after the autumn of 1914. This was partly a matter of the vagaries of geography. German nationals and ethnic Germans fleeing those areas of Eastern Europe over-run by Russian Tsarist troops could be supported by organisations such as the *Beratungsstelle für Deutsche Flüchtlinge* (Advice Bureau for German Refugees).[43] However, with the imposition of the Allied naval blockade and the cutting of Germany's transatlantic telegraph cables, much of the rest of the world was beyond Germany's reach. With the exception of German East Africa, most German overseas colonies were occupied by enemy countries – Britain, France, Belgium and Japan – in 1914-15.[44] From August 1914 onwards, ever larger numbers of German men of military age were interned in metropolitan France and Britain, and in their extra-European territories and dominions. This was accompanied by expropriation and expulsion measures, as well as sporadic mob violence. Anti-German riots became a global phenomenon following the sinking of the *Lusitania* in May 1915, with attacks on German communities throughout the UK as well as in Moscow, Johannesburg, Durban, Sydney, Melbourne and elsewhere.[45] Following the sinking of one of its ships by a German U-boat, there were even anti-German riots in Brazil in April 1917.[46] Several other South American countries, including Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Peru,

came under pressure to intern the crews of German merchant ships stuck in their ports.[47] In the US after 1917, anti-foreigner violence was more typically of the vigilante kind, and was directed against individuals rather than whole communities, but went as far as the public lynching on 5 April 1918 of one German immigrant from Dresden, Robert Prager, who was a coal miner working in Collinsville, Illinois, and was thought to hold socialist beliefs.[48]

However, although the chief causes of the wartime persecution of German minorities are to be found on the home fronts of the Allied powers,[49] the somewhat reserved response of the German government in Berlin cannot be explained merely by reference to unfavourable geopolitical factors and the changing fortunes of war. Rather, it also reflected a shift in mentality away from the transnational to the national when it came to visions of German war aims, and a corresponding 're-territorialisation' of notions of 'Germanness' and 'state interest'. For instance, Reich Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's famous 9 September 1914 war aims memorandum, which was brought to light in the early 1960s by the Hamburg historian Fritz Fischer, envisaged an immediate territorial settlement in which France would be 'so weakened as to make her revival as a great power impossible for all time' and Russia 'thrust back as far as possible from Germany's frontier.' Bethmann mentioned 'the creation of a continuous [German-ruled] Central African colonial empire', but this was of secondary importance and anyway was to be 'considered later', as were the more specific territorial aims 'to be realised vis-à-vis Russia.'[50]

Scholars have interpreted Bethmann Hollweg's September war aims programme differently, with Fischer arguing that it represented a clear-cut intention to 'permanently change the face of Europe' as a step towards the attainment of world power,[51] and critics, such as Egmont Zechlin, casting it merely as a temporary, tactical plan to enable Germany to continue to hold its own against Britain and the British Empire, in the

expectation that France and possibly also Russia would soon concede defeat and sue for a separate peace.[52] For our purposes, however, the interesting thing to note is the wording used in the preamble to the programme. Here Bethmann boldly stated what he thought the 'general aim of the war' was, namely to achieve 'security for the German Reich in west and east for all imaginable time.'[53] As the finer details of the programme then go on to suggest, economic and military 'security' were conceived solely in territorial terms. There was no mention in this document of *Auslandsdeutsche* in the sense of extra-territorial networks of German emigrants or how they might contribute to securing the preservation of the Kaiserreich after the war, whether in the immediate future or 'for all imaginable time'. In other words, the *Auslandsdeutsche* were no longer being thought of, as they had been in certain circles before 1914, as crucial to Germany's position as a world power.

This 're-territorialisation' of the political imaginary in Germany, in other words of the Kaiserreich's global power relations and conceptions of its own 'state interest', was most visible at the level of 'grand strategy' (*Große Politik*). However, it can also be seen at other, more banal levels of German wartime administration. When it came to the approval or rejection of wartime applications for naturalisation, for instance, the Reich pursued a line which differed from virtually all other belligerent states. Whereas the latter were keen to reduce the number of naturalisations permitted, and even to reverse some that had been granted to persons of enemy heritage before 1914, German wartime policy at Reich and state level was to loosen restrictions, including in respect to resident aliens of Russian, British and non-Christian backgrounds. As Eli Nathans notes:

> The result, in Prussia, was an increase of some three thousand naturalizations each year over the 1914 figure, at least in 1915 and 1916. This benevolence even extended to foreign Jews. Several hundred of the petitions granted in 1915 were from Jewish men

> enlisting in the army, a figure for Jewish naturalizations far higher than those recorded before the war. The strictures on the naturalization of Social Democrats were also relaxed. The Social Democrats had voted for war credits, after all.[54]

Compared to the pre-war trend, then, this marked a somewhat abrupt shift back towards territorial residency (*Ansässigkeit*) and economic performance (*Leistung*), as opposed to 'Germanness' in a cultural, religious or transnational sense, as a key criteria for acquiring or retaining German citizenship. The cause was largely the manpower shortages on the German home front, but this too was linked to issues of 'security', whether defined in military or economic terms or both.

Meanwhile, when it came to maintaining enthusiasm for the war, emphasis switched to the hundreds and thousands of young German men whose remains lay in the fields of Flanders and northern France, or in the hostile landscapes of the East, and who would never come home again. The best of the country's youth was said to have died in the war in Europe; it was their masculine heroism and self-sacrifice that would 'inspire a new and stronger Germany.'[55] True, propagandists writing for the Imperial government's War Press Office (*Kriegspresseamt*) continued to emphasise the 'necessity' of extra-European colonies, but this too was now couched in territorial and racial terms only. (White) German blood had been spilled in defence of these colonies, while Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal had all deliberately reneged on pre-war agreements to maintain established racial hierarchies in Africa in the event of war in Europe. It was on these grounds, rather than as a contribution to expanding global networks, that demands for an enlarged German empire in the centre of that continent (*Mittelafrika*) were now legitimised.[56]

The reserve side of this was that persons of German nationality abroad were looked on with increasing suspicion, especially those who had not

tried to return 'home' in 1914 to support the fatherland. In particular, the small number of German nationals who were repatriated to the Reich from enemy countries under exchange agreements reached during the war - mainly women, children and older men, as well as internees who were released from captivity on medical grounds - were met with a lukewarm, and at times even downright hostile, attitude from German officialdom. Certainly their loyalty and patriotism were not taken for granted. The acting commander of the Seventh Army Corps, headquartered in Münster and responsible for military security in some of the most strategically significant areas of western Germany, including part of the border with the neutral Netherlands, was particularly concerned. On 30 July 1918 he wrote to the provincial governors in Prussian Westphalia and to representatives of the state governments in the principalities of Lippe and Schaumburg-Lippe to highlight his fears:

> The dangers to state security posed by [German] civilian persons returning home from countries overseas are fundamentally the same as the threat posed by returning members of the armed forces: political subversion, spying or carrying out acts of sabotage on behalf of enemy powers, infiltration of undesirable elements, and so on.[57]

Similar views were held by German diplomats serving overseas. On 19 March 1918, for example, the German consul-general in The Hague, Friedrich Rosen, wrote to the Prussian War Ministry to notify officials there that the 600 German civilian internees so far released from Britain and sent to Holland under the July 1917 exchange agreement were not ideal candidates for repatriation as they were suffering from 'all the heinous effects of long-term captivity', including 'complete nervous exhaustion and barbed-wire disease.'[58] On 26 April he followed this up with a letter to the German Chancellor Georg von Hertling, in which he warned that

> there are many inferior elements [*minderwertige Elemente*] among the German civilian prisoners currently interned in the Netherlands… The great majority of them… were resident in England before the war; many of these have become very anglicised and, in spite of their obligation to register for military service [in Germany], have never given a thought to serving the Fatherland in uniform. Only a handful of them belong to that group of Germans who were seized on board neutral ships while trying to reach home from distant lands at the start of the war… in order to serve the Fatherland in its hour of danger.[59]

Rosen's concerns demonstrate that, despite all the propaganda accusing the Allies of abuses against German civilians, official suspicion of *Auslandsdeutsche* had already begun during the war itself. Disappointment at the US entry into the war as an associate power of the Allies in April 1917, and the evident failure of German Americans to do more to undermine or sabotage American mobilisation measures thereafter, may have contributed to this.[60] However, it was in the war's immediate aftermath that these concerns grew to impact more directly on policy at Reich and state level, as we shall now see.

The Expulsion of the *Auslandsdeutsche* in 1919-20 and their reception in post-war Germany

Some 'overseas Germans' had already been expelled from enemy countries during the war or had been exchanged as a result of bilateral agreements mediated by neutral countries. However, much larger numbers found themselves forcibly repatriated to Germany in the years 1919-20. For reasons of space we will leave to one side the hundreds of thousands of Russian-subject Germans who fled from the former Tsarist Empire as a result of the Bolshevik revolution, the civil war of 1918-20

and the famine of 1921-2. We will also exclude from consideration the 470,000 or so residents of Weimar Germany who (according to the 1925 census) had lived in Posen and Pomerelia before the war but had 'voluntarily' quit their homelands as a result of the border changes in 1919 which had left them living under Polish rule.[61] These groups in many ways shared a similar fate to the *Auslandsdeutsche*, including being seen in a poor light by officialdom and being temporarily housed in *Heimkehrlager*. However, in the political language of the time, and in order not to confuse them with their post-Second World War counterparts, the German *Heimatvertriebene* of 1944-47, they are better described as *Rückwanderer* ('returnees'), *deutschstämmige Zuwanderer* ('immigrants of German descent') or *Flüchtlinge* ('refugees') rather than as *Auslandsdeutsche*.[62]

The term *Auslandsdeutsche* in the context of the immediate post-First World War era referred more narrowly to those 'overseas Germans' who were forcibly removed from the following countries in the years 1919-20: Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal, together with their overseas colonies and dominions; the United States and its overseas colonies; Brazil and various Central American countries which broke off diplomatic relations with Germany in the years 1917-18; and China. Also included here are the more than 200,000 German victims of the French *épuration* ('purification') measures in Alsace-Lorraine in 1918-20.[63] Siam had already expelled its 274-strong German community to British India in February 1918, while 450 Germans from Palestine were removed to British Egypt in late 1917.[64] Earlier in the war, German civilians had been evacuated from West Africa in 1914/15 and from East Africa in 1916, the former finally arriving in metropolitan France (via French North Africa) or ending up in neutral Spanish internment in 1916; and the latter being sent to various destinations (India, Egypt, South Africa, the Azores and metropolitan Portugal).[65]

In Britain, Belgium, France and Portugal, as well as in most of their overseas possessions, the default assumption, at least from the beginning of 1918, was that *all* Germans would be expelled as soon as possible, except those individuals granted exemptions. Britain and South Africa eventually awarded a relatively large number of certificates granting leave to remain, especially to Germans of long-term residency or to British-born women who had acquired German nationality through marriage. On the other hand, France, Belgium and Portugal allowed very few exemptions, as did Australia, New Zealand, India and China.[66] Countries in the New World, including the United States and Brazil, as well as the British Dominion of Canada, adopted the reverse position, assuming by and large that most immigrants of German descent would not be expelled, except for individuals identified as 'undesirable' or a threat to national security. In the context of the post-war 'Red Scare', this typically meant those 'overseas Germans' and other aliens identified as having left-wing views or suspected of being strike leaders.[67]

Expellees from France usually entered Germany via Switzerland or directly across the new border from Alsace-Lorraine. The remainder came back home on Allied, usually British ships, sometimes via stop-off points including Singapore, Bombay, Egypt, Malta, Gibraltar and the Isle of Man. Already on 10 January 1919 the Home Office in London assured the Secretary of the Prisoners of War Department, Lord Newton, that 'civilian enemy subjects' would be repatriated from all parts of the Empire 'as rapidly as shipping can be obtained.'[68] Given the ongoing Allied naval blockade of Germany, Rotterdam in the Netherlands was still used as a principal port of entry for those coming from overseas, at least in the initial period after the war.[69] More than 11,807 Germans arrived here from outside Europe between 7 April and 1 August 1919 alone, 3,014 of them without papers.[70] Rotterdam was seemingly only replaced by Hamburg in early 1920, after the lifting of the blockade. [71]

The reception that the expellees received upon crossing the border into Germany in 1919 or 1920 was often cold and bureaucratic. Certainly it was very different to the 'heroes' welcome' offered by Ebert to the returning troops in Berlin in December 1918. Regarding those *Auslandsdeutsche* who were coming 'home' after living abroad for many years, the main concern of the authorities was where they would live and who would house them. Already in April 1918, with the Treaty of Brest Litovsk with Russia and the Treaty of Bucharest with Romania about to be signed, the civil authorities in Prussia had agreed to take over responsibility for the care of 'returnees' from the East from the German Red Cross, provided that the persons concerned were 'Reich Germans with a claim to Prussian or, in some cases, non-Prussian citizenship who have fled or been expelled from enemy countries.'[72] It was further agreed 'that over time every province [of Prussia] will take the same per capita allocation of destitute refugees relative to the size of its overall population.'[73] As the war in the west came to an end later that year, further plans had to be made. In October 1918, for instance, the civilian authorities in Düsseldorf were pressed upon by the German military to receive 150 members of the pro-German Flemish separatist movement and their families (350 people in total) who were being evacuated from occupied Belgium for their own safety and were – according to instructions issued by the acting commander of the Seventh Army Corps – to be treated as 'political refugees'.[74] Two hundred German families were likewise evacuated from Belgium via the border post at Liège on 1 November 1918 and were again sent to an emergency reception centre (*Übernahmestelle*) in Düsseldorf.[75]

On 3 January 1919 a new government body, the *Reichszentralstelle für Kriegs- und Zivilgefangene*, met for the first time in Berlin, but it was powerless to prevent post-war expulsions of Germans and in reality spent most of its energy defending the war record of the German Foreign Office and Reich Colonial Office when it came to looking after German

civilian interests overseas.[76] The question of military prisoners of war was easier to manage politically in the sense that they largely wanted to come home once the war was over, and the Allies could be condemned for continuing to hold them after the end of hostilities while hypocritically claiming to have fought the Central Powers in order to 'strengthen and rebuild international law.'[77] Civilian prisoners, however, had diverse interests and a more complicated legal status, which meant that repatriation was often involuntary and combined with loss of property, family separation and destitution. In Britain, for instance, the number of residents of German heritage fell from 57,500 in 1914 to 22,254 in 1919, largely as a result of internment, denaturalisations, 'voluntary' repatriation and expulsions, the latter mostly carried out between January and April 1919.[78] From April 1919 it was the turn of German expellees from overseas British colonies and dominions, and from countries allied to Britain such as Portugal, Brazil and China. Most experienced long and arduous journeys, accompanied by violence and abuse, on their way back to western Germany via Rotterdam. For instance, Germans expelled from China in March 1919 on board three British ships complained about the 'heavy-handed and humiliating treatment… that was meted out to them by the British authorities at the time of embarkation in Shanghai and during the journey', even though women, children and older men had been among the passengers:

> The steamers were completely over-filled and utterly unsuitable for carrying a large number of Europeans on a week-long voyage through tropical climates. The behaviour of the British authorities in Singapore, where the ships were moored for a further week in the glaring sun while goods were loaded, was grossly inhumane. Even the severely sick were refused permission to go on land in search of healthier accommodation. There were a number of deaths in consequence.[79]

The more than 1,000 Germans forced to leave South Africa in May 1919 included a group who departed on the H.M.T. *Imgona* from Durban in Natal province. When they arrived in Rotterdam it became apparent that some of their luggage had not been loaded because 'insufficient space had been left in the holds' for it.[80] Expulsions also took place from Egypt, Malta, Gibraltar, Cyprus, East Africa and various British Caribbean and Atlantic Islands (Barbados, Trinidad and Bermuda) after April 1919.[81] These measures were given retrospective sanction by the Treaty of Versailles, signed on 28 June. Under article 220, Germany was obliged to 'admit to its territory without distinction all persons liable to repatriation', a move designed by the Allies to avoid a situation in which they might be forced to take back expellees who were refused entry on arrival 'home'.[82]

From early 1919 the German press had reported on the supposed 'unworthy treatment' of German expellees at the hands of British soldiers during the sea-crossing from England to the Netherlands.[83] Women's groups were set up to demand a more proactive stance from the German government in respect to repatriation of German prisoners abroad, and a mass protest was staged in Berlin in April.[84] Meanwhile, on orders of the Reich Ministry of Interior, special camps or *Heimkehrlager* were set up to house the incoming returnees, often in former holding centres for POWs such as the one near Regensburg in Bavaria, which was handed over to the Bavarian Ministry of Interior in 1919.[85] Other big camps were established at Essen in the Ruhr and Münster in Westphalia, coming under the control of the Prussian provincial authorities. In Austria too, civilian *Heimkehrlager* were established at the behest of the Ministry of Interior in Vienna.[86] In 1919-20 the typical stay in one of the camps for *Auslandsdeutsche* entering Germany from the west was between one and two months – an admittedly much shorter time than the average six months for those ethnic German 'returnees' coming from the East.[87] Most of the *Heimkehrlager* in western Germany had indeed

been shut down by the end of 1920, while the ones in the East lasted at least until 1923, and some until 1925. Jochen Oltmer argues that, from the authorities' point of view, the *Heimkehrlager* had a largely integrative function, being concerned with assisting returning *Auslandsdeutsche* with finding accommodation and jobs. But apart from the miners and former Imperial officials from Alsace-Lorraine, there was no special treatment for them, or protected status when it came to tax breaks or the allocation of employment opportunities.[88]

In the meantime, for *Auslandsdeutsche* coming from further afield than Alsace-Lorraine, the camps made a clear statement about citizenship and loyalty, namely that those who had lived abroad and had therefore been absent from German soil for some time would not have their status as members of the putative *Kriegsgemeinschaft* taken for granted, irrespective of their German heritage. Furthermore, their past instrumentalisation as transnational supporters of German *Flottenpolitik* and *Weltpolitik* could not override the feeling that in national terms, they now symbolised the shame of Germany's defeat and its helplessness in face of Allied demands. Reich Germans migrating from, or choosing to stay in, Poland could be cast in national and international terms as an 'embattled minority'; it was in the interests of successive Weimar governments to draw attention to their plight, both domestically and for foreign policy reasons.[89] However, the 'new political and territorial realities' established at Versailles in June 1919 meant that the *Auslandsdeutsche* coming from western Europe and the wider world could not fulfil the same symbolic function. Rather, to cite Marcia Klotz, both the loss of German colonies in 1919 and the return of the non-European *Auslandsdeutsche* served as a 'reminder of the new global order and Germany's diminutive status within it.'[90] In this sense, the establishment of *Heimkehrlager* in western Germany in 1919-20 was not just about economic reintegration or housing, but came to symbolise a

broader 'de-transnationalisation of [German] national identity' which prefigured that of the post-1945 era.[91]

Support groups for *Auslandsdeutsche*

This recasting of national identity to downgrade or remove entirely the importance of transnational forms of *Deutschtum* or Germanness was of course not without its domestic critics. Already in August 1918 the chairman of the *Reichsstelle für deutsche Rückwanderung und Auswanderung* (Reich Bureau for German Remigration and Emigration), a new pressure group based in Berlin-Charlottenburg, began writing to various state representatives in order to pass on concerns that had been relayed to him by the VDA and other groups about the supposed mistreatment of *Auslandsdeutsche* returning from western Allied countries. The gist of the complaints was

> that the returnees have not been received in friendly fashion, especially by lower level police and government officials, and that their feelings of attachment to the homeland, which had come to life again at the beginning of the war, have been negatively impacted [by this]. The returnees have been viewed in a number of quarters as an unwelcome burden on local welfare resources. A recurrent story is that officials have the same negative attitude towards the returnees as they do towards emigrants in general, treating both groups as 'undesirable' members of the population.[92]

Such treatment, the letter continued, endangered 'important demographic, economic and military goals.' More particularly, it was a duty of the state 'to promote and strengthen patriotic attitudes and ties of belonging to the motherland among the *Auslandsdeutsche*, because they alone constitute the right human material needed to rebuild the

[extra-territorial] links destroyed during the war.'[93] Whether this letter did any good seems unlikely. Indeed, on 26 October, as the war was coming to an end, the Prussian War Ministry wrote to all state governments reiterating its earlier warnings that the return of 'suspect elements' among the *Auslandsdeutsche* might 'offer new opportunities to our enemies… [to promote] espionage, sabotage or subversive propaganda.' Border and welfare officials, it continued, should be particularly on the lookout for 'fraudulent persons who have infiltrated returnee groups, and persons who are genuine returnees but have been recruited by our enemies for hostile purposes.'[94]

Things would only get worse after the 11 November armistice, especially as it became ever clearer that a large proportion of the *Auslandsdeutsche* living in western Allied countries and colonies would now be expelled. By spring 1919 – i.e. before the terms of the peace settlement were known – a number of support groups had been set up to draw attention to the plight of the *Auslandsdeutsche* and to support their attempts to re-establish themselves at home or abroad. Among them was the *Hilfsbund für Auslandsdeutsche*, founded in Düsseldorf in May 1919 as a joint venture by the local branches of the *Auslandsbund Deutscher Frauen*, the *Baltischer Vertrauensrat*, the *Frauenbund der deutschen Kolonial-Gesellschaft*, the *Ostmarkverein,* the *Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland*, the *Vereinigung deutscher Flüchtlinge aus Belgien* and the *Westdeutsche Vereinigung ehemaliger Zivilinternierter*.[95] There was also a separate *Schutzbund der im Feindesland durch Kriegshandlung geschädigten Zivilpersonen*, which represented expellees from former enemy countries looking for new employment opportunities in commerce and the tourist trade. In a round robin letter sent to several leading Düsseldorf firms in July 1919, the *Schutzbund* declared:

> Among our members are salesmen, exporters and importers, engineers, chemists, technicians of various kinds, mechanics, craftsmen and hotel workers. Most of them have several years'

> experience of working abroad, making them well-travelled and highly skilled in business and languages.[96]

Meanwhile, another body claiming to represent the interests of *Auslandsdeutsche* at national level was the *Volksbund zum Schutze der deutschen Kriegs- und Zivilgefangenen*, founded in Berlin on 20 December 1918 and initially calling itself the *Reichsbund* before changing its name to the more populist-sounding *Volksbund* in early 1919.[97] From the middle of 1919 this organisation campaigned for proper compensation for Germans who had lost property or businesses when they were expelled from enemy countries. However, at a meeting with representatives of the Reich Ministry for Economics and various German companies on 13 August 1919, it became obvious to *Volksbund* representatives that the *Auslandsdeutsche*, even if they were to receive a settlement, would be heavily disadvantaged by the wartime and post-war inflation. Re-establishing businesses overseas would be made all the more difficult if what little compensation they received was paid in devalued Reich marks rather than foreign currency, and if they were also expected to pay high rates of taxation. But the Reich Ministry and the leading industrialists would not budge on this issue, insisting that it would be wrong to privilege *Auslandsdeutsche* over *Inlandsdeutsche* when it came to compensation decisions. For the *Volksbund*, this failure to recognise the particular economic needs of the *Auslandsdeutsche* was grossly unfair. Domestic German industries that had lost property abroad during the war had still been able to keep their domestic operations going after 1914, and in some cases, had made handsome profits via government contracts. Some still had foreign currency reserves dating back to before the war.

> On the other hand, the *Auslandsdeutsche* have suffered enormous losses as a result of the liquidation of their property held abroad; in many cases they have lost their entire [means of] existence.[98]

When the Federal Council (Reichsrat), representing the individual German states, endorsed the Reich government's decision in this regard on 27 November 1920, this caused further outrage. A joint letter from the local branches of the *Bund der Auslandsdeutschen* in the unoccupied part of the Rhineland and the province of Westphalia to the head of the Rhineland regional administration in Düsseldorf estimated that its members would get at best one fifth of the true value of their liquidated property back, and called this a 'betrayal' by the fatherland:

> The pioneers of *Deutschtum* abroad, who once built German associations, schools and churches throughout the world, who fostered German art and life and who provided a market for German products across the entire Earth, have today been reduced by the German government to Reich citizens of the fourth class.[99]

'We are no less German than the *Inlandsdeutsche* and the over-privileged Alsace-Lorrainers', the letter continued, a reference to the notion that expellees from the former *Reichsland* on Germany's western border with France had been given preferential treatment when it came to allocation of jobs, especially those who had been civil servants in the post-1871 Imperial bureaucracy. 'We demand from the government equal treatment as citizens with equal rights.'[100]

How many of the *Auslandsdeutsche* were able to re-establish themselves in the new republican Germany, with only minimum compensation and limited job opportunities, and how many decided to re-emigrate, if they could, is difficult to establish with any confidence, but seeking answers to these questions would certainly make a worthwhile future research project. One starting point would be the first postwar census in the UK, undertaken on 19 June 1921 and due to be published online by the family history website Findmypast, in association with the UK Office for National Statistics, in January 2022.[101] Cross-referencing this with the 1911 census, and with lists of German civilians released from British

internment camps and expelled to Germany in 1919, would reveal how many had been able to slip back into Britain from the beginning of 1920 onwards. Although trying to guess in advance what the census records for 1921 will reveal is a potentially hazardous enterprise, it seems likely that quite a few *Auslandsdeutsche* would have sought to depart from Germany again as soon as possible, in particular those who had left behind families when they were expelled from their host countries.

Conclusion

By the time the Reichsrat made its decision in November 1920 to back the Reich government's policy of making no special concessions to the *Auslandsdeutsche*, the state governments' attention had already shifted to the much larger group of *deutschstämmige Zuwanderer* (migrants of ethnic German background) coming from the East. This group was officially assisted not only by the *Reichszentrale für Kriegs- und Zivilgefangene*, whose director, the Social Democrat Daniel Stücklen, was appointed *Reichskommissar für Zivilgefangene und Flüchtlinge* on 30 August 1920, but also by the German Red Cross. Most of these ethnic German migrants from the East were non-propertied farm labourers and forestry workers who came either on their own steam, or later on, through the assistance of philanthropic groups.[102] Like their counterparts who 'returned' to Germany to escape Tsarist Russification measures between the 1880s and 1914, they were typically illiterate and lacked knowledge of (Reich) German culture and law.[103] The number of camps established in Germany's eastern borderlands to cater for these migrants was increased from six to nine by the end of 1920, and reached a total of twenty-two, with a maximum population of 36,899, by the end of 1922. Between autumn 1920 and April 1923, according to Stücklen, around 200,000 *Deutschstämmige* passed through these camps; thereafter the numbers tailed off, with the last camp dissolved in May

1925.[104] In the first years after the war, the Prussian and other state governments preferred to hold German migrants from Poland in camps for relatively long periods, not only because it was difficult to find jobs and accommodation for them, but because they could then be instrumentalised as 'powerful symbols of German suffering' or – on the nationalist, anti-Versailles right – as the basis for revisionist claims to lost territories in the East.[105] Other German-speakers were encouraged to stay in Poland for the same reasons.[106] The advocates of territorial revision in the East in the early 1920s usually did not go as far as the geographers and historians of the period 1925-35 who, through their supposedly 'scientific' *Ostforschung*, laid 'claim to areas of German settlement that had never been part of any German state in Eastern Europe.' But they were nonetheless a stepping-stone towards the radicalised *völkisch*-racist forms of national identity established under the Nazis.[107]

Where does this leave the *Auslandsdeutsche*, whose existence largely disappeared from public view after 1920? They were certainly not constructed as a minority in the same way as the Germans from Poland were. This was not just for reasons of formal foreign policy, but, as I have argued in this article, also reflected a more general cultural shift towards the re-territorialisation of notions of Germanness. The 'burning' or 'bleeding borders' in the East were something tangible; they provided an emotional identification with the nation and its suffering, or, as Elizabeth Harvey puts it, they were plainly well-suited to provide the 'imagery of a national body, violated and mutilated.'[108] The same applied, albeit to a lesser extent, to the confiscated German colonial territories in Africa and the Pacific.[109] But the emotional response to the loss of extra-territorial networks and transnational relationships represented by the *Auslandsdeutsche* – whether of the religious, associational, linguistic or commercial kind – was far more muted, reflecting Weimar Germany's uncomfortable and ambiguous position as a 'postcolonial nation in a still-

colonial world.'[110] Certainly the sense of injustice felt by or on behalf of the *Auslandsdeutsche* could not sustain anything like the level of nationalist/quasi-religious 'fervour' and 'cultural remobilization for other wars' that territorial issues like the 'Polish question' in the 1920s and 30s could.[111] Newly-established pan-German networks after 1918, as well as older bodies seeking to revive their political fortunes in the post-war era, chose as their 'sites of memory' places closer to home, such as Danzig, Upper Silesia, the Sudetenland, Saxon Transylvania, South Tyrol or Vojvodina. Although they sometimes used phrases like *Grenz- und Auslandsdeutsche*, the intention was rarely to draw attention to Germans once living, or continuing to live, in such faraway places as Britain, France, Portugal, India, China, South Africa, Australasia or the Americas.[112] Rather, the latter were now, more often than not, cast as that part of the *Volk* living 'on foreign soil'.[113] For Hitler, foreign soil was something that had to be conquered, regardless of who lived there: in the world, as he saw it, races had to colonise or be colonised. There was no mid-way position based on informal spheres of influence or global, extra-territorial networks creating an interconnected but diverse and 'liberal' German world as an outward expression of the 'ideas of 1848'.[114]

This finding also has broader implications for the way we look at the question of national movements and border populations in post-First World War Europe. In particular, it is an illustration of how significant historical entanglements with, and ways of (re-) imagining, non-European spaces could be in shaping the fate of European minorities.[115] Eric Hobsbawm has characterised the years 1918-50 as the 'apogee of nationalism', with spaces for national heterogeneity and diversity – although perhaps not for international activism – correspondingly rendered precarious and suspect.[116] Much of this was connected with a re-territorialisation of nation-states which had already begun in 1914, or perhaps even during the Balkan wars of 1912-13. From this point of view, the *Auslandsdeutsche* belonged to a different age, one in which the

borders of national belonging had been more open, both geographically and in terms of a willingness to include far-flung transnational communities of citizens within economic and cultural ways of imagining nationhood. With the reframing of ideas about diversity through the Minority Treaties of the early 1920s, and with Germany, as a wounded, 'postcolonial nation', powerless to influence events accept through actions – which it did not always fully control – on its own territory,[117] the *Auslandsdeutsche* had quite simply become an anachronism.

Endnotes

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[7] See C. R. von Frentz, *A Lesson Forgotten: Minority Protection under the League of Nations. The Case of the German Minority in Poland, 1920-1934* (Münster, 1999), 56; D. Goesewinkel, *Schutz und Freiheit? Staatsbürgerschaft in Europa im 20. und 21. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 2016), 150.

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[11] See the various contributions to P. Panayi (ed.), *Germans as Minorities during the First World War: A Global Comparative Perspective* (Farnham, 2014). For measures against German settlers in the former European overseas colonies, see also M. Murphy, *Colonial Captivity during the First World War: Internment and the Fall of the German Empire, 1914-1919* (Cambridge, 2017).

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[13] M. Klotz, 'The Weimar Republic: A Postcolonial State in a Still-Colonial World', in: E. Ames, M. Klotz, L. Wildenthal (eds.), *Germany's Colonial Pasts* (Lincoln, NA, 2005), 135.

[14] G. Deleuze & F. Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. by Brian Massumi (London and New York, 1987) [1980], 60. Emphasis added.

[15] Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood*, 115.

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[22] All the above figures taken from K. J. Bade and J. Oltmer, 'Deutschland', in: Bade et al (eds.), *Enzyklopädie Migration*, 147.

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[43] See the appeal issued by this organisation in April 1915, in LNRW, Abt. Ostwestfalen-Lippe, Detmold, Staatsministerium Lippe, L 75, XIII No. 21, Bl. 473.

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[47] See, for instance, German Foreign Office to the Zentralauskunftsstelle für Auswanderer, 19 July 1918, in BArch, R 1505/21, Bl. 257. Also M. Stibbe, 'Radicalização e Internacionalização: Rumo a uma história global de cativeiro militar e civil durante a primeira guerra mundial', in: P.A. Oliveira (ed.), *Prisoneiros de Guerras: Experiências de cativeiro no seculo XX* (Lisbon, 2019), 65.

[48] J. Nagler, *Nationale Minoritäten im Krieg: 'Feindliche Ausländer' und die amerikanische Heimatfront während des Ersten Weltkriegs* (Hamburg, 2000), 384-403.

[49] For further examples, see G. Fischer, *Enemy Aliens: Internment and the Homefront Experience in Australia, 1914-1920* (St. Lucia, Queensland, 1989); P. Panayi, *The Enemy in Our Midst: Germans in Britain during the First World War* (Oxford, 1991); A. Francis, *'To Be Truly British We Must Be Anti-German': New Zealand, Enemy Aliens and the Great War Experience, 1914-1919* (Oxford, 2012); B. S. Kordan, *No Free Man: Canada, the Great War, and the Enemy Alien Experience* (Montreal, 2016).

[50] F. Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War*, trans. by James Joll (London, 1967) [1961], 103-6.

[51] Ibid., 101.

[52] E. Zechlin, 'Deutschland zwischen Kabinettskrieg und Wirtschaftskrieg: Politik und Kriegführung in den ersten Monaten des Weltkriegs 1914', in: *Historische Zeitschrift* 199 (1964), 347-458.

[53] Fischer, *Germany's Aims*, 103.

[54] Nathans, *The Politics of Citizenship,* 185.

[55] Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers,* 72.

[56] Kriegspresseamt, *Deutsche Kolonien: Eine Lebensnotwendigkeit* (Berlin, 1918).

[57] Acting commander of the Seventh Army Corps to the State Ministry of Lippe (and others), 30 July 1918, in Stadtarchiv Detmold, Weltkrieg: Kriegswirtschaft 1914-1928, No. 439.

[58] Rosen to Unterkunftsdepartement of the Prussian Ministry of War, 19 March 1918, in BArch, R 901/83978.

[59] Rosen to Hertling, 26 April 1918, in ibid.

[60] Even during the neutrality period before 1917, as Michael Kazin has recently written, 'most [American] wage-earners born in Germany and Austria-Hungary were glad to benefit from the manufacturing boom' which resulted from weapons exports to Britain. Furthermore, as early as November 1914 'Bethlehem Steel Magnate Charles M. Schwab (whose grandparents on both sides had emigrated from Germany) signed a contract to deliver $50 million in arms to the Allies'. See M. Kazin, *War against War: The American Fight for Peace 1914-1918* (New York, 2018), 25-6; Nagler, *Nationale Minoritäten*, 113, also identifies the Lusitania sinking in May 1915 as a key turning point, when many German-Americans switched from (largely passive) support for the Kaiserreich to public protestations of loyalty to the United States.

[61] Chu, *The German Minority*, 54.

[62] See J. Oltmer, 'Deutsche "Rückwanderer" aus Rußland in Deutschland von der 1890er Jahren bis in die Zwischenkriegszeit', in: Bade et al (eds.), *Enzyklopädie Migration*, 505-8; Oltmer, 'Heimkehrlager', 198; and A. H. Sammartino, The *Impossible Border: Germany and the East, 1914-1922* (Ithaca, NY, 2010), 106, 109 and 122.

[63] L. Boswell, 'From Liberation to Purge Trials in the 'Mythic Provinces': Recasting French Identities in Alsace and Lorraine, 1918-1920', in: *French Historical Studies* 23/1 (2000), 141; G. Aly, *Europa gegen die Juden, 1880-1945* (Frankfurt-am-Main, 2017), 133-40.

[64] P. Panayi, *The Germans in India: Elite European Migrants in the British Empire* (Manchester, 2017), 51; Manz and Panayi, 'The Internment of Civilian "Enemy Aliens"', 23; E. F. v. Rabenau, 'Die Lage der Palästinadeutschen', in: *Der Tag* 162 (24 July 1920). Copy in BArch, R 8034/II, No. 7667, Bl. 72-4.

[65] Murphy, *Colonial Captivity*, 152-68; Stibbe, 'Radicalização e Internacionalização', 67.

[66] M. Stibbe, *Civilian Internment during the First World War: A European and Global History, 1914-1920* (London, 2019), 239-89.

[67] See A. Hagedorn, *Savage Peace: Hope and Fear in America, 1919* (New York, 2007), esp. 420-2 and 429. Also Nagler, *Nationale Minoritäten*, 496-509; and Kordan, *No Free Man*, 264-7.

[68] Under-Secretary of State, Home Office, to Secretary of Prisoners of War Department, 10 January 1919, in The National Archives, Kew, London (henceforth TNA), FO 383/478.

[69] See the relevant documents in BArch, R 901/83958 and TNA, FO 383/501-2. Also Murphy, *Colonial Captivity*, 196.

[70] German consulate in Rotterdam to AA, 6 August 1919, in BArch, R 901/83960. This was on top of several thousand sent from Britain between January and April 1919 – see German consulate in Rotterdam to AA, 23 April 1919, in BArch, R 901/83959.

[71] Panayi, *The Germans in India*, 218.

[72] Prussian Ministry of Interior to the Oberpräsidenten of the Prussian provinces, 9 April 1918, in LNRW, Abteilung Rheinland, Duisburg, Oberpräsidium Düsseldorf, No. 14986, Bl. 359-60.

[73] Prussian Ministry of Interior, Leitsätze über die Übernahme der Auslandsflüchtlinge auf die Provinzverbände, n.d. [1918], in ibid., Bl. 361-4.

[74] Acting commander of the Seventh Army Corps to governor of the district of Düsseldorf, 18 October 1918, passing on request from the Governor-General of Occupied Belgium, 17 October 1918, in ibid., Bl. 284.

[75] President of the civil administration in Liège to governor of the district of Düsseldorf, 1 November 1918, in ibid., Bl. 278-9.

[76] See, for instance, Verhandlungsbericht über die am 3. Januar 1919 stattgehabte Sitzung der Reichszentralstelle für Kriegs- und Zivilgefangene; and Protokoll der Sitzung am 23. Januar 1919, both in BArch, R 901/86451.

[77] On the western Allies' decision to hold German military prisoners until 1919-20, and the German response, see H. Jones, *Violence against Prisoners of War in the First World War: Britain, France and Germany, 1914-1920* (Cambridge, 2011), 296-307 (quote on 306).

[78] Panayi, *The Enemy in Our Midst*, 97. See also German consulate in Rotterdam to AA, 23 April 1919, in BArch, R 901/83959, and Under-Secretary of State, Home Office to Secretary of Prisoners of War Department, 8 April 1919, in TNA, FO 383/501.

[79] Swiss envoy in Berlin to the AA, 13 June 1919, in Swiss Federal Archives, Bern, E2020-1000-130, Bd. 63, DE 96 004.

[80] See Foreign Office minute, 10 June 1919, in TNA, FO 383/502.

[81] War Office to Secretary, Prisoners of War Department, 17 June 1919, in TNA, FO 383/478.

[82] Treaty of Versailles, article 220, at https://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/versailles.html.

[83] See, for instance, 'Unwürdige Behandlung deutscher Zivilinternierter', in: *Deutsche Tageszeitung*, 64 (4 February 1919). Copy in BArch, R 8034/II, no. 7664, Bl. 61.

[84] See, for instance, 'Ein Massenprotest deutscher Frauen', in: *Berliner Tageblatt*, 184 (25 April 1919). Copy in ibid., Bl. 154. Also Reichsausschuß deutscher Frauen zur Befreiung unserer Gefangenen, Berlin-Wilmersdorf, 28 April 1919, in Landesarchiv Berlin, A Rep. 060-53, Bl. 12.

[85] Ministry for Military Affairs, Operations Department, to the General Commander of the second Bavarian Army Corps and the Bavarian Ministry of Interior, 23 July 1919, in Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Munich, Abt. II: Neuere Bestände, MInn 66273.

[86] M. Stibbe, 'The Internment of Enemy Aliens in the Habsburg Empire, 1914-1918', in Manz, Panayi, Stibbe (eds.), *Internment during the First World War*, 74-5.

[87] See Oltmer, 'Heimkehrlager', 198-200.

[88] Ibid., 207.

[89] Sammartino, *The Impossible Border*, 98-9; Chu, *The German Minority*, 12.

[90] Klotz, 'The Weimar Republic', 141.

[91] Manz, *Constructing a German Diaspora*, 264-5.

[92] Reichsstelle für deutsche Rückwanderung und Auswanderung to the State Ministry of Lippe (and others), 24 August 1918, in LNRW, Abteilung Ostwestfalen-Lippe, Detmold, Staatsministerium Lippe, L 75, XIII No. 21, Bl. 544.

[93] Ibid.

[94] Prussian War Ministry to the State Ministry of Lippe (and others), 26 October 1918, in ibid., Bl. 547.

[95] Protokoll über die Sitzung zur Gründung des Hilfsbundes für Auslandsdeutsche, 13 May 1919, in LNRW, Abteilung Rheinland, Duisburg, Oberpräsidium Düsseldorf, No. 14986, Bl. 342.

[96] Schutzbund der im Feindesland durch Kriegshandlung geschädigten Zivilpersonen, letter sent to various Düsseldorf firms and to governor of district of Düsseldorf, 24 July 1919, in ibid., Bl. 330.

[97] B. Feltman, *The Stigma of Surrender: German Prisoners, British Captors, and Manhood in the Great War and Beyond* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2015), 149-51.

[98] 'Die Entschädigung der Auslandsdeutschen', in: *Mitteilung des Volksbundes zum Schutze der deutschen Kriegs- und Zivilgefangenen*, 32/22 (August 1919), 3-4. Copy in BArch, R 901/86449.

[99] Die vereinigten Ortsgruppe des Bundes der Auslandsdeutschen im unbesetzten Rheinland und Westfalen to the Regierungspräsident in Düsseldorf, n.d. [December 1920], in LNRW, Abteilung Rheinland, Duisburg, Oberpräsidium Düsseldorf, No. 14986, Bl. 380-1.

[100] Ibid.

[101] See http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/about/news/contract-awarded-to-publish-the-1921-census-online/.

[102] Oltmer, 'Heimkehrlager', 198-201.

[103] Nathans, *The Politics of Citizenship*, 158.

[104] All the above figures taken from Oltmer, 'Heimkehrlager', 203-6.

[105] Sammartino, *The Impossible Border*, 99.

[106] Blackbourn, 'Germans Abroad and *Auslandsdeutsche*', 344; Chu, *The German Minority*, 54-6.

[107] Sammartino, *The Impossible Border*, 100. On the 'transformation' of Ostforschung in the years 1925-35, see also M. Burleigh, *Germany Turns Eastwards: A Study of Ostforschung in the Third Reich* (Cambridge, 1988), 26-33.

[108] E. Harvey, *Women and the Nazi East: Agents and Witnesses of Germanization* (New Haven, CT, 2003), 32-3.

[109] Wildenthal, *German Women for Empire,* 186-96.

[110] Klotz, 'The Weimar Republic', 141.

[111] A. Becker, 'Faith, Ideologies, and the "Cultures of War"', in J. Horne (ed.), *A Companion to World War I* (Oxford, 2010), 243.

[112] Münz and Ohliger, 'Auslandsdeutsche', 376.

[113] E. Maxis, *Volk auf fremder Erde: Das Schicksalsbuch der Auslandsdeutschen* (Breslau, 1933).

[114] Klotz, 'The Weimar Republic', 144.

[115] Here I have been influenced in particular by J. Leonhard, 'Comparison, Transfer and Entanglement or: How to Write Modern European History today?', in: *Journal of Modern European History* 14/2 (2016), 149-63.

[116] E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 1992) [1990], 131-62.

[117] Blackbourn, 'Germans Abroad and *Auslandsdeutsche*', 343-4.

Archival Review: The Herder Institute

ANTJE COBURGER

The Herder Institute for Historical Research on East Central Europe was founded in Marburg in 1950 by the Johann Gottfried Herder Research Council. At the Herder Institute, research relates to the territories of Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the Kaliningrad region, which are explored in their historical, cultural, transnational and global contexts. The rich materials of the Herder Institute reflect many aspects of the history of East Central Europe, including many local traces of German history and culture. Combined with the extended knowledge of the team, students, visitors, visiting scientists and conference participants a wealth of information on the territories is available.

The Institute is a member of the Leibniz Association, one of the major research organizations in Germany, and is therefore funded by the federal and state governments. The Herder Institute employs about 90 staff members dedicated to a range of tasks and research subjects, conducting about 15 projects of varying scope and funding, developing new online applications and producing Qualification theses or academic publications based on the materials.

The Herder Institute houses an extensive and diverse range of collections relating to East Central Europe. It includes a library with a music and press collection, an image archive and a document and map collection, holding materials that are particularly unique in character. The collection spans modern-day Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and the Kaliningrad Region, as well as the Czech Republic and Slovakia. There are

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also some collections relating to Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Hungary. Thematic focal points are history, art history, culture, and the region's common cultural heritage, and includes image, map and archival materials in both digital and analog form. Collections cover a time frame spanning the long period from the Middle Ages up to the twenty-first century. The collections are increasingly searchable online and many of them can also be consulted online.

The first port of call is the Research Library, which is the largest specialist library with an East Central European focus in the German-speaking countries. Whatever is not available on site can be obtained quickly through national and international interlibrary loan. The inimitable collections, with their primary and often unique research materials, provide an invaluable source base.

Pictures 1-2: Collection of Prof. Przemysław Urbańczyk from the early 1980s

Holdings of the Research Library

The holdings of the Research Library encompass around 545,000 bibliographic items most of them available as books, data records, phonograms, microfilms and microfiche (http://opac.ub.uni-marburg.de/DB=2/). The library also contains a separate press collection consisting of a newspaper collection and a unique archive of media clippings (comprising around 5 million cuttings) as well as a music collection and special collections such as scholarly estates, or series of so-called "gray literature", including for example the 'samizdat' collection. The Research Library also maintains a bibliography portal and participates in library-oriented thematic portals (such as https://www.osmikon.de/). The scope of topics ranges from politics to culture and includes economics and social history as well as cultural studies on East Central Europe. Most of the literature stems from the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

For almost all regions there are items available on national movements, parties, conflicts, subaltern organizations or minorities. Collections are indexed and curated according to its own internal systematics. It allows to search for specific titles (with author names, titles, keywords, title, etc.), use substantive criteria (guided search) to look up persons or locatiies, or conduct a search with the help of selected tag lists. (https://www.herder-institut.de/en/departments/library/opac-and-catalogue-facilities.html)

Example: Samizdat Collection of Prof. Przemysław Urbańczyk, Warsaw from the early 1980s

Since the early years of the Institute, almost all documentation related to East Central Europe and its history has been gathered and curated. This not only includes written or printed textual sources, but also various types of visual sources such as photographs, postcards, illustrations and, last but not least, maps. Our collections are of course constantly updated and extended as new acquisitions, donations and deposits, including acquisitions from private collections and bequests are collected. A fine example is the private collection of Prof. Przemysław Urbańczyk from Warsaw, who collected approximately 1,100 monographs and periodicals of the Polish underground press, especially from the early 1980s. Graphics and photographical materials of that collection are also preserved in the image archive. Since 2013 this holding of so-called samizdat publications has been made fully accessible. As a workshop at

the Herder Institute on protest movements and samizdat showed, these issues are highly contested in terms of discourse. As collective, contemporary historical phenomena they can illuminate exciting cases of civil society and alternative public spheres. At the same time this collection raises pressing key issues of preservation. Due to the poor paper quality of the early 1980s, documents are already occasionally difficult to read. This raises new challenges related to the Institute's capacities to preserve, digitise, and curate this important collection – so how can they be preserved and, if necessary, digitised?

Holdings of the Image Archive

The Image Archive holds and indexes image sources that relate to East Central Europe which are made available to researchers and the interested public. The archive contains a wide range of photography, postcards, as well as artwork and drawings from the sixteenth century to the present day. The holdings of the Image Archive can be divided into four categories according to their provenance: some have been passed down from institutions (archives, monument preservation organizations), others from photographers or companies (agencies, publishing houses). Some material has also been obtained from researchers (working in the areas of architecture, history, art history, urban planning) or originates from private collections. The main focus of this graphic material is on the documentation of urban and rural settlements, (cultural) landscapes, and on secular and religious buildings, along with their fixtures and features. Moreover, the collection holds images of historical events and festive occasions, as well as a wide range of pictures documenting everyday life and portraits of personalities. The Image Archive is considered an important addition to the holdings of the map and document collections, offering unexpected access to knowledge about East Central Europe, both as it was and is today, from various angles.

Example: Collection of Prof. Rudolf Jaworski: Propaganda Postcards about National Movements from the interwar period until the middle of the twentieth century

The bequests and collections preserved in the Herder Institute not only shed light on individuals and organizations but also on contemporary historical issues. The Collection of Prof. Rudolf Jaworski (Propaganda Postcards about National Movements from the interwar period until the middle of the twentieth century (https://www.herder-institut.de/bildkatalog/index/index?tree[Sammlungen]=27)) serves as an illustrative example. The "Jaworski Collection" has around 2,500 historical postcards with political motifs, iconography and propaganda from around 1890 to 1945, with the majority of postcards originating from around 1900 to 1925. The collection was a gift made by Prof. Dr. Rudolf Jaworski who had collected these postcards for research purposes



and is currently being made accessible. An important topic on postcards of that time is the appreciation of the colors, since many propaganda postcards, even those dating from before the First World War, depict flags, coats of arms or national colors. Around 1918 they are often associated with a patriotic motto or a hero as leading motive and become particularly important in the spread of nationalist ideas.

Pictures 3-4:
Jan Žižka leads the Czechoslovak legionaries into battle, postcards from the Jaworski Collection, around 1918 (inv.no. 219877 and 219908)

Archival Review: Institute of Cornish Studies

GARRY TREGIDGA

The Institute of Cornish Studies was officially created in 1971 as part of the University of Exeter in association with the former Cornwall County Council. It developed a broad remit in its early years as the archaeologist Charles Thomas, its first Director noted, for the 'study of all aspects of man and his handiwork in the regional setting (Cornwall and Scilly), past, present and future. The development of society, industry and the landscape in our fast changing world is as much of concern [...] as the history of those vast topics in the recent and remote past' (www.exeter.ac.uk/cornwall/research/facilitiesandcentres/ics). This led in the 1970s to a series of projects covering such subjects as archaeology, botany, oral history and place names. Its leadership changed in 1991 with Philip Payton, a political scientist and historian, developing an interdisciplinary New Cornish Studies. This included a specific focus on modern Cornwall since the eighteenth century and a consideration of topics like migration, politics, tourism and ethnic identity.

More recently the Institute has been led by two co-directors, Garry Tregidga and Joanie Willett, who are attempting to bring together interdisciplinary research on Cornwall into four themes: Culture, Heritage and Society; Politics and Government; Economy and Business; Environment and Health. The aim is to share this knowledge with the wider community in Cornwall and beyond to provoke policy discussions over the future. In addition to the four research themes, the Institute is also interested in Cornwall's global connections. Cornish people have

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taken their mining skills in regard to tin and copper all over the world, providing us with links to countries such as the USA, Australia and New Zealand. The area's international trade goes back at least as far as the Bronze Age, and its ethnic heritage and traditions provide connections to other Celtic nations like Brittany, Ireland and Wales. Moreover, there are points of resonance with many other parts of Europe, in particular other rural areas which are also calling for stronger representation and political devolution in an often metropolitan policy environment.

Since its creation the Institute's research agenda has also been developed alongside an active archiving strategy covering areas like religion through the Canon Adams collection, nationalist politics with the Len Truran and Royston Green papers, and Liberal/Liberal Democrat party papers since the 1960s donated by the family of Mary Mann. The Institute also undertook a project to document the Cornish experience of the 1979 and 1983 British general elections. The resulting archive contains letters and newscuttings, alongside election ephemera relating to the various political parties, candidates and constituencies in Cornwall during these two elections. In recent years all of this material has been preserved as part of the Archives and Special Collections at the University of Exeter's Penryn Campus in Cornwall, which is the current home of the Institute (www.library/fxplus.ac.uk/collections/archives-special-collections).

Documentation work has also been developed on an ethnographic basis by the Cornish Audio Visual Archive (CAVA). The CAVA initiative was established by the Institute in 2000 in association with other archival and educational bodies operating in Cornwall with a view to harness the multimedia power of oral history, film, music and photography in order to create a greater understanding of Cornwall in the past and present. The Archive's cornerstone initiative was 'Cornish Braids', which was an oral history programme of over 500 recordings based on the themes of work, religion, politics, leisure and social relationships. These earlier

recordings are accessible to the public at Kresen Kernow, which is a new archive centre in the Cornish town of Redruth that was opened in 2019 (www.kresenkernow.org).

New recordings are now being collected by 'Cornish Story' in order to build on the legacy of CAVA. Cornish Story is another initiative of the Institute that was launched in 2010 as an online dissemination platform that seeks to bring together multimedia recordings from CAVA with other online articles relating to Cornwall's cultural heritage (www.cornishstory.com). This accessible resource is linked to a programme of public engagement events along with a series of books and pamphlets. Current projects include a series of life interviews with

St. Pirans Day Procession - A Cornish Pilgrimage at Penhale Sands. Photograph courtesy of J M Photojournalism

elected politicians and activists associated with political parties operating in Cornwall. This will include Mebyon Kernow, the principal Cornish nationalist party and a member of the European Free Alliance, which was founded in 1951 and initially operated as a pressure group before developing over time into a political party. Questions will look at the subject of cultural memory alongside issues of ideological belief and party strategy. The first stage has been a community-based project at Luxulyan in East Cornwall marking the fortieth anniversary of an attempt to build a nuclear power station in 1980. A successful protest campaign led to the authorities eventually withdrawing the proposal and a memory day in February 2020 led to the collection of new oral history interviews, photographs and written material. Significantly, this pilot project also highlighted the role of the Cornish national movement in the campaign both through the direct involvement of nationalist activists and in the use of Cornish cultural imagery such as its language and ancient flag (a white cross with a black background) at protest events.

Cornish Democracy is another project led by the Institute that brings together research with archiving opportunities. With the relationship between belonging and governance now to the fore as result of the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union it is appropriate to look at a territory like Cornwall that claims to have a strong sense of Celtic identity but that is officially seen as part of England. In recent decades there has been evidence of a cultural renaissance in relation to Cornish music, heritage and language, which was symbolised in 2014 by the British government officially recognising the Cornish as a national minority under European rules for the protection of national minorities (www.gov.uk/government/news/cornish-granted-minority-status-within-the-uk).

Although Cornwall was granted a limited devolution deal in the following year, the status of the existing unitary council is clearly not comparable with the fiscal and legislative powers enjoyed by the Scottish Parliament

or Welsh Sennedd. The Cornish Democracy project therefore seeks to investigate both the Cornish experience and its future potential in the wider context of place-based narratives. Alongside a publication on the subject, a documentation programme covering written sources, online surveys, focus groups, and individual recordings is being developed covering the historical background, community governance, interaction with Westminster, economic concerns and cultural heritage. Participation in the surveys and interviews of the project is not just restricted to political activists since it was felt that an initiative of this nature should seek to record voices from the wider public. This ongoing project will seek to create a useful database for the future.

Documentation is not just limited to Cornwall's contemporary national movement. In 2017 the Institute collaborated with the Cornish Language Office in Truro and local resource providers in a project that attempted to identify, collate and preserve archives relating to the revival of the Cornish language at the turn of the twentieth century. Entitled *Dasserghi Kernewek* (Reviving Cornish), this project brought together both written documents and audio records to create a comprehensive Register of Assets with material held in a variety of archives including the Henry Jenner collection now held in Kresen Kernow (www.dasserghikernewek.org.uk).

Research into the early history of the Cornish national movement in the nineteenth century has recently been extended through the Trelawny project. This is a study of the Cornish anthem 'The Song of the Western Men', which is more commonly known as 'Trelawny'. It was written in 1825 by the Rev. Stephen Hawker but there is evidence that the chorus is far older and was inspired by stories dating back to the seventeenth century. Research combines written resources with oral evidence to explore the anthem's historical evolution through time and the way in which it was co-opted as a political campaign song in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and was on a cultural level adopted by Cornish

diaspora communities around the world. The project also explores the sometimes contentious nature of the anthem. At one level this reflected criticism on the part of some leading members of the early Cornish movement who objected on religious grounds to Trelawny's association with the Protestant cause and preferred the alternative of 'Bro Goth Agan Tasow' that was based on the pan-Celtic 'Land of My Fathers' from Wales. At a wider level there were others who objected to the transnational origins of the tune since it was apparently based on 'Le petit tambour' from France. Despite these concerns and the existence of other competitors, it is significant that Trelawny continues to be regarded by many as the Cornish national anthem. It is intended that the project will result in a monograph on the subject and a collection of written and oral material will be deposited as part of a planned Cornish National Music Archive at Kresen Kernow and made available to the public on an online basis.

As the Institute approaches its fiftieth anniversary it welcomes the opportunity to collaborate with scholars and archivists associated with NISE. Our approach is to operate at both the micro and macro levels, whereby we promote interactive research through documentation projects at the communal level while at the same time pursuing a comparative approach towards the regions and small nations of Europe in order to foster greater knowledge and understanding. For further details please email cornishstudies@exeter.ac.uk

State of Nationalism (SoN): Nationalism and Social Class

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Introduction

Much like other works on nationalism, this article explores the 'interrelationships' between concepts that are themselves difficult to 'delimit'.[1] What kind of general claims for example can be made about the linkages between a phenomenon like nationalism, that can take on both conservative and liberal forms, and social classes, the defining attributes, origins and number of which are often matters of dispute? The barriers to any normative assessment of linkages are therefore formidable. Works dealing directly with the subject tend, accordingly, to be more often occupied with investigating matters of perception or the behaviour of certain classes (variously defined) at certain places and times. This is not to say that the problem has failed to entice scholars, and indeed theorists past and present have occasionally given thought to the idea of constructing a general sociology of nationalism capable of advancing propositions on large questions such as the elective affinities between particular classes, status groups and doctrines. Marx's identification of the leading part played by the bourgeoisie in the onset of the age of nationalism is of course critical in this connection and no doubt still exerts influence on the popular understanding of the problem.

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Dean Kostantaras, 'State of Nationalism (SoN): Nationalism and Social Class',
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With these points in mind, more attention will be given first to what Anthony Smith, Max Weber and other figures have said about the general theoretical challenges which the present subject poses to researchers. As indicated above, these are in large part traceable to the elastic nature of the concepts in question. If however nationalisms can be fashioned to serve the interests of any class or group, it would be remiss to omit from consideration works from the Marxist tradition which, again, laid stress on the historical role of the bourgeoisie. Although this literature is largely based on developments within Europe, it remains a source of critical perspectives and modes of analysis of far-reaching influence. In addition to a survey of how nationalism and social class are treated in some of the formative works from this tradition, attention is given as well to the additions and modifications of authors such as Otto Bauer, Eric Hobsbawm and Tom Nairn. The final section of this review explores the particular interest shown by modern scholars in questions of micro-sociology and nationalism, as exemplified by works which investigate the diverse aims, imaginings – and corresponding social constituencies – that may be encompassed within a 'single' nation or national movement.

General theoretical problems and observations

In turning first to the problems faced by scholars in connection with the grand questions of theory alluded to above, it is worth considering the points made by Anthony Smith in an early work describing what he took to be the 'sociological neglect of nationalism' by his predecessors.[2] Listed first among the remedies proposed to correct this deficit was a call for more studies on 'the social composition, and mobility profiles, of both the leadership and the followers of nationalist movements.' This was 'a key topic', he added, 'on which data are either lacking, or unsystematized.'[3] And yet, earlier in the same work, Smith cited several factors that appeared to obstruct such a project. 'Methodologically,' wrote Smith, 'nationalism presents great difficulties of definition, classification and explanation.' It

was, above all, the 'sheer range of ideas and concepts of the nation held by the participants, (not to mention the analysts)' that proved most daunting.[4] Smith went on to quote corroborating remarks from Weber: 'In the face of these value concepts of the "idea of the nation"', wrote the latter, 'which empirically are entirely ambiguous, a sociological typology would have to analyse all sorts of community sentiments of solidarity in their genetic conditions and in their consequences for the concerted action of the participants.'[5] Any investigation of the 'social composition' of a given movement could not in summary proceed very far without a corresponding analysis of the values embedded in its particular conception of the nation and attendant claims.

Smith continued to dwell on the significance of this problem in later works, as have many others. 'Nationalism cannot be seen,' wrote for example John Breuilly in *Nationalism and the State*, 'as the politics of any particular social class.'[6] This follows again from the fact that nationalist doctrines can be fashioned to serve the ends of virtually any social or political agenda. As David Miller similarly attests, 'A moment's glance at the historical record shows that nationalist ideas have as often been associated with liberal and socialist programmes as with programmes of the right… the flexible content of national identity allows parties of different colours to present their programmes as the true continuation of the national tradition and the true reflection of national character.'[7] Liah Greenfeld drew similar conclusions in her sweeping *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. Finally, when speaking more recently of a 'class route to nationhood', Stein Tønnesson alludes to the manner in which nationalisms are often figured upon concepts of the nation that privilege one class or another – as opposed to the imputed affinity of one class or another to nationalism.[8]

As indicated above, Weber's comments on the diverse 'value concepts' embedded in ideas of the nation and their implications for a 'social typology' are therefore consonant with the thoughts of many contemporary researchers. The one general rule (with some caveats) that Weber found worthy of note in this connection concerned the tendency of intellectuals to

serve as the most consistent advocates of the 'national idea'.[9] Similar observations are found in works by Smith and Breuilly, to name only a few.[10] The '"leading classes" may vary between and even within movements at different times', wrote for example Smith, however, 'the pivotal role of professionals and intellectuals must remain constant or the movement risks disintegration.'[11] That said, it was questionable whether much significance could be attached to this fact, as intellectuals are always the leading cohort in the fashioning of any political or social ideology.[12] Although Weber would have likely concurred with this assessment, the connection served nevertheless to highlight the significance of 'prestige interests' in any explanation of the sources of individual or collective action.[13] Intellectuals are accordingly drawn to the 'national idea' just as those 'who hold the power to steer common conduct within a polity' are especially joined to the 'state', as he argued in one telling passage:

> The significance of the "nation" is usually anchored in the superiority, or at least the irreplaceability, of the culture values that are to be preserved and developed only through the continuation of the peculiarity of the group. It therefore goes without saying that the intellectuals… are to a specific degree predestined to propagate the "national idea", just as those who wield power in the polity provoke the idea of the state.[14]

It might nevertheless be objected that 'intellectuals' do not represent a 'class', or even further, that like nationalism, class too is often discussed in an 'unsystematic' or at least indiscrete manner. There is no room to pursue the problem in detail here, however, in general, many of the works studied throughout refer to class in a way that perhaps evokes the 'basic three-class system' in capitalist societies (itself a product of the relation between individual 'market capacities' and rates of 'mobility closure') described by Giddens.[15] A glance at the specialist literature finds of course suggestions for a far more variegated picture, with some arguing that Britain, to cite one example, may contain as many as seven distinct classes and any number of 'status groups'.[16] Others propose that scholars take a still more flexible

stance, as Bergman observes of one contemporary exchange: 'When Runciman asked "How many classes are there in contemporary British society?" he received this response: "As many as it proves empirically useful to distinguish for the analytical purposes in hand".'[17] Looking ahead, one finds the position articulated here by Erikson and Goldthorpe employed in some of the more recent works cited below, such as in the case of the latent class analysis performed by Bonikowski and DiMaggio on contemporary 'varieties of American popular nationalism'.[18]

These micro-sociological interests are not of course entirely novel. Marx himself saw the 'divisions of society' as 'infinitely complex' and that 'within each class there are groups whose interests may conflict.'[19] Weber arrived at a similar conclusion when appraising the popular bases of nationalism during his own day. He believed for example that 'certain leading strata of the class movement of the modern proletariat' displayed a marked 'indifference' to nationalist doctrines. However, their efforts to promote a similar attitude among their peers met 'with varying success, depending upon political and linguistic affiliations and also upon different strata of the proletariat.'[20] These latter remarks concerning the national sentiments and political inclinations of various segments of the working class may merit comparison with what Hobsbawm and others discussed below have written on the concept of the 'labor aristocracy' (although Weber's 'labor aristocrats', if they may be called such, behaved very differently than Hobsbawm's). In sum, Weber felt that 'an unbroken scale of quite varied and highly changeable attitudes toward the idea of the "nation" is to be found among social strata' and that even 'strata of "intellectuals" do not have homogeneous or historically constant attitudes towards the idea.'[21]

On the social bases of nationalism during the Age of Revolution: Marx and after

If contemporary thinkers often display a similar reluctance to make general claims about the natural affinity or disposition of one class or another to nationalism, or at least to press them very far, assumptions of this kind may nevertheless persist. This may in turn reflect the power of earlier traditions of analysis, dating to the nineteenth century, or 'classical age' of European nationalism, that boldly advanced claims of this kind – with specific attention given to the role of the bourgeoisie. In the words of Miroslav Hroch, who experienced certain difficulties when applying this thesis to his own studies, 'the idea that the modern bourgeoisie is linked to the formation of the modern nation is deeply rooted in Marxist historiography – possibly as far back as the early years of Karl Kautsky's theoretical activity.'[22] Of particular importance are the famous declarations in this vein found within the 1848 *Manifesto*:

> The bourgeoisie keeps more and more doing away with the scattered state of the population, of the means of production, and of property. It has agglomerated population, centralised the means of production, and has concentrated property in a few hands… Independent, or but loosely connected provinces, with separate interests, laws, governments, and systems of taxation, became lumped together into one nation, with one government, one code of laws, one national class-interest, one frontier, and one customs-tariff.[23]

According to the authors, the nation is to be read as a highly-articulated social, economic and political construct that cohered, not incidentally, with bourgeois interests and aspirations.[24] The 'nationalism' espoused by the middle classes was thus 'a false representation of the real',[25] which, upon closer examination could be exposed as a quest for political power cast in the terms of the day – as illustrated by Sieyes's claim that the Third Estate was the nation, and, according at least to his understanding (e.g., power

accrued from the nation), was the rightful bearer of sovereignty. This same connection informed the ideological claims of the many 'liberal nationalisms' of the era, but provoked in turn, as indicated below, a healthy response from other sectors of society which devised nationalisms congruent with their own interests.[26]

It should nevertheless be added that not all Marxists viewed nations as largely artificial constructs or even incompatible with the eventual triumph of socialism. Some indeed, notably Otto Bauer (1881-1938) of the Austro-Marxist school, made quite elaborate claims regarding the formation and future relevance of nations, the historicity of which was grounded on the existence of 'physical and intellectual characters' that plainly served to separate one group of people from another. 'A systematic approach to the question of the nation' must in fact 'begin with a conception of *national character*.'[27] These had been fashioned by the conditions under which the ancestors of a given nation 'struggled for their existence, the forces of production they mastered, [and] the relations of production into which they entered.'[28] The 'unifying tendencies' of capitalism served to advance the transmission of this character throughout the entire body of the nation by providing the peasantry as well as the 'laboring masses' (who had remained largely indistinguishable from one another until modern times) with access to education. One might expect that this process would only be abetted by the turn to socialism and indeed 'it is only a socialist society that will see this tendency triumph.'[29] 'Contrary to the received Marxist opinion,' wrote Kolakowski, Bauer held that 'socialism not only does not obliterate national differences but reinforces and develops them by bringing culture to the masses and making the national idea the property of everyone.'[30]

These considerations aside, many important works have followed that hew closer to 'classical' Marxist conventions. Among these, Tom Nairn's *The Break-up of Britain* (first published 1977) has been particularly influential. For Nairn, the spread of capitalism remains the critical starting point in any historical reconstruction of the rise of nations and nationalism; however, his portrait of bourgeois mobilization departs from the account in

the *Manifesto* by emphasizing how these developments produced a state of 'uneven development' that was especially insufferable for elites of the periphery: Feeling themselves excluded from the opportunities commensurate with the age and even faced with the prospect of extinction, they championed the cause of political sovereignty as a means to obtain mastery over their fates and affairs. The only 'resource' or weapon at their disposal was the masses who were recruited into their program on the basis of claims to an imperiled identity and traditions. In Nairn's famous wording: 'The new middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses into history' in order to accomplish their aims.[31] It was furthermore an appeal that was congenial to the interests of these same elites, in the sense that the masses were urged to take part in the struggle on the basis of a shared threat to cultural traditions as opposed to any promise of material or political rewards.

Nairn's *Break-up* failed nevertheless to persuade all its readers, notably among them Hobsbawm, who dismissed the author's thesis as 'a rather improvised theory of nationalism.'[32] Still earlier works in Hobsbawm's oeuvre cast doubt on the historical veracity of Nairn's assumptions regarding the ability, or even interest, on the part of nationalists to mobilize the masses.[33] However, the same cannot be said for Benedict Anderson, who clearly admired the work and referred to its arguments frequently, and at length, in *Imagined Communities*.[34] Ernest Gellner, to cite another leader of the modern theoretical canon, also spoke favourably of the *Break-up*, if he found its author a difficult figure to categorize: On one hand, Nairn sought to 'salvage Marxism', but seemed also to place considerable importance on factors, notably ethnicity, that did not rank high in the doctrines commonly associated with that tradition. Gellner nevertheless welcomed this view and indeed gave ethnic divisions a significant role to play in his own historical reconstruction of the formation of nations and nationalism. True, pride of place went to the functional imperatives of the industrial revolution, which (contra Marx), Gellner deemed capable of mediating the social 'chasms' and grievances it generated. However, these too failed in instances where the

boundaries separating rich and poor aligned with 'cultural' divisions. In such cases, the rupture was much more difficult to treat. Nationalism, in other words, is what happens when 'a nation' (e.g., an ethno-linguistic group) becomes 'a class'.[35]

As indicated above, interventions from both within and without the Marxist tradition have conditioned the classical portrait of nationalism as bourgeois revolution conveyed in the 1848 *Manifesto*. This is not to say that the middle classes (or more precisely the 'industrial bourgeoisie') have been withdrawn from the picture, but they have been forced to share the stage: In some cases, per Hroch and Gellner, they do not appear as leading actors.[36] In others, as in Hobsbawm's essays from the *Invention of Tradition*, it was the reaction of the dominant classes to 'the widespread progress of electoral democracy' and related threats that was perhaps of even greater significance in establishing the nation on the political and cultural landscape.[37] For Hobsbawm, the proliferating 'national' traditions of the era should in fact be seen as a 'rearguard action' intended to acclimate the masses to a view of the nation and its ways that was congenial to upper class interests.[38] From a historiographical standpoint, developments and dynamics of this kind were furthermore crucial to explaining how the national idea could appear to triumph in so many places without becoming, in his view, the object of mass interest. Another possibility was offered in the form of the 'labor aristocracy' thesis, or, the idea that an upper strata of the proletariat came to hold political views on matters such as imperialism that were more in line with the ruling classes (a form of 'false consciousness') and, via their leading positions in trade unions and political parties, drew their peers into the fold.[39]

Contemporary investigations of perception and meaning

In addition to weighing in on the contributions of various classes to the emergence of the national idea, Hobsbawm also argued for the coeval

nature of national and class sentiment. Specifically, Hobsbawm claimed that both arose simultaneously and are reflections of a modern revolution in consciousness. They are furthermore complimentary, in the sense that the awakening of class consciousness may even have *abetted* the susceptibility of the masses to national consciousness; indeed, the onset of class consciousness is often described in terms that evoke narratives of national awakening.[40]

As indicated by Fine and Chernilo, Hobsbawm's conception of the mutually-constituting nature of these developments recurs often in contemporary works of historical sociology while also serving as a starting point for investigations of the plurality of national ideas that may exist within a given society or movement.[41] The 'one thing', Fine and Chernilo point out, citing also the works of Poulantzas and Mann, 'that is modern about the modern nation is the class character of national identification, and vice versa.'[42] However, this outcome inevitably leads to the balkanization of the national idea: 'We find,' they continue, 'in historical sociology many arguments which acknowledge that every class in society, and not just the ruling class, produces its own discourse about what it is to be a member of the nation – about what national identity means – and that class movements have used the idea of the nation as the form in which they have sought to put forward their own notions of collective identity.' The mobilizing potential of the 'national idea' lies therefore 'precisely in its ambiguity – in the fact that one can give it a plurality of meanings that only minimally converge.'[43]

This idea is well illustrated in a work from the era of decolonization by Tom Mboya (1930-1969), a pan-Africanist and leading figure in the founding of Kenya. According to Mboya, 'a nationalist movement should mean the mobilization of all available groups of people in the country for the single struggle.'[44] But this necessarily involves, from a rhetorical standpoint, framing the aims of the movement in a way that accommodates the interests of all the potential actors. In the case of East Africa, this 'simplification' was achieved via appeals to the concept *Uhuru*:

> In this way one word summarizes for everyone the meaning of the struggle, and within this broad meaning everyone has his own interpretation of what *Uhuru* will bring for him. The simple peasant may think of *Uhuru* in terms of farm credits, more food, schools for his children. The office clerk may see it as meaning promotion to an executive job. The apprentice may interpret it as a chance to qualify as a technician, the schoolboy as a chance for a scholarship overseas, the sick person as the provision of better hospital facilities, the aged worker as the hope of pensions and security in old age…[45]

Mboya implies that a degree of dissonance is inevitable within any national movement – a condition which its leaders must try at least to obscure by reducing the struggle to 'one distinct idea, which everyone can understand without arguing about the details of policy or of governmental program after Independence.'[46] In framing the tasks at hand in such a way, Mboya further provides a lucid appraisal of the challenges of both popular mobilization and post-independence nation-building – and indeed those posed by the former to the latter.

Finally, much of what has been said above refers to scholarly works of historical sociology that deal with the first wave of national movements from the nineteenth century and their twentieth century successors. In doing so, scholars must contend with shifting, often revolutionary situations. This may even hold true for Hroch's important work, which aimed to show how the social base of a given movement might evolve as it passed through several 'phases', e.g., from 'scholarly interest' to 'mass' mobilization.[47] Still, this involves a setting which Bart Bonikowski, to cite one contemporary critic, believes has been too much of a 'preoccupation' of researchers.[48] Specifically, what, he asks, are the sociological problems that arise in the case of nationalism in 'settled times'? Bonikowski's enumeration of the factors that might distinguish such a project recalls the by-now familiar attitude toward issues of social composition and perception cited above. In his words, 'such research should explicitly

consider the heterogeneity of vernacular conceptions of the nation within any given polity.'[49]

Bonikowski proceeds to articulate a research program founded on the assumption that national identity is prone to a range of socially-contingent inflections: A well-grounded investigation of any particular case would embrace such a premise, and indeed wrestle fully with the problem of identifying the several conceptions of the nation that were likely present and the anxieties or aims to which they correspond. As noted above, this might be pursued through the use of latent class analysis models that employ variables such as age, ethnicity, location, creed, gender, education and income.[50] Examples of how such carefully configured studies may be used to investigate important problems of identity in ostensibly 'settled times' include Mikael Hjerm's analyses of national sentiment, xenophobia and education.[51]

To conclude, as Thompson and Fevre observe, researchers have shown particular interest of late in 'deconstructing' the manner in which nationalist discourse depicts the nation as a 'homogeneous community', and 'unraveling' the range of sentiments and corresponding social components that might be encompassed within a single movement.[52] These preferences may reflect in part the effects of the cultural turn and its emphasis on matters of perception and meaning. However, a glance at older literature also demonstrates a rather consistent tendency of this kind given the problem of establishing any general or normative connections between concepts liable to such conceptual mutability and case-specific characteristics. These difficulties do not nevertheless preclude reference to important analytical traditions, namely those associated with Marx, which, if sited on the conditions prevailing in a particular region and time, continue to inform the critical perspectives and lexicons of modern-day researchers.

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https://stateofnationalism.eu/article/nationalism-and-social-class/

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State of Nationalism (SoN): Nationalism and Collective Trauma

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Introduction

Research on the link between nationalism and social memory has gained momentum since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Historians, social scientists, and philosophers have often attempted to explain the link between nationalism and memory through a historical lens that frames the story of a nation-state's formation in a linear progression. Social memory is thus emphasised as an important part of national identity formation and maintenance. Though often focused on the glorified versions of historical past, social memory encompasses much more than simply the 'positive' moments of the past for the nation. More recent works on remembrance and memory have increasingly put emphasis on the traumatic collective past and the memory of mass trauma as an important historical 'site', with a strong impact on national and group identity formation over time. The Holocaust, the Rwandan Genocide, the Balkan Genocide, the Armenian Genocide, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, have recently received more scholarly attention in the study of memory and nationalism. One particularly important avenue of this work is the study of the memory and history of war and genocide in the intersection of gender and memory. Discussions of such traumatic experiences also

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entail forced exile, movement, and displacement (such as the recent plight of Iraqi, Afghani, and Syrian refugees, which engage important discussions of trauma and identity).

Beyond conceptions of warfare and conflict studies, a more critical perspective has brought the discussion of trauma to the centre of nationalism studies. How traumatic episodes in the history of nations shape national discourse and national identity constructions is the main focus of inquiry in this article. The sections below highlight how trauma studies have been included in nationalism studies, and how this work enriches both the fields of nationalism and trauma studies. The main aim here is to highlight how the literature and field of trauma studies can enhance our understanding of national identity formation and to show that it is vital to consider traumatic experiences within our examination of nationalism.

The article suggests three angles through which the concept of trauma has been connected to the study of nationalism: first, trauma as a trigger of nationalism, challenging national identity discourses; second, the way that research on perpetrator trauma can continue or create discourses of denialism that attempt to distort or silence the trauma of victims; and third, trauma seen as more than an event or set of events investigated as autonomous phenomena, by examining trauma through the lens of justice, recognition, and retribution. These three avenues of studying trauma can play a vital role for the study of nationalism, not only because they help us to understand the impact of these atrocities, but also how they shape national identity discourses. Studying trauma and nationalism through these lenses helps show why some traumatic (historical) events or periods have a strong impact on these discourses across generations, and how memories are transmitted, and can also contribute to a (re)thinking of apology, reconciliation, and justice in (inter)national politics and in the attempt to reconstruct the broken social fabric. Critically, it is also apparent that there is a need for more

attention from scholars of trauma studies on the intersection of gender and micro-approaches to nationalism and the discussion on postcolonial perspectives on trauma and reconciliation, as these areas have been neglected at the expense of the macro-explanations of nationalism that focus on the European context alone.

Literature on nationalism and memory

The field of nationalism is extremely interdisciplinary, presenting divergent definitions of the concepts of nations and nationalism and explanations regarding when they emerged, which came first, and how they are maintained as modern constructs that have become the basis of world politics today. As such, different theorists have provided important contributions to the field of nationalism, coming from varying theoretical perspectives, ranging from primordialism to those inspired by post-structuralism and discourse analysis.[1] Both fields of nationalism studies and memory studies have addressed the central debate around the 'birth' of nation states and national identity. Most scholars of nationalism posit that the nation is a modern phenomenon, linked to structural changes happening around the time of industrialisation, urbanisation and capitalism. Such 'modernists', however, do not completely abandon the idea that the past shaped nations; instead, their shared position tends to be that the modern era represents a significant rupture from significant elements of the past, a forgetting of certain elements of the past, as Ernest Renan claims.[2] However, traumatic experiences, as extreme as genocide for example, that are engraved in the collective (and individual) historical memory of a nation do not 'disappear' or 'dissipate' over time. Instead, I argue that the field of memory and nationalism studies can show us that these traumatic memories articulate themselves in the constructions of the nation continuously over time.

In memory studies, national identity construction refers to the shared collective memory that focuses historically on specific people (heroes), events (through commemoration), and places of memory and memorialisation – or 'lieux de mémoire' to use Pierre Nora's seminal concept,[3] which has been critiqued by postcolonial and poststructuralist scholars for relying on a homogenising ethos. The emphasis in the literature on contesting hegemonic forms of national identity construction brings to light the need to break away from the idea of national identity as a single collective memory, as Jeffrey K. Olick explains, '…the origins of the concept of collective memory [is] in the crucible of statist agendas', which leaves 'reductionist tendencies' in the field for those working on the concepts of memory-nation.[4]

The literature on nationalism and memory has focused on discussions of history as tied to the glorified past of the nation or the myths of ancestry, strongly emphasised by scholars like Anthony Smith and Eric Hobsbawm, for example. Increasingly, however, it is the history of brutality, of colonialism, of migration, of war, that are brought front and centre in the discourse of nationalism. This can divide the nation, but, ultimately, it sheds light on the marginalised histories of individuals and communities that have long been silenced due to the hegemonic structures of colonialism, capitalism, industrialisation and modernisation, and systemic violence.[5] As such, memory studies is an important field of inquiry, especially when linked to the theories of nationalism, because it helps to highlight the importance of an often persistently lingering past into the present and future of national identity. This memory making can take the form of top down state-imposed memory discourse that attempts to erase the presence of minorities, dissidents, or gendered identities (such as LGBTQI individuals and communities). On the other hand, memories are also powerful tools of struggle against imperialism, hegemony, and top-down silencing attempts. It is through the latter understanding of memories

that the subaltern can speak.[6] For example, in the case of the Soviet Union, historiography was deliberately used by the leadership in order to integrate a multinational society and modernize it in the aim of achieving socialism. However, as Vicken Cheterian points out in the case of Armenia, a marginal discourse prevailed as 'a more subtle discourse distinct from the Soviet official line, often for the defence of the nation and against either the Russia central power or a rival neighbouring nationality.'[7]

Another challenge against the modernist perspective in social sciences has been expressed by several scholars who argue that the modernist school tends to focus on a teleological future, with prescriptions towards an endpoint that is more advanced, better, and more civilised.[8] Moreover, explanations that the past 'disappears' in the modern construction of the nation are strongly argued in the literature by several theorists, including John Rawls, Ernest Renan, Ernest Gellner, etc.[9] However, thinking about memories and the strength of the transmission of memories in families and collectives, the past could be viewed not as countering the present or the future, or regressing them, but as simultaneously coexisting with them. The historiographical linearity with the perception of time is therefore not useful in explaining the place of memory (and trauma).[10]

Explaining nations and nationalism through collective trauma

The critical discourse analysis tradition, led by Ruth Wodak and other critical theorists of nationalism, has become an important alternative to the traditional theories of nationalism, especially when considering the place of trauma and history in the making of national identity. The emphasis in this case has strongly shifted from the structural, historical,

and institutional explanations of nationalism to the everyday practices and discourses of national identity.[11] Calhoun explains that nationalism refers to what 'Michel Foucault….called a "discursive formation", a way of speaking that shapes out consciousness, but also is problematic enough that it keeps generating more issues and questions, keeps propelling us into further talk, keeps producing debates over how to think about it.'[12] In addition, intersectional studies have reminded us that several other factors are necessary to consider when studying identity, such as class, ethnicity, race, and gender, and other social divisions.[13]

Traumatic memory is not just represented through an individual's own sphere of collective events, photographs, objects of recollection from the past, or family belongings or stories, but it is also viewed as a collective phenomenon. Collective memory may be the result of a need to create strong bonds among people, emphasising, as Marianne Hirsch posits, their 'shared inheritance of multiples traumatic histories and the individual and social responsibility we feel toward a persistent and traumatic past.'[14] Indeed, as Jeffrey Alexander also stresses, cultural trauma becomes embedded and engrained in the collective identity.[15] He posits that cultural traumas need to be interpreted, narrated, and given meaning by carrier groups, 'which performatively seek to have a particular event acknowledged (or not) by the wider group as traumatic.'[16] As such, cultural traumas, unlike individual traumas, depict 'a dramatic loss of identity and meaning, a tear in the social fabric, affecting a group of people that has achieved some degree of cohesion.'[17]

This aspect of trauma studies has implications for the construction of national identity, in the way in which the traumatic event marks an important turning point in the national identity and discourse.[18] As defined by Alexander, the concept of cultural trauma is understood as the collective feeling of being 'subjugated to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon [a] group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and

irrevocable ways.'[19] The literature on collective traumatic memories therefore highlights the way in which negative historical experiences impact national identity in a way that can shake the foundations of perceived or imagined unity – traumatic events can have a long-lasting impact on collective identities and consciousness.[20] Social constructions of collective memories and remembering are never universal, due to varying historical experiences and social positioning.[21] For example, the 150th anniversary of the founding of Canada in 2017 highlighted the contested nature of collective memory, raising questions regarding whose Canada is really being celebrated. As such, despite attempts of reconciliation through the Truth and Reconciliation Committee, the continued subjugation of Aboriginal narratives of collective identity to the top-down dominant narrative of 'Canadianness', is striking.[22]

Trauma studies has become strongly focused on the ways in which the traumatic experiences of the past become internalized and expressed through commemorations and various acts and practices of remembering. Much of this work has considered intergenerational shifts of traumatic memory, especially in terms of studying memory as the history of brutality, of colonialism, of migration, and of war (often through a critical gendered lens).[23] From this literature we can see how traumatic events and memories require us to consider the impact of collective harm in triggering a sense of loss, destruction, and reparation.[24] The 'shadows of trauma', as Assmann puts it, highlight the 'involuntariness and inaccessibility in the experience of those who engage with the traumatic past, both of those who are directly affected by it as well as those who come after.'[25] Remembering, in this sense, is not associated with the 'golden age' of the nation as Anthony Smith posits, but also, and more importantly, with the histories of violence, defeat, movement, and loss. The feeling of being part of this shared group, especially based on traumatic experiences, is reinforced through trans-generational transmission,[26] based on habitus, rituals,

commemorations, archives, historiographies, etc. As such, the individual and collective are interlinked, because people form memories about the collective 'not only via lived experience, but also via interacting, communicating, identifying, learning, and participating.'[27] Marianne Hirsch captures that with the concept of 'Postmemory',[28] an important concept that can help to bridge the historical traumatic events to the younger generations in a family or community, through various symbolic systems.

Much of the modern traumatic experiences are embedded in the conceptualisation of trauma as a cultural object of study, 'a product of history and politics, subject to reinterpretation, contestation, and intervention.'[29] The recent interdisciplinary volume by Monica J. Casper and Eric Wertheimer strongly highlights these points, reflecting how much there is need for more attention from scholars in the humanities and social sciences. The field of critical trauma studies is increasingly focused on unpacking the term trauma, more aware of the need to think of it in terms of an intellectual epistemological inquiry and an experiential category that works through social and political events, movements, and peoples' experiences, as trauma deals with 'both ontological and epistemological, assemblages and intersectionalities, modes of being and ways of knowing.'[30] This is an important development in trauma studies, as it links with the critical discourse analysis tradition in the study of nationalism – both fields try to combine an examination of both intellectual, epistemological, and structural factors that shape identity and being, with an experiential focus on the agency of individual in understanding and shaping their surroundings.

Trauma as trigger of nationalism

Remembering and commemorating moments of historical trauma, such as genocide, defeat in war, or loss of territory and identity, displacement, play a significant role in determining the discourse of national identity. The study of the role of defeat in nationalist discourse has been emphasised by some scholars of nationalism because of the particular significance it has on distinguishing the national group from other social group associations. Steven Mock's work is well positioned in that perspective, as he argues that the focus on the history of defeat in national myth-making is in fact 'a product of its unique ability to address this dilemma in the context of modern nation building.'[31] In this sense, the debate between those who claim the nation is strictly modern and those who see stronger ethnic roots in the past seems not as meaningful. John Hutchinson also focuses on the memory of warfare and its role in the conception and making of nationalism and the nation.[32] The collective memory of war in history is important to consider in examining the rise of nationalism, for example, if we think of the ways in which the victory of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh and the loss of the Azerbaijani side shape their respective national identity, tied not only to the post-independence development, but even the way the two national identity discourses become linked to past traumatic experiences, such as the Armenian Genocide of 1915 for the Armenians.[33]

These studies, however, do not consider the impact of trauma on national identity constructions, and do not address the gendered component of warfare, highlighting its masculine militarised context. Defeat (and victory) play a role in the discourse of national identity, but to further deepen our understanding of national identity and the place of trauma, the latter's impact is not measured by how nationalism was born in the first place, but by the way in which collectives respond to this trauma and place it in their own histories – rituals and performances of

remembering, discourses on national identity, collective myths and heroes. As such, memories of defeat, loss, and broken collective ties are remembered in a way that may strengthen or weaken national identity. Borrowing from Roland Barthes, Bernhard Giesen argues that 'traumas and triumphs [of remembered histories] constitute the "mythomoteurs" of national identity.'[34] This also marks the significance of traumatic events for national identity constructions, and why it is vital to consider the place and role of traumatic events in the making of collective identities.

Perpetrator trauma, denialism, and distortion/Silencing of narratives

Traumatic recollection based on victim identities have more commonly been the focus of the literature, leaving less room for the examination of the trauma of perpetrators, often a sensitive and difficult topic. The trauma of perpetrators has been analysed in the context of looking for the guilt and punishment of perpetrators.[35] LaCapra advocates for the distinction between the trauma of perpetrators and that of the victims. While they both suffer trauma, even in similar ways, the 'perpetrator trauma…is ethically and politically different in decisive ways. The denial or repression of that crucial difference is one basis of the projective attempt to blame the victim or apologetically to conflate the perpetrator or collaborator with the victim.'[36] On a national level, a cultural trauma of perpetrators' 'shameful acts',[37] to borrow from Taner Akçam, creates disruptions to the norm, because trauma, as Alexander claims, 'is the result of this acute discomfort entering into the core of the collectivity's sense of its own identity.'[38] Gülay Türkmen-Dervisoglu explains the various mechanism adopted by nations to come to terms with their pasts, reflecting on the literature dealing with perpetrator trauma covers how some nations develop 'defense mechanisms…to handle their pasts',

including forgetting and denial, silence, and justification are part of these coping measures.[39] The perpetrator trauma response may also be based on acceptance of the 'shameful acts', with confessions, reconciliation, and even public apologies.[40] In the case of the Armenian Genocide of 1915 memory in Turkey, 'the assassination of Hrant Dink initiated the formation of a cultural trauma', as Türkmen-Dervisoglu argues, and from that moment, 'this trauma even succeeded in giving birth to collective guilt…' and a sense of responsibility and acknowledgement of the atrocities, but it failed to achieve reconciliation.[41]

Therefore, as much as the mobilisation around a national identity can be oriented toward forgetting and denying the atrocious events, a perspective often propagated by the perpetrators, it can also be an expression of the need to maintain the identity around that atrocity, in order to ensure that the struggle for recognition does not dissipate in the near future. Perhaps it is at the juncture of acknowledging an event as traumatic that leads to a sense of responsibility, acceptance, and apology; as Alexander posits, agency is an important element in this process of acceptance, whereby 'collective actors "decide" to represent social pain as a fundamental threat to their sense of who they are, where they came from, and where they want to go.'[42] In the same light, mobilisation and maintenance of national identity can also aim for the recognition of and reparations from the atrocities for the victim groups, and to achieve the state of reconciliation and acceptance by the perpetrators of their crime. Such a perspective has been advocated by the transitional justice literature and the literature on recognition that challenges and critically engages with liberal notions of justice often embedded in retribution and redistribution.[43]

Addressing trauma for recognition and (gendered) justice in nation-building

The work of transitional justice scholarship is an increasingly growing field, especially around questions of gendered transitional justice. For example, Ruth Rubio-Marin discusses how we can rethink reparations in a way to make considerations of gender justice '"mainstreamed" in the discussions and design of reparations.'[44] Transitional justice perspectives focus on the question of reconciliation, particularly 'how the implementation of trials and truth commissions tends to structure conceptions of violence and justice',[45] highlighting the necessity of examining processes of the impact of trauma also through the reconciliation mechanisms and institutions in place, such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Canada. As much as talking about trauma is significant in understanding the shaping of national identity constructions, it is equally important to think of the ways in which reconciliation, reparations, and recognition are processed and occur in a nation (or internationally). Apology cultures are increasingly becoming part of the international discourse on the relationships between states, or within state actors that have challenged state hegemonic discourses that have attempted to distort or deny the histories of the groups in question.[46]

Feminist approaches have brought good examples of such a bottom-up approach, questioning the absence of gender in the study of nation, for a few decades, enriching the understanding of the origins of the nation and perceptions of nationalism. While some exceptions in the literature on gender and nation exist, particularly from the perspective of warfare and militarisation of societies to follow the discussion in this section, gendered approaches have been lacking not only in the field of nationalism studies but also in memory and trauma studies.[47] It is only more recently that works on genocide, for example, have begun to really

address the gendered aspect of this crime against humanity.[48] The consideration of gender is not only important in the literature on nationalism and trauma/memory, but also in the transitional justice perspectives that I believe are strongly linked to that discussion. The gendered perspective in transitional justice can bring out the often embedded assumptions and essentialization related to women's experience, much similar to those that guide many theoretical views on nationalism, conflict, and politics. As such, '…Transitional Justice is a process of drawing and re-drawing boundaries of inside and outside a community, demarcating those groups who have their rights considered and those who have not', in relation to the importance of considering trauma in national identity studies.[49] There is a significant gap in the literature and should be complemented with studies that take different approaches to understanding the impact of warfare, colonialism, migration, movement, and their consequences on individuals and collectives, through post-colonial, comparative, and gendered perspectives.

Concluding notes

This article has highlighted the importance of including the study of trauma in national identity theories. Studies should not only understand the trauma itself – why an event has become traumatic in the memory of the nation, as Alexander's cultural trauma concept does, but also how the process of trauma or these traumatic events shape the nation not only for the surviving and perpetrating generation, but also for the generations after. However, much the past is remembered, celebrated, or mourned, the past itself or the narratives around the past are not static. The shared collective memory is a powerful tool that created a sense of 'collective membrane forged by a shared inheritance of multiple traumatic histories…'[50]

Two critical methodological and theoretical insights stem from the current state of the national-memory/trauma literature. First, future research on trauma and national identity should more actively engage with a comparative approach in traumatic experiences, emphasising a critical approach to nationalism studies that focuses on bottom-up expressions and practices, from the Armenian Genocide to the histories of slavery, the Rwandan genocide, the Shoah, and the Indigenous Peoples' experiences (through genocide and settler colonialism). These traumatic experiences of 'shared precariousness',[51] to borrow from Stef Craps, are brought into comparison in order to help us to understand how to prevent future atrocities and think more seriously about reconciliation and recognition through indigenous and postcolonial lenses. Second, history and memory making involve the 'sedimentation of macroprocesses into micropractices', and this is especially significant when considering memory making and trauma as resulting from 'processes of conquest, colonization, dislocation, and turmoil.'[52] This is translated not only in the explicit expressions of memory in the forms of written and oral narratives that can be relatively more easily accessed by researchers, but also in the form of tacit expressions of practical memory, inspired by Bourdieu's theory of practice, as they have become 'embedded in habits, social practices, ritual processes, and embodied experiences.'[53] As such, these two concluding points require a more thorough consideration of postcolonialism in trauma studies that can help to rethink trauma and reconciliation and recognition though a bottom-up transitional justice approach.[54]

This review is part of
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As such it is also published on the SoN website,

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https://stateofnationalism.eu/article/nationalism-and-collective-trauma/

Endnotes

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Book Review

Ludger Mees, *The Basque Contention. Ethnicity, Politics, Violence*. London: Routledge [Europa Country Perspectives Series], 2020, 288 pp, 18 illustrations. ISBN 9781857439632

In his book, *The Basque Contention,* Ludger Mees pens a history of the Basque nationalism and ETA from its genesis to demise. He has at heart to demonstrate that ETA was nothing more than a mortal deviation from the ideology of Basque nationalism; as such, the abandonment of terrorism brought this nationalism back on track to fight for its primary objective, that is, according to the author, democracy for the Basque people. The book lines up a map of the territory referred to as 'Euskal Herria' (the Basque Country) by Basque nationalists, eight graphs (models of language teaching in the Basque Autonomous Community, the number of ETA victims, the results of the union elections, the share of nationalist votes during the Basque elections, and a poll of the political preferences of the citizens of the Basque Autonomous Community), but also eleven charts – six of them dealing with election results – and an index of proper nouns.

Ludger Mees is highly knowledgeable about Basque nationalism. He has written a number of books and articles on this topic and has collaborated with reputed specialists in the field. He held a professorship in contemporary history at the University of the Basque Country where he became a vice-chancellor. The introduction to this book gives us an indication on the origin of his interest in this topic – which led to a first

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Barbara Loyer, 'Book Review: Ludger Mees, *The Basque Contention. Ethnicity, Politics, Violence*', in: *Studies on National Movements* 5 (2020)

book in 2003 – as Mees explains that he was traumatized by the assassination of his friend José María Korta, a Basque nationalist, by ETA (p.4). 'If truth be told', Mees states 'I have myself been traumatized by ETA's cruelty and by the cynicism of some its defenders, and I have grown admirative of the force of a number of its opponents – some of which have become my friends.'

Mees' thesis is that the Basque contention goes beyond the sole period of ETA's violence and contends that the current assimilation between the Basque conflict and terrorist violence is a 'rather reductionist perspective' (p. 3). Besides, he concludes by saying that 'ETA had (…) radically transformed the nature of the Basque contention, which was no longer only a struggle for democracy and self-governance' (p. 109).

Four hypotheses are established from the first pages of the book (p. 7-8):

1. 'The Basque contention was not the result of ETA's foundation in 1959.'
2. 'Basque nationalism as one of the central actors in the Basque contention was not a creation ex nihilo (…). It was preceded by a long period of ethnic particularism that had already surfaced during the 17th century.'
3. 'Nationalism (…) as a social movement (…) evolved over various stages with different levels of mobilization that oscillated between the extremes of institutional routine and extra-parliamentary contention.'
4. '(…) ETA and its political wings was but one of [different internal factions of Basque nationalism], and not even the majority one.'

The book is built around eight chapters and an epilogue. After a long introduction, the second chapter, titled 'The context', presents the

contention as growing out of a combined weak state structure and of feeble Spanish nationalism. According to the author, one needs to separate the history of the Spanish state and its agents from the history of the Spanish society and its culture as Basque nationalism lies in the second. He analyses the ongoing academic debates on the weakness of nation-building in Spain in six points and concludes on the 'precarious and fragile national identity' in Spain (p. 24). Chapter three covers the seventeenth up to the nineteenth century, the so-called ethnogenesis, with the apparition of a 'marker of similarity and difference' (p. 36) based on a local political system. He subsequently analyses the emergence of a sentiment, of a movement, and ultimately of specific institutions, especially in the context of the Carlist movement, and stresses the singularity of the French political context. The fourth chapter, 'The claim for sovereignty', describes the emergence of the nationalist movement between 1895 and 1939 and focuses on Sabino Arana (founder of the Basque Nationalist Party, PNV), the racist roots of the movement, the foundation of the PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco/Basque Nationalist Party), and the emergence of the political contention ('from contentious politics to war', p.70). We can note his description of the PNV as stamped by a 'patriotic pendulum', oscillating between 'radical identity and ideology and moderate accommodation (*realpolitik*).' The fifth chapter covers the Francoist period – 'between resistance and accommodation' – while detailing the activity of José Antonio Aguirre as president of the Basque Country, the exile, and how marginal the Spanish question was perceived in the midst of the Cold War. At that point, ETA emerged. In the sixth chapter, Mees discusses the transition toward democracy (the 'Transition'): Basque actors had to decide between autonomy and independence, and he notes the tactical divergences inside the PNV on the participation in the Transition. He highlights as well the role of Xavier Arzalluz (leader of the PNV from 1979 until 2004), the 'virulent interference of the Basque contention in the process of democratization' (p. 118), and the violations of human

rights at that time – both by ETA members and by the Spanish security forces. The seventh chapter focuses on the problem of political violence between 1980 and 1995 and stresses the PNV's point of view on the evolution of the Spanish democracy, on the bilingual linguistic model that was adopted, and on the political agreements with the Socialist Party (PSOE) and with the political branch of ETA. The changes caused by the end of the Cold War are made evident in this section. Chapter eighth describes what he calls the 'radical decade' (1995-2005) as the extreme cruelty of ETA and the ordeal of its victims provoked a U-turn in Spanish public opinion. The author focuses on the radicalization of the political branch of ETA, on the organization of street fighting, the distribution of suffering, but also on their strategic discussions with the so-called 'moderate' nationalists on their common objective of self-determination. He lays out the final rapprochement between ETA and the PNV, with the profound change it provoked in the Basque society, as the conflict evolved from one pitting democrats against terrorists (the Ajuria Enea Pact of 1988) to one opposing Basque nationalists and non-nationalists. Chapter nine examines the demise of ETA between 2006 and 2011, the negotiations in Norway, and the organization of the international conference that publicly staged the cessation of ETA.

Hence, this book amounts to a fresco resituating the history shared by both the PNV and ETA, one covering 59 out of the 125 years of the Basque nationalist movement. This highly documented work sheds an interesting light on the very last years of ETA even though, as the author himself recognizes, many episodes of this period remain undisclosed and have yet to be deciphered.

By all accounts, this is unquestionably the work of an expert. And yet, I doubt that Ludger Mees's approach is 'renewed' (p. 7). It seems to me that some of the elements he postulates are not novel hypotheses but mostly an interpretation of a series of well-established facts that have

been covered by the existing scholarship. Since Javier Corcuera's dissertation in 1979 (updated in 2001), a number of historians and political specialists of the Basque Country – Ludger Mees among them, as he had access to the archives of the PNV – have delved into the roots of Basque nationalism and wrote its history. *The Basque Contention* generally synthetizes a history that has already been known, save for the final part that insists on the role of ETA.

Moreover, I believe that it is scientifically problematic to offer nowadays a linear account of a situation that is politically highly subjective. When the author concludes that Spain should 'articulate a liberal, pragmatic and flexible response to the territorial claims of the periphery, admit the pluri-national reality and come, akin to Jürgen Habermas, to the conclusion that "the frightened retreat behind national boarders cannot be the correct response"' (p. 264), he adopts a position that is both politically charged and that goes beyond the simple description of a complex reality. There is a very open debate in Spain today about the fundamentally geopolitical role being played by these accounts of ETA's history. To venture a true hypothesis on the impact of ETA on the history of Basque nationalism, wouldn't it be necessary to start by establishing the number of Basque citizens that had to go into exile during the 1980s and 1990s to avoid death – or life between two bodyguards – and that are still missing from the electoral rolls today (the associations representing the victims put that number at 300,000, but it remains to be calculated)? In his positive review of Ludger Mees's book *El péndulo patriótico*, Javier Corcuera noted in 2006 already that 'the image of the pendulum threatens to occult a reality that is more complex. As can be seen when reading the book written by De Pablo and Mees, the double element of fundamentalism and moderation (…) gives [the PNV] its current strength: the radicals need the moderates and vice-versa.'[1]

For the last 30 years, many Basque authors have described the Basque nationalist ideology as comparable to Spanish and French nationalisms,

making the coexistence of two such nations incompatible on the same territory. Now, Ludger Mees reminds us that the peripheral nationalisms are demanding the recognition of the pluri-nationality of the Spanish territory (the Spanish Constitution currently distinguishes between the Spanish nation and the peripheral nationalities). But these same peripheral nationalities do not admit that the territories they govern – the independence of which they are demanding – are themselves multinational, both Basque and Spanish. The Basque Country, Catalonia, the Baleares, Valencia, Galicia are all territories in which some citizens admit a local nation, some admit a Spanish nation, and others recognize both at the same time.

The rich bibliography commanded by Ludger Mees suggests that the contemporary debates on nationalism in Spain in the twenty-first century are not that important, or at least not necessary for his research. The books that bring a contradictory perspective on his implicit thesis, that the nationalist ideology is in essence democratic, are not mentioned. Not the books by Juan Aranzadi, nor the books by Juan Pablo Fusi, Antonio Rivera, or Jon Juaristi, a former member of the ETA and now an erudite writer that has completed a considerable number of books focusing on the foundations of the sacred dimension of the nation and how it paves the way for sectarianism. Likewise, research published by the anthropologist Mikel Azurmendi, another former member of ETA, is missing. So is the work of Joseba Arregi, a member of the Basque nationalist government during the 1980s and 1990s who has examined the philosophical stalemate faced by ethnic nationalisms trying to create homogeneous states. There isn't any reference to Patxo Unzueta, a member of the anti-Franco ETA, to Kepa Aulestia, former leader of Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE) political party, or to Fernando Savater, a Basque philosopher who has campaigned against an 'imposed nationalism'. The bibliography lacks work on the representations of the history of the nation, or of the Spanish language that have been written in the region.[2]

In the chapter on the Civil War of 1936, two pages delve into the Guernica bombing, but there isn't a line on the secret separate peace signed by Basque nationalists with Italian fascists, even though it is a major event that raises the question of the nationalist loyalties and of their political priorities.

Delivering a historical account of the Basque Country that limits itself to the internal contradictions of Basque nationalism in its legitimate march towards ensuring the rights of the people in question seems problematic. In this book, Ludger Mees only presents Spain as a set of state actors and not as a subject of real sentiments. Opposite to that, the PNV is described as the emanation of a society and of a culture, even though it is now obvious that the party is creating a state dotted with its own agents and is in the process of writing a history at this very moment.

Certainly, the history of political movements offers a conundrum to any academic researcher, as every word is charged. Ludger Mees openly admits that ETA's narrative has been constructed (p. 240), but I have found numerous examples, all through the book, of expressions that are – I truly believe – employed to subliminally set nationalism as a natural evidence that simply emerges from this territory, and not the product of a very efficient politics. For example: 'the Basque citizen' (in lieu of Basque nationalist), the Basque and 'their compatriots in France' (p. 38), 'when the Basques were free and self independent', 'the claim for sovereignty', 'the recovery of historical independence' (p. 54), 'the Basque country, including Navarre', a 'moderate terrorist' (p. 233).

As I understand it, contemporary Basque nationalism in Spain is the result of a winning strategy, employed to this day, that aims at transforming a part of the population into a minority. The process is akin to the political systems of Central European countries. The states born during the 1920s, out of the recently deceased Austro-Hungarian Empire, were not more homogeneous than their predecessor. As such,

they differentiated the citizenship from the nationality (the Hungarians in Slovakia are Slovakian citizens and can revendicate a Hungarian nationality). Similarly, the PNV proposes to make out a Basque nationality different from the Spanish citizenship. Furthermore, when Ludger Mees comments that polls show a 'deeply divided' Basque society (p. 255), he qualifies the independentists and Spanish nationalists as minorities ('Even an updated and perhaps strengthened self-government would leave a *significant minority sector* of the citizens outside this consensus (about autonomy) because they demand independence or a stronger nexus with the Spanish state', [my emphasis] p. 255). Thus, Basque nationalists pose a complex question to Spanish or French citizens, populations that have never been accustomed to the concept of interior minorities. These nationalists hope to influence the concepts of nationhood and sovereignty in Europe.

Ludger Mees explicitly situates 'this case study in the scholarly debate about highly complex issues such as the relationship between state and nation building in Europe' (p. 5). I certainly believe that we need to clarify these complex questions through proper academic research and debates, all directed at the larger public including, notably, publics outside of Spain. In this book, some questions remain untreated. For example, how many Basque inhabitants left their country because of ETA? Who paid for the Aiete conference or for the Oslo negotiations? What is the PNV doing to elucidate the hundreds of murders left untried? What memory policies are being developed in the Basque country? How is the history of the Basque Country and Spain taught in schools? What is the influence of the academic networks linked to the nationalists and to the academic para-diplomacy (i.e. the role of the 'lehendakari Aguirre chair'[3])?

Ludger Mees' book offers nonetheless an interpretation of the PNV's policy towards political violence in general and ETA in particular, with a

large historical perspective. It adds to the existent bibliography about Basque nationalism a synthesis about the end of ETA, from 2006 to 2018 and the previous 'radical decade' of Lehendakari Ibarretxe. It precisely describes the secret talks between nationalists and with the Socialist Party (PSOE and Socialist Party of Euskadi, PSE) using academic, institutional and media sources. It explains how important ETA's withdrawal was for the patriotic left. He describes the peace conference of Aiete and the political success of Basque nationalism after the end of ETA, until the election to the European Parliament in 2019.

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Endnotes

[1] Javier Corcuera Atienza, « Radicalidad y moderación en el nacionalismo vasco », https://www.revistadelibros.com/articulos/el-pendulo-patriotico-historia-del-partido-nacionalista-vasco

[2] For example: Juan Pablo Fusi, Identidades proscritas. El no nacionalismo en las sociedades nacionalistas, Taurus, 2010, p.387

[3] https://agirrecenter.eus/en?set_language=en